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Thesis synopsis 
That a person’s consent is required prior to any medical intervention, is now well established in 
law, ethics and medical practice, and is the most profound practical manifestation of respect for 
autonomy, or self-determination in medicine. 
For consent to be valid a number of conditions need to be satisfied; the person making the 
decision must have sufficient capacity (competence) to make the decision; they must have been 
provided with sufficient information about the proposed intervention and about relevant 
alternatives such that their decision is adequately informed; the decision must be appropriately 
and specifically authorized. 
While the person’s consent occupies the central legitimising feature of medical practice, little is 
known about how consent per se, or its elements, are conceptualised or actualised in high-risk 
medical settings.  
 
Aim 
The aim of this thesis was to develop a richer understanding of the process of consent to high-
risk medical interventions. This issue was explored both theoretically (through the reflection on 
relevant literature) and empirically through study of the experience of consent in clinical 
practice. The exemplar of a high-risk medical treatment on which the empirical study was based, 
is allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplantation, referred to in this thesis as HSCT.  
 
Method 
This was a longitudinal qualitative study. Data was gathered from in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with those people most intimately involved in the consent process (patients 
undergoing HSCT, their ‘significant others’, physicians performing HSCT, and other relevant 
healthcare professionals). 
Data was thematically analysed in terms of the elements of consent (which were explicitly 
explored during the interviews), and by reference to those additional concepts that emerged from 
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the participants’ narratives. The accounts provided by the participants were contrasted against 
contemporary understandings of consent drawn from the relevant empirical and philosophical 
literature.  
 
Findings 
The results of this study reveal that each one of the elements required for valid consent are 
challenged in high-risk medical settings. Capacity is often compromised, decisions are enmeshed 
in social obligations, information disclosure is comprehensive but inevitably limited, 
understanding is rarely tested and never privileged, and all decisions are made in the shadow of 
disease and mortality.  But the results also reveal that consent remains an important process – not 
simply because it validates decision-making and manifests respect, but because it increases trust, 
and builds alliances that maximise adherence, and ensure ‘presence’.   
 
Conclusion 
While consent in medical practice is legally established and morally justified, its realisation in 
practice is extraordinarily difficult. This is never more so than in high-risk medical settings. In 
these situations it is necessary to recognize that consent cannot be understood simply by 
reference to the role it plays in law – but also by acknowledgment of its moral justification, 
social and relational contexts, and clinical utility. 
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Introduction and Organisation of thesis 
That a person’s consent is required prior to any medical intervention, is now well established in 
law, ethics and medical practice and is the most profound practical manifestation of respect for 
autonomy, or self-determination in medicine. 
For consent to be valid a number of conditions need to be satisfied; the person making the 
decision must have sufficient capacity (competence) to make the decision; they must have been 
provided with sufficient information about the proposed intervention and about relevant 
alternatives such that their decision is adequately informed; the decision must be appropriately 
and specifically authorized.  A deficiency in any one of these elements would mean that the 
consent could be vitiated.  
While consent has remained a moral and legal cornerstone of medical practice, much has 
changed in the recent decades regarding how consent is conceptualized. Over the past two 
decades, in particular, profound critiques of the adequacy of consent have been articulated in the 
academic and professional literature. Many commentators have suggested that the accepted 
construction of consent is flawed,
1
 either in its conceptualisation, or it realisation, or both. Some 
have citied the lack of agreed definitions of the fundamental elements of consent, such as 
voluntariness and competence (capacity), and the lack of universal means of measuring or 
assessing such concepts in practice, leading some to question whether consent can ever be truly 
voluntary, or ‘informed’.2 Finally, both clinicians and scholars from the social sciences and 
humanities have noted that consent means different things to different people. Some consider 
consent to be synonymous with shared decision-making,
3
 others view it as fundamentally a rules-
                                                 
1
 Katz, J. 1977. Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale-Law's Vision. U. Pitt. L. Rev.  , 39, 137.; Katz, J. 1994. Informed 
consent-must it remain a fairy tale. J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y, 10, 69, Jones, M. A. 1999b. Informed consent 
and other fairy stories. Med L Rev, 7, 103. 
2
 As Kennedy and  Grubb point out in Medical Law,  2nd edn Butterworths, London 1994 at 151, although 
‘informed consent’ is often treated as synonymous with valid consent, this is strictly speaking not so as the 
requirement that consent be informed is only one, albeit a very important, ingredient of valid consent. Furthermore, 
this term begs various questions, including how informed is informed? 
3
 Katz, J. 1984. The silent world of doctor and patient, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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based practice,
4
 and still others regard consent as a manifestation of a cultural anachronism tied 
to Anglo-American ideas of liberty that fails to acknowledge the social inter-relatedness of 
peoples’ lives and ultimately leaves patients abandoned to the ‘poverty of choice’ and reduces 
the doctor to the status of technician.
5
  
The purpose of this thesis was to develop a richer understanding of the process of consent to 
high–risk medical interventions. It used qualitative research methods to analyse the different 
perspectives of those who are most intimately involved in the consent process – patients 
undergoing a high-risk medical intervention, physicians who perform the intervention, relevant 
healthcare professional, and patient-nominated ‘significant others’.   
 
Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised in a traditional research reporting style of four parts that describe 
Background/Literature Review, Methodology, Results, Discussion and Conclusion.   
Part I provides the background to the study and reviews the literature relevant to the study of 
consent to HSCT. Chapter 1 provides a detailed review of the Australian law surrounding 
consent.  Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the bioethical literature concerning consent to 
medical interventions. This includes a philosophical account of autonomy and consent, an 
analysis of decision-making and consent to high risk medical interventions, a review of the major 
critiques of consent and an overview of empirical studies of consent. Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed discussion of the high risk medical intervention around which this research is framed, 
allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT).   
Part II provides the Methodology and Methods of the study. Chapter 4 describes the justification 
for this research and ‘sets the scene’ for the empirical study - describing the need for further 
empirical research, and outlining the aims of the study. Chapter 5 provides an introduction to, 
and rationale for employing qualitative methods for this research. Chapter 6 describes the study 
                                                 
4
 Faden, R. R., Beauchamp, T. L. & King, N. M. P. 1986. A history and theory of informed consent, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press  
5
 Stirrat, G. M. & Gill, R. 2005. Autonomy in medical ethics after O’Neill. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31, 127-130. 
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in detail, including the study design, participant selection and recruitment, data collection and 
analysis, and details of the participants.   
Part III presents the results, with each chapter focussed on the ways in which informants 
addressed (or did not address) the elements that characterise the accepted construction of 
consent. Results regarding Capacity/Competence are discussed in Chapter 7, Voluntariness in 
Chapter 8, and Information Disclosure in Chapter 9. In Chapter 10, results regarding the concept 
of consent and the consent form are discussed.  
Part IV provides a detailed discussion of the results. This discussion considers both what the 
empirical insights gained from this study could tell us about the adequacy of the current 
understanding of consent, particularly in high risk settings, but also what the experience of 
consent tells us about what consent actually means. The thesis concludes with a consideration of 
the implications of this research for clinical practice, and law, and the possibility for the further 
research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Part 1 - Literature Reviews 
Chapter 1- Relevant Legal Literature Review 
Section 1 ELEMENTS ENABLING CONSENT 
Introduction 
It is now widely accepted in the Western world that individuals have a right to make decisions 
that affect their healthcare and any intentional, non-consensual touching of their bodies is 
actionable.
6
 In the oft-quoted words of Cardozo J in Schloendorf v Society of New York 
Hospital:
7
 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent 
commits an assault. 
 
Australian law reflects the above sentiments, that an individual has the fundamental right to 
determine what shall, and shall not be done to one’s own body.8 9 Any hands-on treatment of a 
patient by a doctor requires valid consent if it is to be lawful. Without consent, the doctor’s touch 
is like anyone else’s – potentially a criminal assault and a civil battery, and therefore, is 
actionable. In order that they may make decisions that are meaningful to themselves, patients 
need to have been provided with information relevant to the decision they are considering, and in 
particular, information concerning the risks and benefits of the therapeutic options. To facilitate 
their decision-making, patients also need to have the mental capacity to understand the 
information and the ramification of the decisions they are making. The responsibility of ensuring 
that the patient is informed and is cognisant of the innate risks falls to the attending doctor. 
Furthermore, it is imperative that the decisions patients make are not unduly influenced by 
others. Before any treatment can commence, the patient needs to indicate his/her authorisation of 
                                                 
6
 1990b. Malette v Shulman 72 O.R. (2d) 417 [1990] O.J. No. 450 Ont. C.A. per Robins JA 
7
 1914. Schloendorf v Society of New York Hospital 195 NE 92 (1914), 93. 
8
 1992b. (Marion's Case)  Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 
CLR 218. 
9
 If a medical practitioner carries out a procedure that involves any kind of physical contact without having been 
provided with valid consent, or without other lawful justification, then the medical practitioner will be liable 
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the doctor to proceed with the agreed therapy.
10
 In view of that, consent can be seen then as a 
synthesis of both patients’ rights, and doctors’ responsibilities. 
This part of the thesis examines consent in Australian law.  
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart
11
 have categorised the legal features of consent as having three 
characteristics, namely: 
1. enabling (characteristics involving competence/capacity to make decisions and issues of 
voluntariness and undue influence), 
2. informing (issues concerning the level of disclosure of information to gain consent, and 
the levels of understanding of that information), and  
3. enacting (characteristics of specificity and authorisation). 
I will examine the Australian common law of consent from the perspective of these 
characteristics.  
The term ‘common law’ as used in this thesis, describes the body of legal principles and 
concepts which have evolved over many centuries initially articulated by judges in England, 
which was later transported via the British Empire to Australia. Australia has its own common 
law, which is modified by state, territory and federal legislation. The decisions of other common 
law jurisdictions such as England and Wales, New Zealand, Canada and the United States are not 
binding in Australian courts,
12
 and are valuable only to the extent of the ratio decidendi, that is, 
their reasoning for the decisions adopted.
13
 Where possible, differences between Australian 
common law and that of other countries will be discussed. 
This first section is focused on the legal elements which enable consent, namely, 
competence/capacity and voluntariness.  
                                                 
10
 The same general principles relating to consent apply to refusal  of medical treatment 
11
 Kerridge, I., Lowe, M. & Stewart, C. 2013a. Ethics and Law for the Health Professions, Sydney, The Federation 
PRess. p330 
12
 ...nor is the High Court of Australia bound to follow its own past decisions, although it ordinarily does so in cases 
raising similar facts – this is known as the doctrine of precedent. The value of the doctrine of precedent is that it 
serves to ensure that the law is developed and applied in a consistent and predictable manner, so that citizens may 
order their affairs with confidence as to their rights and duties. 
13
 Dix, A., Errington, M., Nicholson, K. & Powe, R. 1996. Law for the Medical Profession in Australia, Melbourne, 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
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The next section goes on to examine the issues of information, the levels of disclosure and the 
issue of understanding and its relevance to consent.  
The last section in this part examines the characteristics of enacting consent, namely those to do 
with specificity and authorisation. In each section, the civil and criminal issues will be discussed 
when they are relevant. 
 
1. Competence/Capacity  
Competence and capacity are terms that are frequently used interchangeably in healthcare to 
describe a person’s aptitude in decision-making.14 Competence/capacity is the foundation of 
autonomy in the common law. According to Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland:
15
  
It is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be 
given to the wishes of the patient, so that, if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, 
however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life would or might 
be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even 
though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so.  
 
In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)
16
 Butler-Sloss LJ emphasised the importance of adhering 
to the wishes of a competent person, by stating that: 
The right to determine what shall be done with one’s own body is a fundamental right in 
our society. The concepts inherent in this right are the bedrock upon which the principles 
of self-determination and individual autonomy are based. Free individual choice in 
matters affecting this right should, in my opinion, be accorded very high priority 
 
                                                 
14
 Kerridge, I. H., Lowe, M. & Stewart, C. 2013b. Ethics and law for the health professional, Sydney, The 
Federation Press. p370 
15
 1993a. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316. 
16
 1993d. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. at 116-117 
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Thus any doctor who treats a patient despite that patient’s competent refusal of such treatment, 
commits trespass which may give rise to an action for battery.
17
 Equally, if a doctor accepts the 
treatment refusal of a patient who lacks medical decision-making capacity, then the doctor has 
failed in his or her duty of care to that patient,
18
 the rationale being that any person not capable of 
making medical decisions needs to be protected from harmful effects of their decisions.
19
  
At the same time, however, the decision of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment does 
not have to be sensible or well considered in the opinion of others
20
 in order for it to be 
respected. Indeed, a refusal which may appear to others as foolish or mistaken
21
 
22
 may still be 
valid even if the reasons given may appear to be irrational,
23
 unknown or even non-existent.
24
  
Furthermore, having an active mental illness will not necessarily preclude a finding of 
competence, provided the effects of the illness do not directly impact the person’s ability to make 
the decision in question, as evident in the previously described seminal case of Re C,
25
 
26
 and 
later endorsed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb. 
27
 
Even though, as noted earlier, the terms are used interchangeably, strictly speaking competence 
is a legal concept taking in a global view, and whilst it can be formally determined only in court 
28
 
29
 it is the treating physician who bears the burden of proof to substantiate the claim that the 
                                                 
17
 1990b. Malette v Shulman 72 O.R. (2d) 417 [1990] O.J. No. 450 Ont. C.A. 
18
 Stewart, C. & Biegler, P. 2004. A primer on the law of competence to refuse medical treatment. ALJ 78, 325 - 
342. 
19
 1983c. Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in 
the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, Volume 1: Report--President's Commission for the Study of Ethics Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research Washington, D.C. 20402. 
20
 1992d. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (1992) 4 All ER 649. 
21
 1990b. Malette v Shulman 72 O.R. (2d) 417 [1990] O.J. No. 450 Ont. C.A. 
22
 For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses may competently refuse a blood transfusion based on their religious beliefs 
even when to do so is likely to end in death.  
23
 providing the patient’s reasoning is internally consistent and follows logically from any starting premises.  
24
 1992d. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (1992) 4 All ER 649. 
25
 1994b. Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290; [1994] 1 All ER 819. 
26
 In every state and territory in Australia, the relevant Mental Health Act permits the detainment and treatment of 
people with mental illnesses against his/her wishes on the basis of the common law principle of best interests, and 
only when he or she lacks capacity.  
27
 1995d. Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] All ER 677. at 681 
28
 Appelbaum, P. 2007a. Assessing patients' capacities to consent to treatment. N Engl J Med, 357, 1834-40., 
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patient does not have the mental capacity to meet the demands of a specific decision-making 
situation.
30
 
31
 
32
  Expressed differently, when determining whether someone is legally competent 
to make decisions regarding his/her own treatment, a medical assessment of their mental capacity 
is required. There is however, no ‘one-size-fits-all’ standard for determining a person’s capacity. 
Assessment of capacity is said to vary with the circumstances and often to increase with the 
seriousness of what is at stake.
33
 For example, a physician may determine a person has the 
capacity to consent to undergo a physical examination, but not to consent to undergoing high-
risk surgery.
34
 So whilst the terms distinguish between legal (global) and medical judgments 
(task specific), determinations of incapacity and incompetence nevertheless result in similar 
restrictions of an individual’s autonomous decision-making authority35 and so have significant 
legal, ethical and social implications.  
The law takes the viewpoint that all adults have decision-making capacity until that presumption 
is rebutted.
36
 Any enquiry regarding capacity requires investigation of whether there is 
something about the specific individual, at the specific point in time that rebuts that claim.  
The primary case on testing capacity in healthcare is Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment).
37
 Mr C refused a below knee amputation of his gangrenous leg despite being advised 
that there was only a 15 percent chance he would survive if his lower leg was not amputated. Mr 
                                                                                                                                                             
29
   White, B. P., Willmott, L. & Then, S.-N. 2010a. Adults who lack capacity: substitute decision-making Sydney, 
Thomson Reuters Australia.citing P Resnick and R Sorrentino, “Forensic Issues in Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry” 
(2005) 22(14) Psychiatric Times 26 at 26; R Arnold, (2006) “Fast Fact and Concept #55: Decision Making Capacity, 
2nd ed” (2008) http://www.eperc.mcw.edu/fastFact/ff_55.htm ( May 2010).  
30
 Beigler, P. & Stewart, C. 2001. Assessing Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment. Med J Aust, 174, 522-525. 
Biegler Professor, Stewart C, “Assessing competence to refuse medical treatment”  MJA 174 (522-525) 
31
 Shulman, K., Cohen, C., Kirsh, F., Hull, I. & Champine, P. 2007. Assessment of testamentary capacity and 
Vulnerability to Undue Influence. Am J Psychiatry, 164, 722-727  
32
 Grisso, T., Appelbaum, P., Mulvey, E. & Fletcher, K. 1995. The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: 
Measures of abilities related to competence to consent to treatment. Law and Human Behaviour, 19, 127-148. 
33
 Buchanan, A. 2004. Mental capacity, legal competence and consent to treatment. J R Soc Med, 97, 415-420. 
34
 Tan, J., Hope, T. & Stewart, A. 2003. Competence to refuse treatment in anorexia nervosa. International Journal 
of Law and Psychiatry, 26, 697-707. 
35
 Karlawish, J. 2007. Measuring decision-making capacity in cognitively impaired individuals. Neurosignals, 16, 
91-98.pp 91, 93 
36
 1997e. Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 426. Per Butler-Sloss LJ at 553 
37
 1994b. Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290; [1994] 1 All ER 819. 
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C was an inmate of a high security forensic facility (Broadmoor Hospital in the UK), and had 
been diagnosed with having paranoid schizophrenia. Amongst his delusions was that he was an 
eminent medical doctor, and whilst he had confidence in the medical professionals looking after 
him at Broadmoor and accepted that he may die if his leg was not amputated, he also believed he 
had the ability to cure his own gangrenous limb.  
In granting the injunction restraining doctors from amputating Mr C’s leg without his express 
consent, Justice Thorpe held that Mr C sufficiently understood the nature, purpose, and effects of 
the proposed amputation, and that despite his mental illness, he retained capacity to consent to, 
or refuse, medical treatment. Thus, Justice Thorpe laid out the tripartite criteria for capacity, 
which were subsequently cited in other cases, and have become generally known as the Re C 
test.  A patient has capacity to consent or refuse medical treatment if he/she can: 
i. comprehend and retain treatment information,  
ii. believe it, and  
iii. weigh it up to arrive at a choice.  
The Re C test was eventually incorporated into the UK Mental Capacity Act 2005.
38
  A recent 
application of the test was in Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB 
39
 where the court 
upheld the decision of a woman with paranoid schizophrenia to refuse treatment for gangrene 
and bladder cancer. It was held that the woman’s inability to make treatment decisions regarding 
her mental illness did not mean that she necessarily lacked the capacity to decide whether or not 
to have surgery. 
The test is also part of Australian common law. In Australian Capital Territory v JT
40
 the patient 
was a 69 year-old man with chronic psychotic, paranoid schizophrenia which was characterised 
by religious obsessions. The patient tended to severely fast and he also resisted medication. By 
the time of the trial the patient’s weight had fallen to a dangerous level. The patient refused naso-
gastric feeding and the treatment team were considering the insertion of a percutaneous 
                                                 
38
 2005d. Mental Capacity Act England and Wales. s3  https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/mental-capacity-
act-making-decisions  
39
 2014a. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB [2014] EWCOP 342. 
40
 2009a. Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105 (Unreported, Higgins CJ, 28 August 2009). 
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endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube to provide nutrition. On application to the court to determine 
the patient’s best interests, the ACT Supreme Court found that the patient was not competent to 
refuse the provision of nutrition by way of a feeding tube as his wishes were the product of 
delusional and irrational thought, in turn the product of his severe mental illness.  
In New South Wales the Re C test was employed in Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A
41
 a case involving a Jehovah’s Witness who had made an advance directive to refuse 
dialysis. McDougall J noted [at 25] that a person would be found incapable if he or she was 
unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to the decision, in particular 
as to the consequences of the decision, or is unable to use and weigh the information as part of 
the process of making the decision. 
Another Australian example is Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter
42
 In this case the 
Western Australian Supreme Court was asked by a care facility for the disabled (Brightwater)  to 
clarify its legal obligations in the event that a mentally competent patient no longer wanted to 
receive medical services which, if discontinued, would lead to his/her death.  Specifically, this 
case was concerned with a Mr Rossiter who was quadriplegic and resided at Brightwater. He was 
totally reliant on others, mostly the staff at Brightwater, to assist him with most, if not all 
physical requirements, including nutrition and hydration which was delivered directly into his 
stomach via through a PEG. Although he was not terminally ill, he had been advised that there 
was no prospect that his condition would improve and in some respects, for example, in relation 
to his eyesight, his condition was deteriorating. On many occasions, he clearly and explicitly 
indicated to the staff at Brightwater, as well as to his own doctor, that he wished to die. Lacking 
the physical capacity to bring about his own death, he repeatedly directed the staff at Brightwater 
to ‘discontinue the provision of nutrition and hydration through the PEG’.43  
With input from psychological assessments by two medical experts, the court found that Mr 
Rossiter did have full mental capacity, and hence was capable of making reasoned decisions 
concerning his own health and safety, and in particular was capable of making decisions in 
respect of his future medical treatment after weighing up alternative options and was capable of 
                                                 
41
 2009d. Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
42
 2009b. Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229. 
43
 Ibid. at 11 
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expressing reasons for the decisions.
44
 Mr Rossiter was therefore judged to be competent to 
exercise his right to refuse future medical treatment. Furthermore, the court declared that 
Brightwater would not be criminally responsible for consequences of acceding to Mr Rossiter’s 
wish for the discontinuation of treatment.  
Most recently, the New South Wales Supreme Court employed the test in Re JS
45
 a case 
involving a quadriplegic (who had a number of serious co-morbidities) who wished to have his 
artificial ventilation removed. Darke J found that the patient did have capacity, and that he had 
made a thoughtful and rational decision which had been made over a period of months of careful 
deliberation. 
Some jurisdictions in Australia have provided statutory definitions of capacity.
46
 These tests are 
identical to the common law test. The Queensland legislation was tested in Re PVM
47
 where a 
39-year-old Aboriginal man with traumatic brain and spinal cord damage was found to be 
competent, despite his injuries, to request the removal of artificial ventilation and to refuse 
further treatment. In Re Bridges
48
the test was applied to a mentally ill patient who was found to 
be incompetent to refuse dialysis after she had ceased taking her anti-psychotic medication. 
                                                 
44
 Another aspect of capacity is that for as long as Mr Rossiter retains his capacity, he has the right to revoke his 
decision to stop receiving treatment. 
45
 2014b. Re JS [2014] NSWSC 302. 
46
 Guardianship Act  1987 (NSW) s 33  (2) For the purposes of this Part, a person is incapable of giving consent to 
the carrying out of medical or dental treatment if the person:  (a) is incapable of understanding the general nature 
and effect of the proposed treatment, or (b) is incapable of indicating whether or not he or she consents or does not 
consent to the treatment being carried out.  (3) For the purposes of this Part, a person shall be taken to object to the 
carrying out of medical or dental treatment: (a) if the person indicates (by whatever means) that he or she does not 
want the treatment to be carried out, or  (b) if the person: (i) has previously indicated, in similar circumstances, that 
he or she did not then want the treatment to be carried out, and (ii) has not subsequently indicated to the contrary 
Guardianship And Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 36 (2)  For the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of 
patient in subsection (1), a person is incapable of giving consent to the carrying out of a special procedure, a medical 
research procedure or medical or dental treatment if the person- (a)  is incapable of understanding the general nature 
and effect of the  proposed procedure or treatment; or  (b)  is incapable of indicating whether or not he or she 
consents or does not consent to the carrying out of the proposed procedure or  treatment. 
Guardianship And Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 36 (2)  (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is 
incapable of giving consent to the carrying out of medical or dental treatment if the person – (a) is incapable of 
understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment; or  (b) is incapable of indicating whether or 
not he or she consents or does not consent to the carrying out of the treatment 
47
 2000c. Re PVM [2000] QGAAT. 
48
 2001a. Re Bridges [2001] Qd R 574. 
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Treatment was authorised until such time as the medication took effect and the patient had 
regained competence, after which she could then make a decision regarding her treatment. 
How and when to assess competence/capacity 
Assessments of a person’s competency/capacity are pivotal to assuring that those who cannot 
care for themselves receive necessary protection from unwanted medical interventions, while 
respecting the autonomy of those who can make those decisions for themselves.
49
 An 
individual’s level of capacity to make decisions, including medical decisions, may vary at any 
given time according to their neurological capacity,
50 
 (for example, whether they have an acute 
clouding of their sensoriun) and according to the
 
complexity of the decision to be made.
51 
 In 
other words, capacity is context-specific. By way of example, an adult may have the capacity to 
consent to having blood drawn for diagnostic tests, or to undergoing various interpretive imaging 
scans, but not to undergoing bone marrow transplant, for which the blood tests and scans are an 
integral part.  
An adult can lack capacity for a number of reasons, including inherited conditions such as a 
congenital intellectual disability, or acquired conditions such as loss of cognition due to a brain 
injury or due to the ageing process. Lack of capacity can also be a temporary or permanent 
condition. Temporary conditions include, but are not limited to, the effects of certain drugs (both 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic), symptoms (such as pain or breathlessness), illness (both 
physical and mental). When an adult is deemed to not have the requisite decision-making 
capacity,
52
 restrictions come into play regarding their authority to provide valid consent to a 
medical procedure. 
                                                 
49
 Collier, B., Coyne, C. & Sullivan, K. 2005. Mental Capacity, Powers of Attorney and Advance Health Directives, 
Sydney, Federation Press. Collier, B Coyne, C Sullivan, K,  p 1. 
50
 Karlawish, J. 2007. Measuring decision-making capacity in cognitively impaired individuals. Neurosignals, 16, 
91-98. Pp 92-93 
51
 Dunn LB et al 2006. Assessing Decisional Capacity for Clinical Research or Treatment: A Review of Instruments. 
AJP Psychiatry Online, 163. http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/ajp.2006.163.8.1323 (March 2009) 
52
 The Guardianship Act NSW  (Part 5, s 33(2)) defines that a person is incapable of giving consent to the carrying 
out of medical or dental treatment if the person:(a) is incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the 
proposed treatment, or(b) is incapable of indicating whether or not he or she consents or does not consent to the 
treatment being carried out. 
Page 32 of 429 
 
A patient’s capacity to consent and to participate in medical decision-making is generally not 
formally assessed at routine clinical consultations unless there is a reason to suspect that they 
may lack it. Closer assessment is indicated for patients in whom an abrupt change in mental 
status is detected, in those who refuse the recommended treatment without apparently 
considering the consequences, or in those who have a known risk factor for impaired decision-
making such as those with recognised cognitive impairment or mental illnesses, people under the 
influence of mind altering drugs, and children who are deemed ‘minors’.53 
In cases where the patient’s capacity is called into question, it is the health professionals in the 
first instance who are charged with assessing the patient's abilities to make a variety of decisions 
including the capacity to refuse, or to accept a specific medical intervention and treatment.
54
 A 
variety of tests for capacity exist, but most only draw attention to a patient’s cognitive ability. 
The most common ones include the MacArthur
 
Competence Assessment Tool–Treatment 
(MacCAT–T),55 and the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE).56  However, none of the 
commonly used tests are universally accepted as gold-standard instruments
57
 
58
 and all these are 
subjective measures and have assumptions of an individual’s values,59 rationality, logic and 
agency.
 
 
                                                 
53
 In Australia a child is someone less than 18 years of age except in New South Wales and South Australia where 
the ‘age of majority’ for consent to medical treatment  is 14 and 16 years respectively: Minors (Property and 
Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW) & Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). Someone who has 
not attained these ages is said to be ‘a minor’ This is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this thesis 
54
 2004b. Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha ) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061  
55
 Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. 1998. Assessing competence to consent to treatment: A guide for physicians and 
other health professionals. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK: Oxford University. 
56
 Folstein, M., Folstein, S. & McHugh, P. 1975. ‘Mini Mental State': a practical method for grading the cognitive 
state of patients for the clinician. J Psychiat Res 12, 189-198. 
57
  Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. 1998. Assessing competence to consent to treatment: A guide for physicians and 
other health professionals. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK: Oxford University. 
58
  Appelbaum, P. S. 2007b. Assessment of patients' competence to consent to treatment. New England Journal of 
Medicine, 357, 1834-1840. 
59
 Vollmann, J. 2006. "But  I Don't Feel It":  Values and Emotions in the Assessment of Competence in Patients 
With Anorexia Nervosa Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 13. 
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Substitute decision-making when adults lack capacity  
Some adults may never have the capacity to consent to treatment whereas with others, 
interventions may be available which will restore their decision-making autonomy and agency.
60
  
For either group of patients, it is important to provide for alternative schemes of consent.
61
 In 
most cases the doctor may seek consent from the patient’s substitute decision maker62 who is 
commonly referred in most Australian jurisdictions to as the ‘person responsible’. In accordance 
with the NSW Guardianship Act 1987
63
 for example, the ‘person responsible’ may be, in order 
of priority: 
i. an appointed guardian (including an enduring guardian chosen by the patient) who has 
been given the right to consent to medical and dental treatments or, if there is no guardian 
ii. the most recent spouse or de facto spouse (including same-sex partner) when the spouse 
or de facto has a close and continuing relationship with the person or, if there is no 
spouse or de facto spouse 
iii. the unpaid carer or the carer at the time the person entered residential care (note: 
recipients of a government carer benefit are not considered to be paid) or, if there is no 
carer 
iv. a relative or friend who has a close personal relationship with the person. 
                                                 
60
 Aujoulat, I., Luminet, O. & Deccache, A. 2007. The perspective of patients on their experience of powerlessness. 
Qualitative Health Research, 17, 772, Pauker, S. G. 2010. Medical decision making: how patients choose. Medical 
Decision Making, 30, 8S-10S, Malterud, K. 2010. Power inequalities in health care–empowerment revisited. Patient 
Education and Counseling, 79, 139-140. 
61
 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), s 32L (although this appears to be limited to a 
default decision-maker); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), ss 77, 80; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld), s 101; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s 16; Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1995 (Tas), s 39(3); Medical Treatment Act 1998 (Vic), s 9; Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1986 (Vic), s 42O; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 110ZK. Note in Qld, there is specific 
provision in the legislation that allows a doctor and any person acting under the doctor’s direction or supervision to 
use the minimum force necessary and reasonable to carry out healthcare authorised under the legislation: 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 75. 
62
 Substitute decision-making a generic term used to describe encompassing enduring powers of attorney and 
advance directives. Enduring powers of attorney allow the appointment of  ‘an attorney’ to manage a person's (the 
principal) finances should that person lose capacity to do so themselves. Advance directives permit the appointment 
of a guardian to make lifestyle and personal/health decisions for the principal. Directions guide the substitute 
decision-maker about what the principal would have wanted. Purser, K., Magner, E. & Madison, J. 2009a. 
Competency and capacity: the legal and medical interface. Journal of Law and Medicine, 16, 789-802. 
63
 http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/maintop/view/inforce/act+257+1987+cd+0+N  Current version for 1 January 
2014 to date (March 2014). 
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If the person responsible can’t or won’t make a treatment decision, he or she must decline in 
writing. The next person in the list will then become the person responsible. A medical 
practitioner or other qualified person can also remove the person responsible from their role by 
certifying, in writing, that the person responsible is not capable of carrying out the role. 
If there is no person responsible, application can be made to the Guardianship Tribunal which 
can consent on behalf of the incapacitated adult. 
The person responsible does not, however, have authority to consent on behalf of the 
incapacitated person for all medical interventions. For example, the ‘person responsible’ cannot 
override the patient’s pre-stated wishes that s/he does not want a particular treatment, or that the 
patient now indicates s/he does not want. Authorization by the Guardianship Tribunal would be 
required for any such interventions.   
In addition, there are some interventions
64
 that are classified as ‘special’65 ‘prescribed’66 or 
‘major’67 and which require authorization by relevant the Guardianship Tribunal (or Supreme 
Court). These include:  
 sterilisation (all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory) 
 termination of pregnancy (Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria) 
 medical procedures concerning contraception (Australian Capital Territory, Northern 
Territory) 
 tissue transplantation (Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria) 68 
                                                 
64
 White, B. P., Willmott, L. & Then, S.-N. 2010a. Adults who lack capacity: substitute decision-making Sydney, 
Thomson Reuters Australia. 
65
 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), s 33 (definition of “special treatment”); Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld), s 68, Sch 2, ss 6-7; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), s 3(1) (definition of “special 
treatment”); Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), s 3 (definition of “special procedure”). 
66
 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), (definition of “prescribed medical procedures”); 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “prescribed treatment”). 
67
 Adult Guardianship Act (NT), s 21(4). 
68
 This refers to non-regenerative tissue in the ACT and Tas and any type of tissue in Qld and Vic. See 
Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), dictionary (definition of “prescribed medical 
procedure” (e)); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, ss 7(a), 8; Guardianship and 
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 medical research (Queensland) 
 experimental treatment (New South Wales, Queensland) 
 prescribed special healthcare (all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory and Western 
Australia) 
 electroconvulsive therapy and psychosurgery (Australian Capital Territory, Queensland). 
New South Wales and Tasmania have additional procedures that are designated as falling within 
this category, including: 
 treatment involving the use of mechanical, chemical or physical stimuli that induce 
changes in behaviour through punishment, so called ‘adversives’  
 medication that affects the central nervous system where dosage, duration or combination 
is outside accepted norms  
 any treatment that involves the administration of a drug of addiction (other than in 
association with the treatment of cancer or palliative care of a terminally ill patient) over 
a period or periods totalling more than 10 days in any period of 30 days 
 psychosurgery, including any neurological procedure carried out for the relief of the 
symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. 
Emergencies and the doctrine of necessity 
As a general rule, treatment may be initiated in emergency situations without gaining the 
patient’s prior consent under the defence of necessity. Whilst the courts have not defined what 
constitute an emergency, there is general consensus that the underlying rationale is that a 
‘reasonable person’ would consent to necessary treatment, if they were in a position to do so.  
By way of example, it is possible to imagine that a patient may present to an Emergency 
Department either unconscious or having sustained a level of trauma such that s/he is deemed 
incompetent to consent or refuse medical treatment. If the situation is time critical, and if it is 
deemed necessary to provide treatment to either preserve life or to reduce the chance of further 
                                                                                                                                                             
Administration Act 1995 (Tas), s 3(1) (definition of “special treatment” (c)); Guardianship and Administration Act 
1986 (Vic), s 3(1) (definition of “special procedure” (d)). 
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harm, then a healthcare professional may act in the patient’s best interest, in the knowledge that 
the common law recognises a defence of necessity to battery. This was recognized in Wilson v 
Pringle
69
 in which the court noted in reference to an unconscious patient:  
The patient cannot consent…hitherto it has been customary to say that in such cases that consent 
is to be implied for what would otherwise be a battery…it is better to say that the surgeon’s action 
is acceptable in the ordinary conduct of everyday life, and not a battery. 
 
It should be noted however, that the terms ‘emergency’ and ‘necessity’ are sometimes 
differentiated when considering whether pre-treatment consent is required, or more specifically 
why the person is unable to consent. For example in Murray v McMurchy
70
 in which a caesarean 
section was performed on a women after an extended labour and failed forceps delivery attempt. 
During the surgery the doctor noticed that the woman had multiple fibroid tumours, and so 
elected to perform a tubal ligation in order to prevent the woman from undergoing the hazards of 
a second pregnancy, but without having previously discussed this possibility with the patient. 
Whilst the court accepted that the procedure was necessary, and even though it was convenient to 
perform the procedure at the time of the caesarean section, the situation was not considered an 
emergency, and as such the doctor was liable for performing the tubal ligation without the 
patient’s consent.  
In contrast, in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)
71
 the court considered the proposed 
sterilisation of a 36 year old woman with a serious mental disability. Ms F had developed a 
sexual relationship with a fellow patient at the psychiatric facility where she had resided for most 
of her life. Both her mother and medical staff at the hospital were concerned that she would not 
cope with an ensuing pregnancy and child birth, and would not be able to raise a child herself. As 
alternative methods of contraception were not practical for her, they sought a declaration that it 
would be lawful for her to be sterilised on the grounds that Ms F was incapable of giving valid 
consent since she did not appreciate the implications of the operation. Lord Goff stated:
72
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…in limited circumstances, recognition may be given to a need, in the interests of the patient, that 
treatment should be given to him in circumstances where he is (temporarily or permanently) 
disabled from consenting to it. It is this criterion of a need which points to the principle of 
necessity as providing justification. 
 
In this situation authorisation to perform sterilisation was granted.  
In another case that addressed the distinction between the terms ‘emergency’ and ‘necessity’, in 
Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A
73
 McDougall J referred to medical 
intervention without consent being “justified by what is sometimes referred to as the ‘emergency 
principle’ or ‘principle of necessity’”74 seemingly suggesting that the terms can be used 
interchangeably. White and colleagues
75
 conclude that this indicates that ‘treatment can be 
provided in the absence of consent when there is a threat to the general well-being of the patient 
and it is not possible, due to the circumstances, to obtain consent.’ Indeed, legislation also exists 
in Australian jurisdictions to allow for emergency treatment to be provided without consent.
76
 
Four states
77
 also allow for non-consensual treatment to be provided in non-emergencies if: 
 there are no substitute decision-makers available  
 the treatment is necessary and will most successfully promote the patient’s health and 
well-being, and 
 the patient does not object to the carrying out of the treatment.  
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2. Voluntariness 
Consent must be voluntary  
Consent implies a voluntary agreement to the proposal of another. However, voluntariness is 
more complex than it appears at first flush, most notably because it is generally agreed that 
critically ill patients are likely to be vulnerable.
78
 Whereas it is accepted that most actions 
undertaken during one’s life will generally be as a result of some influence, the concern is that 
the patient’s vulnerability may lead them to be unduly influenced by others around them, 
especially those who are perceived to be stronger and/or appear ‘wiser’ than the patient, and who 
appear to act in the best interest of the patient.
79
 
80
  Illness provides a particular challenge for 
consent, insofar as we state that for consent to be valid, it has to be made voluntarily and without 
undue influence, yet we recognise that critically ill patients are likely to be vulnerable; and also 
that they may have restricted capacity as a result of their illness.
81
 
Undue influence is a legal concept. It may be factual or presumed and in most cases the onus of 
proof is on the complainant. Presumptions of undue influence may stem from particulars raising 
suspicion of undue influence arising from a special relationship such that one is able to exercise 
dominion over the other by reason of trust, or confidence.
82
 
83
 
Historically, the notion of undue influence evolved around the transfer of property especially 
within a relationship of obvious imbalance of power between the parties.
 
In such situations, if the 
perceived weaker party conferred a benefit upon the stronger party the law would presume that 
any transfer of property had been made under undue influence and it would void the transfer.
84
 
There are a number of established categories of relationship in which the law automatically 
presumes undue influence exists, based on power differential between the parties, and hence 
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stronger influence. The established categories include parent and child, priest (meaning religious 
leader or elder) and worshiper, doctor and patient.  
In healthcare, there are other aspects of undue influence, not only within the doctor-patient 
relationship, but possibly also from family members or friends. Whilst in such instances, there 
may be no obvious benefit conferred upon the stronger party, there still may be concern on the 
person’s influence on the nature of a patient’s consent (except perhaps by way of the patient’s 
[W]ill, especially if the influence could be implicated in the patient’s death).85 It is possible to 
consider two potential scenarios; (i) when the patient is pressured into refusing an intervention, 
and  (ii) when the patient is pressured into undergoing an intervention. To illustrate: 
(i) In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
86
 a pregnant woman who had been involved in 
a car accident, was admitted to hospital. Her refusals to consent to have blood transfusions were 
perceived by the medical staff as being as a result of undue influence by her mother who was a 
practicing Jehovah’s Witness (unlike the daughter who was not) and who was noted to have 
visited the patient at times immediately before she refused the transfusion. The patient’s medical 
condition deteriorated and after giving birth to a stillborn, and when she become unconscious, 
the father and boyfriend of the patient sought judicial approval for the transfusion to proceed, in 
her best interest. The Court of Appeal found that her refusal was invalid because of incapacity 
(being unconscious) because her refusal was not specific to the circumstances in which she now 
found herself, and also that the mother had exerted undue influence over the patient to cause her 
to refuse the transfusion.  
(ii) There are only a few cases that have come before the courts to decide whether undue 
influence has been exerted to coerce a competent person to consent to a procedure, and even 
fewer that have won.
87
 In Norberg v Wynrib
88
 a physician prescribed a drug to a patient who was 
addicted to it in exchange for sexual favours from her. There was no suggestion that the patient 
had not agreed to the sexual conduct. However, La Forest J stated that: 
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….. the consent must be genuine; it must not be obtained by force, or threat, or be given under the 
influence of drugs. …………….In a situation where a plaintiff is induced to enter into an 
unconscionable transaction because of inequitable disparity in bargaining strength, it cannot be 
said that the plaintiff’s act is voluntary.89 
 
In Re Dueck
90
a 13-year-old boy with cancer refused further chemotherapy and proposed surgery 
which the oncologist caring for him believed had a 65% chance of resulting in a recovery.  In 
refusing the treatment, the boy claimed that he believed his father who told him that God would 
heal him and that there was a treatment available in California and Mexico that had an 85% to 
90% cure rate without surgery. (This ‘treatment’ was not medically recognized, and there was no 
evidence that it had any beneficial effect.) Psychological and psychiatric assessments indicated 
that the boy had no developmental impairment that would limit his decision-making capacity. 
Nevertheless, the boy was less mature than an average 13-year-old, and his father was a 
dominating authoritative figure. The court stated that if the boy was ‘a mature minor’ (i.e. 
competent to meet the demands of the specific decision-making situation in question), then his 
wishes would be respected.
91
 The factors considered in making this determination were the 
child’s age and maturity, the extent of the child’s dependency on his parents, and the complexity 
of the treatment. Given the profound influence of the domineering father and his misguided faith 
in a non-existent cure, the court found that the boy was not able to understand the relevant 
medical information or appreciate the consequences of the proposed treatment. Consequently, 
the boy was not deemed ‘a mature minor’ and an order was made giving the authority to the 
Minister of Social Services to make medical decisions on the boy’s behalf.  
Finding a ‘middle ground’ that remains open, honest, respectful of the patient’s values, accepting 
of the patient’s cognitive ability and yet satisfies the legal requirement of consent becomes an 
enormous challenge.
92 93
 This tension was captured by Sir John Donaldson MR in 1985:
94
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A doctor’s duty of care, as the profession would readily concede, involves his evaluating risks 
and weighing advantages and disadvantages before recommending a particular type of treatment. 
But, having decided what to recommend, there must be a natural, and, up to a point praiseworthy 
desire that the advice shall be accepted and a strong temptation not to say anything which might 
lead to its rejection and so frustrate the doctor’s prime object, which is to maintain and improve 
the patient’s health. 
 
In many ways the issues surrounding voluntariness are bound by how one defines ‘undue 
influence’, how can it be quantified, and how to determine when the line of illegitimacy is 
crossed? As seen in Re T
95
 the test requires the judge to examine the strength of will of the 
patient and the closeness of the relationship between the patient and the persuader. These factors 
are then weighed to determine whether the consent was a reflection of the patient’s own desires 
and wishes, and therefore, the patient’s ‘true’ decision.  
...does the patient really mean what he says or is here merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy 
someone else or because the advice and persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he 
can no longer think and decide for himself? In other words, is it a decision expressed in form 
only, not in reality?
 96
 
 
The governing consideration here is the right of every human being to make the decision which 
affects his own life and welfare and to determine the risks he is willing to undertake.
97
 Thus, the 
question of voluntariness will always focus on a combination of factors;  primarily, when and 
how factors external to the patient become relevant, requiring a broad focus on the patient’s 
circumstances, relationships and events surrounding the patient’s decision.  
Synopsis 
This section has reviewed the legal elements of enabling consent. It has examined 
capacity/competence, substituted consent in the absence of competence, emergency, and 
voluntariness via the doctrine of undue influence. The next chapter will examine the question of 
how the law deals with the problem of informing consent, in both the criminal and civil law. 
                                                                                                                                                             
93
  White, M. T. 1998. Decision-Making Through Dialogue: Reconfiguring Autonomy in Genetic Counseling 
Journal Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19, 5-19  
94
 1985d. Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital  [1985] AC 871;   [1985]  1 All ER 1018. 
95
 1993d. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95. 
96
 Ibid. per Lord Donaldson at 113 
97
 1983a. F v R [1983] 33 SASR 189. 
Page 42 of 429 
 
  
Page 43 of 429 
 
Section II ELEMENTS WHICH INFORM CONSENT 
Introduction 
For consent to be valid, the patient needs to have been advised on a variety of aspects of what is 
being proposed, most particularly the patient needs to be made aware of the risks and benefits of 
all relevant therapeutic options.
98
 That is to say that the patient needs to be advised about the 
risks of undergoing or refusing the various treatments, the likelihood of any of those risks 
eventuating, and the likely resultant outcome which may include long term effects which, in turn, 
might include financial or quality of life burdens. Without the relevant information, it is assumed 
that the patient may not able to make an informed choice that aligns with his/her personal values 
and goals,
99
 and therefore the patient’s consent would not be valid.100  
This chapter examines the Australian common law approach to the problem of information 
provision in the consent process. It begins with Australian criminal law.  
1. Criminal Law and Consent 
Criminal law involves a breach of ‘Crown’s peace,’ namely the rules of the state which 
safeguard bodily integrity and private property.  In order to establish criminal liability, a person 
must prove that a crime was committed and ordinarily this requires that the accused acted 
knowingly or recklessly and that the actions contributed substantially to the breaking of the 
peace, for example, the death of a person. Alternatively crimes can be brought against those who 
act with gross negligence and cause harms to others.
101
 Criminal actions against health 
professionals are very rare in Australia but when they have arisen, they are primarily in relation 
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to assaults and criminal negligence.
 102 103
  As will be discussed, consent can also be an issue in 
cases of criminal negligence.  
Assault 
In Australian criminal law, ‘assault’ is a term inclusive of both the threat of force, an attempt to 
use force and the actual application of force. Assault has been defined as: 
A person who strikes, touches, or moves, or otherwise applies force of any kind to, the person of 
another, either directly or indirectly, without his [sic] consent, or with his [sic] consent if the 
consent is obtained by fraud, or who by any bodily act or gesture attempts or threatens to apply 
force of any kind to the person of another without his [sic] consent, under such circumstances that 
the person making the attempt or threat has actually or apparently a present ability to effect his 
[sic] purpose, is said to assault that other person, and the act is called an assault.
104
 
 
For example, s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides that ‘[w]hosoever assaults any 
person, although not occasioning actual bodily harm, shall be liable to imprisonment for two 
years’. Generally speaking, assaults are those where the victim suffers from actual harm (which 
include more minor injuries such as bruising) or grievous bodily harm (more serious injuries 
such breaking the continuity of the skin). 
Consent and Assault  
Subject to the limits of consent (which will be discussed below), consent is a defence to assault. 
In the NSW Court of Appeal judgment in Fitzgerald v Kennard 
105
 Cole JA said at [201]: 
[T]he normal issue will be … whether the victim consented to the physical contact. In such a case 
no question arises regarding whether the victim was put in fear of physical violence by acts of the 
accused which might be categorised as angry, revengeful, rude, insolent or hostile. The physical 
contact, absent consent, establishes the assault. Where the physical contact was intended, the 
element of mens rea [guilty mind] in such an assault is established.  
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Consent is valid if information about the basic nature and extent of the touching that is to take 
place has been provided. This was discussed by the High Court in Reeves v R.
106
 Reeves was a 
gynaecologist whom CDW had attended upon for the excision of a vaginal lesion. However, 
during the surgery Reeves excised CDW’s vulva, including her labia and clitoris.  CDW argued 
that she had never consented to the complete removal of her labia and clitoris and had never been 
informed that this would occur as part of the surgical procedure.   
At trial, the judge gave a direction to the jury that there would be no lawful cause or excuse for 
the surgery if Reeves did not honestly believe that CDW had given her informed consent to the 
full extent of the operation, including removal of the labia and clitoris.  The judge stated that 
‘informed consent’ required the medical practitioner to explain the purpose of the operation, the 
part or parts of the body to be cut or removed, the possible major consequences of the operation 
and any options or alternative treatments which may be reasonably available. Reeves was found 
guilty and sentenced to a term of two and a half years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 
one year. 
Reeves appealed on the basis that the direction requiring an informed consent was erroneous. 
The Court of Criminal Appeal found that the introduction of the concept of ‘informed consent’ 
was an error, but that this error had not occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.  
On appeal to the High Court it was found that the correct test for consent to surgery was that the 
patient be informed in ‘broad terms’ of the nature of the procedure. Even though the trial judge 
had stated the test erroneously, the High Court found that the prosecution had excluded beyond 
reasonable doubt that CDW had not been informed that the surgery involved the removal of her 
labia and clitoris. The High Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeal that the misdirection 
regarding informed consent had not occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.  
Consent by fraudulent means  
Gaining a person’s consent by fraudulent means will vitiate that consent. Fraud as to the 
purposes of the touching or as to the identity of the person touching will nullify any consent 
given. In Chan Wai Hung v Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
107
  a woman mistakenly 
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believed that she was participating in a first-aid demonstration, and in R v Tabassum
108
 a women 
had been tricked into consenting to being touched on her breasts in the belief that the appellant 
was medically qualified and involved in a breast cancer research programme.  
Questions arise as to whether it is relevant to take into account the accused state of mind and 
purpose for touching. In R v Mobilio
109
 a radiographer subjected several female patients to 
vaginal examinations using ultrasound transducers. These examinations had no medical value 
and were conducted solely for the sexual gratification of the radiographer. He was subsequently 
charged and convicted of rape. On appeal, the court held that any mistaken belief on the part of 
the complainant[s] must relate to the nature and character of the act or to the identity of the 
sexual partner. Therefore, since the patients had consented to the insertion of the transducer into 
their vaginas, their consent was not vitiated simply because they were mistaken about the reason 
behind the act. The academic and judicial response to this decision was highly critical. It seems 
certain that the patients would not have consented had they known the real reason for the internal 
examination. The Mobilio ruling was reversed by legislative change to the Victorian Crimes Act 
1958 s 36 (g)
110
 which states there is no consent where a person ‘mistakenly believes that the act 
is for medical or hygienic purposes’. 
Similar cases in Queensland have recorded convictions. In R v BAS 
111
  the accused had 
committed multiple acts of indecent dealing, sexual assault and rape by pretending to offer 
alternative medical treatments which included touching of the victims breasts by his hands and 
by machines, blowing air onto the victim’s breasts, and touching the genitals of the victims. The 
prosecution had argued that the accused had performed these acts for sexual gratification and not 
for therapeutic purposes and that consent had been obtained by fraud. Section 348 of the relevant 
Queensland Act
112
 requires that the consent not be obtained by ‘false and fraudulent 
representations about the nature or purpose of the act’. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding 
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of the jury that the accused had dishonestly represented his purpose for seeking consent to acts 
he performed. 
In R v Jones 
113
 two ambulance officers attended an emergency call for a woman with chest pain. 
An electrocardiogram (ECG) was performed, the woman went to hospital and was later released. 
Two days later one of the ambulance officers appeared again at the woman’s house and asked to 
repeat the test on the basis that the earlier results were unusual. He placed the electrodes on her 
breasts but quickly left when the woman’s partner arrived home. The officer was charged with 
indecent assault. The officer argued that he was not acting for a sexual purpose. At trial the judge 
directed the jury that the officer’s intention was irrelevant to whether the act was indecent 
because placing the electrodes on the woman’s breast was of a sexual nature. The Queensland 
Court of Appeal overturned the verdict and ordered a re-trial on the basis that the officer’s 
intention may be relevant and it was up to the jury to determine whether the behaviour was 
sexual in nature. 
Criminal Negligence 
Healthcare professionals may be found criminally liable for failing to meet an appropriate 
standard of care if that failure can be considered a ‘gross’ departure. Such was the case in R v 
Adomako,
114
 in which the House of Lords found an anaesthetist guilty of manslaughter for his 
failure to notice that a patient undergoing surgery for a detached retina was no longer connected 
to the anaesthetic equipment. Four and a half minutes passed before it was noticed that the 
endotracheal tube was disconnected, even though the patient’s heart rate and blood pressure were 
giving warning signs. Experts gave evidence that the delay in noticing the disconnection was 
‘abysmal’ and was ‘a gross dereliction of care.’ 
In R v Misra,
115
 the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions of two doctors for manslaughter, 
whose patient had died from toxic shock syndrome after routine knee surgery. Both doctors had 
been responsible for the post-operative care of the patient and had failed to realise that the patient 
was suffering from a post-operative infection.  
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Convictions of health professionals for criminal negligence are rare. In R v Pegios
116
 the NSW 
District Court judge stated at [11] that: 
(1) the accused owed a duty of care to the deceased; 
(2) by his act or omission, the accused negligently breached that duty of care; 
(3) the accused's negligent act/omission caused the deceased's death; and 
(4) considering the extent by which the accused's conduct fell short of a reasonable 
standard of care and the associated level of risk of death, the degree of the accused's 
negligence was so ‘gross’ that it amounted to a crime. 
In Sam v R
117
, Thomas Sam (a homoepath) and his wife Manju were convicted of the involuntary 
manslaughter of their daughter Gloria. Gloria died from septicaemia probably brought on by the 
combined effects of chronic eczema and malnutrition. Gloria had been suffering from severe 
eczema for some time. Thomas was a trained naturopath and had treated Gloria for her eczema. 
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal found that Thomas should be tried by reference to 
the standard of a reasonable homeopath and by that standard he had been grossly negligent.  
Consent and criminal negligence  
A failure to gain appropriate consent may constitute criminal negligence. Perhaps the most 
famous example in Australia of this is the trial of Jayant Patel, a surgeon, who was linked to the 
injury and death of several patients at Bundaberg Hospital in Queensland. Dr Patel was 
originally charged after an Inquiry with three counts of manslaughter (of 14 charges in total).  
At trial and on appeal Patel was found guilty of the unlawful killing of 3 patients and of 
unlawfully inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Patel was charged under s 288 of the 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)
118
 which states: 
It is the duty of every person who, except in a case of necessity, undertakes to administer surgical 
or medical treatment to any other person, or to do any other lawful act which is or may be 
dangerous to human life or health, to have reasonable skill and to use reasonable care in doing 
such act, and the person is held to have caused any consequences which result to the life or health 
of any person by reason of any omission to observe or perform that duty. 
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Originally the prosecution case against Patel was that he had negligently performed the 
operations. The defence argued that Dr Patel’s conduct satisfied the section as he had the consent 
of the patients to the procedures and the procedures were performed competently. After the 
Crown had finished bringing its evidence regarding negligence, the prosecutors changed their 
approach and argued that Patel was not negligent in the performance of the surgery but was 
negligent in advising the patient’s to undergo the surgeries. To do this the prosecution had to 
argue that s 288 not only applied to negligence in the performance of surgical or medical 
treatments but that it also applied to negligent decisions to offer inappropriate treatments. 
After an historical reading of the section, Byrne J found that the phrase ‘surgical or medical 
treatment’ which is used in the section, must be read to include diagnosis and advice concerning 
treatment. The duty s 288 imposes was found to oblige the surgeon not to commend 
inappropriate surgery to the patient or not to perform it, even with consent. 
On that basis it was Dr Patel’s negligent failure to offer appropriate treatment which was the 
negligence upon which the findings of manslaughter and grievous bodily harm were based.  
Patel appealed unsuccessfully in R v Patel
119
 - the Court of Appeal agreeing with Byrne J’s 
reading of s 288 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)
120
 finding, at [51], that the section applied ‘in 
relation to criminally negligent acts or omissions in the course of performing surgery and 
criminally negligent acts or omissions in performing surgery at all.’ 
Patel also appealed on the basis that there was a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution 
had changed its argument after it had lead evidence regarding Patel’s negligent performance of 
treatment. The admission of such evidence was prejudicial to the defence because the evidence 
was no longer relevant to the charges but cast Patel in an unfavourable light. This was also 
dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 
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Patel then appealed successfully in 2012 to the High Court
121
  with the High Court agreeing with 
Byrne J’s and the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of s 288 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)122  
and the inclusion of consent processes.  French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said at [26]-[28]: 
Surgical treatment refers to all that is involved, from a recommendation that surgery should be 
performed, to its performance and the post-operative care which is necessary to be given or 
supervised by the person who conducted the surgery.  The duty imposed by s 288 may be 
breached by a discrete act of gross negligence in carrying out the surgical procedure or if gross 
negligence attends the making of judgments about a patient's condition and the risks to the patient 
of the surgical procedure. 
It is of course obvious that there can be no criminal responsibility for a death or grievous bodily 
harm without the physical act of surgery.  However, recognition of the causative significance of 
the act of surgery does not prevent the duty from arising at an earlier point.  Section 288 is apt to 
refer to the matters necessary to be considered before surgery is performed.  There can be no 
criminal responsibility for manslaughter or grievous bodily harm merely by the formation of an 
opinion or the giving of a recommendation.  But once the surgery is performed, the person 
performing it may be guilty of those offences if his or her assessment of the need for it, or of the 
risks to the patient which would attend it, is criminally negligent and death or grievous bodily 
harm results 
 
Notwithstanding, the High Court found that too much prejudicial evidence had been led before 
the prosecution changing its case. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered. At retrial 
Patel was twice acquitted. 
2. Torts 
This next part of the chapter deals with the tort law approach to information provision. In 
common law, a tort is a non-contractual wrong.
123
 
124 
  
Torts are classified as being forms of: 
• trespass – involving acts which directly cause harm. The wrongdoer (tortfeasor) commits 
an act voluntarily and knowingly, however, it is irrelevant whether the tortfeasor knew 
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that the act would result in harm and harm is not necessary for trespass to have been 
committed; and 
• actions on the case – where a person acts or fails to act when they had a duty to do so, 
and harm results indirectly, perhaps after the passing of some time. Because harm is 
indirectly caused in actions on the case, it is necessary to provide actual harm to establish 
a cause of action. 
Tort law functions broadly to protect the physical and mental integrity of people and property.
125
 
The broad objectives of tort law are threefold: 
i. to provide compensation to those who have suffered because of the action or inaction of 
other people and to shift the cost of those sufferings to the person or companies 
responsible for them; 
ii. to act as a deterrent to discourage harmful, negligent and/or risky behaviour; and 
iii. to provide punishment and retribution for wrongdoing.  
The most relevant civil laws to medical practice are the laws of; 
1. trespass (assault, battery and false imprisonment)126 and 
2.  negligence.  
Importantly, it is out of these two areas of tort law (trespass and negligence) that the legal 
concept of informed consent emerges. 
Tort reform in Australia 
There have been significant changes in tort law in Australian in recent years many of which have 
particular relevance to medical negligence. These changes have been implemented following the 
recommendations of the review of the country’s law of negligence undertaken in 2002, 
commonly referred to as the Ipp Review. 
I will now address the rationale for the Review and discuss how it has impacted on tort law in 
relation to consent, commencing with its effect on negligence.   
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The Ipp Review of the law of negligence 
At around the turn of the current century, a number of elements came into play that had 
significant impact on Australian tort law.
127
 In 1994, the federal government commissioned a 
review of the professional indemnity arrangements of that period. The report claimed that tort 
law reform was urgently needed to address rising medical litigation.
128
 It revealed that many of 
the medical defence organisations (MDOs) in Australia
129
 had insufficient funds to cover 
potential claims, particularly claims that would arise from incidents that had occurred but as yet 
had not been reported to the MDO.  
There existed a perception that tort law, particularly negligence was being interpreted too 
liberally by the courts resulting in what was seen to be excessively large compensation payouts 
to victims due to an expansion of a defendant’s liabilities. An ‘indemnity crisis’ was rumoured. 
Various reasons, including some whispered to be conceivably politically motivated, were cited.  
In response to the perceived ‘indemnity crisis’, in 2002 the Australian Government formed an 
expert panel under the stewardship of Justice David Ipp
130
 to review the law of negligence in 
Australia for personal injury. The Review's primary purpose was to address the public view of 
escalating, ‘unsustainable’ public liability insurance premiums on one hand, and on the other 
hand, the apparently unbounded damages awarded to those injured through another's fault. 
Included amongst its terms of reference was to inquire into the application, effectiveness and 
operation of common law principles as they applied in negligence. Specifically, the review was 
asked to ‘examine a method for the reform of the common law with the objective of limiting 
liability and quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death.’131 In addition, it was 
to attempt to craft a single statute (that might be styled the Civil Liability (Personal Injuries and 
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Death) Act (‘the Proposed Act’) to be enacted in each jurisdiction. The Review became known as 
the Ipp Review. 
In response to the report of the Ipp Review
132
 all Australian jurisdictions adopted various reforms 
recommended by the Report or modified their existing reform programs in line with the Review. 
For example, claims for personal injury under the common law of negligence have now been 
limited by the Civil Liability Acts which were passed in 2002-2003.
133
 Unfortunately a National 
Civil Liability Act was not formed as had been the initial remit, and consequently the various 
Acts are not uniform across the jurisdictions. The Acts are set out in the following table:  
 
New South Wales Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
Victoria Wrongs Act (Vic)  
Queensland Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)  
South Australia* Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) * formerly Wrongs Act  
Western Australia Civil Liability Act 2002 
Tasmania Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas)  
Northern Territory Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) 
Australian Capital Territory Civil Law(Wrongs) Act 2002 
 
The primarily object of the Acts is to reduce the number of actions and to reduce damages 
payouts. The Acts do not apply to sexual assault, sexual misconduct or harms that are 
intentionally committed to cause injury or death. The following sections will consider tort law 
and make specific comment on how it has been affected by the Ipp Review. 
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Consent and negligence  
The tort of negligence is not concerned so much with the presence or absence of consent, but 
rather the failure of the doctor to comply with the legally imposed duty of care. It has long been 
characterised as a tort concerned with: 
... causing damage to another because of a failure to exercise reasonable care; it is doing 
something that a reasonable persons in the class of person to which the defendant belongs would 
not do, or not doing something that a reasonable person in that class would do.
134
 
 
Negligence is therefore concerned with harm caused by carelessness,
135
 not ordinarily harms 
caused intentionally (although as noted above, Australia does recognise a category of negligent 
trespass). It is therefore concerned with relationships between people and/or property and is 
founded on an implicit assumption that, first and foremost, there is the expectation that a person 
may owe duties of care to others.  
When presiding over the 1883 case of Heaven v Pender,
136
 Brett MR's characterized negligence 
as follows: 
Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that 
every one of ordinary sense who did think, would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary 
care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger or 
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid 
such danger. 
 
Fifty years later, in the landmark House of Lords case, Donoghue v Stevenson
137
 it was found 
that to establish liability in negligence, it had to be proven that; 
1. a duty of care existed between the parties, 
2. a breach of that duty occurred, 
3. the injury/harm was caused by the breach of the recognized duty, 
4. the harm that resulted was not too remote for the breach of duty of care, and 
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5. there were no defences available to protect that breach of duty. 
Donoghue is now commonly regarded as the case which established the modern tort of 
negligence. It was key in positing the principles that duties of care could arise independently of 
contracts and that remedies may be available to people who were not in a contractual 
relationship.
138
  
A duty of care existed between the parties 
From very early times, a duty to use care and skill in dealing with patients had been imposed on 
doctors, but this was originally done through contract.
139
 The customary view of the doctor-
patient relationship is that it is contractual
140
 
141
 although, like most contracts in healthcare many 
of the terms of the contract are implied rather than expressed.
142
  One of the implied terms of 
medical contracts is that the doctor is duty bound to use reasonable care and skill in treating the 
patient.  
As the tort of negligence emerged it was clear that doctors would owe a similar duty of care to 
their patients arising in tort, and eventually the same duties were imposed on the institutions in 
which doctors worked.
143
  
The existence of a duty of care is not dependant on treatment have commenced. The provision of 
preliminary advice, even without examination of the patient, may be enough to establish a duty. 
For example, in Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital,
144
 a patient with kypho-scoliosis and 
spina bifida was said to have been owed a duty of care by a neurologist, even though the 
neurologist had not yet physically seen the patient at the time of her injury. The neurologist had 
been asked to see the patient regarding putting the patient into traction to correct a malformation 
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of her spine but had not yet done so. Instead of examining the patient, the doctor wrote that he 
would see her after traction. Unexpectedly, after traction was applied she became paralysed. A 
duty of care was found to be owed by the neurologist as he had been asked to examine the 
patient and had indicated that he would treat the patient.  
A duty of care to third parties 
The ‘duty of care’ is an unusual obligation. It is not a duty owed to the community as a whole; it 
describes a personal responsibility we owe to others.  Thus healthcare professionals do not owe a 
duty to the world at large. Nor (with limited statutory exceptions) do doctors have a duty to come 
to the rescue of strangers, in actual or potential peril.
145
 However, health care providers may owe 
a duty of care to persons other than their patient where it is reasonably foreseeable that their 
actions might harm those persons.
146
 In such cases, health care providers could be held liable for 
injuries or harm suffered by third parties as a result of their acts and omissions.  
In Australia, such duties have been recognised, mainly in cases where the third parties are sexual 
partners, family members or friends of the patient. For example in BT v Oei 
147
 a duty was found 
to be owed to the sexual partner of the patient who was not advised to undergo an HIV test, in 
circumstances where it would ordinarily have been offered as standard treatment. In Kemp v 
Lyell McEwin Health Service
148
 the parents and brothers of a patient claimed they suffered 
psychiatric illness from watching their son/brother die from a rejection of a heart transplant, after 
he had been negligently sent home from hospital. In McKenna v Hunter & New England Local 
Health District
149
  a duty was owed to the family members of a victim who was killed by a 
mentally ill man who had been negligently released into the victim’s custody. 
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A breach of the duty of care 
Having established that a duty of care exists, it needs to be determined if there has been a 
negligent breach of that duty of care. In describing the circumstances of how a breach of a duty 
of care may come about, Baron Alderson in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks
150
 stated:  
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those 
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing 
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The defendants might have been 
liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person would 
have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.  
 
In other words, a breach of a duty of care occurs when the standard of care that has become the 
customary extent of care, is not met, or in other words, the standard of care is the way in which a 
person must act to ensure that they do not breach their duty of care. The breach of duty does not 
have to be intentional in order to prove negligence. The standard of care is determined in relation 
to the class of people to which the defendant belongs.  
In considering whether the doctor has breached that duty of care, the courts look at the standard 
of care which would be reasonably expected from a doctor in the specific circumstances. If the 
doctor’s conduct falls below the standard of care required by law then it is said that there has 
been a breach of the duty of care. The law does not demand that doctors are without fault, only 
that they exercise the skill that a reasonable practitioner professing the same skills would be 
expected to exercise in similar circumstances.  
The traditional means of determining whether the medical standard of care had been breached 
under English law, is the Bolam test,
151
 so-named after the 1957 case Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee.
152
 The facts of the case include that the claimant underwent electro 
convulsive therapy (ECT) as treatment for his mental illness. At the time there existed no 
consensus amongst the medical profession as to whether relaxant drugs should be given prior to 
ECT, or whether manual restraints ought to be used on patients who had not been given 
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relaxants. In the case at hand, no relaxant drugs were given nor were manual restraints applied 
and the claimant suffered a serious fracture as a result of violent muscle spasms, the effects of 
ECT. The claimant argued that the doctor was in breach of his duty by not warning him of the 
associated risks, and not using a relaxant drug and/or manually restraining him as a precaution 
against injury. 
In addressing the jury, McNair J made clear to them the difference between professional 
negligence and ‘ordinary’ negligence when he stated:153 
I must tell you what in law we mean by ‘negligence’. In the ordinary case which does not involve 
any special skill, negligence in law means a failure to do some act which a reasonable man in the 
circumstances would do, or the doing of some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances 
would not do; and if that failure or the doing of that act results in injury, then there is a cause of 
action. How do you test whether this act or failure is negligent? In an ordinary case it is generally 
said you judge it by the action of the man in the street. He is the ordinary man. In one case it has 
been said you judge it by the conduct of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus. He is the 
ordinary man. But where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or 
competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man 
on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard 
of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not 
possess the highest expert skill; it is well established that it is sufficient if he exercises the 
ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art. ... in the case of a 
medical man, negligence means failure to act in accordance with the standards of reasonably 
competent medical men at the time. That is a perfectly accurate statement, as long as it is 
remembered that there may be one or more perfectly proper standards; and if he conforms with 
one of those proper standards, then he is not negligent. 
 
On reflecting upon potential competing testimony of experts McNair J referred to the test of 
negligence as applied by Lord President Clyde in the earlier Scottish case of Hunter v Hanly: 
154
 
In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine difference of opinion and 
one man clearly is not negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that of other 
professional men, not because he has displayed less skill or knowledge than others would have 
done. The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis and treatment on the part of the doctor 
is whether he has proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty 
of, if acting with ordinary care.  
 
 
                                                 
153
 Ibid. 
154
 1955 SC 213 
Page 59 of 429 
 
McNair J added that a doctor is:  
... not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art ... Putting it the other way round, a 
man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a 
body of opinion who would take a contrary view.  
 
The above statement provided doctors with considerably greater protection than what was 
afforded to other professions. The principle effectively is different from the ordinary test for 
standards of care because it prevents the judiciary from being able to decide between competing 
claims about what the appropriate standard of care should be. Under Bolam once it had been 
established that a responsible body of medical opinion would have acted in the way that the 
defendant acted, it was not open to the judge to disagree with that body of opinion and require a 
higher standard of care.  
The benefit of the Bolam principle was that it was aimed at encouraging innovative behaviour. 
McNair J said: 
That does not mean that a medical man can obstinately and pigheadedly carry on with some old 
technique if it has been proved to the contrary to what is really substantially the whole of 
informed medical opinion. Otherwise you might get men today saying ‘I don't believe in 
antiseptics I am going to continue to do my surgery the way that it was done in the Eighteenth 
century.’ That would clearly be wrong… It is not essential for you to decide which of the two 
practices is the better practice as long as you accept that what Dr Allfrey did was in accordance 
with a practice accepted by reasonable persons.
155 
 
 
Bolam did not require the body of opinion to be held by a large number of practitioners. In De 
Freitas v O’Brien156 the court held that it was sufficient for 11 surgeons out of 1000 to support a 
particular procedure to constitute a ‘responsible body’.   
Bolam did, however, leave it to the judiciary to determine what bodies of opinion were 
reasonable or responsible. In the 1997 case of Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority
157
 3 
year old Patrick Bolitho was admitted to St Bartholomew’s Hospital with an acute respiratory 
condition that became progressively worse, culminating in respiratory collapse, cardiac arrest 
                                                 
155
 1957a. Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
156
  [1995] 6 Med.L.R. 108 
157
 1997b. Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] PIQR p334 
Page 60 of 429 
 
and death. The hospital admitted breach of duty of care for the failure of the senior registrar to 
attend Patrick when she was called to see him. In court experts called for the claimant stated that 
the standard of care would have been to intubate the child, however the senior paediatric registrar 
claimed that even if she had attended Patrick she would not have intubated him in the 
circumstances. The registrar cited Bolam demonstrating that a responsible body of opinion would 
have endorsed her opinion, and thus her failure to attend Patrick was not causally linked to his 
cardiac arrest since, hypothetically, had she attended, the outcome would have been the same. 
Experts called by each side provided conflicting views as to whether intubation of Patrick would 
have been appropriate under the circumstances.  
However, Farquaharson LJ in the Court of Appeal stated that the Bolam test could not be used to 
justify actions that place a patient at risk: 
It is not enough for a defendant to call a number of doctors to say that what he had done or not 
done was in accord with accepted clinical practice. It is necessary for the judge to consider that 
evidence and decide whether that clinical practice puts the patient unnecessarily at risk. 
 
When the matter was appealed to the House of Lords, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said:  
The Court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes liability for negligent treatment or 
diagnoses just because he receives evidence from a number of medical experts who are of the 
opinion that the defendant’s treatment or diagnosis accorded with the current medical practice but 
rather the Court has to be satisfied that the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such 
opinion was formed from a logical basis. 
The court has to subject the expert medical evidence to scrutiny and to decide whether practice is 
reasonable. The issues of reasonableness is for the court and not for the medical profession.
158
 
 
Thus said, the reasonableness of professional opinions is considered in view of the risks and 
benefits of a particular course of action, and upon the logic of which it is founded.  In his 
judgment Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated: 
In the vast majority of cases the facts that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular 
opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. In particular, where there are 
questions of assessment of the relative risks and benefits of adopting a particular medical 
practice, a reasonable view necessary presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have been 
weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in rare cases it can be demonstrated that 
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the professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to 
hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible.  
 
Thus, the House of Lords held that whilst the opinion of respected medical experts may well be 
impressive, it is not necessarily sufficient or conclusive. The opinions of respected of peers can 
be departed from, if it is the opinion of the court that it is ‘not capable of withstanding logical 
analysis’, or is otherwise ‘unreasonable’ or ‘irresponsible.’159  
Bolitho was applied in Reynolds v Tyneside Health Authority
160
  in which it was claimed that the 
defendant midwife was negligent in failing to perform a vaginal examination on a woman in 
labour. It transpired that the baby was in a breach presentation position which caused the 
umbilical cord to prolapse, resulting in the baby having birth asphyxia leading to cerebral palsy.  
The evidence of the defendant midwife‘s expert witnesses was that they supported her decision 
not to perform the vaginal examination which carries with it a small increase in risk of infection.  
However Gross J was not convinced on the evidence, and he found that this was one of those 
rare instances in which the court should be prepared to disregard expert witness’ statement, given 
on the grounds that their opinions were unreasonable, irresponsible, illogical and indefensible.  
It has been stated by some commentators 
161
 that Bolitho turned Bolam on its axis, in that it made 
plain that it was the court, and not the medical profession, which was the final arbiter of medical 
breach of a duty of care. That may however be overstating the effect of the decision, as the legal 
standard of the duty of care remains essentially the same. What Bolitho did achieved was 
(building upon De Freitas
162
) to provide for the opportunity to consider all available evidence in 
light of current medical knowledge and approach, reserving the right of court to consider 
questions of medical negligence and to reject a body as not being reasonable.
163
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Cases heard in the UK are still determined on the basis of Bolam however the judges’ opinions 
must be supported by a reasoned explanation after consideration of the full range of professional 
opinion, thus making decisions ‘Bolitho justifiable’.164 
Bolam and the standard for information provision in the United Kingdom 
Up until recenty, in the United Kingdom Bolam  was applied to cases of negligent advice. In 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital 
165
 the House of Lords 
confirmed that the Bolam test should be used as the test for standards in information provision. 
Mrs Sidaway, the plaintiff, consulted a neurosurgeon regarding a painful deformity in the region 
of her fifth and sixth cervical vertebrae for which conservative treatment had failed to affect a 
cure. In 1960, the neurosurgeon performed a laminectomy - the pain resolved, but reappeared 
some several years later. In 1974 the same neurosurgeon proposed a delicate operation that 
involved working within three millimetres of Mrs Sidaway’s spinal cord, exposing the cord and 
interfering with the nerve root. The surgeon advised her of the possibility of ‘disturbing a nerve 
root’ but according to Mrs Sidaway, failed to warn her of the risk (said to be 1-2%) of damaging 
her spinal cord and of the possible consequences should that happen. During the operation, 
which was performed without technical negligence, Mrs Sidaway's spinal cord was in fact 
damaged inadvertently, and she was left severely disabled. She brought a claim alleging that she 
had not been properly warned of the risks associated with the surgery. 
As previously noted, the tort of negligence is not concerned so much with the presence or 
absence of consent, but rather on the failure of the doctor to comply with the legally imposed 
duty of care. For her case in negligence to be successful, Mrs Sidaway needed to establish that 
she was owed a duty of care, that duty had been breached, and the breach had resulted in harm 
that was reasonably foreseeable.  
At the trial, Skinner J found that the neurosurgeon did not make it clear to Mrs Sidaway that the 
surgery was elective, ‘…thereby that it could be postponed or even refused at the price of 
                                                 
164
 2000 Penny v East Kent Health Authority [2000] PNLR 323.; 2008b. Oakes v Neininger [2008] EWHC 548 
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 1984e. Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  [1984] 1 QB 493, 1 All ER 1018. 
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enduring pain…’ 166 and that whilst referring to potential nerve root damage, the neurosurgeon 
had not mentioned the possibility of the more serious consequence of damage to the spinal cord.  
Applying the Bolam principle and relying upon the evidence of four neurosurgeons, Skinner J 
concluded that the extent of the defendant's disclosure was consistent with ‘…a practice which, 
in 1974, would have been accepted as proper by a responsible body of skilled and experienced 
neurosurgeons’.167  
Later, the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether the Bolam test should 
appropriately be applied to all three of the medical practitioner's functions, namely diagnosis, 
treatment and provision of advice. Sir John Donaldson MR began by affirming Bolam in its 
application to diagnosis and treatment,
168
 but questioned its applicability to non-clinical 
judgments, such as duty to disclose.  
On further appeal, House of Lords considered, amongst other things, whether a patient’s right to 
information necessarily created a legal duty for the doctor to disclose. In doing so they gave 
consideration to the nature, extent and standard by which to judge information disclosure; 
whether medical opinion or the rule of law should guide a court’s decision; whether full 
disclosure (akin to the American doctrine of ‘informed consent’) was appropriate. 
Even though the claim was brought in negligence, it failed.  Of the four judgments handed down, 
each provided a different reason why the case should be rejected.  
Three distinct and incompatible reasons can be indentified; 
1. Lord Diplock claimed that it was up to the medical profession to decide whether a risk 
needed to be disclosed. As long as a responsible body of medical opinion agreed that the 
risk was not material, the doctor would have acted reasonably in not disclosing it (in 
accordance with the Bolam test).  
2. Lords Bridge (with whom Lord Keith agreed) and Templeman said however that it was 
the courts who should decide whether a risk should be disclosed, and if the occasion 
                                                 
166
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167
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arose then a judge considered disclosure of a risk obviously necessary for the patient to 
make an informed choice, then the court could define the risk as material even if medical 
practitioners would not.
169
  
3. Lord Scarman confirmed Bolam test in cases of diagnosis and /or treatment, and 
confirmed that the decision about the materiality of risks was appropriately left to the 
patient given that, as he recognized, there were matters other than those immediately 
related to health that could impact on the patient’s decision.  He stated that; 
The doctor’s duty…requires him…to provide information need to enable the patient to 
consider and balance the medical advantages and risks alongside other relevant matters, 
such as, for example, his family, business or social responsibilities.
170
  
Rejecting her claim for damages, the court held that the manifestation of the risk was so small, it 
did not constitute being ‘material’ and that consent did not require an elaborate explanation of 
remote side effects.  
Sidaway remained intact as an English precedent for many years. However, it was never beyond 
criticism.
171
 
The case against Bolam  
On first appearances, the Bolam test is straightforward and says basically that in order for there 
to be negligence stemming from a breach of a doctor’s duty, the standard of care must have 
fallen below the standard expected by his/her peers. However on deeper consideration, having 
the medical profession ‘self-regulating’ might serve to overprotect the profession. It might also 
be argued that Bolam perpetuates paternalism given that it creates a preference for the 
profession’s own view about what it appropriate.172  
 
                                                 
169
 ibid, at 663, per Lord Bridge 
170
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Other significant impediments identified in the Bolam test included: 
(a) the criteria used in the Bolam test may not take into account the advances in medical 
technology, knowledge, and skills  
(b) it gives weight to what the accepted standard of practice is, rather than was is should be; and  
(c) the test was, by its very nature, subjective and based on opinion even potentially in situations 
where the standard of care has fallen below acceptable limits. One can imagine that it would not 
be too difficult for a doctor to find amongst his/her colleagues those who could portray 
themselves as ‘… a competent reasonable body of opinion...’173 that agreed with him/her to 
satisfy the test. Indeed, in employing the Bolam test, it would not matter that there were other 
experts, even those more eminent than the expert witnesses called to provide evidence, who 
might consider the approach taken to be negligent,
174
 or even that it was rejected by the bulk of 
alternate expert opinion.
175 176
  
A further impediment of Bolam was that it did not recognize the rising tide of respect for patient 
autonomy,
177
 and this questions how well the professional standard, as set out in Sidaway, can 
simultaneously protect the patient's right to autonomy and self-determination while fairly 
defining a practicable obligation for doctors. 
How Australian courts dealt with Bolam and standard of care issues 
Australian courts unambiguously expressed an aversion to the Bolam test. In Albrighton v Royal 
Prince Alfred Hospital 
178
 (which was discussed above) Reynolds J claimed that;   
It is not the law that if all or most of the medical practitioners in Sydney habitually fail to 
take an available precaution to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury to the patients then none 
can be found guilty of negligence.
179
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Australian courts also highlighted that the determination of a standard of care is not limited to 
diagnosis and treatment - a doctor is also duty bound to exercise skill and care in the provision of 
medical advice to the patient, especially information concerning potential risks regarding the 
proposed intervention. This is contrary to Bolam which is not applied to the duty to provide 
information.  
Soon after Albrighton, South Australian Supreme Court deliberated on the influential case of F v 
R
180
 in which a woman brought an action in negligence alleging that she had not been adequately 
advised of the possibility of failure of contraception following tubal ligation (contemporaneous 
data established that the failure rate was less than 1%). The Full Court refused to apply the 
Bolam principle, with King CJ stating: 
In many cases an approved professional practice as to disclosure will be decisive. But professions 
may adopt unreasonable practices. Practices may develop in professions, particularly as to 
disclosure, not because they serve the interests of the clients, but because they protect the 
interests or convenience of members of the profession. The court has an obligation to scrutinize 
professional practices to ensure that they accord with the standard of reasonableness imposed by 
the law. A practice as to disclosure approved and adopted by a profession or section of it may be 
in many cases the determining consideration as to what is reasonable. On the facts of a particular 
case the answer to the question whether the defendant’s conduct conformed to approved 
professional practice may decide the issue of negligence, and the test has been posed in such 
terms in a number of cases. The ultimate question, however, is not whether the defendant’s 
conduct accords with the practices of his profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to 
the standard of reasonable care demanded by the law. That is a question for the court and the duty 
of deciding it cannot be delegated to any profession or group in the community.
181 182
  
 
When determining what practices the law demands as being representative of reasonable care, 
King CJ referred to various factors which needed to be considered by a careful and responsible 
doctor. His Honour stated that the following factors, whilst not being exhaustive, are relevant: 
• Nature of the matter to be disclosed. 
• Nature of treatment. 
                                                 
180
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181
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182
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• Patient's desire for information. 
• The temperament and health of the patient. 
• General surrounding circumstances.  
Essentially, the issue that the Australian courts saw with the Bolam test in its original form was 
that it could potentially preclude a finding that a common practice is negligent even if it 
manifestly is.
183
 Notwithstanding, there were still supporters in Australia of the Bolam principle 
from both the legal and medical professions.
184
  
Australian courts reject Bolam 
In 1992, the High Court of Australia, as the ultimate court of appeal and having the final word on 
the interpretation and application of all Australian laws including state and federal laws, and the 
common law, confirmed the demise of the Bolam Test
185
 in the seminal case of Rogers v 
Whitaker.
186
  
Mrs Whitaker had suffered a stick injury to her right eye several years prior to consulting Dr 
Rogers about the possibility of improving the appearance of the affected eye. Dr Rogers 
informed Mrs Whitaker that he felt that he could not only improve the cosmetic appearance of 
the eye, but that surgery could potentially improve sight in that eye. She agreed to the surgery 
but not until after ‘incessantly’ questioning Dr Rogers as to possible complications. The surgery 
was performed with skill and care however, regrettably there was no improvement in Mrs 
Whitaker’s sight and indeed she developed a condition known as sympathetic ophthalmia which 
affected the sight she had in her ‘good eye’;  she was left, effectively blind. Mrs Whitaker 
claimed that Dr Rogers was negligent in that he had failed in his duty of care to warn her of the 
risk of sympathetic ophthalmia, of which the likelihood of occurring was said to be in about 1 in 
14,000 cases.  Dr Rogers attempted to invoke the Bolam test claiming that there was a 
                                                 
183
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responsible body of medical opinion that agreed that they also would not have disclosed the 
small risk of sympathetic ophthalmia to Mrs Whitaker. 
In their joint judgment, the majority of the High Court
187
 asserted that except in cases of 
emergency or necessity, all medical treatment must be preceded by the patient's selective choice 
to undergo it, and that choice is meaningless unless it is made on the basis of relevant 
information. A doctor’s duty of care thus must include the disclosure of relevant information on 
which the patient can form his/her choice.  
The law should recognize that a medical practitioner has a duty to warn a patient of a material 
risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular 
case, a reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.
188
   
…the ‘duty to warn’ arises from the patient’s right to know of material risks, a right which in turn 
arises from the patient’s right to decide for himself or herself whether or not to submit to the 
medical treatment proposed.
189
 
 
However, in acknowledging the role of medical evidence, the six High Court judges in Rogers  
noted that  ‘responsible professional opinion will have an influential, often a decisive, role to 
play’ when a court is examining whether a doctor provided diagnosis or treatment according to 
the appropriate standard of care.
190
 However, the majority was not prepared to accept that such 
opinion would always be determinative of the standard of care [emphasis added], and stated the 
following: 
In Australia, it has been accepted that the standard of care to be observed by a person with some 
special skill or competence is that of the ordinary skilled person professing to have that special 
skill. But, that standard is not determined solely or even primarily by reference to the practice 
followed or supported by a responsible body of opinion within the relevant profession or trade.
191
 
 
                                                 
187
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Gaudron J in her minority judgment was even more emphatic in her rejection of the Bolam 
principle in relation to diagnosis and treatment: 
Even in the area of diagnosis and treatment there is, in my view, no legal basis for limiting 
liability in terms of the rule known as ‘the Bolam test’ which is to the effect that a doctor is not 
guilty of negligence if he or she acts in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of doctors skilled in the relevant field of practice. That is not to deny that, 
having regard to the onus of proof, ‘the Bolam test’ may be a convenient statement of the 
approach dictated by the state of the evidence in some cases. As such, it may have some utility as 
a rule-of-thumb in some jury cases, but it can serve no other useful function. 
192
 
 
In relation to a doctor’s duty to inform, Gaudron J added that it is the doctor-patient relationship 
that gives rise to a duty to inform.  
…that duty takes its precise content, in terms of the nature and details of the information to be 
provided, for the needs, concerns and circumstances of the patient. The patient may have special 
needs or concerns which, if known to the doctor, will indicate that special or additional 
information is required. In a case of that kind, the information to be provided will depend on the 
individual patient concerned. In other case, where for example, no specific enquiry is made, the 
duty is to provide the information that would reasonably be required by a person in the position of 
the patient.
 193
 
 
Accordingly, Rogers had affirmed the reasoning applied in F v R
194
 
195
 in which King CJ stated 
that although ‘much assistance will be derived from evidence as to the practice obtaining in the 
medical profession’ in determining the standard of care, he was ‘unable to accept that such 
evidence can be decisive in all circumstances’. King CJ stated that the court ‘has an obligation to 
scrutinize professional practices to ensure that they accord with the standard of reasonableness 
imposed by law’. The judgment of Bollen J in the same case was in a similar vein. It was his 
view that the court  
                                                 
192
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193
 ibid at 5 
194
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…will not produce an answer merely at the dictation of the expert evidence…I respectfully think 
that some of the cases in England have concentrated rather too heavily on the practice of the 
medical profession.
196
 
 
In relation to a doctor’s duty to provide a patient with adequate, relevant information, the 
majority held that ‘Generally speaking, it is not a question, the answer to which depends on 
medical standard and practices.’197 
Thus, the High Court in Rogers unequivocally rejected Bolam, and established that the standard 
of care in Australia is not determined by medical professional practice, but by a legal standard 
noting that:  
The ultimate question, however, is not whether the defendant’s conduct accords with the practices 
of his profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to the standard of reasonable care 
demanded by the law. That is a question for the court and the duty of deciding it cannot be 
delegated to any profession or group in the community.
198
 
 
The standard of reasonable care as demanded by the Australian law requires that a doctor’s duty 
extends to the provision of information regarding any material risk inherent in the proposed 
medical procedure. As previously noted, a risk is material if, in the circumstance of the particular 
case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it; or if the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that this particular patient, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.
199
  
Thus, the legal standard of reasonable care can be said to be patient-centred, as the doctor’s duty 
to inform ‘takes its precise content, in terms of the nature and detail of the information to be 
provided, from the needs, concerns and circumstances of the patient’. The doctor is made aware 
of the extent of the needs or concerns of the individual patient by the patient’s known history, the 
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specific questions and comments made by the patient, or by the needs and concerns of a 
reasonable person in this patient’s circumstances.  
Thus the High Court effectively dispelled any doubts that may have lingered as to whether the 
Bolam principle represented the law in Australia in relation to medical practice. Rather, the law 
imposes on healthcare professionals a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in their provision 
of professional services.
200
 The duty is a ‘single comprehensive duty covering all the ways in 
which a doctor is called upon to exercise his skill and judgment’201 and extends to the 
examination, diagnosis and treatment of the patient and to the provision of information and 
advice.  
Post Rogers, consideration of the practice of a ‘responsible body’ of the medical profession in 
Australia is usually reserved for instances when a court must assess whether a doctor was 
justified in invoking ‘therapeutic privilege’ to withhold information from a patient. Therapeutic 
privilege is only justified where ‘there is a particular danger that the provision of all relevant 
information will harm an unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile patient’. It involves cases 
where the patient is unable to ‘receive, understand or properly evaluate the significance of the 
information that would ordinarily be required with respect to his or her condition or the treatment 
proposed.’ 202 
The test of materiality as laid down in Rogers, was expanded on Rosenberg v Percival.
203
 
Callaghan J provided the following dissection of the test of materiality as haven two limbs: 
…[Materiality has] an objective and a subjective test, that is to say, a universal test for an 
hypothetical reasonable person in the patient’s position, and a test to be applied to the particular  
patient, even if, perhaps, she or he is an unreasonable one. What this in practice may mean is that 
the more inquisitive, or demanding, or less or more sophisticated perhaps, or obsessive, or 
suspicious, or hypochondriacal the patient may be, the greater the need for identification of an 
elaboration upon the slightest risks because such a patient may be likely to attach significance to 
them.
204
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The UK Supreme Court rejects Bolam in negligent advice cases 
Most recently the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has decided to follow the Australian 
approach and rejected the Bolam test as espoused in Sidaway. In Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board 
205
 the Supreme Court overturned the majority decision in Sidaway and found that 
Lord Scarman’s minority and Rogers v Whitaker to be correct. The case concerned a pregnant 
woman with insulin dependent diabetes mellitus whose baby was at risk of shoulder dystocia if 
she underwent a vaginal delivery. The woman argued that she was not told of the risk of shoulder 
dystocia because the doctor had formed the opinion that the risk of it occurring was very small. 
The doctor said that he did not warn the woman of the risk as he believed that most women once 
told of the risk would request a caesarean section. The woman underwent a vaginal delivery but 
during delivery the umbilical cord was occluded and the child was deprived of oxygen, leading 
to the child suffering dyskinetic cerebral palsy. The woman argued that she should have been 
told of the risk of shoulder dystocia because she would have elected for a caesarean section, and 
the injury to the child could have been avoided. 
Then majority decision was given by Lord Kerr and Lord Reed (with Lord Neuberger, Lord 
Clarke, Lord Wilson and Lord Hodge agreeing). Their Lordships stated at [87]: 
The correct position, in relation to the risks of injury involved in treatment, can now be seen to be 
substantially that adopted in Sidaway by Lord Scarman, and by Lord Woolf MR in Pearce, 
subject to the refinement made by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker… An adult 
person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to 
undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity 
is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any 
reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the 
circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely 
to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient would be likely to attach significance to it. 
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The standard of care after the Ipp Review  
In its final report,
206
 the Review Panel maintained that the standard of care as it applies to 
negligence, and the disclosure of information to patients are separate entities, and as such, need 
to be examined as separate entities.   
Issues about the standard of care in medical negligence cases may arise in relation to treatment 
(which includes diagnosis, the prescribing of medications and the carrying out of procedures) 
and to the giving of information about treatment. The Panel considered that the distinction 
between treatment, on the one hand, and the provision of information, on the other, is a very 
important one, and that the law should deal with these two activities in different ways. The 
standard of care therefore has to be discussed separately in regard to each.
207
 
Following amendments to legislation as recommended in the Ipp Report, a modified Bolam test 
was introduced to Australian law. It is known as the ‘peer professional defence’. For example, in 
the Civil Liability Act (NSW) s 5O states that: 
(1) that a person practising a profession (‘a professional’) does not incur a liability in 
negligence arising from the provision of a professional service if it is established that the 
professional acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was widely 
accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. 
(2) However, peer professional opinion cannot be relied on for the purposes of this 
section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational.  
(3) The fact that there are differing peer professional opinions widely accepted in 
Australia concerning a matter does not prevent any one or more (or all) of those opinions 
being relied on for the purposes of this section.  
(4) Peer professional opinion does not have to be universally accepted to be considered 
widely accepted.’  
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This provision is mirrored by similar provisions in all other states, and confirms, as restated in 
Walker v Sydney West Area Health Service
208
 that ‘the law imposes the duty of care but the 
standard of care is a matter of medical judgment’.209 This is a departure from the previous 
common law position established in Rogers in 1992, that it was not for the medical profession 
alone to establish the standard of care, rather it was for the court. It must be noted that at the time 
of writing, neither the Northern Territory nor the Australian Capital Territory had enacted this 
similar legislation, and they continue to rely on the court to set the standard of medical care, as 
determined by Rogers.  
When a court seeks to determine whether a healthcare professional (or indeed any professional) 
has breached a duty of care, three sequential steps are taken: 
1. an assessment of the evidence with regard to whether there has been negligence at 
common law; 
2. an assessment of the evidence with regard to whether the defendant acted in a manner 
that was consistent with  ‘peer professional opinion’ that is widely accepted in Australia 
as competent professional practice; and 
3. an assessment of the evidence and argument as to the possible discretionary rejection that 
the opinion provided by peer professional as irrational or unreasonable. 
210
 
Specifically: 
1. In NSW, Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania, the provisions apply to professionals and 
are not limited to the medical profession. The South Australian provisions apply to a 
‘person who provides a professional service’. The Western Australian provisions apply to 
a ‘health professional’.  
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2. In Queensland and Western Australia, there is no qualification that the peer professional 
opinion must be widely accepted in Australia.  
3. In Victoria and Western Australia, the peer professional opinion being relied on must not 
be ‘unreasonable’ as opposed to being ‘irrational’.  
Importantly, the Ipp Review recommended that these sections should not be applied to liability 
arising in connection with the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning, advice or other 
information in respect of the risk of death of or injury to a person thus reinforcing the importance 
of disclosure of risks as determined by the High Court in Rogers v Whitaker.
211
  
In Dobler v Halverson,
212
 the NSW Court of Appeal stated that the wording of the section 
indicated that it was meant to act as a defence to negligence, so that the obligation of proving 
compliance with rational, widely accepted, competent professional practice would lie with the 
health professional. Giles JA also stated that: 
For s 5O, the question is not necessarily one of preferring A’s evidence of acceptable professional 
practice to the evidence of B. If B’s evidence supports the manner in which the defendant acted, 
the question is whether there is established a professional practice widely accepted by (rational) 
peer professional opinion. If A and B both gave their evidence as evidence of whether the manner 
in which the defendant acted accorded with professional practice widely accepted by (rational) 
peer professional opinion, the question will be one of preferring A’s evidence to that of B, but 
otherwise it will be one of acceptance of B’s evidence, its weight and what it establishes. The 
conceptual distinction must be made, although in the acceptance of B’s evidence and its weight 
regard to the evidence of A is likely to remain relevant.
213
 [at 103] 
 
This ‘defence-based approach’ was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Sydney South West Area 
Health Service v MD,
214
 where a doctor had failed to plead s 5O of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) in his defence and argued that it was the plaintiff’s responsibility to argue such matters. 
This was rejected by the Court of Appeal which confirmed that s 5O was a defence which need 
to be proven by the doctor. In Brakoulias v Karunaharan
215
 and Grinham v Tabro Meats Pty 
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Ltd,
216
 the Victorian courts have also adopted the ‘defence-based’ approach to Wrongs Act 1958, 
s 59.  
In Grinham v Tabro Meats Pty Ltd,
217
 it was said that the professional bears the burden of 
proving that their conduct was ‘widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as 
competent professional practice.’ In this case, Forrest J found that it was necessary for the 
defence for evidence to be brought about practice across Australia, rather than just from a 
particular region or province. 
Another case of the successful application of s 5O of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) is 
Melchior v Sydney Adventist Hospital Ltd
218
 in which the defendant surgeon failed to administer 
a post-operative anticoagulant following an Achilles tendon repair operation. The patient died 
many days later of a blood clot. Hoeben J found that the defence of s 5O applied after hearing 
evidence that the majority of orthopaedic surgeons who specialised in foot and ankle surgery 
were not administering anticoagulants after Achilles tendon repair surgery. 
Provision of information after the Ipp Review   
The Ipp Review recommended that Rogers be maintained for cases on the provision of advice 
about treatment.
219
  Most states have created an exception to the modified Bolam standard for 
cases on the duty to warn of injury. Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria also enacted civil 
liability provision expressly addressing breach of duty to warn.
220
  
Some jurisdictions created legislation that removed the duty to warn of obvious risks. In 
Tasmania the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 17(2)(c), says that a medical practitioner is not 
under a duty to warn of obvious risks.  NSW, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western 
Australia also removed a general duty to warn of obvious risks but these laws did not apply to 
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the duties of professionals providing services. It is presumed that plaintiffs are aware of such 
risks, but plaintiffs can rebut the presumption.
221
 
The Ipp reforms also removed liability for the materialisation of an inherent risk, where such a 
risk is defined as a risk which cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill. 
However the exclusion of liability does not apply to a duty to warn of such risks.
222
 These 
provisions will be discussed below in the causation section.  
Causation 
Causation is a complex concept even though the High Court has said that it is ultimately a matter 
of commonsense.
223
 In order for a claim in negligence  to succeed, not only does there need to be 
an established duty of care and proof that this duty has been breached, but also that the breach of 
duty has caused or materially contributed to some resultant harm. The onus of proof that it was 
the negligent breach of duty that caused the harm, falls to the claimant. In some instances 
proving causation is straightforward, however in other instances the causal nexus between A (a 
breach of duty) & B (harm caused by that breach) may be difficult to prove.
224
  Complicating the 
issue when considering causation from a  medical law perspective is that the evidence required in 
medicine of A causing B is more rigid (usually requiring scientific evidence of at least 95% 
probability) than proof required in law of causation which is on the balance of probabilities (that 
is of at least 50%.)
225
 The different approaches lie in the concept of certainty, and stem from the 
purpose of the legal perspective which is concerned with allocating legal responsibility. Thus, 
when uncertainty exists about causation in medical law cases, the lesser, civil standard of proof 
is required by law. 
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As in an oft-applied passage from the Canadian case, Snell v Farrell, Sopinka J. stated: 
Causation is an expression of the relationship that must be found to exist between the tortious act 
of the wrongdoer and the injury to the victim in order to justify…226  
 
Even when there is a clear connection between the type of harm suffered and a particular 
action/inaction, it may be extremely difficult to demonstrate that the harm was caused by the 
action/inaction as opposed to some other factors for which the defendant is not responsible.
227 
 
228
 
It can happen then that even if a doctor has not exercised reasonable care in diagnosing a 
condition, or attending a patient, the deterioration of the patient’s condition may not have been 
caused by the doctor’s action[s] or inaction.229 It is also foreseeable that the act or omission need 
not be the sole cause of the harm. The law is concerned not so much with what caused the harm, 
but did the defendant cause it?   
Determination of causation generally involves a two-step process. The first concerns the factual 
question which is ordinarily determined by the application of the 'but for' test; the second step is 
to determine whether, and to what extent, the law regards the defendant as being responsible for 
the breach – these are policy and value judgments. The first step, but for, casts a very wide net, 
sometimes yielding unacceptable results so that it cannot be relied upon exclusively
230
 whereas 
the second step, examining the scope of liability, serves to narrow the focus of enquiry by 
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supplementing the but for test by with value judgments and policy consideration involving 
notions of ‘common sense.’231 
The factual, or ‘but for’ test for causation  
The traditional common law approach to causation is the but for test which asserts that the injury 
or harm to the claimant would not have occurred but for the breach of the duty of care imposed 
on the defendant. If the injury or harm would have occurred regardless of the negligent act or 
omission, the act or omission is not a cause of the damage and there is no legal liability for it. 
Therefore, the but for test is a negative criterion of causation,
232
 that is, it works to eliminate 
factors that were not a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. By way of example, in the English case, 
Barnett v Kensington Hospital
233
 three men who worked together attended the emergency 
department of a Kensington hospital complaining of vomiting and feeling generally unwell. The 
medical officer on duty did not attend them, but advised them via the nurse to go home and call 
their own doctors. One of the men died some hours later. The post mortem revealed arsenic 
poisoning as the cause of death. The court found that the medical officer was in breach of his 
duty of care by failing to see and examine the deceased man, but it held that on the but for test, 
even if the deceased man had been examined and admitted for treatment, there was little or no 
chance that the only effective antidote would have been administered to him in time, and it was 
more likely than not that he would have died anyway. Thus, negligence was not the cause of 
death.  
This finding is contrasted in the more recent Australian case of South Eastern Sydney Area 
Health Service v King.
234
 
235
  Ms King alleged that Professor O’Gorman-Hughes, paediatric 
haematologist had negligently performed her treatment by virtue of not being fully conversant 
with all the necessary up-to-date information in relation to the proposed treatment, specifically 
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about a recent amendment to the protocol.
236
 The court upheld the finding that but for the 
negligence, (not being aware of the evidence that the protocol should be amended) the resultant 
quadriplegia would have been avoided, thus the breach had caused the injury.  
Notwithstanding, the fact that the injury would not have occurred but for the defendants act or 
omission is often not sufficient to establish causation for legal purposes, because it is too broad. 
A person should not be liable for every wrongful act or omission which is a necessary condition 
of the occurrence of the injury that befell the plaintiff.  
The scope of liability in causation    
The second inquiry to be made when determining causation involves the legal question of 
whether, and if so to what extent, a defendant should in law be responsible for the consequences 
of his or her breach. This second question involves considerations of policy and value judgments, 
and supplements the but for test with common sense.  It is a filtering device to narrow the 
otherwise unacceptably wide net cast by the test of factual causation. It asks the question whether 
it is common sense to consider that the injury was caused by the negligent act. March v 
Stramare
237
  the seminal authority in Australian case law on common law causation, provides an 
example of a widely adopted normative approach to causation.  
For the purposes of the law of negligence, the question of causation arises in the context of the 
attribution of fault or responsibility whether the identified negligent act or omission of the 
defendant was so connected with the plaintiff’s loss or injury that, as a matter of ordinary 
common sense and experience, it should be regarded as a cause of it.
238
 
 
In March, the defendant parked his delivery truck in middle of multi-lane road at night to load 
produce. The truck had its rear and hazard lights on.  The plaintiff who was drunk, drove his car 
into the back of the truck and sustained injuries from the collision. He alleged that the injuries he 
sustained were caused by the negligence of the defendant in parking his truck in the middle of 
the road at night. The court was  required to make a comparative assessment of the two but for 
causes – the plaintiff would not have crashed his car but for the defendant having obstructed the 
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road by his truck, however nor would the crash have occurred but-for the plaintiff being drunk 
and driving at great speed. The difficulty in proving causation is evident in that the case went up 
to the Supreme Court, and then to the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South 
Australia held that the defendant’s negligence did not cause the plaintiff’s injuries however later 
the High Court restored the trial judge’s decision holding that the defendant’s negligence in 
parking his truck in the middle of the road at night did have a causation effect. In so doing, the 
High Court specifically rejected the but for test as the exclusive test of factual causation. Instead, 
the Court relied on a common sense view of causation which it had previously relied upon in its 
decision in Fitzgerald v Penn.
239
 There, the Court said that the question of causation is to be 
determined by asking ‘whether a particular act or omission … can fairly and properly be 
considered a cause of the accident.’240 Consequently, value judgments and policy as well as our 
‘experience of the ‘constant conjunction’ or ‘regular sequence’ of pairs of events in nature’241 are 
regarded as central to the common law's conception of causation. 
Limitations to causation - Novus Actus Interveniens 
Causation may no longer be established if a new act intervenes (novus actus interveniens) or 
where there are multiple causes between the negligent act and the injurious outcome,
242
 that is to 
say that there is a break in the chain, even though a simple application of the but for test would 
suggest otherwise.
243 
The intervening act may be an act of a third party, a natural event or an act 
by the plaintiff.  Novus actus interveniens potentially exonerates the first negligent 
actor/defendant from liability, or further liability, as the case may be.  
When the harm is the result of several causes, the issue of remoteness of the cause, material 
contribution to, or increase of the risk contributes to the question of causation. 
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Remoteness 
Some injuries resulting from a breach of duty of care are so unexpected (remote) that the law 
does not impose liability for them. According to Herron CJ in Beavis v Apthorpe:
244
 
In one sense, almost nothing is quite unforeseeable, since there is a very slight mathematical 
chance, recognizable in advance, that even the most freakish accidents will occur. In another, 
nothing is entirely foreseeable, since the exact details of a sequence of events never can be 
predicted with complete confidence. 
 
The question of remoteness in causation falls to whether the injuries sustained were a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the breach of the duty of care.
245
 But that is not to say that the 
defendant must have been able to foresee the exact injury that eventuated. The mere reasonable 
foreseeability of harm alone is not enough to establish causation,
246
 only that the reasonably 
foreseeable risk of injury was created, and that the subsequent injury fell within that risk. It can 
be said then that the duty of care is a ‘forward-looking rule’, focussing on what is reasonably 
foreseeable. Causation is a ‘backward-looking rule’, concerned with who or what was 
responsible for an injury. Given the different focus of these two concepts, it is possible for a 
person to breach their duty of care, but not be the cause of a reasonably foreseeable injury.
247
 
Further, the requirement calls for the risk of harm to be of the kind that is not far-fetched or 
fanciful, but real.
248
 
Proof of causation in duty to disclose cases 
In cases where a doctor has negligently failed to inform the patient about a material risk, and that 
risk comes home, the patient may claim that the doctor’s negligent failure to inform caused the 
injury because the patient would not have consented to the treatment had s/he known about the 
                                                 
244
 1962. Beavis v Apthorpe (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 852 at 856. 
245
 1961b. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The "Wagon Mound" (No 1)) [1961] UKPC 
1, [1961] AC 388, [1961] 1 All ER 404.; 1967b. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The 
"Wagon Mound" (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617 , 1961a. Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46.  
246
 1980. Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
247
  Causation In Failure To Warn Cases: High Court Finds In Favour Of Neurosurgeon.    
http://www.tresscox.com.au/resources/resource.asp?id=1310 (viewed 2 February 2014) 
248
 1969b. Tremain v Pike [1969]  3 All ER 1303.; 1967a. Bradford v Robinson Rentals Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 267.; 
1963. Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837  
Page 83 of 429 
 
risk[s]. Generally speaking, it falls to the patient/plaintiff to prove that s/he would not have 
proceeded with the proffered intervention, in the case of elective treatments, had s/he been aware 
of the risks. In situations where the intervention proffered is but one of several treatment options, 
it still falls to  the patients/plaintiff to prove firstly that s/he would not have proceeded if 
sufficiently informed, then further evidence would usually be required to establish what would 
have happened had a different path been followed ostensibly without the same risks.
249
 
Australian courts have thus been faced with ascertaining what the patient would have done if 
warned of the risk before the relevant treatment.  
In Rogers, evidence was tendered and accepted by both parties that Mrs Whitaker had 
incessantly asked about possible damage to her good eye prior to consenting to the surgery, and 
so it was established beyond reasonable doubt that she would not have proceeded with the 
surgery (which was elective) had she been made aware of the risks. The High Court thus found 
that it was Dr Rogers’ negligent failure to inform Mrs Whitaker of the risks that caused her 
injury.  
Notwithstanding, in Chappel v Hart
250
 McHugh J expressed concern that relying on 
pronouncements from patients following an adverse outcome, about what they might have done 
if informed of risks,  was inherently problematic and ought to be treated with caution.  
Human nature being what is, most plaintiffs will genuinely believe that, if he or she had been 
given an option that would or might have avoided the injury, the option would have been taken. 
In determining the reliability of the plaintiff’s evidence in jurisdictions where the subjective test 
operates, therefore, demeanour can play little part in accepting the plaintiff’s evidence. It may be 
a ground for rejecting the plaintiff’s evidence. But given that most plaintiffs will genuinely 
believe that they would have taken another option, if presented to them, the reliability of their 
evidence can only be determined by reference to objective factors, particularly the attitude and 
conduct of the plaintiff at or about the time when the breach of duty occurred.
251
 [emphasis 
added]  
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In addressing these concerns about the reliability of the retrospective nature of the plaintiff’s 
evidence, the court in Rosenberg v Percival
252
 looked for more objective evidence regarding 
what the plaintiff would have done had she been sufficiently informed of the risks. The factors 
and evidence considered included: 
• her need for surgery – she had been suffering from a worsening condition of 
malocclusion for a number of years. The osteotomy procedure undertaken was the 
operation most likely to produce the best result in her case; 
• her desire for treatment – she had consulted several specialists for the purpose of 
remedying the condition and getting the best result. There was evidence of her 
willingness to undergo the risks of procedures (including general anaesthetic) which she 
was familiar with; 
• her character, personality and prior experiences – she knew that surgical operations carry 
inherent risks of harm given her professional background (she had 20 years’ experience 
as a qualified nurse, a doctorate of philosophy in nursing and held a senior lectureship in 
nursing at a university) and did not ask specific questions about risk; 
• the remoteness of the risk – the risk possibility was very slight; and  
• her willingness to undergo subsequent procedures – she subsequently underwent another 
operation to correct the consequences of the temporo-mandibular joint disorder.
253
 
Taking these objective factors into account, the court concluded that had the patient/plaintiff 
been advised by the surgeon about the risks, she would still have gone ahead with the surgery. 
Thus, the negligence claim in Rosenberg v Percival failed on causation grounds.  
Causation following the Ipp Review 
The Ipp Review provided the opportunity for jurisdictions to re-examine elements of negligence 
law, including causation, however the Review recommended that the two-prong test be 
maintained. The majority of jurisdiction adopted this form of causation. 
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The High Court examined the requirement of factual causation in Strong v Woolworths Ltd
254
 at 
[20], where the High Court said: 
Under the statute, factual causation requires proof that the defendant's negligence was a necessary 
condition of the occurrence of the particular harm. A necessary condition is a condition that must 
be present for the occurrence of the harm. However, there may be more than one set of conditions 
necessary for the occurrence of particular harm and it follows that a defendant's negligent act or 
omission which is necessary to complete a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient to account 
for the occurrence of the harm will meet the test of factual causation within  s 5D(1)(a).  In such a 
case, the defendant's conduct may be described as contributing to the occurrence of the harm.  
 
Scope of liability is also expressly addressed. For example, s 5(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW)
255
 states that liability requires a finding: 
(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the 
harm so caused ( ‘scope of liability’). 
Section 5D(4) also states: 
(4) For the purpose of determining the scope of liability, the court is to consider (amongst 
other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be 
imposed on the negligent party. 
A case which illustrates the scope of liability is Paul v Cooke.
256
 The case was concerned with 
the failure of a radiologist, Cooke who failed to detect a berry aneurysm during an angiogram. 
Two years later, the aneurysm was discovered and the patient underwent a coiling procedure 
performed by a neurosurgeon and a different radiologist. During that procedure the aneurysm 
burst and the patient, Paul, suffered a stroke and was permanently disabled. Paul argued that the 
negligent failure to detect the aneurysm caused her brain damage. At trial, Brereton J found that 
factual causation had been established as had Cooke diagnosed the aneurysm in 2003, Paul 
would have had sought treatment and the aneurysm would have been removed and it was more 
likely than not that no complications would have arisen. However, Brereton J went on to find 
that injury did not fall within the scope of liability. The radiologist’s job was to diagnose the 
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aneurysm so that the patient could be treated and the harm of spontaneous rupture could be 
avoided. While the doctor did fail in that duty, a spontaneous rupture never eventuated. The harm 
suffered by the patient Paul was a harm caused by intra-procedural rupture. That harm was ‘not 
harm of the kind from which the relevant rule of responsibility was intended to protect her’: at 
[128].  The risk of intra-procedural rupture was foreseeable but that risk was not caused, and 
remained unaffected by, the failure to make a diagnosis. On that basis it could not be said that the 
breach had caused the damage. 
The Court of Appeal upheld Brereton J’s findings. Basten JA, Leeming JA and Ward JA all 
agreed that the harm suffered by Ms Paul resulted from the materialisation of a risk occurring 
that could not be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill. The Court found that this 
was an appropriate case for the application of the limiting principle that the scope of a negligent 
defendant's liability normally does not extend beyond liability for the occurrence of such harm 
the risk of which is was the duty of that defendant to exercise reasonable care and skill to avoid; 
it was no part of Dr Cooke's duty to avoid the risk of intra-operative rupture and Dr Cooke's 
negligence did not create any intra-operative risk. Leeming JA summarised the court’s 
position:
257
  
There will be many cases where s 5D(1)(b) considerations are finely balanced. This is not one of 
them. Although no one could review the facts of this case without feeling sympathy for Ms Paul, 
the harm she has suffered is not within the scope of Dr Cooke's liability. Accepting, as the Act 
commands, that there must be some occasions where breach of duty and factual causation are not 
sufficient, the absence of any increased risk and the fact that Ms Paul's harm resulted from her 
informed exercise of choice to undergo a risky procedure combine to make this a clear case 
 
Causation in negligent advice cases following the Ipp Review 
The Review supported retaining the position in Rogers in causation claims, as a means of 
acknowledging the significance of patients’ right to self determination,258  and to provide an 
answer to the question of what this patient would have done if warned of the risks, as opposed to 
what a hypothetical person might have done.  
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 This assumes that information about risks is essential for a person to be able to make meaningful decision.  
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The ensuing civil liability legislation enacted in New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, and 
Western Australia contain essentially identical language addressing the application of a 
subjective test in relation to causation, however they prevent the patient making statement about 
what they would have done had they known about the risk. In the Civil Liability Acts 2002 
NSW,s 5D(3) it is said that: 
If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who 
suffered harm would have done if the negligent person had not been negligent: 
(a) the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, 
subject to paragraph (b), and 
(b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about what he or she would 
have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or 
her interest. 
The High Court considered this section in Wallace v Kam.
259
 Dr Kam performed surgery on Mr 
Wallace’s spine to alleviate longstanding pain. This procedure had two risks, both of which 
should have been drawn to the patient’s attention but were not. The first risk, a lesser risk, was 
temporary damage to the nerves (femoral neurapraxia), materialised. The second risk, but which 
did not materialise, bore the more significant outcome of a 1 in 20 chance of paralysis. Wallace 
admitted that had he known about the first risk he would still have undergone the surgery but he 
argued that had he known about the second risk he would not have. As he would not have had 
the surgery if he had been made aware of the risk of paralysis he argued that he would not have 
had the procedure that led to nerve damage. 
The High Court considered the issue of causation and the 2 step test set out in s 5D of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW):
260
  
Whether the defendant caused the harm/injury; and 
Whether, and to what extent, a defendant should be responsible for his/her breach.  
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The High Court found that on the accepted facts, the first step of the test for causation, factual 
causation, (that is the but for test), was established that Mr Wallace would not have undergone 
the surgery if Dr Kam had exercised reasonable care in warning about the risk of paralysis 
arising from the surgery. However, the second step in proving causation, scope of liability, was 
not established.  The second step under s5D(2) requires the Court to consider the scope of 
liability. The court stated: 
The distinction now drawn by s 5D(1) between factual causation and scope of liability should not 
be obscured by judicial glosses. A determination in accordance with s 5D(1)(a) that negligence 
was a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm is entirely factual, turning on proof by the 
plaintiff of relevant facts on the balance of probabilities in accordance with s 5E. A determination 
in accordance with s 5D(1)(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person's liability 
to extend to the harm so caused is entirely normative, turning in accordance with s 5D(4) on 
consideration by a court of (amongst other relevant things) whether or not, and if so why, 
responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.
261
 
 
Applying these criteria to the facts, the Court found that it was not appropriate to impose liability 
on the doctor for the failure to avoid neuropraxia when the patient would have been prepared to 
accept the risk.
262
 The Court said:  
Consideration of a case involving the materialisation of one of a number of distinct risks of 
different physical injuries makes it necessary to return to the nature of the duty and the policy that 
underlies its imposition. The duty of a medical practitioner to warn the patient of material risks 
inherent in a proposed treatment is imposed by reference to the underlying common law right of 
the patient to choose whether or not to undergo a proposed treatment. However, the policy that 
underlies requiring the exercise of reasonable care and skill in the giving of that warning is 
neither to protect that right to choose nor to protect the patient from exposure to all unacceptable 
risks. The underlying policy is rather to protect the patient from the occurrence of physical injury 
the risk of which is unacceptable to the patient. It is appropriate that the scope of liability for 
breach of the duty reflect that underlying policy.
263
 
 
 
 
                                                 
261
 at [14]. 
262
 2005a. Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134.at 144  
263
 at [36] 
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Trespass  
The tort of trespass is the unauthorised interference with someone’s person (or property). For the 
action in trespass to be successful, the defendant is required to prove that:  
• there was no lawful justification for the unauthorized act/interference. 
• the injury/harm was direct264 (to the plaintiff or to his/her property) 
Intention is still a relevant factor in Australian trespass law but it is also possible to have an 
unintended trespass. English law, in contrast, requires that intent be an essential part of an action 
in trespass. Any unintended harms must be dealt with by the law of negligence.
265
 
266
  
Trespass against the person (as opposed to property) is usually refined further into the separate 
torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment.  
Assault 
Assault requires a direct threat
267
 that creates in another person an apprehension of imminent 
harmful
268
 or offensive contact.
269
 An assault, in the strict sense, and as will be used in this 
thesis, is therefore any overt act, but not an omission to act, which causes fear to another. 
270
 It is 
the fear which is the substance of assault, as Barwick CJ in The Queen v Phillips
271
 described: 
[A]n assault necessarily involves the apprehension of injury or the instillation of fear or fright. It 
does not necessarily involve physical contact with the person assaulted, nor is such physical 
contact, if it occurs, an element of the assault.   
                                                 
264
 The frequently quoted example of the distinction is that if a person going along a road is hit by a log which has 
been thrown, the interference is direct; whereas if he or she trips over a log which had earlier been thrown onto the 
road, the interference is indirect: Reynolds v Clarke (1725) 92 ER 410 
265
 1971a. Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554. 
266
 1965. Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 , Court of Appeal. 
267
  Even a thwarted attempt to commit a battery may still be an assault as in 1830. Stephens v Myers (1830) 172 ER 
735. 
268
 In 1969a. Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWLR 451 threats  made over the telephone could constitute an assault 
compare to the 1669. Tuberville v Savage [1669] EWHC KB J25. in which the court held that a conditional 
threatening statement, without an imminent threat of harm, does not constitute an assault.    
269
  1983b. Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309.; 1911. Brady v Schatzel, Ex Parte Brady (1911) St R Qd 206 ; 1988d. 
Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11   
270
 1997d. R v Burstow [1997] UKHL 34 House of Lords. considered at the same time as  R v Ireland [1998] 1 AC 
147 An offence could be committed in the absence of a direct or indirect application of force to the body, and silent 
telephone calls were capable of constituting an assault . 
271
 1971b. The Queen v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467.at 472 
Page 90 of 429 
 
 
The threats can be made by words,
272
 actions,
 273
 or words and actions together so that the threat 
is derived from their combined effect. 
274
 
Battery 
Battery is said to be the unlawful, ‘... direct, intentional imposition of any unwanted physical 
contact on another person...’ 275 that is to say that the interference must be direct and not 
passive,
276
 or consequential,
277
 and that it involves the unlawful touching of another. The 
pertinent intention is to make contact with the body of the plaintiff, not to do the plaintiff an 
injury - this has great relevance in medical interventions.  
If no obvious harm comes to the person as a result of the unauthorised touching, the ‘harm’ is 
considered to be the non-consensual touching per se. This notion is in deference to the concept 
of the inviolability of the body
278
 - the law regards the slightest unauthorised, intentional 
touching as constituting a trespass to the person. 
Additionally, there need not be any evidence that the unwanted touching is associated with an 
element of hostility.
279
 Thus a medical procedure carried out without the patient’s, or authorised 
surrogate’s prior consent may be a battery. Indeed, even if the person’s life is saved, if there was 
no lawful authorisation to the touching, an action in battery can still be brought.
280
  
                                                 
272
  1964b. Police v Greaves [1964] NZLR 295 in which G pointed a knife towards the police and said ‘Don’t you 
bloody move. You come a step closer and you will get this straight through your guts’ and ‘get off this property 
before you get this in your guts.’  
273
 1891b. R v Hamilton (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 111 at 114 – in which the Court found that a father had exceeded his 
bounds of authority when he attempts to coerce his child by pointing a pistol at him. 
274
  1937. Purdy v Wozesensky [1937] 2 WWR 116 in which the defendant was beating the father of a girl, in her 
presence  and said to her ‘You’re next’. 
275
 1992a. Battiato v Lagana [1992] 2 Qd R 234  per Moynihan J at p235  
276
 1844. Innes v Wylie (1844) 174 ER 800. 
277
 1725. Reynolds v Clarke (1725) 92 ER 410. 
278
 Oxford English Dictionary Copyright, 2013 Oxford University Press ‘that must not or cannot be transgressed, 
dishonoured, or broken; to be kept sacred’ (February 2014) 
279
 2001b. Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd Casino (2001) 53 NSWLR 98.; although  in 1993c. R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 
75., the House of Lords said that if an act was unlawful, it was [by implication] hostile  
280
  Such was the case in 1990b. Malette v Shulman 72 O.R. (2d) 417 [1990] O.J. No. 450 Ont. C.A. in which the 
unconscious plaintiff, carrying a card declaring her to be Jehovah's Witness and refusing blood transfusions, was 
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Very few cases come before the courts claiming trespass in Australia with the bulk of liability 
claims being brought in negligence. Nevertheless, there have been a few cases of trespass in 
Australia. Most notable was the case of Hart v Herron
281
 which concerned a Mr Hart who 
admitted himself voluntarily to a Sydney psychiatric hospital, Chelmsford Hospital, in 1973. 
Hart alleged that while he was a patient at Chelmsford, he was treated using Electo-Convulsive 
Therapy (ECT)
282
 and deep sleep therapy
283
 without his consent; indeed Mr Hart gave evidence 
at the trial that he had been asked to sign a form consenting to such treatment but had refused. He 
said that shortly after refusing, a nurse asked him to take a tablet, which he did, and ‘after which 
everything went black.’ His next recollection was waking 10 days later, and discovering that he 
had, against his specific directives, been treated by ECT and deep sleep therapy. The jury found 
in favour of Mr Hart against the psychiatrist, Dr Herron, finding that Mr Hart had been assaulted 
(amongst other claims).  
Consent as a defence to assault and battery 
Given that the fundamental element underpinning assault and battery is that the action is 
unauthorised, then the most obvious defence is the person’s consent to the interaction. For 
example, consensual touching, does not ordinarily lead to battery.  
The defence of consent in this context requires that the person being touched understood the 
basic nature and effects of the touching. In the medical context, a doctor is liable in trespass if 
s/he did not inform his/her patient ‘in broad terms of the nature of the procedure’284 prior to its 
commencement.  This is a different (and quite lower) standard of information provision than the 
                                                                                                                                                             
administered a blood transfusion which saved her life but the action of transfusing her without her consent was 
nevertheless found to constitute a battery.  
281
 1996b. Hart v Herron [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81 -395. 
282
 Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) consists of a series of brief, low-frequency electrical pulses from small 
electrodes placed at specific locations on the head, causing convulsions in the patient. It is used to treat a range of 
mental illnesses such as severe depression, catatonia and some forms of mania and schizophrenia.  
283
 Deep Sleep Therapy has fallen from favour and is currently dissuaded from use - it is used carried out by 
administering large doses of barbiturates, tranquilisers or sedatives to patients, thereby inducing a state of 
unconsciousness that would be maintained for several weeks. It was theorised that such a treatment could ‘rewire’ a 
patient’s brain, and thus cure them from their ‘mental problem’. Bromberger, Brian, and Janet Fife-Yeomans. Deep 
Sleep: Harry Bailey and the Scandal of Chelmsford. Sydney: Simon & Schuster Australia, 1991;   Susan Geason  
‘Dark Trance: Dr. Harry Bailey & the Chelmsford Private Hospital Scandal.’. July 2007. 
http://www.susangeason.com/darktrance.html (viewed January 2011). 
284
 1992g. Rogers v Whitaker (1992)  109 ALR 625 (HCA).(majority judgment); 2001f. Rosenberg v Percival  
(2001) 205 CLR 434: (2001) 178 ALR 577; [2001] HCA 18. HCA. 
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duty in negligence to provide information about material risks (which is discussed in more detail 
below). 
Consent cannot be relied upon as a defence: 
 if the act to which a person has consented is unlawful;285  
 if the law does not permit consent to the act in question to have effect;286or   
 if the consent proves to be invalid for reasons including the incapacity of the person to 
consent, misrepresentation or fraud.
287
  
A cautionary note is that generally consent is not a defence to trespass occasioning actual bodily 
harm unless the circumstances fall within one of the recognised ‘lawful’ exceptions such as 
sport
288
 and surgery.
289
 The examples of lawful exceptions are all supported by a recognised 
public interest in the allowing such behaviour.  
While there is some English judicial commentary to the contrary,
290
 medical interventions in 
Australia are not automatically lawful, regardless of how benevolent the motivation, as McHugh 
J of the High Court of Australia stated
291
 
It is the central thesis of the common law doctrine of trespass to the person that the voluntary 
choices and decisions of an adult person of sound mind concerning what is or is not done to his or 
her body must be respected and accepted, irrespective of what others, including doctors, may 
think of is in the best interests of that particular person. 
 
                                                 
285
  e.g. consent to euthanasia is not defence - see 2012b. Carter v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland 
[2012] QSC 234.  
286
 1993c. R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75. 
287
 1991e. R v Mobilio [1991] Vic Rp 28; [1991] 1 VR 339.; 2012c. Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223. 
288
  Sportsmen and women implicitly consent to the normal risks under the rules of engagement of the particular 
sport however; consent only operates to act in the ordinary legitimate course of the game. 1979. McNamara v 
Duncan (1979) 26 ALR 584.; 1990 Sibley v Milutinivic [1990] Aust Torts Report 67, 686. 
289
 1975. Schweizer v Central Hospital (1975) 53 DLR (3d) 494.. 
290
 Lord Mustill asserted in Airedale v Bland [1993] AC 789 -891 ‘...bodily invasion in the course of proper medical 
treatment stand completely outside the criminal law’; he confirmed this view in his judgment in Brown by referring 
to the Law Commission Consent in the Criminal Law , 117, para 8.50 ‘...that proper medical treatment, for which 
actual or deemed consent in a prerequisite , is in a category of its own.’ 
291
 1992h. Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion's case) (1992) 175 
CLR 218  
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Further, a doctor’s reasonable and honest belief in error that a patient had consented is no 
defence. In Ljubic v Armellin
292
 a doctor was found liable for performing a hysterectomy 
including oophorectomy on a patient believing that she had consented to having both her uterus 
and her ovaries removed when in fact the patient had consented only to the removal of her 
uterus. 
Moreover, the patient’s consent may be negatived because they had not been provided with 
information adequately describing the nature of the treatment in broad terms. For example, 
Matheson J of the Supreme Court of South Australia found that in D v S
293
 the surgeon had not 
told the patient about the cosmetic and sensory implications of a reduction mammoplasty, and 
that had he done so, the patient would not have undergone the procedure. His failure to disclose 
the information was a breach of his duty and ‘in the circumstances, her consent was not a true 
consent’.294 
Finally fraud or misrepresentation may also vitiate consent. In Dean v Phung,
295
  the patient had 
consulted the dentist after being accidentally struck in the face. Over a period of 12 months, the 
dentist carried out 53 procedures which included a number of unnecessary and ineffective 
treatments. The total cost of the treatments was over $70,000. 
Basten JA gave the lead decision for the Court of Appeal. Basten JA found that the treatment 
was a battery and that a defence of consent could not be made out. Basten JA said that consent is 
validly given for medical treatments when where the patient has been given basic information 
about the nature of the treatment. In cases where the nature of the treatment was misrepresented 
consent will be vitiated. If the treatment was demonstrated objectively to be incapable of 
addressing the patient’s condition, then the subjective beliefs of the practitioner, regarding the 
treatment will be irrelevant. Even in cases where the conduct was objectively capable of 
constituting therapeutic treatment, if the treatment was undertaken solely for a non-therapeutic 
purpose not revealed to the patient, there will be no relevant consent. 
                                                 
292
 2009f. Ljubic v Armellin [2009] ACT SC 21  
293
 1981b. D v S (1981) 93 LSJS 405. 
294
  ibid.at 419 
295
 2012c. Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223. 
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Basten JA found that the treatment in question was unnecessary, was therefore a battery and the 
consent had been vitiated by misrepresentation. Beazley JA agreed with the orders of Basten JA. 
Macfarlan JA agreed in general with Basten JA but disagreed on the issue of whether it was 
necessary to show some subjective intention that the health practitioner knew that the treatment 
was not going to provide any benefit. His Honour was concerned that if the practitioner's state of 
mind was to be ignored, negligent advice that treatment is required will result in a trespass 
despite the practitioner's bona fide belief in the necessity for treatment.  
The objective approach of Basten JA was upheld in White v Johnson.
296
 This case was also 
concerned with dental work which the plaintiff argued had not been consented to and which was 
alleged to be unnecessary and ineffective. The Court of Appeal repeated the finding that a 
medical practitioner will be liable for assault and battery when they are solely motivated by an 
unrevealed non-therapeutic purpose. Leeming JA specifically agreed with Basten JA’s objective 
formulation and rejected the subjective test suggested by Macfarlan JA in Dean. Leeming JA 
also stressed that in these types of cases it will be the patient who must prove that consent had 
been fraudulently obtained and that the treatment bore no therapeutic purpose. Because the 
plaintiff had failed to prove fraud, her claim for assault and battery failed. 
False imprisonment 
False imprisonment requires [i] the detention of the person and [ii] the unlawfulness of such 
detention. It is based on the intent to unlawfully confine the person, and can occur when a person 
is physically, chemically, or psychologically (by intimidation or threat) restrained. The person 
restrained does not have to attempt to escape the restraint in order to state a claim for false 
imprisonment,
297
 indeed, even if the claimant was not aware at the time that s/he was being held 
unlawfully.
298
 
299
   
In the context of healthcare, questions of false imprisonment are most commonly concerned with 
patients who want to leave the hospital before they are formally discharged. There is no special 
                                                 
296
 2015b. White v Johnson  [2015] NSWCA 18. 
297
 1920. Meering v Graham-White Aviation Co Ltd (1920) 122 LT 44.; 1953. Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26  
298
 1922. Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447.; 1971c. Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621.; 1988b. Murray v 
MOD [1988] 2 All ER 521.; 1991d. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo Lin Seng [1991] 2 VR 597. 
299
 1984c. Hart v Herron (1984) Aust Torts Reports 80-201. 
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exception (apart from under mental health law and infectious disease law) that allows hospital 
patients to be held against their will. All competent adults (except for prisoners and members of 
the military services) are legally entitled to be physically free and therefore patients have the 
right to discharge themselves from hospital at their own discretion. This right also applies to 
parents or guardians to remove children (minors) from the hospital. Should a patient contemplate 
discharging him/herself early, then the hospital has a duty to warn a patient of the risks entailed 
in leaving before it is medically indicated, but it does not have the right to restrain the patient. Of 
concern might be an instance in which healthcare professionals have concerns that a patient 
presents a risk of harm to him/herself or to others,  or if it is unclear whether the patient is 
competent to make the decision to leave the hospital against medical advice. Should such an 
occasion arise, then the mental health legislation of every state and territory in Australia allows 
for the detainment of people who are considered to be of an imminent danger to themselves or 
others as well as those with a previously diagnosed mental illness.
300
  Equally each state provides 
mechanism under public health law for the compulsory treatment of particular infectious 
diseases. 
Defences to false imprisonment 
The tort of false imprisonment reflects the fundamental interest of the common law in protecting 
individual liberty and freedom of movement
301
 and good faith is not a defence
302
 to detain a 
person unlawfully. The only defence to a claim of false imprisonment is that the imprisonment 
was lawful. As Kirby J stated in Ruddock v Taylor:
303
 
Wrongful imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. Lack of fault, in the sense of absence of faith is 
irrelevant to the existence of the wrong. This is because the focus of this civil wrong is on the 
vindication of liberty and wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. A plaintiff who proves that his 
or her imprisonment was caused by the defendant therefore has a prima facie case. At common 
law it is the defendant who must then show lawful justification for his or her actions. 
 
                                                 
300  The mental health legislation of every state and territory in Australia allows for the detainment and coercive 
treatment of people with a mental illness. Ryan, C. J. & Callaghan, S. 2011. Protecting Our Patients' Rights. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 45, 180. 
301
 1955. Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147. per Fullagar J at 152.   
302
  2003. Ruddock v Taylor [2003] NSWCA 262 per Ipp J at 4 
303
 2005f. Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612 at 140 
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False imprisonment is an action which is committed when the voluntary conduct of one person 
directly subjects another to total deprivation of freedom of movement without lawful 
justification.
304
 In claims of false imprisonment, it is the defendant who must prove that the 
either the person consented,
305
 or that the detention was otherwise justified.
306
  
Summarising claims in trespass 
The civil law imposes on healthcare professionals a duty to act in certain ways including not 
treating, or detaining a patient without that patient’s consent, or without some other legal 
authority.
307
 Viewed from a different perspective, doctors have duty to not treat a patient (or 
detain him/her) without his/her consent, or without some other legal justification. A patient may 
sue a healthcare professional for damages and receive compensation if a medical intervention 
proceeds without his/her consent without there being proof of injury or harm – the ‘harm’ is seen 
as the touching of the person without his/her consent. The common law defence of necessity may 
be evoked in the case of a medical emergency where the patient’s life is at risk of dying and 
obtaining consent prior to treatment is not possible.
308
  
Finally, the tort of trespass has developed as a means of serving to protect a person’s right to 
sovereignty over his/her body, to protect one's physical integrity as well as the individual’s sense 
of dignity and personal autonomy.  
The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person’s body is inviolate.309  
  
The effect is that everybody is protected in law against any form of unwanted touching/physical 
contact,
310
 or deprivation of liberty by means of close physical restraint
311
 
                                                 
304
 Laws of Australia, (LBC), Volume 33.8 Intentional Torts 
305
 1984c. Hart v Herron (1984) Aust Torts Reports 80-201. at 67, 814 
306
 2011a. Darcy v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 413. 
307
 The duty also extends to taking reasonable care in treating patients, and this is discussed later under Negligence  
308
 2009c. Hunter  and  New England  Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
309
 1984a. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, .per Goff LJ  at 378 
310
  1992h. Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion's case) (1992) 175 
CLR 218  
311
 2007b. NSW v Delly [2007] NSWCA 303.; 2010. Trevorrow v State of South Australia  [2010] SASC 56. 
Page 97 of 429 
 
(2010)(2010)(2010)(2010)(2010)regardless of whether an injury results. That is not to say that 
the ordinary bustle and jostle that one might experience in everyday life, the so-called 
‘exigencies of everyday life’,312 or when undertakings various sports, particular contact sports313  
can be routinely considered to be trespass to the person.  Indeed, most physical contacts resulting 
from everyday life are considered to have been consented to, by implication, based on 
individuals’ situation of living in a society.314  
A person’s consent to being touched, by and large, transforms the touching into a lawful act by 
justifying it,
315
 although it needs to be noted that certain criteria (the elements of consent) need to 
be satisfied, and this is discussed at length elsewhere in this chapter. Specifically, that the person 
must be competent to consent, that his/her decision to consent is made voluntarily, and that 
relevant information has been disclosed.
316
 
The law of trespass following the Ipp Review  
As stated above, the Ipp Review legislation does not apply to acts where there was an intention 
to cause harm (see for example Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B). This was examined in 
Dean v Phung.
317
 The Court of Appeal found that the dentist had misled the patient and had 
committed battery and, as a result, the Civil Liability Act 2002 did not apply to the claim. The 
consent given by the patient was vitiated by the fact that the dentist had deliberately misled the 
patient. A health practitioner’s conduct will be considered misleading if the treatment were 
demonstrated objectively to not be capable of addressing the patient’s condition.  Even where the 
conduct of the practitioner was objectively capable of constituting therapeutic treatment, the 
consent will be vitiated if the treatment was undertaken solely for a non-therapeutic purpose not 
revealed to the patient.  The Court of Appeal also stated that if a matter is concerned with the 
                                                 
312
 1984a. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, . per Goff L at 378 
313
 1979. McNamara v Duncan (1979) 26 ALR 584. at 588; 2006a. Fallas v Mourlas [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-
835; [2006] NSWCA 32. citing ss 17-19 of the NSW Civil Liability Act –involvement of  a dangerous recreational 
activity  
314
 1984a. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, . 
315
 1990d. Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 , 73; 1984b. Freeman v Home Office (No 2) [1984] 1 
All ER 1036. 
316
 There are some situation in which a person’s consent is not required, such as in emergency situations, and when 
the person lacks capacity, and these have been discussed previously 
317
 2012c. Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223. 
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provision of more detailed information about the risks of adverse outcomes then the relevant tort 
is negligence and not battery.  
In White v Johnston
318
 Leeming JA said the following regarding Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), 
s 3B: 
The question posed by s 3B(1)(a) has two limbs: it is whether the proceeding involved the ‘civil 
liability of a person in respect of an intentional act that is done by the person with intent to cause 
injury or death ...’. No doubt [the dentist’s] conduct was intentional, but it was also necessary to 
establish that the dental procedures were performed ‘with intent to cause injury’… [I]t does not 
follow that because an intentional tort is alleged and made out that s 3B applies. ‘[I]t is not a 
necessary element of assault (and battery) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff’: 
Cowell v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales
319
 at 743; it is the act and not the 
injury which must be intentional.  
 
Synopsis 
This section has reviewed the law of disclosure from the perspective of criminal law and tort 
law. The chapter also examined the differences within tort law between trespass and negligence, 
and the changes to both that have occurred in the last decade due to the Ipp Reforms. 
 
The next section will focus on the elements involved in enacting consent. 
  
                                                 
318
 2015c. White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA 18. 
319
 1988a. Cowell v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales (1988) 13 NSWLR 714  
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Section III – ENACTING CONSENT 
Introduction 
This section of the chapter examines the legal requirements for the enactment of consent. It first 
examines the role of specificity, which is the requirement that the patient consent to the actual 
treatment that has been provided. 
Specificity   
Consent must cover the act to be performed, that is to say that the treatment provided must fall 
within the scope of the specific consent that has been given by the patient. In specific 
circumstances, the consent may be extended to cover further unforeseen treatment such as an 
emergency. This situation was considered in the previously described case of Murray v 
McMurchy
320
 in which tubal ligation was performed on a patient when consent had only been 
given for caesarean section. The court held that ‘tying off’ the patient’s fallopian tubes at the 
time of the emergency caesarean section was for convenience rather than urgency, and could 
have been postponed to allow the patient to consider the ramifications. As consent had not been 
extended to cover the tubal ligation, this amounted to trespass. 
Ordinarily, if the situation is an emergency where it is not be possible to provide full advice to 
the patient or substitute decision-maker about the intervention before it is performed, the courts 
will accept that prior consent is not required, and that life saving interventions should not be 
delayed to obtain consent. Such was the situation in Marshall v Curry
321
 in which consent had 
been given by the patient for a hernia operation, however during the surgery, conditions were 
uncovered that neither the surgeon nor the patient had anticipated. The surgeon believed that it 
was necessary for the health of the patient, and possibly to save his life, to perform an 
orchidectomy at the time, and that it would have been unreasonable to postpone the removal of 
the patient’s testicle to a later date. In this case the court found that the doctrine of necessity 
covered the actions of the surgeon to protect him from liability. 
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 1949. Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442 (BC SC). 
321
 1933. Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260. 
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In contrast, in Brushett v Cowan
322
  in which the patient was being investigated for a possible 
sarcoma on the thigh, the Court of Appeal rejected the patient’s assertion that she had not 
consented to a bone biopsy which was carried out at the same time as a muscle biopsy to which 
she had consented. The patient had signed a consent form which included the following 
statement: ‘I also consent to such further or alternative measures as may be found to be necessary 
during the course of the operation ....’ The Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that the bone 
biopsy did not go beyond the consent given by the plaintiff to the defendant and therefore there 
had been no battery. The plaintiff’s formal consent to treatment, the court held, should be viewed 
against the background of the biopsy as part of an ongoing investigative process aimed at 
discovering the cause of her symptoms. The scope of her consent therefore extended to the 
removal of a necessary sample of the bone adjacent to the muscle in pursuit of the continuing 
investigative process. 
However, a clause in a consent form or any other method of providing authorisation, giving 
consent to ancillary procedures does not give complete discretion or authority to the medical 
practitioner to do whatever s/he wants. These clauses are usually construed by the courts 
purposively, so that only procedures connected with the target operation are covered, as in 
Brushett v Cowan above, but the connection itself may be loose. Indeed, wording concerning 
ancillary procedures to the effect that the patient agrees to ‘any further or alternative treatment as 
may be found necessary during the course of the operation’ would most likely be interpreted as 
‘necessary for the completion of the agreed treatment’ as opposed to surgery or treatment that 
was not related to the procedure for which consent was given.  By way of example, in Schweizer 
v Central Hospital
323
 in which a patient was successful in his action for assault after having 
undergone a spinal fusion when he had consented to fusion of the joint on his toe; it was held 
that the ancillary procedure clause in the consent form did not cover that procedure on his spine.  
In spite of this, specific consent is not needed for every step in an operation, or in a procedure 
with multiple components such as a bone marrow/stem cell transplant. In Davis v Barking, 
Havering and Brentwood Health Authority
324
  the patient consented to the excision of a cyst. She 
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 1991a. Brushett v Cowan (1991) 2 Med LR 271. 
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was only told she would have a general anaesthetic but the anaesthetist also provided a caudal 
anaesthetic. The court held this was impliedly covered by the consent.  
Authorisation - Forms of consent 
According to Fleming:
325
 
Consent may be given expressly, as when a patient authorises a surgeon to perform an operation, 
but it may just as well be implied: Actions speak louder than words.  Holding up one’s bare arm 
to a doctor at a vaccination point is as clear an assent as if it were expressed in words....Failure to 
resist or protest indicates consent if a reasonable person who is aware of the consequences and 
capable of protest or resistance would voice his objection 
 
Thus, consent may be: 
i. Explicit (oral or written) 
ii. Tacit (failure to indicate refusal) 
iii. Implied (consent to HSCT implies consent to auxiliary treatments including 
chemotherapy) 
iv. Presumed (in an emergency, one may presume what a patient would do if able to consent) 
i.  Explicit  
Obtaining a patient’s consent is not the same as having the patient sign a consent form. Under 
common law there is no legal requirement for consent to be in writing. The law takes the view 
that a countersigned document such as a consent form does not prove that consent was 
obtained.
326
 
327
 
Some institutions and hospitals, may nevertheless require a consent form to be signed, however, 
this is a pre-emptive stance with the anticipation that a signed consent form would provide 
important evidence if consent is disputed in court.  
                                                 
325
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327
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According to Bristow J in Chatterton v Gerson:
328
  
... getting the patient to sign a pro forma expressing consent to undergo the operation ‘the affect 
and nature of which have been explained to me’..., should be a valuable reminder to everyone of 
the need for explanation and consent. But it would be no defence to an action based on trespass to 
the person if no explanation had in fact been given. The consent would have been expressed in 
form only, not in reality 
 
Significantly, having a signed consent form does not preclude a later complaint from a patient, 
although it is unlikely that a claim in trespass would be successful because a signed consent form 
would indicate that the patient had been advised in broad terms of the nature of the proposed 
intervention. As discussed previously, a claim in trespass could be successful if the intervention 
undertaken was different to the one authorized,
329
 or even if one/some of the components of the 
authorized intervention were significantly varied.
330
 Likewise, there is no requirement for 
consent/authorization to be verbalized. 
ii. Tacit  
Tacit consent is inferred from the fact that the patient remains silent and does not object when 
s/he has an opportunity to refuse, for example when the patient does not make it known that s/he 
objects to being examined by a doctor and/or other healthcare professional. Possibly the best 
known case is O’Brien v Cunard331 in which Ms O’Brien, whilst a passenger a Cunard 
steamship, lined up with approximately 200 other women who were being vaccinated against 
small-pox in accordance with the quarantine regulations of the port in which they were landing. 
The ship’s surgeon vaccinated all immigrants who desired it and gave them a confirmatory 
certificate. Ms O’Brien told the surgeon that she had been vaccinated, but she had no typical 
vaccination mark; she held her arm out for the vaccination and said nothing about not wanting to 
be vaccinated. After he vaccinated her, she took the certification he gave her. O’Brien later sued 
Cunard for vaccinating her against her will (assault and battery). The court reasoned that when 
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consent to act is not explicitly expressed, an individual may rely on the other party's behaviour 
and overt acts in order to determine whether that party has consented to the individual's conduct. 
Ms O’Brien had the opportunity to refuse the vaccination, but her behaviour indicated consent, 
and therefore the surgeon was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have 
been. In determining whether she consented, the doctor could be guided only by her overt acts. 
There was nothing in the conduct of Ms O’Brien to indicate to the doctor that she did not wish to 
obtain a certificate which would save her from detention at quarantine, and to be vaccinated for 
that purpose. The doctor’s conduct was lawful. 
iii. Implied  
There are two forms of implied consent; an example of the first may refer to when a patient 
presents to a hospital ward having fasted overnight and carrying an overnight bag.  It is implied 
by the patient’s behaviour that s/he is consenting to being admitted to the ward and to undergo 
the agreed procedure. A second consideration of implied consent concerns when there are 
multiple steps integrated in an intervention. The law focuses on the isolated incident of 
authorization and has never really engaged in whether a patient has been kept informed at 
various stages of treatment
332– therefore incremental consent/authorizations are implied and 
there is no need to have separate authorization. A pertinent example to this thesis is when a 
patient authorizes/ consents to stem cell transplant, it is implied that s/he has 
authorized/consented to all the constituent treatments, including chemotherapy, radiotherapy, 
immunosuppressive drugs, antibiotics etc.  
iv. Presumed 
Presumed consent is a dubious concept that applies in cases of necessity where it is not possible 
to gain the consent of the patient or of a substitute decision-maker. It posits that a healthcare 
professional can presume that consent would have been given by the patient had they been 
competent to provide it. The basis of the presumption is normally that other patients would 
usually consent to such interventions. 
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The better view is that the notion of presumed consent does not form part of the Australian 
common law and instead the correct principle to employ is the principle of necessity, which was 
discussed in earlier. 
As was discussed above, the principle of necessary provides for situations when it is uncertain 
whether or not a competent adult does or does not consent to/authorise an intervention. An 
example would be if an adult is admitted to a hospital in an unconscious state and has not had the 
opportunity to signify whether s/he would consent to treatment, and there is no reason to believe 
that s/he would refuse treatment.
333
 In such circumstances, treatment can be justified by the 
principle of necessity as stated by Lord Goff in Re F:
334
 
... to fall within the principle, not only (1) must there be a necessity to act when it is not 
practicable to communicate with the assisted person, but also (2) the action taken must be such as 
a reasonable person would in all the circumstances take, acting in the best interests of the assisted 
person. 
 
He continued: 
On this statement of principle, I wish to observe that officious intervention cannot be justified by 
the principle of necessity. So intervention cannot be justified when another more appropriate 
person is available and willing to act; nor can it be justified when it is contrary to the known 
wishes of the assisted person, to the extent that he is capable of rationally forming such a wish. 
 
It should also be noted that consent is specific to circumstances; it is conceivable that a patient 
who might refuse to undergo a particular treatment in some circumstances, will consent to 
treatment in different circumstances. This situation was considered in Werth v Taylor
335
 in which 
Mrs Werth, a Jehovah's Witness, had pre-emptively refused blood products prior to her giving 
birth to twins. Following delivery, she haemorrhaged severely and during attempts to stem the 
bleeding, the anaesthetist, Dr. Taylor observed ‘mottling and cooling of the skin peripherally, 
premature ventricular activity, oozing of crystalloid material from her eyes, and fairly rapid and 
significant fall in blood pressure. Dr Taylor determined that a blood transfusion was medically 
                                                 
333
 Skegg, P. 1974. A justification for medical procedures performed without consent. Law Q Rev 90, 512-30. 
334
 1990d. Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1  at p75 
335
 1991f. Werth v Taylor [1991] 475 N.W.Rep. (2nd) 426. 
Page 105 of 429 
 
necessary to preserve Mrs Werth’s life, and the transfusion went ahead, despite her known 
refusal. Dr. Taylor moved for summary disposition claiming that Mrs Werth’s refusal was not 
contemporaneous of the situation, and not fully informed of the facts. It was held that only 
contemporaneous refusal of treatment by a fully informed, competent adult patient is sufficient to 
override evidence of medical necessity, and no action lies for battery for treating a patient 
without such refusal.  
Of note is that the notion of contemporaneous consent or refusal has the potential to be 
problematic
336
 because a doctor will be liable in damages if s/he treats a patient when there is a 
valid refusal of consent on one hand, and liable in damages on the other hand if s/he fails treat in 
accordance with the principle of necessity when the patient is unable to make a decision. In 
comparison to Werth v Taylor discussed above, in Malette v Shulman,
337
 a Canadian court 
awarded damages to a patient who had been given a blood transfusion in order to save her life 
but against her known wishes. The facts of the case include that Mrs Malette was involved a car 
accident; Dr Shulman, the doctor attending her, was made aware of a card Mrs Malette carried 
stating that she would refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons. The court found that by 
preparing and keeping the No-Transfusions card Mrs Malette foresaw the potential need for 
blood transfusions and that her actions suggest her decision was made with a clear understanding 
of the risks. The court found that transfusing her against her stated wishes overrode any principle 
of necessity. 
For how long is consent valid? 
A person’s consent remains valid until the person either withdraws his/her consent, or the 
patient’s circumstances change, including the possibility of a different procedure being 
attempted/ investigated.  
Who has legal responsible for ensuring a patient has consented? 
The attending medical officer who performs the procedure is responsible for ensuring that the 
patient has consented to the medical intervention prior to its commencement. This does not mean 
that the doctor cannot ask another practitioner to seek the patient’s consent on their behalf, 
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although they should be aware they could still be held responsible if a valid consent has not been 
obtained. 
Limitations to what one can consent to 
The law strives to achieve a balance between personal autonomy; i.e. the right of individuals to 
control what happens to them, and the prevention of harm (to individuals and to society).
338
 
Consent to actual bodily harm, for example wounding, serious harm, death, is not lawfully 
accepted unless the activity concerned is one that is recognised to be in the public interest.
339
 
There is no doubt that surgery is invasive, and many other medical interventions produce 
collateral damage, however, such procedures are seen to be in the public interest as they are 
performed with the intention of benefitting the patient.  
Situations that do not require prior consent 
 Statutory provisions  
There are a number of circumstances when consent is not necessary. For example, all Australian 
states and territories have legislated mental health acts covering treatment of mentally ill persons, 
and the circumstances in which they may be treated without their consent, in their best interest, 
or for the safety of others. The provisions also allow for non-consensual treatment of certain 
people living in the community and who are under ‘community treatment orders.’340  There are 
also statutory provisions which permit treatment to be given to a child without consent and to 
adults who lack capacity, and these are discussed more fully under the section on capacity. 
Public health legislation is also in place which, in certain circumstances, permits (a) compulsory 
blood alcohol and drug testing for example following motor vehicle accidents, and (b) 
compulsory quarantine in order to protect the community against the spread of certain 
communicable diseases.
341
 There are also statutory provisions in place that allow for the 
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compulsory examination and testing of individuals for example when the person participates in a 
sport that mandates drug testing,
342
 or undertakes certain employment.
343
  
Therapeutic privilege 
There may be instances in which it is considered reasonable and indeed appropriate to limit or 
withhold information from a patient.
344
 For example if the treating physician has good reason to 
believe that disclosure of certain information may cause psychological injury to the patient
345
 
346
  
‘therapeutic privilege’ may be invoked. This notion of therapeutic privilege however, is not 
widely accepted.
347
  It is contested on the grounds that it is difficult to define or to limit, and may 
deprive the patient of all decisional autonomy.
348
 
349 350 
 
Whilst therapeutic privilege is primarily a North American notion,
351
 its potential was 
acknowledged in FvR 
352
 when King CJ stated the amount of information a careful and 
responsible doctor should disclose depended on:  
…the nature of the matter to be disclosed; the nature of the treatment; the desire of the patient for 
information; the temperament and health of the patient; and the general surrounding 
circumstances… 
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Only one Australian case at the time of writing has successfully referenced ‘therapeutic 
privilege’ as a defence in negligence, and that is Battersby v Tottman.353 In this case, a claim of 
negligence was brought against a psychiatrist who had prescribed a high-dose antipsychotic drug 
to control a patient’s mental illness without warning the patient that the potential side effects of 
the recommended dose might include serious retinopathy which could lead to permanent loss of 
her sight. The court found that Dr Tottman understood the patient’s mental and emotional 
condition to be of such a nature (namely, acute depression and dangerously suicidal) that 
justified his conclusion that the decision regarding the proposed therapy, should be made by him, 
on her behalf. 
In contrast, in Gover v South Australia and Perriam
354
 the decision to withhold information 
about a thyroid-induced eye condition failed on its claim of therapeutic privilege despite the 
apparent nervousness and volatile temperament on the patient. 
(1985a)(1985a)(1985a)(1985a)(1985a1985a)(1985a)(1985a)(1985a)(1985a)(1985a)The High 
Court of Australia nevertheless, endorsed ‘therapeutic privilege’ in Rogers in which the majority 
held:
355
 
The law should recognise that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in 
the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. This duty is subject to 
the therapeutic privilege. 
 
Although as Skene
356
 has noted, the High Court however provided no real guidance as to how 
reasonableness will be determined in the context of a plea of therapeutic privilege. The only 
guidance is to be found in the following statement: 
[W]hether the patient has been given all the relevant information to choose between undergoing 
and not undergoing the treatment is a question of a different order. Generally speaking, it is not a 
question the answer to which depends upon medical standards or practices. Except in those cases 
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where there is a particular danger that the provision of all relevant information will harm an 
unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile patient, no special medical skill is involved in disclosing 
the information, including the risks attending the proposed treatment.
357
  
 
Others have also noted the limitation of the notion of ‘therapeutic privilege’. Nagree358 in 
describing the risks that need to be disclosed on a consent form, asserted that the nervous, 
volatile patient contemplated by the High Court in Rogers was ‘an anomaly rather than the norm’ 
in everyday practice, and should not guide law or medical practice in this area. Freckelton 
concurred,
 359
 describing the rare occurrence of the likelihood of therapeutic privilege 
pronouncing that ‘[i]t will be rare consumers of health care whose condition will be found by the 
courts to have warranted such withholding of information.’  
Significantly, Mulheron
360
 has suggested that one possible reason for the rare occurrence of 
claims of therapeutic privilege may be related to the failure of the courts to define what is 
actually meant by the term: 
The failure of the courts...to better articulate the therapeutic privilege‘s content and scope leaves 
the law in an unsatisfactory state for medical practitioners who are concerned not to exacerbate 
their patients’ anxieties and disclose risk information that could be likely to cause harm to their 
patients’ health. 
 
In sum therefore, many would agree that a claim of therapeutic privilege, is not a defence that 
should be invoked merely because advising the patient or substitute decision maker of the 
prognosis is extremely difficult for the responsible doctor, nor should it be  ‘...simply because 
divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient needs.’361  
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Synopsis 
This section has reviewed the legal elements of enacting consent – specifically it has examined 
the primacy of a patient’s sovereignty over their own body, and how their wishes are to 
respected. It has done this by examining the elements of specificity, and the various ways one 
might use to indicate authorization of an action.  Situations in which consent may not be required 
are also discussed.  
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Part I, Chapter 2, Review of the Relevant Bioethics Literature  
Introduction 
As noted in the preceding chapter which reviewed the relevant legal literature, any discussion 
about the requirement for consent prior to any medical intervention is usually foreworded by 
mention of the landmark legal case of Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital
362
 in which 
Justice Cardozo famously said [at 126]:  
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. 
 
Although, contrary to commonly held assumption, and according to Lombardo who recently 
undertook a comprehensive legal analysis of the case,
363
 the Schloendorff case was not directly 
about consent at all
364
, but rather it was concerned with the relationship between the hospital, the 
physicians and surgeons, and the immunity from legal liability of a hospital as a charitable 
organization.
365, 366
 Moreover Ms Schloendorff failed in her legal case. 
Despite this, the sentiment behind Justice Cardozo’s pronouncement is clearly understood and is 
incorporated in everyday Western bioethics, and achieving consent remains a core bioethical 
(and legal) requirement. Thus, it is now universally accepted in clinical practice, law and 
bioethics that individuals have the moral right to make autonomous decisions about their own 
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health care.
367
 The practical manifestation of this broad respect for autonomy is that an 
individual’s consent is required prior to the commencement of any medical intervention or 
treatment. Similarly, a person’s consent is required for the unplanned withdrawal of any medical 
intervention or treatment. Indeed, in many ways, the requirement for consent is, perhaps, the 
most visible way in which the health care system demonstrates respect for the dignity of 
individuals, acknowledging their autonomy, and ensures both that competent patients are able to 
make autonomous choices, and non-competent patients are protected from harm.
368
  
For a person’s consent to be legally and ethically valid, the following criteria (or elements of 
consent) must be satisfied:
369
 
 The person must have the capacity to give consent (they must be competent and have the 
capacity to understand information relevant to the decision) 
 The person must consent freely and voluntarily - that is to say that there must be no 
undue influence exerted on the person to consent 
 The person must have been provided with sufficient relevant information to be able to 
make a reasoned decision. (It is the responsibility of the attending clinician to ensure that 
there has been adequate disclosure of material issues to the person.)  
At first glance, these elements of consent appear to be straightforward and easily attainable. 
However, in recent years commentators from bioethics, (as well as law and medicine) have 
raised concerns about how attainable each element of consent is, and therefore, how solid and 
how ‘realistic’ the intellectual foundation of the concept of consent itself is in practice. 370 371 372 
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These concerns assume an even greater bearing in the context of serious illness and high-risk 
medical interventions because people may be ‘incapacitated’ by their illness, may have no other 
realistic options available to them, and may lack the time to consider the risks and benefits of the 
various treatment options in any detail.
373
  
Critiques of consent generally fall into four groups, namely those that;  
1. challenge the construction and attainability of each of the elements of consent 
2. challenge the philosophical basis of consent 
3. challenge the descriptive adequacy of the concept of consent  
4. question the practical application of the current construct of consent. 
 
2.1 Critiques of the construction and attainability of the elements of consent 
2.1.1 Capacity/competence 
Even though the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘competence’ are often used interchangeably in bioethics, 
they have their roots in different contexts. Strictly speaking, a person’s decision-making capacity 
in healthcare is determined by medical professionals
374
 whilst the courts are the final arbiters of 
determining a person’s competence.375 In other words, determining if someone is legally 
competent to make decisions regarding their own treatment requires an assessment of their 
mental capacity.
376
  In this thesis, the terms will be used interchangeably because both terms 
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summon the same meaning in the present context of bioethics, and that is, whether the person is 
cognitively able to make a reasoned decision about their healthcare. 
It is widely accepted that people should be permitted to, and indeed have the right to make 
decisions about events that affect their lives.
377
 This ‘right’ is an expression of one’s 
autonomy.
378
 In accordance with this concept of autonomy,
 
it is also presumed that a person is 
competent to make health care decisions until proven otherwise.
379
 
380
 This presumption of 
capacity has intuitive appeal when one considers that the large majority of people are capable of 
managing their everyday activities and lives.
381
  
The obligation to ensure that the patient is in fact competent rests with the attending medical 
practitioner, even though the courts may be the final arbiter when there is dispute. In most 
instances, however, the timing is such that the attending medical practitioner needs to ensure that 
the patient’s consent or refusal is valid, and that necessitates ensuring that the patient is 
competent to make the decision. In the clinical setting this is a critically important judgment as 
the determination that a person is unable to make decision regarding their own healthcare will 
require efforts to be made to establish whether the patient has an advance car plan, and to 
identify and appoint a surrogate decision-maker.  
Whilst there is general consensus amongst commentators that person’s capacity can, and often 
does vary over time, there is no such agreement about whether competence is task specific,
382
 or 
global,
383
 nor about thresholds of standards or ‘levels’ of competence.  
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In regard to clinical practice, it is particularly noteworthy that there are no objective, universally 
agreed, standards for measuring or assessing capacity.
384
 Various criteria have been suggested 
including: rationality of choice, reasonableness of choice, evidence of choice, or a patient’s 
apprehension or understanding of a situation.
385
 The absence of clear criteria for the assessment 
of competence is particularly problematic in situations where a person’s capacity might come 
into question including when a person appears to be acting in an ‘irrational’ manner,386 appears 
to be making decisions that discounts his/her long-term goals,
387
 changing his/her mind from a 
previously known set of values or preferences, shows obvious signs of cognitive failure or 
mental disorder,
388
 or refuses potentially life-saving treatment. 
389
 
390 391
  Such situations are 
particularly challenging because a person may not be deemed incompetent based purely on 
his/her refusal of medical treatment, life saving or otherwise; nor is a person legally or morally 
obliged to make decisions that seem sensible or well-considered in the opinion of others.
392
  
However this does not mean that every decision a person makes should be accepted on face 
value. Indeed, society has to balance its strong interest in protecting the supremacy of a 
competent person’s right to make autonomous decisions393 394 with protecting them from harm. 
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This requires serious efforts to ensure that people are competent to make decisions of great 
importance. 
Unfortunately, and perhaps unsurprisingly, just as there is no single, agreed definition of 
competence/capacity (although there are many standards to which it may be held, depending on 
the circumstances), there is no single universally applied test that can be used to determine 
whether a person lacks capacity, although many tests exist. (These are discussed in detail under 
the Part I, Chapter 1, in the Legal Literature Review) 
While problems of measurement beset considerations of competence to make healthcare 
decisions, there is another, more fundamental logical question regarding competence that 
concerns the relationship between competence to make a decision and the decision itself. There 
is little agreement, for example, as to how much information about risks of a particular therapy 
or intervention a patient must be able to understand to be deemed competent. This complex issue 
become even more complex when one considers that patients may require different types of 
competence for different decisions and also different levels of competence, depending upon the 
complexity of the decision and (perhaps) upon the severity of its consequences.
395
  
2.1.2 Voluntariness   
The constraint that consent must be made voluntarily for it to be valid is a reflection of the 
(Western, liberal) notion that all people should be able to make decisions free from undue 
influence or manipulation.
396
 While this objective would seem intuitively correct, closer scrutiny 
of the element of voluntariness reveals a number of concerns regarding its meaning and 
attainability.  
The first concern relates to the meaning of voluntariness. In moral terms, voluntariness is 
concerned less with the performance of an action, and more about determining what controls that 
                                                                                                                                                             
394
 King CJ in F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189 at 193; also in Malette v Shulman 67 DLR (4
th
) 321 (1990),  Robins JA at 
328 “[a] competent adult is generally entitled to reject a specific treatment or all treatment, or to select an alternate 
form of treatment, even if the decision may entail risks as serious as death and may appear mistaken in the eyes of 
the medical profession or of the community. … it is the patient who has the final say on whether to undergo the 
treatment”. 
395
 Kerridge, I. H., Lowe, M. & McPhee, J. 2005. Ethics and Law for the Health Professions, Sydney, Federation 
Press. 
396
 Faden, R. R. & Beauchamp, T. L. 1986c. A History and Theory of Informed Consent., New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
Page 117 of 429 
 
action. Specifically the degree of control the patient has, or should have, over his/her actions is 
the determinant for whether the decision is considered valid. 
This leads to the second concern which relates to the inability to measure voluntariness. There is 
no agreed instrument in either the empirical or the ethics literature
397
 for an observer to 
determine whether the person has acted voluntarily. This is despite the fact that it is commonly 
accepted that the term ‘undue influence’ is the concept of determining voluntariness when 
considering consent to medical interventions. It is worth noting that the term ‘undue influence’ is 
borrowed from equity law which deals with transfers of property, and traditionally, the purpose 
of the doctrine of undue influence was “to protect people from being forced, tricked or misled in 
any way by others into parting with their property.” 398 Yet, whilst the legal understanding of 
‘undue influence’ has been accepted in the medical context, there has been little theoretical or 
empirical exploration of what constitutes ‘undue’ or ‘reasonable’ influence. A more general 
definition of voluntariness drawn from research ethics
399
 is that a voluntary decision is one that 
reflects the free-will of an individual, however this does not advance understanding or practical 
utility as it still leaves undefined what it means for a decision to reflect free-will or to be free of 
undue influence. It remains is unclear how ‘free will’ can be understood (by either the person 
themselves or an external observer) and the degree to which ‘free-will’ is atomistic or socially 
determined -  that is to say, the degree to which it is a function of a pre-existing relationship and 
contextual realities.  
The difficulties associated with determining whether undue influence has been applied are most 
evident in situations in which a patient apparently changes his/her mind about previously stated 
or known positions, or when a patient refuses treatment, usually life-saving treatment. The most 
relevant exemplar to this thesis is the 1992 UK case known as Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) in which a young, pregnant woman was admitted to hospital following a motor 
accident 4 days earlier. She had developed a serious pneumonia and was in severe pain for which 
she was administered antibiotics and analgesics, including Pethidine, a narcotic drug, and given 
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oxygen. During her hospital admission Ms T indicated on several occasions that she did not want 
a blood transfusion and signed a form of refusal, however these refusals were noted to have 
coincided with visits from her mother who was a practicing Jehovah's Witness (Ms T was not of 
that faith). After giving birth to a stillborn child, Ms T’s medical condition worsened and she 
became unconscious. Her father and boyfriend then sought judicial approval for the 
administration of blood products.  Blood transfusions were authorized by the court on the basis 
that there was no binding refusal and that blood could be provided in her best interests. The 
Court of Appeal found that her prior refusals for blood products were invalid because of 
incapacity (under the influence of narcotic drugs), and also because they did not cover the 
extreme situation that had subsequently arisen. Importantly, it was also argued that her refusal 
was invalid because she had been unduly influenced by the mother. In discussing undue 
influence Lord Donaldson MR stated that:
400
 
A special problem arises if at the time the decision is made the patient has been subjected to the 
influence of some third party. This is by no means to say that the patient is not entitled to receive 
and indeed invite advice and assistance from others in reaching a decision, particularly from 
members of the family. But the doctors have to consider whether the decision is really that of the 
patient...The real question in each such case is, does the patient really mean what he says or is he 
merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and persuasion to 
which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer think and decide for himself? In other 
words "Is it a decision expressed in form only, not in reality?” 
 
Whilst Lord Donaldson did not articulate a test for assessing voluntariness, his words express 
deeply and intractably normative aspects of such judgments. 
The third concern relates to how one might set a threshold for determining whether the influence 
has been ‘undue’. What makes this so complex, quite apart from the difficulties associated with 
measuring voluntariness, is that it is not at all clear that patients can ever make decisions 
completely free from influence. Indeed, it is highly likely that in real-life circumstance patients 
will always be influenced at least  to some extent and in some way by internal (e.g. pain, 
medication, emotional and psychological factors, lack of alternatives that constrain choice) or 
external forces (e.g. the beliefs, values and preferences of their healthcare professionals, the 
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clinical setting, family, friends).
401
 Thus, in many situations it seems likely that a patient’s 
capacity to make choices may be compromised by pain, depression or anxiety, and illness may 
leave them physically and emotionally or psychologically weak and potentially vulnerable to 
influence.
402
 
403
 This notion has, however, received limited attention in bioethics, and much of 
the ethics literatures simply states that patients’ decisions ought to be made autonomously.404  
Given these difficulties, it is unsurprising, that there is scant literature in bioethics on 
voluntariness in clinical practice. Instead, what literature does exist has focused largely on 
voluntariness to consent to participation in research. And even in this context, much of the 
research has focused on information disclosure and the potential impact that knowledge may 
have on decisions regarding participation.
405
 While there is no doubt that knowledge may 
influence voluntariness, voluntariness is more than this.  
2.1.3 Disclosure of relevant information 
In terms of valid consent, decision-making can, in principle, only occur where there has been 
adequate disclosure of relevant information.  In recent years a number of landmark Australian 
cases have clarified exactly what constitutes adequate disclosure, or what information doctors 
should disclose to patients for their consent to be valid. The most significant are Rogers v 
Whitaker,
406
 Chappel v Hart
407
 and Rosenberg v Percival.
408 
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In Rogers the High Court of Australia said that it is part of the doctor’s duty of care to disclose 
“material” risks. A risk is material, if - “in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it 
or if the medical practitioner is, or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if 
warned of the risk, would likely attach significance to it.”409   
The High Court also identified that the following factors are important in deciding whether a risk 
is material and must be disclosed to a patient: the nature of the matter to be disclosed; the nature 
of the proposed procedure; the patient’s desire for information; the temperament and health of 
the patient; and the general surrounding circumstances.  
Subsequent cases have emphasised that some patients may have special concerns, different 
perhaps from the ‘reasonable’ person; that informed consent requires that doctors must listen to 
and respond to the questions and concerns of their patients (Chappel v Hart); and that it is the 
patient, and not the medical practitioner, who ultimately carries the burden of the risks.
410
 
Despite the apparent legal clarity provided by these cases, it is evident that there is ongoing 
confusion amongst healthcare providers as to the amount of information they should give to 
patients regarding a proposed therapy or intervention and about alternatives and risks.
411
 There 
also remains considerable scepticism regarding whether this (assumed) model of medical 
decision-making is consistent with the needs and preferences of patients and whether, 
particularly in the setting of complex or life-threatening medical interventions, additional 
information may only increase patient anxiety and sense of vulnerability.  
Perhaps most importantly, it is also possible that disclosure can never be adequate as, while it 
may be possible to communicate complex technical and scientific information relevant to care, it 
may be fundamentally impossible to genuinely and realistically communicate the type of 
experiences that characterize serious illness, such as pain, fear, debilitating lethargy, loss of 
identity and sense of isolation. In other words, even where clinical teams utilize different media 
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and different team members to communicate information about a therapy or intervention, 
disclosure can never be truly absolute.  
 
2.2 Critiques of the philosophical basis of consent 
As noted, the requirement for consent to medical interventions is perhaps the most visible 
representation of the socio-cultural emphasis that is given to respect for autonomy, where 
autonomy is understood as self-determination, ‘free will’ or rights.412 In recent years, however, 
the pre-eminent role of autonomy in contemporary bioethics and health law has come under 
sustained philosophical or conceptual attack from within medicine, law and ethics.  It has been 
suggested, for example, that;  
 healthcare decisions should depend less upon respecting autonomy and more on 
providing care and compassion;
413
 
 the focus on autonomy and individualism diminishes the importance of human 
relationships, caring and interdependence and fails to recognise how vulnerable people 
may become in the setting of serious illness;
414 415
 
  the choices that a person makes are only comprehensible within their social, cultural and 
institutional context, and cannot be understood without consideration of these factors,  the 
emphasis on autonomy is largely a cultural construction, as non-Western cultures tend 
not to place such value upon the rights of the individual
416
 and that 
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 illness inevitably compromises  autonomy, meaning that attention should be directed to 
the moral and legal significance of the doctor-patient relationship and the place of care 
and professional virtues in decision-making.
417
 
418
 
None of these criticisms of autonomy require that the commitment to consent be abandoned. 
Rather, they suggest that consent in medicine needs to be critically examined within its social, 
cultural and relational context.
419 420
 
2.3 Critiques of the descriptive adequacy of consent 
Critics of the construction of consent as a wholly rational concept or as a single authorisation 
(the signing of a consent form or the action of “consenting a patient”) argue instead that it should 
be regarded as a staged, dynamic process, an ongoing “conversation of consent” that takes place 
within a context shaped by the expectations, needs and experiences of both the patients and the 
physician.
421  
Those who support this reconfiguration of consent suggest that if viewed in this way, consent 
would continue to emphasise the importance of disclosure of information, particularly about 
material risks, but would also highlight the importance of other concepts that characterise the 
process of decision-making in medicine, such as vulnerability,
422 423
 trust, 
424 425
 regret
 426 427
 and 
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responsibility, and other moral virtues or values, such as professional commitments to care, and 
to presence (an implicit contract to provide ongoing explanation, reassurance and support during 
the course of treatment).
428
 These concepts and values, it is argued, are fundamental to the 
health-professional-patient relationship and are a pre-requisite for effective communication and 
any construction of consent that fails to account for them cannot adequately capture its 
complexity or contextual specificity.   
2.4 Critiques of the practical application of consent 
The final category of critiques of consent relate to the apparent disjunction between the notion of 
consent and the practice of medicine. In essence, the argument is that the concept of consent (as 
it is commonly understood) is so far removed from the reality of the practice of medicine and so 
poorly understood, that it serves mainly to heighten the distrust of the law felt by physicians, 
creates confusion in patients as to the meaning of consent and the consent form, and leaves the 
real legal and ethical requirements for autonomous authorisation unsatisfied. 
429
 
430
      
In this regard, the results of a quantitative survey undertaken by Skene and Millwood in 1995,  
just 3years after the landmark decision in Roger v Whitaker, and 2 years after the dissemination 
of general guidelines on providing information to patients produced by National Health and 
Medical Research Council
 431
 
432
 are worthy of note. The survey found that  “despite the media 
publicity of Rogers v Whitaker and the research council's guidelines, many doctors still did not 
know, or misunderstood, their legal obligations”433 regarding the disclosure of information to 
patients.  
                                                 
428
 Little, J. 2002. The Fivefold Root of an Ethics of Surgery . Bioethics, 16, 183-201. 
429
 Siegal, G., Siegal, N. & Weisman, Y. 2001. Physicians' attitudes towards patients' rights legislation. Med Law 
Review, 20, 63-78. 
430
 Katz, J. 1980. Disclosure and consent. In: MILUNSKY, A. & ANNAS, G. (eds.) Genetics and The Law. Vol II. 
New York: Plenum Press. 
431
 Skene, L. & Millwood, S. 1997. Informed consent to medical procedures: the current law in Australia. Doctor's 
knowledge of the law and their practices in informing patients. In: SHOTTON, L. (ed.) Health, Law and Ethics. 
Canberra: Social Science Press. 
432
 www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/publications/attachments/e57.pdf 
433
 Skene, L. & Millwood, S. 1997. Informed consent to medical procedures: the current law in Australia. Doctor's 
knowledge of the law and their practices in informing patients. In: SHOTTON, L. (ed.) Health, Law and Ethics. 
Canberra: Social Science Press. 
Page 124 of 429 
 
But while there may be considerable divergence between common medical practice and the law, 
this does not create a valid argument that the commitment to the notion of consent should be 
diminished. Rather, it suggests that more account should be taken of individual and cultural 
variation in regards to the degree of preferred involvement in decision-making.
434
 
435
 
 
For 
example, some data has shown that in certain cultures,
436
 older patients, and men may prefer a 
relatively ‘non-participatory’ role in the management of their illness.437  
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that, for many patients, being a participant in the decision 
making process and understanding the rationale behind their doctors’ recommendations may be 
more important than being the decision maker. 
438
 
439
 
440
 
2.4.1 Empirical studies on consent in healthcare 
There has been surprisingly little empirical research into the practice of informed consent. An 
early review (1983) of empirical studies into the operationalisation of consent in clinical practice 
was undertaken by Meisel and Roth.
441
  The review analysed an undeclared number of empirical 
studies undertaken mainly in the 1970s designed to assess the quality of consent around 5 
components;  
1. information disclosure  
2. capacity 
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3. understanding 
4. voluntariness 
5. decision 
The main purpose of the review was to delineate what is known about how informed consent 
operates in the clinic and how, if at all, that diverges from the legal vision of informed consent.  
Meisel and Roth deduced that there was no conclusive evidence one way or the other about how 
achievable consent is in clinical practice.  
Since that time, ongoing concern that some patients undergo procedures without them providing 
valid consent
442
 
443
 has prompted a range of interventions aimed at improving consent including 
the development and provision of decision-aids and written information to supplement the ‘usual 
practice’ of information disclosure, often with limited empirical evidence relating to the benefits 
of such interventions in the consent process.
444
  
In 2013, Kinnersley et al
445
 undertook a systematic review of randomized controlled and cluster 
randomization trials of interventions designed specifically to promote consent studies with a 
view to assessing the effects on patients, clinicians and the healthcare system of interventions 
over a wide variety of settings to promote consent for patients undergoing surgical and other 
invasive healthcare treatments and procedures.
446
 The final review incorporated 65 trials from 12 
countries involving patients undergoing a variety of procedures in hospitals. Individual studies 
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ranged from having 20 to 596 participants, resulting in a total of 9,021 participants entered into 
these studies. Interventions used various designs and formats but the main data for results were 
from studies using written materials, audio-visual materials and decision aids to improve patient 
knowledge, an important prerequisite for informed consent, with the intent to enhance patients’ 
consent. Some interventions were delivered before admission to hospital for the procedure while 
others were delivered on admission.  
The data revealed the following;  
 Meta-analyses showed statistically significant improvements in knowledge when measured 
immediately after interventions (up to 24 hours), shortly afterwards (1 to 14 days), and at a 
later date (more than 14 days). 
 Satisfaction with decision making was also increased and decisional conflict was reduced. 
 No statistically significant differences were found for generalised anxiety, anxiety with the 
consent process and satisfaction with the consent process.  
 There were limited data for other important but less commonly measured outcomes such as 
deliberation, decisional conflict, uptake of procedures and length of consultation 
The review authors concluded that the results should be interpreted with caution due to the 
heterogeneity of the interventions and outcome measures. For example, whilst some studies 
claimed they were investigating patient understanding, 
447
 they were in fact reporting on patient 
recall, thus highlighting the inherent difficulty of extrapolating understanding from recall which 
flags some of the confusion that surrounds the consent process. As a consequence, the authors 
concluded that the results did not provide any certainty as to which specific intervention 
provided the most benefit.  
                                                 
447
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Only one study
448
 attempted to measure informed consent as a unified concept. (All other studies 
had assessed only components of the consent process, such as recall, or satisfaction with the 
process.) This particular study recruited 47 participants in the intervention group and 50 
participants in the control group, and examined the impact of a internet-based learning module 
for parents of children undergoing an elective, sedated (non-general anaesthesia), first time upper 
endoscopy at the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia. The measure of consent was based on a 
modified questionnaire developed by Woodrow,
449
 as a means of attempting to quantitatively 
measure the attainment of procedural informed consent, as follows:  
 
1. List a discomfort of the procedure: 11. Were you informed of the benefits of the 
procedure? 
2. List a benefit of the procedure:  12. Do you understand the risks of the 
procedure? 
3. List a major and minor risk of the procedure:  13. Do you understand the benefits of the 
procedure? 
4. List one consequence of not having your 
procedure today:  
14. Were you informed of the rare possibility of 
a life threatening complication from the 
procedure?   
5. List one alternative to today's procedure:  15. Were you informed of the common risk of 
abdominal discomfort or nausea after the 
procedure? 
6. Do you understand why your child needs the 
procedure today? 
16. Did you know that you could refuse the 
procedure? 
                                                 
448
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7. Do you know enough about today's 
procedure that you could basically explain to 
another person how it will occur? 
17. Were you given the opportunity to refuse the 
procedure? 
8. Was the procedure explained to you? 18. Were you informed about alternatives to the 
procedure?   
9. Did you understand the explanation of the 
procedure? 
19. Were you informed about possible 
consequences of not having the procedure 
today?   
10. Were you informed of the risks of the 
procedure? 
20. Did you get all the information you need to 
make a good decision about the procedure? 
 
The authors of the study concluded that the standard practice of attaining consent (at least in 
regards to paediatric endoscopy)  failed to achieve its theoretical goals (decision making 
capacity, voluntariness, disclosure, recommendation, understanding, decision, authorisation) and 
that even when necessary information was repeated electronically in a comprehensive and 
standardised video, consent, as measured by their instrument, remained incompletely achieved.  
Concerns that consent is rarely achieved in the clinical setting have been noted previously by 
others.
450
 In an effort to understand why this may be, Cassileth et al
451
 undertook a study 
exploring patients’ perception of consent and their attitudes towards it. Two hundred cancer 
patients were recruited to complete two written tests; [i] to measure their recall of information 
regarding consent, and [ii] to determine their perceptions of the purpose, content, and 
implications of written and verbal information. 
                                                 
450
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In regards to their recall of written and orally delivered information – the first question the 
patients were asked was to indicate which of the following best described how they dealt with 
the written information they had been given; 
i. I read the whole thing very carefully 
ii. I just gave it a quick reading 
iii. I only read parts of it 
iv. I did not read it 
The second questionnaire asked about the content that should have been covered, either in the 
consent forms or in discussion with the physician, before the patient signed the consent form 
including, knowledge of diagnosis or illness, proposed intervention, purpose of the proposed 
intervention, possible risks or complications, appropriate alternatives, and whether the patient 
had been given adequate opportunity to ask questions. These items were noted explicitly on the 
forms giving consent for chemotherapy and surgery. The form for radiotherapy contained the 
following statement “The effect and nature of this treatment, possible alternative methods of 
treatment, and the risks of injury despite precautions have been explained to me”. It is assumed 
that these had been disclosed to the patient verbally.  
The results of this study revealed that 81.5% of the patients could correctly identify their 
diagnosis, 60% could correctly describe what their treatment would involve, and 59% could 
describe the essential purpose of the treatment. Fifty five percent were able to list a major risk or 
complication, while only 27% could name one alternative treatment.   
Patients with less than secondary school education had significantly poorer recall and 
understanding of information pertaining to their treatment consent; when education was held 
constant, no effects of age, race, hospital used, and treatment were discernible between the 
patients. Bedridden patients gave significantly fewer correct responses to each item on the recall 
test than did ambulatory patients. 
After the recall test, patients were asked a series of questions designed to elicit their 
understanding and opinion of consent process. When asked about the adequacy of the 
information provided, most patients (76%) reported that they had received "just the right 
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amount"; 20% thought that the information was inadequate; while 2% thought that too much 
information had been offered. Significantly there was a positive relation between response to this 
question and scores on the test of recall: persons who answered that the explanation offered "just 
the right amount of information" had higher scores on the recall test than did patients who 
selected either of the remaining two responses (P<0.001). 
When patients were asked how much they could understand of the explanatory material, 85% 
said that they could understand "all" or "most" of the information; 9.5% could understand "only a 
little," and 3.5% "could not understand it." There was a positive relation between the amount of 
information understood and scores on the recall test (P<0.001) - the higher the educational level, 
the greater the percentage of patients who indicated that they could understand all the 
information provided to them. Seventy-five per cent of the patients thought that the information 
provided was helpful “so that I can help decide about my treatment." However, most of the 
remaining 25% claimed that the “... explanations are silly, because I would do what my doctor 
says anyway". 
Interestingly, when asked about their perception of the purpose of consent forms, 79.5% patients 
said they were to protect physicians’ rights; 49% thought they were to protect patients’ rights; 
43% said their purpose was to explain treatment; 11.5% thought they were hospital ‘red tape’, 
while 8% did not know. However, when asked their opinion of the necessity of consent forms, 
80.5% deemed them "necessary." Whether patients believed consent forms to be necessary or 
unnecessary, had no effect on their ability to recall the material, although, those who answered 
that consent forms "don't matter one way or another" or "don't know" had lower scores on the 
recall test. Notably, when asked to select one of two statements about the necessity of consent 
forms, 70% of respondents selected that “patients have the right not to sign consent forms”, 
however, importantly 28% believed that "if patients are given consent forms, they must sign 
them".  
The results of Cassileth’s study corroborate the findings of previous and subsequent studies 
which make clear that many patients do not recall much of the information provided to them 
before they consent to proposed medical care.  
Whilst more recent empirical studies provide some insights into the consent process, many 
questions remain unanswered about how consent can be realized. Often this is because most 
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studies examine one component of consent in a well defined, but limited context. Not 
surprisingly because it is easy to measure, the majority of studies examine either the provision of 
information, or patients’ views regarding information disclosure. Most of these studies have been 
in relatively controlled settings, such as in regards to elective surgery. Far less research has been 
done in complex clinical settings such as when cancer has progressed beyond cure, and hence 
when trade-offs need to be made between possible benefits and likely side effects of treatments. 
The results of these studies that have been done in this setting make even clearer the challenges 
of consent in clinical practice. 
A systemic review of the literature from 1966 to 2003 examined trials that tested means of 
improving the provision of information and patient participation in decision making in patients 
with advanced cancer was undertaken by Gaston and Mitchell.
452 453
 The systemic review 
included 172 articles. Of these, 47 described studies of communication or shared decision–
making. These were divided into four themes – [i] do patients want to participate in decision–
making; [ii] are patients adequately informed; [iii] interventions to improve information giving; 
[iv] interventions to encourage participation in decision–making, on the basis that patient 
participation in medical decision–making is an important means of increasing patient 
satisfaction.
454
 
455
 (This approach assumes, of course, that patients want to be more involved in 
the decisions about their healthcare.) Analysis of these studies revealed, however, that whilst the 
majority of patients wanted detailed information about treatment options, fewer wanted to 
actually share in making decisions - preferring that their physician made the decisions about 
treatment options. For example, Blanchard et al
456
 interviewed 439 in-patients and found that 
92% wanted “all the information” but only 66% of these wanted to actually participate in 
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treatment decisions. Similarly, Stewart et al
457
 found that of 105 women with ovarian cancer, 
90% claimed they wanted detailed information on treatment options but only 63% wanted to 
share decisions with their attending physician.  
Taking this further, Bruera et al
458
 examined both expressed patient preferences as well as 
perceptions of their physicians of patients’ preferences regarding decision–making and 
communication in palliative care. Seventy eight patient-physician pairs were assessed. Full 
concordance between the physician and the patient was seen in only 38% of cases suggesting 
that patients’ decision–making preferences are poorly predicted by physicians.  
Other studies have examined patients understanding of the intervention they were consenting to, 
and the therapeutic intent of the intervention. Chow et al
459
 found that of 60 patients considering 
palliative radiotherapy, 35% believed their cancer was curable, and 38% believed radiotherapy 
would prolong their life. Similarly, Mackillop, Stewart, Ginsburg, and Stewart
460
 interviewed 
100 cancer patients undergoing active treatment, to determine how they perceived their illness 
and how their perceptions compared with those of their attending physicians. Ninety-eight 
percent of patients recognized that they had cancer and 87% correctly identified the tumour type. 
Ninety five percent of patients with localized or regional disease were aware of this, but 33% of 
patients with metastatic disease incorrectly believed that the cancer was localized. Almost 10% 
of patients being treated for cure thought they were being treated palliatively, while 33% of 
patients receiving palliative treatment believed that the aim of treatment was to cure them. Forty 
of these 48 patients (83%) significantly overestimated the probability that the treatment would 
prolong their lives. Because interactions between doctors and patients were not directly 
observed, it was not possible to determine whether patients' misunderstanding of their illness was 
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due to suboptimal communication or to denial, or some other cause. Importantly, doctors 
frequently failed to recognize their patients' misconceptions. Of the 16 cases (6%) in which a 
patient was being treated palliatively but mistakenly believed that the treatment was curative, in 
only one case did the doctor recognize that this misunderstanding existed. 
How one might improve patients’ knowledge and understanding would seem to be important 
when considering the adequacy of consent.
461
 However, it cannot be assumed that increased 
knowledge and understanding necessarily translates to improved quality of consent.
462
 There is 
much less empirical data that sheds light on the interactions between information disclosure and 
the quality of consent.
463
 Stanley et al
464
 examined whether providing patients with more 
extensive information would improve their perceived understanding, as well as their actual 
understanding of risks associated with a surgical procedure. The study concluded that additional 
written or verbal information did not improve a patient’s understanding of risks and 
complications of the procedure, nor did it improve patients’ perceived understanding of the 
operation or its complications.  
Whether information increased or decreased patients’ anxiety about their treatment has also been 
the subject of empirical study.
465
 Intriguingly, Tattersall et al,
466
 found that increasing the amount 
of information that was provided to cancer patients was not associated with increased anxiety, 
although increasing their participation in the decision making process did increase some patients’ 
anxiety levels, and this anxiety persisted over a 2-week time span. The authors noted that whilst 
                                                 
461
 Lloyd, A. 2001. The extent of patients’ understanding of the risk of  treatments. Qual Health Care 10, i14-i18. 
462
 Brezis, M., Israel, S., Weinstein-Birenshtock, A., Pogoda, P., Sharon, A. & Tauber, R. 2008. Quality of informed 
consent for invasive procedures. Int J Qual Health Care, 20, 352-357.; Falagas, M. E., Korbila, I. P., Giannopoulou, 
K. P., Kondilis, B. K. & Peppas, G. 2009. Informed consent: how much and what do patients understand. Am J 
Surg., 198, 420-435.0–435 
463
 Leclercq, W., Keulers, B., Scheltinga, M., Spauwen, P. & van der Wilt, G. 2010. A review of surgical informed 
consent: past, present, and future. A quest to help patients make better decisions. World J Surg, 34, 1406-1415. 
464
 Stanley, B., Walters, D. & Maddern, G. 1998. Informed Consent: How Much Information Is Enough? Aust. N.Z. 
J. Surg., 68, 788-791. 
465
 Spring, D., Akin, J. & Margulis, A. 1984. Informed consent for intravenous contrast-enhanced radiography: a 
national survey of practice and opinion. Radiology, 152, 609-613, Tobias, J. & Souhami, R. 1993. Fully informed 
consent can be needlessly cruel. BMJ, 307, 1199-1201. 
466
; Lankton, J., Batchelder, B. & Ominsky, A. 1977. Emotional responses to a detailed risk disclosure for 
anesthesia, a prospective, randomized study. Anesthesiology, 46, 294-296.;    Freeman, W., Pichard, A. & Smith, H. 
1981. Effect of informed consent and educational background on patient knowledge, anxiety, and subjective 
responses to cardiac catheterization. Cathet Cardiovasc Diagn, 7, 119–134. 
Page 134 of 429 
 
this mirrored the 1986 findings of Simes et al
467
 who noted that “soliciting informed consent 
from patients for clinical trials raised anxiety levels”, Tattersall et al could not explain this 
finding and acknowledged that it called for further research.  
Few empirical studies have examined what impact the timing of information disclosure and the 
demand for the patient’s authorization has on the quality and validity of consent. This may be, in 
part, due to the divergence of how the law views consent (as a discrete event, dependent 
primarily upon the disclosure of information) and how it is viewed through a bioethical lens (as a 
process that is based on ethical principles such as autonomy, beneficence, and on respect for 
human dignity).
468 469 470 471
  
Whether consent is viewed as an iterative process or as an event, has important implications,
472
 
particularly with regard to the process of communication, the timing of consent and the 
authorization for medical interventions. On one hand, information needs to be disclosed in time 
so that patients have the opportunity to consider their options, and to be able to express their 
opinions and ask questions. However on the other hand, it has long been accepted that a large 
proportion of patients forget much of the information they have been told, especially over 
time.
473
 This suggests that when consent is sought from a patient may be salient to the validity of 
that consent. While it may be expedient to obtain consent close to the time that the intervention is 
to be performed, this clearly allows less time for patients to deliberate and to ask questions, and 
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may be unavoidably coercive.
474 475
 These concerns have been reinforced by studies suggesting 
that there is evidence to suggest that some patients undergo surgery that they would decline if 
they had been fully informed and had time to deliberate and to ask questions.
476
 
2.4.2 Empirical studies on consent in high-risk medical interventions  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a paucity of literature examining consent in high-risk medical 
procedures. This may be because, in part, it is difficult to conduct studies when time is of the 
essence, where outcomes are uncertain,  when the ‘controls’ do not characterize high quality 
research, tight selection and exclusion criteria, and where rigorous consent processes, ill defined 
end points,  are difficult to apply. But in part it is also because defining what is ‘high-risk’ is 
complex and controversial.
477
 Specifically, what needs to be established is whether high-risk 
refers to; 
 the patient, who is at high-risk of morbidity and/or mortality perhaps because of his/her 
disease, age, concomitant processes, living conditions, and so forth, or   
 the medical intervention, which poses the risk to the patient for example some 
neurological surgeries, or stem cell transplants carry inherent risks for morbidity and/or 
mortality. 
Having decided this, the question then becomes whether the perception of risk is determined by;   
 the patient, (including significant others) which is not only dependent on what 
information s/he has been provided with, but the valency which s/he has applied to that 
information in regard to his/her beliefs and values, or   
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 the healthcare professional[s], which is closely dependant on past experience and 
professional expectations, and may differ between the various disciplines e.g. transplant 
related baseline mortality risk of 25% might be tolerable in stem cell transplants, but 
unacceptable in solid organ transplants.  
Therefore, how risk is understood is dependent not only on the circumstances, but also on ‘who 
is doing the understanding’.478 479  
It is difficult to know exactly how many interventions, or how many participants, are high-risk. 
In part, this is because of limitations of record systems, and in part, because the vast majority of 
studies of consent in high-risk interventions have been limited to surgery and surgical patients.
480
 
It is widely recognised that most peri-operative deaths occur in patients who can be described as 
high-risk,
481
 and therefore, identifying those high-risk patients is both a critical part of  pre-
operative assessments, and a critical influence on consent because ensuring such patients are be 
aware of the risks
482
 is paramount for valid consent.
483
 
In 2011, the National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) was 
undertaken in the UK. The review considered the peri-operative care of surgical patients aged 16 
and over, who underwent inpatient surgery (both elective and emergency), and their outcome at 
30 days.  
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All patients across the UK who underwent inpatient surgery, both elective and emergency, 
during the study period and met the study criteria, were included. Exclusion criteria included 
whether the patient had day surgery with no planned overnight stay, or were obstetric, cardiac, 
transplant or neurosurgery cases. Data collection took place in two stages. Firstly, prospective 
data were collected at the time the patient was operated on, to allow prompt identification of 
patients undergoing surgery during the defined sample week. The second stage of data collection 
used the standard method of case review by asking ‘Local Reporters’ to identify all patients 
retrospectively who underwent surgery in the same given time period via the hospital patient 
administration systems. This was to allow cross checking to ensure the captured prospective 
sample was representative and to allow identification of the consultant at the time of discharge 
and the outcome of the patient. From this data a group of patients, defined as high-risk, were 
randomly selected for detailed peer review.  
The primary purpose of the study was to examine the care of high-risk patients, with survival 
statistics being the outcome measure of interest with very little attention paid to non-medical 
qualities of the patient specificities. The report acknowledged the difficulty in reliably and 
accurately identifying the patient group that is at high-risk of mortality and morbidity, noting that 
the literature is full of differing descriptions, scoring systems and tests to classify high-risk. The 
report recognized that attempts to classify high-risk are largely based on assessment of 
comorbidities either alone or combined with a classification of the surgical intervention. 
Occasionally tests of organ function and more recently of physiological reserve are also used to 
try to address this issue. Notwithstanding, the peer review aspect of the study included patients 
who had been described prospectively as ‘high-risk’ by an anaesthetist, with no knowledge of 
outcome and in the setting of their institution. No definition of what constituted a high-risk 
patient was provided, and the classification was therefore shaped by the anaesthetists’ knowledge 
of the high-risk surgical literature and their own perception of risk. The number of patients 
considered to be high-risk was 3,734/19,097 (20.1%). Using the pragmatic definer of high-risk, 
there was a clear increase in the perception of risk with increasing age – almost 40% of the 
population greater than 70 years of age was considered high-risk and almost 50% of the 
population greater than 80 years was considered to be high-risk. The urgency of surgery was 
considered and found that 65% of cases were elective, 12% expedited, 21% urgent and 2% 
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immediate. Whilst there was a shift towards more urgent classification in the high-risk group, 
this was not as pronounced as may be thought. Of the high-risk group 49% were elective, 17% 
expedited, 30% urgent and 4% immediate 
 Of the 276 patients classified as immediate, 54% were thought to be high-risk. 
 Of the 3736 patients classified as urgent, 29% were thought to be high-risk. 
 Of the 2305 patients classified as expedited, 27% were thought to be high-risk. 
 Of the 11822 patients classified as elective, 15% were thought to be high-risk. 
Mortality of patients thought to be of high-risk, and undergoing elective surgery was 18/1320 
(1.4%); mortality of patients thought to be of high-risk, and undergoing non-elective surgery was 
144/1282 (11.2%), and 79% of postoperative deaths overall were in the high-risk group 
(165/208). 
Having established the risk profile of patients undergoing surgery, the NCEPOD study attempted 
to assess the degree to which these risks were accounted for in the consent process. It did so by 
reviewing the consent form and the medical records in 512/829 (62%) of cases. 
Peer review of the consent form and the medical notes was undertaken by members of a 
multidisciplinary group comprised of consultants, associate specialists, nurses and trainees from 
anaesthesia, intensive care medicine, critical care and surgery. When asked whether the consent 
process was ‘adequate’, 77% considered that consent was adequate, while 23% judged it to be 
‘inadequate’. The obvious problem with this judgment is that it was made purely on the basis of 
a retrospective analysis of documentation without any substantiation by interview with patients 
or clinicians. In reality therefore, the NCEPOD results really only provide data on documentation 
and not the consent process. Nevertheless, what they reveal about documentation of risks is still 
significant. 
Given that the NCEPOD report concerned itself with ‘high-risk’ patients, one might expect that 
mortality estimates would be documented on the consent form. However, this was only found in 
37/496 cases. Likewise, whilst one would anticipate that risks disclosed to a patient might be 
recorded in the medical notes, information on mortality risk was only found in only 45/644 (7%) 
of cases. 
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Documentation of risks in patients’ medical notes was also used as evidence of consent in a 
study of 60 patients preparing to undergo high-risk elective and urgent neurosurgery.
484
 The 
patients who were included in the study had various neurosurgical conditions and had been 
admitted for routine elective and urgent (but not emergency) surgery. All were competent adults 
over the age of 18 years, with either English as their first language or with a very good 
understanding of English. 
In one part of the audit, the patient's medical notes were reviewed specifically to analyse written 
evidence of the consenting procedure pertaining to four areas: (i) the nature of the patient's 
condition; (ii) the nature of the operation; (iii) the risks specific to the particular type of 
operation; and (iv) the general risks of neurosurgery and neuroanaesthesia. In the other phase of 
the audit, a questionnaire was given to each patient after they had consented for surgery and 
before the operation itself. The questions required a simple (Yes or No) answer with a Not 
Applicable (N/A) option available in cases where alternative treatments were not applicable. The 
questionnaire was designed to assess the type of information given to the patients and test the 
patient's understanding of this information. Following surgery, the same patients were asked 
again if they still felt that they had reached an informed decision. Overall, 58/60 patients (97%) 
felt that they had reached an informed decision regarding surgery when they were asked before 
the surgery and the response was the same when the patients were asked the same question again 
following surgery (i.e. 97% of the patients still felt that they had reached an informed decision). 
One hundred percent of the patients felt have been informed about the nature of their condition 
and the nature of the operation. Fifty five patients (92%) understood the specific risks of their 
proposed operation. However, only 15 patients (25%) were informed about the general risks of 
surgery. The areas where the responses were inadequate included; information provision 
regarding the general risks of surgery and anaesthesia, with both parts of the audit revealing that 
inadequate explanation had been given of the general risk of surgery (75% of the patients felt 
that they had not informed about such risks and 83% of the case notes contain no documented 
information about such risks). This is both surprising and disturbing because these general risks 
such as deep venous thrombosis, pulmonary embolism, chest infection, urinary catheterisation 
                                                 
484
 Ellamushi, H., Khan, R. & Kitchen, N. 2000. Consent to surgery in a high risk speciality: a prospective audit. 
Ann R Coll Surg Engl., 82, 213-6. 
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and infection, nutritional and metabolic complications are important causes of postoperative 
morbidity and mortality in surgery in general, and in some types of neurosurgery it may exceed 
the specific risks of the specific operation.  
Given the obvious limitations of using documentation of risks or completion of consent forms to 
assess the adequacy of the consent process, and the difficulty of conducting contemporaneous 
studies of consent in high-risk or emergency setting with critically ill patients, some other studies 
have attempted to assess the validly or quality of consent by asking survivors whether they 
‘would do it all again’. 
As part of a prospective audit of outcomes of 26 adults with severe sepsis
485
 who had been cared 
for in ICUs in Scotland, Cuthbertson et al
486
 measured mortality and morbidity at 3.5 and 5 years 
post discharge from ICU.
487
 All survivors (100% at 3.5 and 5 years) claimed they would be 
willing to be treated in an ICU again if they became critically ill, despite many having had 
dreadful experiences in ICU
488
 some of which they could recall. 
In light of research suggesting that consent may be compromised or challenged in high-risks 
settings, others have attempted to explore, not simply whether valid consent is possible, but 
whether it is necessary. Pinch and Spielman
489
 sought to systematically describe parents’ 
perspective of the ethical dimension of care of their newborn infants, including their view on 
                                                 
485
 Severe sepsis is associated with high levels of morbidity and mortality – in this study a total of 439 patients were 
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JH, Bakker J: The impact of severe sepsis on health-related quality of life: a long-term follow-up study. Anesth 
Analg 2008, 107:1957-1964; Iwashyna TJ, Ely EW, Smith DM, Langa KM: Long-term cognitive impairment and 
functional disability among survivors of severe sepsis. JAMA 2010, 304:1787-1794; 
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 Cuthbertson, B. H., Elders, A., Hall, S., Taylor, J., MacLennan, G., Mackirdy, F. & Mackenzie, S. J. 2013. 
Mortality and quality of life in the five years after severe sepsis. Critical Care 17, R70. 
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J Med  2011, 364:1293-1304.;  Unroe M, Kahn JM, Carson SS, Govert JA, Martinu T, Sathy SJ, Clay AS, Chia J, 
Gray A, Tulsky JA, Cox CE: One-year trajectories of care and resource utilization for recipients of prolonged 
mechanical ventilation: a cohort study. Ann Intern Med 2010, 153:167-175 
488
 Some patients who spend time in an ICU develop what is colloquially known as ICU syndrome. A combination 
of their illness, an unnatural environment, sedatives, and opioids can caused them to experience visual and tactile 
hallucinations and to feel extreme anxiety and confusion. 
489
 Pinch, W. J. & Spielman, M. L. 1990. The parents' perspective: ethical decision-making in neonatal intensive 
care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 15, 712-719. 
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consent. This study recruited 32 families of high-risk newborns from a Level III nursery, those 
nurseries that provide high dependency care. Participants were asked to describe their 
perspective of ethical decision-making responsibility and notably how the consent process is 
contextualized. The study concluded that the parent participants took a passive role when it came 
to making treatment decisions about their new born, and that most significantly, they found this 
acceptable to them. The parents cited stress, lack of comprehension of the technological details, 
and ‘capitulation’ to the expertise of the medical team, as justification for their ‘passivity’. 
Importantly, they all signed consent forms, which many described as “a perfunctory permission-
granting activity” for them. And also importantly, this situation did not pose a dilemma for them, 
nor did it involve conflict in most circumstances. 
In conclusion then, whilst empirical studies provide some insights into the nature of 
communications and the consent process in high-risk settings, many questions remain 
unanswered about how consent can be realized.
490
 
2.4.3 Empirical studies on consent in bone marrow transplantation (BMT) 
As we have seen, whilst there are many studies scrutinising the ‘realizability’ of consent in 
elective therapeutic settings, there is very little published data on consent to any types of 
exceptional or high-risk treatment in general, so it is not unexpected that there is an even greater 
dearth of literature on consent in the context of allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplant 
(HSCT). In this regard, it is striking that much of the literature that is available is very old
491
 and 
the longitudinal study undertaken by Jacoby et al in 1999
492
 remains the most comprehensive 
study of consent in bone marrow transplantation.  
                                                 
490
 Meisel, A. & Roth, L. H. 1983b. Toward an informed discussion of informed consent: a review and critique of 
the empirical studies. Ariz. L. Rev, 25, 265. 
491
  Andrykowski, M., Brady, M., Greiner, C., Altmaier, E., Burish, T., Antin, J., Gingrich, R., McGarigle, C. & 
Henslee-Downey, P. 1995. 'Returning to normal' following bone marrow transplantation: outcomes, expectations 
and informed consent. Bone Marrow Transplant 15, 573-81.;Fromm, K., Andrykowski, M. & Hunt, J. 1996. 
Positive and negative psychosocial sequelae of bone marrow transplantation: implications for quality of life 
assessment. J Behav Med, 19, 221-40. 
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 Jacoby, L. H., Maloy, B., Cirenza, E., Shelton, W., Goggins, T. & Balint, J. 1999. The basis of informed consent 
for BMT patients. BMT, 23 711-717. 
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Jacoby had noted that in the small number of earlier studies
493
 with patients undergoing bone 
marrow transplant (BMT), patients did not appear to give nearly as much weight or currency to 
the information surrounding the risks of BMT in their decision making process as had been 
assumed. The objective of Jacoby’s study, therefore, was to clarify and evaluate the basis of 
‘informed consent’ in adult patients undergoing BMT. Patients considering BMT were asked to 
complete a self-administered questionnaire at 4 separate timepoints: at their first and second 
BMT clinic visits, at the time of hospital admission, and finally at 3 months post treatment. The 
time period between the first visit and admission to the hospital ranged between 6 weeks and 5 
months. Questions focused on expectations, knowledge, anxiety and factors which most strongly 
contributed to their decision to undergo treatment. A total of 51 patients attending a transplant 
unit at a New York medical centre, completed the first questionnaire; 17 completed the first 
follow-up phase questionnaire (diminished numbers due primarily to illness and death), and 13 
completed the last questionnaire 3 months post discharge from hospital. All but 2 patients 
underwent an autologous transplantation which, even at that time, was associated with 
considerable less morbidity and mortality than allogeneic transplantation (the exemplar used in 
this thesis), as detailed in Chapter 3.   
Jacoby’s study confirmed previous findings that patients considering undergoing BMT were 
motivated principally by their overriding desire for survival, and their belief that BMT was their 
best chance at a good outcome.  
The authors concluded that patients in this study gave relatively little weight to understanding the 
information provided to them during what is commonly referred to as ‘the informed consent 
process’ when the transplant physician discloses ‘material information’ about risks and benefits 
of the intended treatment. 
                                                 
493
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When asked about the timing of their decision, and the relevance of the disclosure of ‘material 
information’ had on that decision making, almost half of the patients (8) in the study stated that 
they had in fact made the decision to undergo BMT even prior to their first BMT consultation, 
that is to say, prior to the requisite information disclosure by the transplant physician. When 
asked specifically about what importance they placed on the information from the transplant 
physician and how it contributed to their decision, 76.5% (13) patients stated that they felt that 
the communication helped to alleviate their fears and to maintain their hope and expectations for 
a good outcome. 
Patients in the study stated that the most salient motivators to consent to BMT included an/their 
overriding desire for survival, and that BMT was their best chance at a good outcome. Most 
(76.9%) patients indicated that chance of survival was the ‘most important factor in deciding to 
proceed with BMT. The ongoing nature of information disclosure served primarily to establish 
trust, and the trust in turn helped them maintain hope for a positive outcome. The authors viewed 
this as being when the patients’ vulnerability increased, voluntariness of their choice inversely 
decreased.   
The findings of this study are enormously significant because most assumptions about decision 
making and about consent are that it involves a purely rational consideration of information 
disclosure by the healthcare professional and understood by the patient. Most examinations of 
consent also assume that there are always alternative procedures available, and patients are able 
to weigh up these alternatives in light of their values and beliefs, and make a considered 
assessment of the risks and benefits of the different options. However, for patients who have a 
life-threatening disease, for whom there is no other medical treatment that can potentially save 
their life, the results of Jacoby’s study suggest that their self-determination is constrained and 
they may be ‘forced’ to consider BMT if they are to have a chance to survive long term.  
Similarly, in other studies parents of children for whom BMT is proffered as a means of potential 
‘cure’ or increased survival, reported feeling compelled to consent on behalf of their child.494  
                                                 
494
 Prows, C. & McCain, G. 1997. Parental consent for bone marrow transplantation in the case of genetic disorders. 
J Spec Pediatr Nurs, 2, 9-18.  Miller, V. A. & Nelson, R. M. 2012. Factors Related to Voluntary Parental Decision-
Making in Pediatric Oncology. Pediatrics, 129, 903-909, Levi, R. B., Marsick, R., Drotar, D. & Kodish, E. D. 2000. 
Diagnosis, Disclosure, and Informed Consent: Learning From Parents of Children With Cancer. Journal of Pediatric 
Hematology/Oncology, 22, 3-12.  
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Predictably, there is a larger literature surrounding consent to BMT in children than in adults, 
reflecting the ethical concerns about substitute decision-making and consent to a medical 
intervention that carries with it significant rates of mortality,
495
  morbidity,
496
 and treatment 
failure.
497
 Despite the significant risks, when faced with the decision, very few parents decline 
treatment for their child.   
In an attempt to understand how parents negotiate the consent process in BMT, Benedict et al
498
 
undertook a study in Canada examining if parents felt that the consent they provided was valid, 
and how the consent process affected them. Importantly, the study included parents of children 
who had not survived, something no previous studies had examined with regard to BMT. The 
study sought to answer 3 questions (i) Do parents feel compelled to consent to paediatric BMT? 
(ii) Do parents feel they provided adequate consent?  (iii) What short- and long-term impact did 
the informed consent process and the decision to consent have for parents? 
All parents had participated in an initial “BMT consent conference” and had received a written 
copy of the information discussed in the consent conference; further information was provided to 
parents by a transplant physician immediately prior to the transplant.
499
  Interviews were 
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conducted with 20 parents of 12 children including 5 parents of 3 children who had died 
subsequent to BMT.
500
   
The perception by parents of their capacity to understand the information was assessed on a five-
point scale. While assessed in this way, most parents felt that they had full or only mildly 
decreased capacity, however, in discussion, 10 (50%) parents described some difficulty 
processing disclosed information. 
Regarding their perception of ‘freedom to choose’ 15 parents (75%) reported feeling as though 
they had ‘‘no choice’’ but to consent, indicating that they felt personally compelled to do so. One 
mother put it this way, ‘‘There was no other option. We didn’t have any choices. This was the 
only one. So when you’re up against it, there is no choice. You have to proceed and, and then it’s 
all hope’’. The 5 remaining parents felt BMT offered the ‘‘most hope’’ for their child.  
Whilst most stated they understood they could decline BMT, most parents said they did not feel 
this to be an acceptable option. It is easy to see why this may be the case as, at least in this study, 
while options other that BMT had been discussed, in all cases options included palliation, 
experimental interventions or standard options, such as chemotherapy, but with demonstrated 
poorer outcomes. Despite this, 18 parents (90%) volunteered that they did not feel any external 
pressure from medical staff to consent to BMT. Two mothers reported perceiving some degree of 
expectation from medical staff to accept BMT as the ‘‘best choice’’ for their child. 
Eleven (55%) parents ranked all three components of informed consent (information, freedom, 
capacity) as fully adequate (5/5 on the Likert scale). At the time of interview, 19 (95%) parents 
denied current regret or second thoughts with respect to consenting to BMT. No parents 
questioned the validity of the consent they provided for their child’s BMT and all parents (n=20), 
including those whose children died subsequent to BMT, claimed they would consent to BMT 
again, if faced with the same circumstances. Notwithstanding, 11 parents (55%) stated that they 
felt their child’s situation was “hopeless” at the time of consent, 
One obvious limitation of the study was that the parent participants were self-selected, and as a 
result there may be a bias in either direction of positive or negative feelings about the transplant 
consent process.  
                                                 
500
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In conclusion, whilst it is acknowledged that the information disclosed to parents (and adults in 
their setting) is necessarily complex and most likely outside their usual realm of knowledge and  
experience, their capacity to absorb and integrate that information might be affected by many 
factors,  decision-makers (parents of children, or index cases themselves) felt compelled to 
consent to BMT. However, in each circumstance, the majority of participants in studies indicated 
that they perceived that the consent they provided was valid.  
 
2.5 Synopsis 
Many questions remain about the adequacy of the current construction of consent for patients 
faced with life-threatening illnesses. In particular, it is unclear whether the commonly accepted 
elements of consent adequately capture the complexities of complicated, multifaceted medical 
treatment. Is there something about a high-risk medical intervention that sets it apart from 
consent to less risky interventions? How much is patients’ decision-making capacity, and 
voluntariness influenced by their illness? How realistic is it to expect that information disclosed 
will be understood and incorporated into a ‘rational’ decision? And perhaps most importantly, 
does the current construction of consent assist patients, their families, as well as healthcare 
professionals understand and optimise the ways in which they think about consent to high-risk 
medical interventions. 
The concept and practical application of consent in the allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell 
transplants setting (HSCT) faces a series of additional challenges - the information is 
exceedingly complex, the likelihood of various outcomes is uncertain and that uncertainty is not 
able to be eliminated, the patients have limited options and frequently convey that they feel 
obliged to continue with care. Patients are also often very sick and may have difficulty 
participating in decision-making in any real way,
501
 and it may be difficult, if not impossible, to 
adequately describe the nature of the transplant experience.
502
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Part I, Chapter 3 - Literature review of the exemplar of a high-risk 
medical intervention used in this thesis - Allogeneic haematopoietic stem 
cell transplant  
 
1. Introduction 
The high risk medical procedure used as an exemplar in this empirical study of consent is 
allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT).
503
  
Allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplants are often, rather confusingly, referred to using 
different terminology including allogeneic progenitor cell transplant (HPC), and bone marrow 
transplants (BMT), the latter being a general, but somewhat outdated term.
504
 The changes in 
terminology relate to developments in understanding of stem cell biology and an increasing 
ability to describe the population of cells active in transplantation. Throughout this thesis, I will 
use the term HSCT to depict the intervention used in this study. 
HSCT is undoubtedly ‘high risk’ due to its associated high morbidity and mortality rates. 
Equally important in relation to this study is the fact that HSCT is usually the ‘last chance’ for 
patients to achieve prolonged disease-free survival.  
2. Haematopoietic stem cells and their use in transplantation  
2.1 Haematopoietic stem cells 
Haematopoietic stem cells (HSC) were first identified in 1961, and since then have been 
extensively studied
 505
. HSCs are primitive, multipotent cells that have the capacity for self-
renewal, proliferation and differentiation, and give rise to a variety of blood cells.
506
  HSCs in 
humans, reside primarily in the bone marrow where they can differentiate to form erythrocytes 
                                                 
503
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the transplanted material is from ‘self’); haematopoietic alludes to ‘blood forming’; stem cells are primitive cells 
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504
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(red blood cells), leucocytes (white blood cells) and thrombocytes (or platelets - the cells 
involved in coagulation) which, when mature, migrate out to the peripheral circulation.
507
 It is 
this capacity for self renewal, proliferation and functional differentiation that is exploited in 
haematopoietic stem cell transplantation. 
2.2 Haematopoietic stem cell transplant 
Haematopoietic stem cell transplant may be considered in the treatment of a variety of diseases 
including haematological malignancies (e.g. leukaemia, lymphoma, multiple myeloma, 
myelodysplastic syndrome), some solid tumours (e.g. sarcomas, neuroblastoma, breast cancer, 
testicular cancer) and some non–malignant conditions (e.g. aplastic anaemia, autoimmune 
disorders, immunodeficiency syndromes, inborn errors of metabolism).   
In allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplants (HSCT), stem cells from an antigenically-
matched donor are infused into the patient; they navigate their way to the patient’s bone marrow, 
self-replicate and then begin to differentiate to create new blood-forming cells in the patient’s 
bone marrow. In this manner, the donor’s stem cells are ‘grafted’ to the recipient’s bone marrow 
stroma, and the new population of blood cells become part of the recipient.
508
  New stem cells, 
free of the patient’s original malignancy are sequentially manufactured thereafter and released 
into the patients peripheral blood supply.
509
 
510
 
2.2.1 Source of the stem cells 
HSCTs are characterised by the source of the stem cells. Until the 1990s, the bone marrow was 
the only source of stem cells for transplantation.
511
 However, following the discovery of colony 
stimulating factors (GM-CSF and G-CSF) by Australian physiologist, Don Metcalf in the 1980s, 
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it became possible to stimulate the production of HSCs 
512
 resulting in increased numbers of 
HSCs in the peripheral blood system in sufficient numbers for transplantation.
513
 Hence 
transplantation of HSCs derived from peripheral blood is known as peripheral blood stem cell 
transplant (PBSCT).
514
 In recent years, CSF–mobilized blood cells have been used increasingly 
as the source of stem cells for transplantation. Another source of HSCs is umbilical cord 
blood.
515
 
2.3 The process involved in HSCT  
HSCT is an intense and arduous journey for patients and those people closest to them. The 
treatment involves several phases of emotional, physical and functional highs and lows; the 
initial decision to undergo HSCT, the anxiety surrounding the process of sourcing a suitable 
donor, the excitement of having donor stem cells available, the perceived pressure to stay as 
healthy as possible and free from infections leading up to the transplant, the lack of control over 
the need for their disease to stay in remission, reaching the ‘point of no return’ when to refuse to 
continue would result in imminent death, the period of isolation, the relative anticlimax of the 
infusion, the continual fear of relapse, rejection, infections, loss of independence, uncertainty of 
outcome, symptoms of graft-versus-host-disease (GvHD) competing with toxic effect of the 
immunosuppressants used to limit GvHD
516
, and generally, the fear of the unknown. 
2.3.1 Patient selection 
Review of a patient for suitability for HSCT involves a number of assessments including 
consideration of the patient’s co-morbidities. Co-morbidities describe any concurrent health 
conditions that coexist with the index disease and can have a significant effect on the patient’s 
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outcome.
517
 They are an important independent prognostic factor for patients undergoing HSCT. 
Until recently, patients could have potentially been excluded from consideration of HSCT if they 
had any single organ dysfunction such as might result from cardiac, pulmonary, renal, hepatic 
diseases, unless they were otherwise fit and young. While many patients with serious co-
morbidities may survive HSCT, their pre-treatment health status remains an important 
consideration because as the severity of co-morbidities increases, the risk of toxicities in 
response to the various specific treatments involved in HSCT also increases
518
 resulting in 
shortened life expectancy, thus potentially cancelling any gains derived from undergoing the 
rigours of HSCT.
519
  
Patients who participated in the current study had all been diagnosed with a haematological 
malignancy or bone marrow disorder prior to undergoing HSCT. From the time of diagnosis, 
depending on the disease, its stage, the presence of co-morbidities, (concomitant but unrelated 
conditions) the patients would have undergone chemotherapy in most cases, and/or other 
therapeutic procedures including radiotherapy, in an attempt to achieve disease-free survival. 
HSCT was recommended to the patients in this study because it was felt to provide their best 
chance of long-term survival. This judgement in turn, was made on the basis of assessment of 
their risk of relapse or disease progression using a variety of clinical, chromosomal, 
immunophenotypic and molecular ‘markers’.  
2.3.2 Identifying a donor  
Without a suitable donor, HSCT cannot proceed. Not surprisingly therefore, the sometimes 
lengthy process of sourcing a potential donor is a time of enormous anxiety for most patients. 
The first step is to identify a compatible donor. Compatibility is defined in terms of the human 
leukocyte antigens (HLA) which are the proteins found on the surface of certain white blood 
cells (lymphocytes) and which are responsible for the characteristics of an individual’s immune 
system. Each individual has a unique set of HLA antigens, (with the exception of 
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identical/monozygous twins who will have all the same HLA antigens as one another). The HLA 
is referred to as the major histocompatibility complex (MHC) in humans, and compatibility at 
this site between donor and recipient is responsible for recognising ‘self’ and ‘non-self’.  
Recognition of ‘self’ and ‘non-self’ is essential for immune functioning, and hence survival of 
the recipient patient. There are many HLA antigens, but for the purposes of transplantation there 
are six different HLA antigens of significance; three major MHC class I, and three major MHC 
class II antigens. Each of these HLA antigens has two genetic components or alleles, one being 
derived from each parent. Hence, there are six alleles, or genetic components that are routinely 
identified and then matched between donor and recipient by a process known as tissue typing.
520
  
The aim of tissue typing and subsequent matching is to identify a donor whose six transplant 
related HLA antigens are matched those of the patient. Siblings have the greatest potential to 
have a close match to one another due to the way in which the HLA antigens are transmitted by 
their parents (by Mendelian inheritance which results in a one in four chance that any one sibling 
will have inherited the same short arm of chromosome number 6 on which the HLA antigens 
reside, from each parent as the patient). The probability of finding a suitable family donor is only 
about 30%.
521
 For this reason, many people requiring transplantation will need to have stem cells 
from an unrelated donor. While unrelated donor transplants were initially far inferior to related 
donor transplants, in recent years improvements in tissue typing and in supportive care have lead 
to outcomes in both siblings and matched unrelated donor (MUD) transplant being broadly 
equivalent.
522
 
If the donor and recipient pair have a 6-6 match, they are said to be ‘matched’. If the donor and 
recipient pair have any degree of matching less than this, they are said to be ‘mismatched’. 
‘Mismatched’ transplants can be performed but carry a greater risk to the patient.523 Part of the 
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problem is that, if the patient’s immune system sees the donor’s antigens as being too vastly 
different from ‘self’, the patient’s immune system will try to kill off the ‘non self’ donated stem 
cells, and this may lead to graft rejection.   
HLA-matched unrelated donors are found using national and international Bone Marrow Donor 
Registries. With advanced techniques for tissue typing and matching, transplantation results 
using unrelated donors have improved almost to the point of those results using sibling donors.
524
 
It remains the case, however, that the closer the match in HLA types between the donor and the 
patient, the lower the rate of transplant-related complications and the greater the chance of a 
successful transplant.   
Members of the same ethnic group are more likely to have matching HLA types, which means 
that the likelihood of a potential transplant recipient being matched with a registered donor is 
determined, to a large extent, by the representation of that person’s ethnic group on the donor 
registry. As it happens, most registered donors are Caucasians and hence, Caucasians will have 
an 80-90% chance of finding a possible match. Ethnic minorities on the other hand, are relatively 
under-represented on bone marrow donor registries, with the result that non-Caucasians are 
likely to find an HLA matched donor in fewer that 20-30% instances.
525
 Nevertheless, even in 
the best circumstances, it is not always possible to identify an HLA matched donor due to large 
variations in HLA-types within the population. 
Even when closely matched stem cells are used, another complexity needs to be managed - the 
donor’s cells have a propensity to attack the patient’s vital organs, causing graft versus host 
disease (GvHD), the most serious complication of HSCT, and which can lead to death in some 
cases, and long term morbidity in others.  
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2.3.3 Harvesting the donor’s stem cells  
Stem cells are taken from the donor (called ‘harvesting’) by one of two ways; (i) by repeated 
aspirations of bone marrow from the iliac crest, the thick rim at the top of the hip bone (this 
procedure is conducted under general anaesthetic, so it is not without risk to the donor, plus 
many donors find this procedure produces significant residual pain at the harvest site), or (ii) 
more commonly, stem cells are harvested from the donor’s peripheral blood. In order to collect 
sufficient stem cells using this procedure, the donor is required to receive injections of 
haematopoietic growth factor (G-CSF) which stimulates the proliferation of stem cells in the 
bone marrow, and subsequent mobilisation of these cells into the peripheral blood. The side 
effects of this process of harvesting are not usually severe, however, may include bone and joint 
pain, headache, chills and fever, eye inflammation (uveitis), and more rarely, splenic 
enlargement.  
Ethical questions inevitably arise regarding the risk to a healthy person in undergoing a general 
anaesthetic and suffering pain from the bone marrow harvest, and the possible risks associated 
with injecting an otherwise healthy person with haematopoietic growth factors in the peripheral 
blood stem cell harvest. 
Although donor’s stem cells are generally used within 1-3 days of collection, they can be 
cryopreserved so that arrangements can be made to coincide with the most appropriate time for 
the transplant team to prepare the patient. 
2.3.4 Transplant conditioning and stem cell infusion  
On admission to the transplant centre where the patient remains for the next 3 to 5 weeks, 
patients undergo a period of pre-treatment, also known as "conditioning therapy." Conditioning 
therapy includes high dose chemotherapy and may also include exposure to total-body 
irradiation. The aims of conditioning therapy are to eradicate any remaining malignant cells or 
evidence of potential disease, to suppress the cells of the immune system (thus causing immuno-
suppression)
526
 and to enable the donor cells to engraft (establish colonies of cells in the 
recipient’s bone marrow cavity).  
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Following conditioning chemotherapy, the patient quickly develops pancytopenia, meaning a 
lack of (i) red blood cells (ii) white blood cells and (iii) platelets. As a result s/he becomes 
anaemic, has an increased risk of infection, and may experience major bleeding. Infections can 
lead to sepsis and septic shock despite the prophylactic use of antibiotics, and accounts for a 
large share of treatment-related mortality (see Figure 2). Precautions are generally taken to 
reduce the risks associated with this phase of the procedure. For example, the transplant centre 
from where all the patients in this study were recruited, accommodates HSCT patients in single 
occupancy rooms and in a sterile air environment. Patients are requested to stay isolated in their 
rooms during critical periods that require additional care. Young children are excluded from 
visiting the patient. Visitors are asked about having any infectious diseases prior to them being 
given access to the patient during this period; hand washing is mandatory for visitors and staff 
alike. Patients are likely to experience nausea, vomiting, weakness, debilitating fatigue, and 
anxiety about their immediate future.  
Approximately 6 to 10 days after initiation of the conditioning regimen, the donor’s stem cells 
are infused into the patient’s blood stream, essentially ‘rescuing’ the patient from the lethal 
effects of the conditioning chemo-radiotherapy. The infused stem cells navigate their way to 
their niche in the patient’s bone marrow cavity by a process known as ‘homing’ where they 
‘engraft’ and create a ‘new’ bone marrow. After a period of growth, the newly engrafted stem 
cells develop into mature blood cells and eventually (after about 2 to 3 weeks) migrate out into 
the peripheral blood,
527
 thus replenishing the patient’s blood cells and reinstating his/her immune 
system, although the latter could take months or even years to completely recover.
528
  When 
sufficient numbers of mature cells are found in the patient’s peripheral blood, the patient is at 
less risk of infection and bleeding, and is, in all probability, ready to be discharged from hospital. 
At several time points following discharge from hospital, (generally at 1 month, 3 months and 
then annually thereafter) tests are repeated to establish whether the patient has achieved, or 
remained in remission (no evidence of disease).  
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3. Biomedical aspects of HSCT 
Whilst the experience of undergoing HSCT may share some features of some other medical 
interventions, for example many solid tumours are treated with chemotherapy and radiation, and 
some conditions are treated by autologous stem cell transplants, there are nonetheless some very 
significant differences. From a biological perspective, it is the immunological conflict between 
donor and recipient’s cells which set HSCT apart from other extreme interventions.529 530 Other 
major differences include complications which challenge the patient’s physical, psychological 
and functional status. 
3.1 Complications associated with HSCT 
HSCT is associated with an array of complications. These arise because of a range of factors 
including the patient’s previous treatments including chemotherapy, co-morbidities, age and 
general health status. Complications of HSCT have a number of characteristics, for example;  
 they are frequently life threatening. Due to the high morbidity and mortality inherent in 
the intervention itself, in Australia HSCT is only considered for those patients who have 
life threatening diseases. So, the patient knows that s/he will die if they do not undergo 
HSCT, however , if they do undergo HSCT with its associated morbidity, they may still 
die, and probably sooner than if they had not undergone the intervention; ‘like the sword 
of Damocles hanging over their head’531 
 they often occur precipitously, indeed often with such frightening speed and severity that 
it can be confusing and distressing for the patient and especially for their intimate circle.  
 they are protean in nature i.e. they are highly variable, assuming different forms and 
characteristics. Almost any body system can be affected.  
 they may alter the way patients see themselves and represent themselves to others; their 
appearance changes sometimes dramatically – they may experience remarkable changes 
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in their weight, painful skin ulceration and other lesions like herpes appear,  they may 
develop skin rashes followed by sloughing off of the skin;  
 they often produced significant functional changes include debilitating fatigue, 
breathlessness, and gastrointestinal disturbances including diarrhoea which impact on 
relationships and life in general  
 they may lead to emotional exhaustion from the tumultuous journey on which they have 
embarked. There is the burden of decisions, the knowledge that the opportunity to rescind 
the decision to undergo the intervention is past, the uncertainty of outcome, all of which 
can place the patient in an agitated and distressed demeanour  
 they may change or completely disrupt social relationships and roles change, patients 
become totally dependent on others; because the patient becomes immuno-suppressed as 
an essential part of the transplant, the patient’s social world becomes a threat to his/her 
survival. This can threaten relationships as well as confidence the patient has in his/her 
environment exacerbating feelings of vulnerability. 
 they do not end, but change in type and severity according to the duration of time post-
transplant; complications are said to be early (within the first 3 months following 
transplantation), delayed (occurring any time between 3 months and 2 years), late 
(occurring between 2 to10 years), and very late (occurring later than 10 years post 
transplantation).
532
 
Most early complications usually occur as a direct result of the conditioning regime causing 
damage to otherwise normal tissue. Cancer cells are known to be highly proliferative, and it is 
this feature that is exploited in ‘conditioning’ the patient by the use of chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy which are known to explicitly target rapidly dividing cells. But while this 
conditioning regime is effective in killing the cancer cells, there is nonetheless, unintended 
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collateral damage to other non-cancerous, healthy cells.
533
 The patient’s white blood cell and 
platelet counts plummet to their nadir, rendering the patient highly susceptible to infections and 
haemorrhage. To protect the patient against infection as far as possible, the patient is usually 
isolated and very much under the watchful eyes of the various health care professionals 
observing for signs of infections and other complications 
Early complications may also arise from the production of inflammatory cytokines triggering 
both acute graft-versus-host disease (aGvHD) 
534
 and endothelial damage causing interstitial 
pneumonitis, endothelial leakage syndrome, and veno-occlusive disease.
535
 Veno-occlusive 
disease, a potentially lethal liver syndrome is frequently accompanied by multi-organ failure and 
early detection and supportive management is essential. Pneumonitis is an inflammation of the 
lung; it may be caused by reactivation of a latent viral infection, or could be a newly acquired 
viral, bacterial or fungal infection. Endothelial leakage syndrome is a severe and distressing 
condition common in patients who have become septic due to infection and is characterized by 
loss of intravasal fluids into the interstitial space causing weight gain,
 
generalized oedema, 
hypotension, and hypoalbuminemia.
536
 
During this early phase, when the adverse effects of HSCT are severe, some patients may 
question their decision to undergo the transplant, but of course, it is too late, they have passed the 
‘point of no return’, and concerns about death and dying loom large.537   
3.2 The infusion  
Many patients may feel anxious about the infusion of donor stem cells but this core event in the 
process is generally unproblematic, and it is paradoxically often described later by patients as 
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having been ‘a non-event.’ Indeed, the experience for them, they say, is not dissimilar to 
receiving a blood transfusion. 
3.3 The engraftment period  
The engraftment period produces more anxiety as the patient waits for advice from the transplant 
physician about whether the graft has ‘taken’. Engraftment can take anywhere between 6 days 
post infusion to up to 5 weeks, but usually occurs 12-21 days after the infusion of stem cells. 
Because this period incorporates the time when the patient’s white cell count is at its lowest, and 
hence the patient is severely immuno-compromised, the longer the time taken for engraftment, 
the greater the risk to the patient of life threatening infections.  
3.4 Graft-Versus-Host Disease (GvHD) 
The appearance of GvHD often heralds a new wave of life threatening events. First described by 
Barnes and Loutit,
538
  GvHD is an inflammatory process unique to HPT and has a direct impact 
on the transplant outcome and the survival of the patient (see Figures 1 and 2). It results from the 
‘newly’ engrafted immune cells recognising the patient as foreign, and can occur even if the 
HLA match is identical between the donor and the patient/recipient, because the immune system 
still recognises other differences between the tissues. GvHD is a ‘double-edged sword’; on one 
hand it is seen as a positive sign that the patient’s immune system has transformed into that of 
the donor, essentially conferring an advantageous graft-versus-tumour effect,
539
 but on the other 
hand, it can also be disastrous to the patient. As a result, low grade (Grade I/II) GvHD confers a 
survival advantage, whereas more severe (Grade III/IV) GvHD reduces overall survival.  
GvHD is described as being acute or chronic depending on its onset relative to the infusion of the 
stem cells. Acute GvHD describes a distinctive syndrome of dermatitis, hepatitis, and enteritis 
developing within 100 days of the infusion,
540
 whilst chronic GvHD describes a more diverse 
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syndrome developing after 100 days. As a consequence, the 100 day interval from infusion of the 
stem cells takes on an important implication for both the patient and the attending health care 
professionals. 
3.4.1 Acute GvHD (aGvHD)  
Acute graft versus host disease (aGvHD) is characterized by damage to the liver, skin and 
mucosa, the lungs, and the gastrointestinal tract. Symptoms include severe intestinal 
inflammation with sloughing of the mucosal membrane, severe diarrhoea, abdominal pain, 
nausea, and vomiting, itching and a generalised redness of the skin which may have the 
appearance of a mild to severe sunburn, burning of the eyes, dryness and soreness in the mouth 
and pain when attempting to eat certain foods, and jaundice - all of which can diminish a 
patient's self-esteem.
541
 The side effects of drugs used to treat aGvHD can further stress a 
patient's already delicate emotional state.
542
 Depression, confusion, anxiety, mood swings, and 
exaggerated emotional responses are common and can make the aGvHD recovery period 
extremely difficult not only for patients and their intimate circle, but also for the health care 
professionals caring for them. 
3.4.2 Chronic GvHD (cGvHD)  
Chronic graft versus host disease (cGvHD) mostly affects the skin and mucosa,
543
 the eyes and 
mouth, liver, lungs, and gastrointestinal tract,
544
 however multiple other sites may also be 
affected. Abnormalities of the skin include redness and generalized thickening of the dermal 
layers which can lead to joint contractures causing tightening of the tendons and severe debility 
that are likely to be permanent. Other symptoms include dryness and sensitivity of the mouth and 
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other mucous membranes; ocular symptoms
545
 including burning and irritation due to reduced 
tear secretion, lung disease with wheezing, and cough leading to bronchitis and pneumonia. 
cGvHD is treated with steroids which suppress the immune system resulting in increased 
susceptibility to infection. Death due to severe cGvHD is usually a consequence of infectious 
complications.
546
  
3.5 Mucositis 
Mucositis is a general term that describes an inflammatory response of healthy mucosal 
epithelial cells to chemotherapy and/or radiotherapy. Mucous membranes line the entire 
gastrointestinal tract and hence all mucous membrane-covered surfaces from the mouth to the 
rectum are susceptible to mucositis although the lips, tongue and the back of the throat are the 
most obvious to the observer.
547
 Mucositis causes the patient significant pain, discomfort and 
considerable distress and is the most common condition requiring systemic analgesics during 
cancer therapy.
548
  The need for opioid analgesics to alleviate the pain of mucositis can cause 
extended hospital stays, which may in turn create further complications.
549 550
  
Mucositis is particularly serious because it can lead to infections, impaired nutritional status, and 
other complications that can increase morbidity, and impact patient outcomes.
551
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All patients undergoing HSCT are at risk of developing mucositis
552
 although the incidence and 
severity may vary greatly among patient populations. Oral mucositis is graded using a WHO 
grading system of severity.
553
 In grade 4 (severe) cases, the inflammation causes the patient so 
much pain that it not possible for the patient to swallow and they require a naso-gastric tube for 
enteral nutrition. (A naso-gastric tube is a soft tube which is fed up the nares, past the pharynx, 
down the oesophagus and into the stomach. Its purpose is to allow delivery of nutrition and 
medications directly to the stomach of patients during the period of severe oral mucositis. It may 
be inserted pre-emptively, before symptoms become too severe. Insertion of the naso-gastric tube 
is a procedure that most patients dread but consent to having, once the importance of receiving 
adequate nutrition at this critical time in their treatment course, and the advantage of having it 
inserted prior to severe symptoms developing, is explained. The naso-gastric tube stays in place 
until the gastrointestinal tract is functioning normally or the patient is capable of swallowing.) 
3.6 Infections 
Patients undergoing HSCT are at significant risk of contracting bacterial, viral and fungal 
infections both because their immunity has been suppressed by the conditioning treatment 
leading up to the stem cell infusion, and because they have various ‘devices’ (e.g. central venous 
lines) in situ. Also, white blood cells that have a role in suppressing infections are also destroyed 
by chemotherapy and radiotherapy during the conditioning phase of treatment, rendering the 
patient susceptible to infections.  
Infections may also occur as a consequence of damage to the integrity of surface barriers caused 
by the conditioning regimes, and by immunosuppressive therapy. For example, the skin may 
breakdown as a result from the combined effects of chemotherapy, radiotherapy, the use of 
steroids, and dehydration – leading to ulceration, cellulitis and septicaemia.  
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GvHD also plays an important role in the development of infections, both because of the direct 
immunological damage to various tissues and because of the immunosuppressive effect of 
treatment for GvHD.
554
 
The oral cavity is a frequent source of infection. For this reason, patients are instructed on the 
necessity to perform daily oral care (principally mouth washing) to minimise both local and 
systemic infections that can result from the open ulcers of mucositis.  
Owing to their lack of resistance, HSCT patients are highly susceptible to fungal infections, 
many of which can be lethal. To prevent fungal infections, the patient may be given antifungal 
medications prophylactically.
555
  
Viral infections are also a significant cause of morbidity and mortality in HSCT patients, 
predominantly in the post-infusion phase. It is not uncommon for latent viral infections such as 
herpes and cytomegalovirus (CMV) to reactivate. CMV can cause life-threatening pneumonia 
and can also cause infection in the gastrointestinal tract, liver and retina in this patient 
population.
556
 The prognosis for the HSCT patient with CMV is poor and so the emphasis rests 
on prevention of a primary infection in the first instance (prophylaxis) as well as prevention of 
reactivation of a latent infection (pre-emptive treatment). Herpes virus can also cause local and 
disseminated infections, and both prophylaxis and pre-emptive therapies are part of management 
plan for susceptible patients.  
Being so susceptible to infections, particularly respiratory viral infections, deprives that patient 
from being able to safely interact with his/her family and intimate circle. Children in particular, 
are a potential source of infection and many patients who are parents find the segregation from 
their children (and grandchildren) especially distressing and difficult.  
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3.7 Pain 
HSCT recipients generally do not experience pain as consequence of their disease, but may 
experience pain as a consequence of the procedure itself.
557
 During HSCT, pain is most 
frequently related to side effects of the conditioning regime – particularly mucositis. Pain 
management needs to be adequately titrated; undertreated pain can prolong hospitalisation and 
can contribute to anxiety and depression.
558
 Patients with oral mucositis may not be able to take 
analgesics orally and most patients require intravenous analgesia.  
The central venous line becomes a good route for administration of analgesics and other drugs. 
But central venous lines are notorious avenues for infections, delivering organisms directly to the 
bloodstream causing septicaemia. Great care is needed to ensure the lines are kept sterile and 
patent. 
3.8 Nausea and vomiting 
Chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (CINV) remains one of the most dreaded side 
effects of chemotherapy with patients consistently listing CINV as one of their greatest fears.
559 
560
  From a patient management perspective, unrelieved nausea and vomiting can result in 
physical complications, such as poor nutrition, aspiration pneumonia, dehydration, fluid and 
electrolyte imbalance, and mucosal tears. Importantly, in recent years the treatment for CINV 
had significantly improved, and few patients experience intractable CINV. 
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3.9 Physical functioning 
Longitudinal studies suggest that physical functioning is likely to remain limited for the first 100 
days post HSCT. There is limited agreement between commentators as to when physical 
functioning recovers - some studies report that physical functioning begins to improve post 100 
days, then it plateaus in the following year, whilst other studies report that physical functioning 
fluctuates over 4 years.
561
  
But HSCT cannot be viewed solely in terms of the biomedical stages in the process.
562
 HSCT has 
wide ranging implications on the whole life of the person undergoing the intervention, and 
almost all, if not all, patients who undergo HSCT experience a wide range of psychological and 
psychosocial disruption to their lives.
563
   
 
4. Psychological and psychosocial implications of undergoing HSCT 
A number of scholars have attempted to map the psychological and psychosocial reactions to the 
different stages of HSCT. 
564 565 566 567 568
 In doing so, each scholar attempted to distance 
him/herself from the early work of Elizabeth Kübler-Ross
569
 emphasising that the models they 
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described were not intended as a rigid structure, that some patients may not exhibit all reactions, 
that the reactions may not appear in order, and that reactions may be transitory or persistent.   
While each schema differs, it is possible to synthesise the various models of Brown and Kelly 
(1976), Haberman, (1988), Thain and Gibbon (1996), Stein et al (2008), Bevans (2008) and 
describe a predictable pattern of physiological and psychosocial reactions that patients might 
exhibit in response to stressors inherent in the HSCT process. 
4.1 Specific stressors in the HSCT process 
The stressors associated with HSCT can be broadly grouped into the following chronological 
categories; 
 deciding to undergo HSCT 
 pre-admission and preparing for the intervention  
 the conditioning regimen 
 infusion of stem cells, isolation and waiting 
 discharge from the transplant centre 
 life post HSCT 
 
4.1.1 Deciding to undergo HSCT  
Due to its high toxicity and subsequent morbidity and mortality in both the short and long term, 
the decision to undergo HSCT is a major step for a person and can be overwhelming for some.
570
 
Even though the patient may be optimistic that the intervention will save them from impending 
death,
571
 there are no certainties in the outcome, only probabilities, and it is likely that doubt 
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about the decision may linger long after the decision is made, and anxieties will re-surface 
periodically during ensuing stages of the HSCT.
572
  
4.1.2 The pre-admission period 
This is the time when both patients and significant others can be more fully educated about 
various aspects of the procedure, and they are advised what to expect at each stage.
573 574 575
 This 
is often a time when the patient is well advised to settle his/her financial and personal matters. 
This, in itself, is a reminder of how vulnerable the patient is, and can be a cause of significant 
anxiety for the patient.
576
  It is also a time when the patient’s significant others become more 
acutely aware of how hazardous the intervention is likely to be, and it is not uncommon for 
family members to experience a great deal of stress.
577
  Trying to balance a positive attitude with 
realistic expectations can also cause tension within relationships.
578
 
4.1.3 The conditioning regimen  
The ‘conditioning regimen’ of chemotherapy with or without total body irradiation is customized 
according to the patient’s disease, prior treatments, and general health status. Many patients rely 
on their recall of their previous experiences with cancer therapy in an effort to prepare 
themselves for the impending unknown in an effort to maintain some level of control and to 
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make their immediate future more predictable.
579
   However, for some patients the experience is 
not like anything they had previously experienced and some report the conditioning phase as 
being “worse than the disease itself.”580  
Chemotherapy drugs are usually given via the central access line. Because the drugs are highly 
toxic, the nurses handling them wear protective clothing including a mask, goggles, special 
gloves, and gown. The requirement of these additional precautions is yet another reminder to the 
patient of the hazardous treatment s/he is embarking upon, and can be quite confronting for the 
patient. For those patients who receive total body irradiation (TBI), the process is painless but for 
many patients it is psychologically very disturbing
581
 
 582
 as they are required to lie motionless in 
a “coffin-like perspex box” (as described by one patient), whilst being exposed to high doses of 
ionising radiation.   
The common side effects of conditioning therapies are excessive fatigue, nausea and vomiting, 
tachycardia, and disruption to normal bowel habits (either diarrhoea or constipation). The 
patient’s appearance begins to change with hair loss, muscle wasting, a variety of changes to the 
skin (dryness, itchy, burning, redness, peeling), and the appearance of painful mouth ulcers. 
Other effects may include tingling and/or loss of sensation in the extremities, and altered hearing 
and sense of smell.
583
 
4.1.4 The infusion of stem cells, isolation, and waiting   
After an anxious wait leading up to what is called ‘Day 0’ in the treatment protocol, the infusion 
of stem cells may be perceived by the patient either as anticlimactic, or a day full of emotional 
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turmoil.
584 585
 Some patients have a sense of overwhelming gratitude to the donor, some 
identifying it as ‘a second birthday’, a day when they are “given another chance at life.”586 587  
For others, there is comfort in the familiarity they feel in that the experience is not dissimilar to 
receiving a blood transfusion.   
Following the infusion of stem cells is the period of isolation and waiting, each of which for 
some patients is psychologically very challenging.
588
 Patients are isolated to protect them against 
contracting potentially life-threatening infections. Daily blood tests are taken not only to closely 
monitor the patient for signs of infections and other medical markers of danger (viz liver, kidney 
function), but to also look for evidence of engraftment of the donor stem cells. Patients are also 
closely monitored for signs of emotional distress
589
 that may stem from loss of control, a sense of 
urgency and frustration in wanting evidence that the stem cells have engrafted, an awareness of 
vulnerability and lingering uncertainty about the future.
590 591 592
 
4.1.5 Discharge from the transplant centre  
Discharge from hospital following HSCT is not always as one would expect - not necessarily a 
time of release, and joy. Many patients may, while being happy to be going home, experience 
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feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case. 
First, the patients have been under intense care by specialist nurses on an hour-by-hour, 
sometimes minute-by-minute basis, and by other members of the transplant team in a less 
obvious manner, for a number of weeks. During this time the patients become totally dependent 
on the various health care professionals. To be released from such concentrated and protective 
care is, for many patients, confronting, and even frightening. For some, it is as though an 
‘umbilical cord’ is being severed.  Second, unlike many illness in which ones feels more 
confident after treatment, the reverse is often true of patients who have undergone HSCT. Some 
patients worry about how they will manage physically, emotionally, and practically should any 
emergencies or serious side effects befall them. The initial sense of relief that the patient has 
survived long enough to be discharged is soon replaced by threats to self-concept, self esteem, 
body image and sexual functioning,
593
 to name a few.
594
  Many patients also experience a loss of 
physical functioning stemming mainly from either fatigue and/or depression, and due to their 
relative lack of exercise whilst they have been hospitalised.
595
  
Patients are subjected to close follow-up in the first 2 yrs post transplantation. After this period, 
follow-up becomes less consistent.
596
 
4.1.6 Life post HSCT 
Recovery from HSCT is not a simple, linear, progressive process of recuperation and 
improvement.
597
 As with the short term effects, late and long term effects of HSCT combine to 
make the course of recovery one of liberating highs and depressing lows.  
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Karen Syrjala has written extensively on the long term and late complications of HSCT. In a 
2004 study
598
 she concluded that psychological recovery lagged significantly behind the time it 
took for a person to recover from the physical demands of the intervention.  
Echoing this, an international group of transplantation experts that met in 2011 to update the 
recommendations for the ongoing care of transplantation patients,
599
 identified that anxiety, 
depression, fatigue, and sexual dysfunction were primary areas of concern for long-term 
survivors of HSCT. The consortium recommended that patients should undergo a clinical 
psychological assessment throughout the recovery period, at 6 months, 1 year, and annually 
thereafter, with professional counseling recommended for those patients with recognized mental 
health needs. In addition, it recommended that patients be strongly encouraged to participate in 
support networks; that there be regular assessments of levels of psychological adjustment and 
functioning of spouse/caregiver and family; and that questions be raised with the patient and 
partner about sexual function at 6 months, 1 year, and at least annually thereafter. 
4.1.6.1 Post-traumatic stress symptoms 
Some patients report symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent distressing 
dreams and nightmares.
600
 It is only during their waking hours that they can make efforts to 
avoid reminders of the stressful experience.
601
  
4.1.6.2 Searching for ‘meaning’ 
One of the more challenging but potentially ‘positive’ experiences of having undergone HSCT is 
that, for some patients, the experience compels them to consider their values, look for ‘meaning’ 
in their lives
602
 and to prioritise various goals.
603
 Relationships with family and friends may be 
                                                 
598
 Ibid. 
599
 Majhail, N. S., Rizzo, J. D., Lee, S. J., Aljurf, M., Atsuta, Y., Bonfim, C., Burns, L. J., Chaudhri, N., Davies, S., 
Okamoto, S., Seber, A., Socie, G., Szer, J., Van Lint, M. T., Wingard, J. R. & Tichelli, A. 2012. Recommended 
Screening and Preventive Practices for Long-Term Survivors after Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation. Biology of 
Blood and Marrow Transplantation, 18, 348-371. 
600
 Smith, M. Y., Redd, W., DuHamel, K., Vickberg, S. J. & Ricketts, P. 1999. Validation of the PTSD Checklist–
Civilian Version in Survivors of Bone Marrow Transplantation. Journal of Traumatic Stress     12, 485 - 499. 
601
 Andrykowski, M. A. 1994. Psychiatric and psychosocial aspects of bone marrow transplantation. 
Psychosomatics, 35, 13–24. 
602
 Frankl, V. E. 2006. Man's Search for Meaning Boston, Beacon. 
Page 171 of 429 
 
strengthened
604
 - although the opposite can also occur and some relationships do not survive.
605
 
Most survivors of HSCT express how glad they are to be alive
606
 and very few later regret their 
decision to undergo the gruelling treatment.
607 608
 
4.1.6.3 Returning to ‘normal’ 
The goal of being able to ‘return to normal’ is critical for some patients, yet this expectation is 
often unrealistic and can result in disappointment and depression.
609
 But while they may never 
return to what they previously deemed as ‘normal’, many people adjust physically, 
psychologically and psychosocially to a ‘new normal’.610 This ‘new normal’ however, may be 
strikingly different to their ’old normal’ being shaped by the continuing need for monitoring 
which, paradoxically, can provide reassurance but also reignites depression
611
 and anxiety
612
 and 
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reminds the person of the possibility of relapse and late complications
613
 including the 
appearance of a second malignancy.
614 615 616
 
4.1.6.4 Psychosocial functioning 
The term ‘psychosocial functioning’ is used here to describe how the person interacts with 
his/her environment, including their relationships with others. Again there is often disagreement 
as to when ‘psychosocial recovery’ post-HSCT occurs. One study found psychosocial 
functioning significantly improved over the 100 days post infusion,
617
 another study found it 
deteriorated over the 100 days post infusion,
618
 whilst yet another study found no change.
619
 
4.1.6.5 Psychological functioning 
Studies examining psychological or emotional functioning in patients undergoing HSCT all 
agree that the greatest psychological toll on the survivors is early in the intervention. Thereafter, 
there is conflict regarding the timing of recovery of psychological functioning. As Pidala 
found,
620
 the interpretation of the data is variable. Some studies suggest that psychological 
functioning returns rapidly from the time of the patient’s discharge from hospital and that it 
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remains relatively stable. Other data suggest that it improves slowly over 2 years,
621
 or that it 
continues to improve over 4 years.
622
 Nevertheless all data seems to indicate that psychological 
recovery lags significantly behind the time it takes for a person to recover from the physical 
demands of the intervention.
623
   
Regardless of the timing of the psychological sequelae, patients face major psychological threats 
at many points throughout the experience of HSCT. There may be a range of disruptions to the 
patient’s psychological health that they interpret as being threats to their identity, life, 
independence, social world, functioning etc.
624 625
 Irrespective of the specific experiences that 
patients endure, inevitably many are left with lingering uncertainty about their health and future 
quality of life. 
626
 
627
 
 
5 Survival data following HSCT 
According to data collected from participating hospitals in Australia and New Zealand and 
analysed by the Australian Bone Marrow Transplant Recipient Registry (ABMTRR),
628
 9.3% 
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patients who underwent HSCT in Australia and New Zealand in 2011 died of a transplant related 
complication within the first 100 days post transplant, and 16.6% at 1 year post HSCT; that is to 
say that the cause of death was due to factors other than relapse or persistent disease. While this 
remains a significant ‘early’ mortality rate, it represents a major improvement in outcomes 
following HSCT transplanted between 1992 to 1995, and 1996 to 1998 having 22.5% and 19.9% 
risk of early transplant related death respectively.  
Figure 1; Primary cause of death in first year post HSCT amongst 5,089 recipients, in 
percentages 
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This chart is based on first HSCT (i.e. no previous autologous  or allgeneic HCT) , carried 
out in Australia and New Zealand between 1998 and 2011.  
 Data courtesy of ABMTRR, Annual Data Summary 2012 
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Of those who survive the first year, a further (approximately) 10% will succumb in the second 
year, but these deaths are mostly related to relapse or progression of the underlying disease (see 
Figures 1 and 2). Notwithstanding, approximately 35-55% of adult patients who undergo HSCT 
in Australia and New Zealand for haematological malignancies, can expect to be ‘cured’. Data 
from 1992–2000 and collected by the ABMTRR showed that 39% adult recipients of allogeneic 
related donor transplants (n = 1673) and 30% for recipients of allogeneic unrelated donor 
transplants (n = 406) were disease free nine years later.
629
 Importantly, however, long-term 
survivors of HSCT continue to experience physical and psychological effects of HSCT including 
recurrent infections, heart, liver, kidney and lung disease, infertility, depression, financial 
hardships associated with a long illness, relapse of their original disease and occurrence of 
second malignancies.  
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Figure 2 Primary cause of the 310 deaths in the second year post HSCT; in percentages  
 
This chart is based on first HSCT (i.e. no previous autologous or allogeneic HCT), carried out in 
Australia and New Zealand between 1998 and 2011.  
 Data courtesy of ABMTRR, Annual Data Summary 2012  
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Synopsis 
The aim of HSCT is provide people with serious and life-threatening illness, the possibility of 
long-term disease-free survival. In recent years, survival rates following HSCT have improved 
across all populations and for all diseases.
630
 This coupled with advances in tissue-typing, 
transplant immunology, pharmaceutics and supportive care means that more people may benefit 
from HSCT 
Nevertheless, HSCT has significant morbidity and mortality – both in the short and long-term, 
and although outcomes are predictable for populations, the outcomes for individuals is generally 
uncertain and unpredictable.
631 632
 Many patients, therefore, enter HSCT surrounded by 
uncertainty, and many continue to deal with the fear of relapse and reminders of their own 
mortality long after the transplant. 
For those who survive it, short and long term effects can be both devastating and far reaching 
affecting members of their intimate circle. 
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Part II.  Rationale, Aim, Methodology, Method  
 
This section of the thesis describes the theoretic background to undertaking this style of research 
and sets the scene for the empirical study. 
It begins with describing the need for further empirical research, the place of empiricism in 
bioethics and the value and limits of this type of research. This is followed by an introduction to, 
and rationale for employing qualitative methods for this research.  
The study is then detailed, including demographics of the participants, why they were 
purposefully selected, how they were recruited.  
The method of data collection is detailed, and finally the analysis of the data is described.  
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Chapter 4 - Rationale 
The core principles surrounding consent to medical procedures in Australia are widely accepted 
in ethics, law and clinical practice. For consent to be valid it needs to be voluntary, the person 
consenting must be competent to do so, and must be in receipt of adequate relevant information 
upon which to make a reasoned decision about the proposed medical procedure, including about 
its risks and benefits, and any available alternative courses of action. Nevertheless, concerns (as 
outlined in Part I ) have been raised about whether these elements of consent can withstand close 
scrutiny especially in instances when the person being asked to give his/her consent is seriously 
ill
633 634
 and the proffered treatment carries with it significant risks.  
The rationale for undertaking this research is to address these concerns.  
4.1 The need for further empirical research 
Much has been written in the medical, legal and philosophical literature not only about the 
requirement for consent, but also about the construct of consent. However, further empirical 
research is needed to re-conceptualise consent especially to high-risk medical procedures, 
through a critical examination of its principles and practices.  Specifically, empirical research is 
needed to elucidate how attainable each element of consent is in the context of serious illness and 
therefore how solid and how ‘realistic’ the intellectual foundation of the concept of consent itself 
is, in practice. That is to say that, there is a requirement to firstly understand the ‘is’ that Hume635 
and others
636,
 
637
 have described, and then to expose how well the ‘is’ relates to the ‘ought’ as 
asserted in the legal, and ethical literature.  
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4.2 Aim 
This study was conducted to reconcile the concerns that have arisen in recent years concerning 
an increasing critique of the adequacy of the current construct of consent in effectively capturing 
medical decision-making, particularly in high-risk medical interventions.  
These critiques are detailed in Part I, Chapters 1 and 2 and take the following forms; 
1. that the elements of consent, namely voluntariness, competence, information disclosure 
are inadequate 
2. that there are other issues that patients and their significant others experience when 
making decisions about medical care that are currently not included but ought to be 
considered in the framework of consent 
3. that the philosophical basis of consent needs to be reviewed in light of the empirical data 
generated by informants with different perspectives on the consent process.  
 The aim is to understand how relevant people negotiate the process of consent to a high-risk 
medical procedure in a naturally-occurring everyday setting, and to compare this with the 
abstract theoretical view of consent, giving due emphasis to the meanings, experiences and views 
of all those informants most intimately involved in the process of consent to a high-risk medical 
intervention.
638
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Chapter 5 Methodology  
In order to satisfy the aims of the research, the chosen methodology needed to; 
 provide a way of accessing the perspectives of those people identified as being most 
intimately involved in the consent process,  
 allow the nuanced accounts of those informants to become a primary source of 
knowledge, rather than privileging claims made in the literature, and  
 explore how well those experiences are captured within the current legal and ethical 
understanding of consent.  
Qualitative research is well placed to address each of these goals.
639,640
 Expressly, qualitative 
research aims to gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour; it attempts to understand 
what happens in participants’ everyday lives, how things work and what things mean to 
participants.  
Qualitative research most commonly depends on in-depth interviews as a source of data. These 
are particularly useful in exploratory research. Open-ended questions and further probing 
provides the opportunity for informants to respond to questions in their own words and style, 
about matters that are salient to them, rather than being limited to choose from fixed responses 
as found in quantitative methods, and in particular in surveys. In this way qualitative research 
can elucidate the why and how of behaviour.   
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative  research tends not to presume which variables are 
important prior to the study, preferring to allow the ‘talk’ or behaviour of the participants to 
reveal what is important to them. Furthermore, qualitative research is also flexible enough to deal 
with factors which emerge that are unanticipated by the researcher. 
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It was not my intention to estimate proportions in a population, quantify relationships between 
pre-determined variables, or produce an average result across a large number of people.
641 642 643
 
Instead, I aimed to produce findings that were richly descriptive, exploratory and explanatory,
644
 
to provide ‘evidence’ of how the process of consent is understood and negotiated by those people 
implicated in the process of consent to a high-risk medical intervention. To satisfy that aim, I 
identified and recruited informants who could provide the best and most germane evidence and 
different perspectives, and they comprised the following four cohorts;  
1. patients undergoing a high-risk medical intervention (HSCT) 
2. doctors responsible to treating and caring for patients undergoing a specific high-risk 
medical intervention (HSCT) 
3. additional relevant healthcare professionals 
4. patient-nominated ‘significant others’, who the patient identified as being pivotal to their 
decision to consent to the medical procedure (HSCT). 
The perceptions of the informants in each cohort composed the empirical data to generate the ‘is’ 
and were reflected upon in light of the ‘ought’ established from the legal and ethical viewpoints. 
 
5.1 Ethics 
Ethics, or moral philosophy, typically involves deep discussion or contemplation, and the 
formulation of recommendations regarding concepts of right and wrong behaviour. Ethics can be 
sub categorized into metaethics, normative ethics, and applied or practical ethics, with the latter 
including bioethics.  
Meta-ethics employs philosophical reasoning to understand the nature of ethical properties, 
statements, attitudes, and judgments "how do I know that is right, or wrong?”  
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According to Beauchamp and Childress,
645
 some approaches to ethics are normative, others are 
non-normative. The term ‘normative’ affirms how things should or ought to be, and hence 
requires making a judgement. Normative ethical theories provide the basis for general norms of 
conduct that describe obligations, permissible actions, and aspirational ideals of action.
646
 In 
other words, they uphold actions that are socially valued.  
Both normative ethics and metaethics rely primarily on philosophical reasoning to understand 
how moral agents should act and behave and to delineate moral concepts and the nature of 
justification in moral theory.
647 648
 
In contrast, while practical/applied ethics may still make judgements about how the world should 
be, and about how people should act and behave, these judgements, may be based on theory and 
reason (the ‘ought’ as Hume described it649). Practical/applied ethics may also be based upon 
considerations of empirical data that describe the world not as it should be, but as it is (Hume’s 
‘is’650). 
5.1.1 Bioethics 
Bioethics is an example of practical/applied ethics and in the context of this thesis is concerned 
with the ethics of healthcare, but may also more broadly include biological topics.
651
  The use of 
empirical, (often social science), methods in bioethics is referred to as empirical bioethics. 
652
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5.1.2 Empirical Bioethics 
This thesis can be viewed as part of ‘the empirical turn in bioethics’ that has occurred over the 
past several decades.
653Contributing to ‘the empirical turn in bioethics’ may potentially involve a 
variety of methodological approaches but for the most part, two common assumptions prevail.
654
 
First, that ethically meaningful information can be gained from the study of people’s beliefs, 
intuitions, observed behaviour, and stated reasoning. Second, that the various research methods 
existing in the social sciences and humanities can contribute to our understanding of these 
aspects of human life. Such methods include historical audits, literary scholarship, surveys and 
other population-based methods, focus groups, experimental methods, interviews and the 
auditing of patients’ medical records.655 Accordingly, this thesis uses empirical bioethical 
methodologies to describe, explore, inform and create recommendations for legal regulation and 
clinical practice. 
5.1.3 The strength of empirical bioethics 
The strength of empirical bioethics is that it provides a means of depicting how individuals or 
groups experience morally relevant issues.
656
 
657
 It provides a way of enriching normative 
arguments and makes possible the description of the attitudes, beliefs, moral opinions, reasoning 
patterns and decision-making of those involved in a certain practice.
658 659 660 
And it facilitates the 
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generation of data which can challenge authority, dogma, convention, norms and experience by 
showing how practice varies.
661
  
This data then can be used to identify moral issues that have escaped previous attention but 
which are relevant in a specific context, including those that may not be obvious because they 
are embedded in practice,
662
 in other words the ’is’. In turn, by engaging moral discourse, 
research employing empirical bioethics can inform the formulation of policy, regulation and 
legislation
663 664
 thus articulating the ‘ought’.   
5.1.4 Criticisms of empirical bioethics 
In contrast to the acknowledged benefits of using empirical research methods in bioethics, a 
number of criticisms have been raised against empirical bioethics. Some concerns are not 
specific to empirical bioethics but relate to the design, conduct, analysis and translation of 
research in any setting.  
One criticism is that the empirical turn in bioethics risks “obscuring normative content by 
generating seemingly ‘neutral facts’.” 665 666 That is to say that excessive attention to data or 
measurement may diminish the attention given to critical reflexion and philosophical analysis.   
The second criticism is metaethical in nature and questions what one can draw from descriptions 
about the ‘is’ - arguing that empirical ethics disregards the extent of the ‘is–ought’ gap that 
David Hume discussed in his Treatise of Human Nature.
667
  (Hume argued that there seems to be 
a significant difference between descriptive statements about what is and prescriptive or 
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normative statements about what ought to be). In general, this criticism of empirical ethics 
suggests that while it can map the moral domain and illuminate how people behave, it “cannot 
generate normativity or determine what is good or evil, right or wrong” 668 - that is to say that it 
cannot claim what is right or wrong. 
For the most part, these criticisms are misrepresentations of what empirical bioethics claims to 
do. Advocates of empirical ethics do not argue that empirical data, in itself, is sufficient for the 
generation of normative claims.
669
 Whilst normative ethics inevitably draws upon assumptions 
about the world, human nature and behaviour, empirical ethics describes aspects of the world 
that are socially constructed, and are by their very nature, value laden.
670
  
The final critique of empirical bioethics relates to the perceived lack of clarity as to how one 
translates the findings of empirical research into normative theory or the generation of moral 
norms. A number of different approaches have been described for integrating empirical research 
and normative ethics, with some prioritising moral theory and others empirical data.
671 672
 Ives 
and Draper
673
 describe one such approach, which they call ‘normative policy oriented bioethics’; 
it “seeks to make normative judgments, and requires the incorporation of moral theory and 
philosophical reasoning to produce rigorous and consistent ethical analysis, and yet it also 
requires empirical work” to practically situate the issues that are in question. While such 
approaches are valuable it remains the case that one of the greatest challenges for empirical 
bioethics is how the data should inform the generation of norms and how to apply these norms to 
policy and process.  
  
                                                 
668
 Borry, P., Schotsmans, P. & Dierickx, K. 2004. What is the role of empirical research in bioethical reflection and 
decision-making? An ethical analysis. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy  7, 41-53. 
669
 Ives, J. & Draper, H. 2009. Appropriate  Methodologies For Empirical Bioethics: It's All Relative. Bioethics  23, 
249-258. 
670
 Parker, M. 2009. Two Concepts Of Empirical Ethics. Bioethics, 23, 202-213. 
671
 Molewijk, A. C., Stiggelbout, A. M., Otten, W., Dupuis, H. M. & Kievi, J. 2003. Implicit Normativity in 
Evidence-Based Medicine: A Plea for Integrated Empirical Ethics Research. Health Care Analysis, 11. 
672
 Leget, C., Borry, P. & De Vries, R. 2009. "Nobody Tosses a Dwarf!"  The Relationship Between The Empirical  
and the  Normative Re-examined. Bioethics, 23 226-235. 
673
 Ives, J. & Draper, H. 2009. Appropriate  Methodologies For Empirical Bioethics: It's All Relative. Bioethics  23, 
249-258. 
Page 188 of 429 
 
Chapter 6 - Method 
The qualitative method employed in this study provided a means to access empirical data that 
allows for close scrutiny of how consent is contextualised and negotiated in a naturally occurring 
setting, thus providing data to support the revision and/or the generation of norms surrounding 
the policy and processof consent.
674
 
There is no ‘one’ style of qualitative research, rather, there are a range of methods which have 
their own degree of appropriateness for different academic disciplines and lines of enquiry. The 
use of different qualitative methods, theories and analytical ‘frames’ allows for changes of ‘lens’ 
in order to allow different scenes, or parts of scenes, to come into view. It may also make data 
accessible and understandable to a range of different audiences. The fact that different 
philosophical perspectives may underpin qualitative research reinforces the notion that reality is 
subjective and ‘multiple’, and created by all the participants in the study including the researcher, 
the individuals being investigated and those reading or interpreting the study.
675 676
      
By attending closely to the lived experiences of those involved in the issue of interest – consent 
to a high-risk medical intervention – qualitative methods like in-depth interviews as used in this 
study can allow us to incorporate those experiences  into the body of knowledge about the 
process of interest – in this case, consent.677  
 
 6.1 Sampling Strategy and Participants 
This study focused on allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) as a case of 
complex, high-risk medical care used for the treatment of life-threatening illness. It was chosen 
for the following reasons; 
 it provides one of the clearest examples of a high-risk medical intervention 
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 it is associated with well-recognised risks and benefits 
 it is practiced in Sydney and was accessible for study. 
Qualitative research encourages purposive sampling – that is to say the choice of participants 
with particular characteristics to achieve a certain purpose. Hence participants were selected not 
because they were representative of a population, but to enable analysis of consent.
678
    
Consideration was given as to who would comprise the most ‘useful’ informants. It was decided 
that the most relevant people fell under four separate categories;  
1. patients who had already consented679  and were undergoing HSCT,  
2. physicians who undertook HSCT and whose responsibility it was to seek the patients’ 
consent;  
3. relevant members of the transplant team, and  
4. a person nominated by the patient as being pivotal in their decision-making. 
Participants were invited to provide insights into their ‘experiential knowledge’ including their 
personal opinions, experiences, emotions and feelings
680
 thereby providing a context-sensitive 
account
681
 of consent to a high-risk medical intervention.      
6.2 Sample size 
Fifty-five interviews were conducted. This number is consistent with the goal of qualitative 
research to enable full understanding of relevant concepts, rather than generalising the findings 
to other populations.
682
 
                                                 
678
 Ritchie, J. E., Lewis, J. & Elam, G. 2003. Designing and Selecting Samples, Thousand Oaks., Sage Publications. 
679
 Only patients who had consented to undergo HSCT were included in the study. This was the case because, in 
practice, few (if any) patients offered HSCT refuse to undergo the procedure, primarily because it offers them their 
best, if not only, chance of long-term survival. Indeed, patients are usually only referred to a specialist transplant 
physician for consideration of transplantation once if it has been decided that HSCT is a medically indicated option 
for them, and if they have already indicated a willingness to undergo the procedure. 
680
 Widdershoven, G., Molewijk, B. & Abma, T. 2009. Improving Care and Ethics: A Plea for Interactive Empirical 
Ethics. The American Journal of Bioethics, 9. 
681
 Spranzi, M. 2012. The Normative Relevance of Cases Rhetoric and Empirical Ethics. Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, 21, 481-492. 
682
 Myers, M. 2000. Qualitative Research and the Generalizability Question: Standing Firm with Proteus. The 
Qualitative Report, 4. 
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Cohort 1 consisted of 16 patients. All patients were interviewed following admission to hospital 
to undergo HSCT and were receiving ‘conditioning’ at the time of the interview, that is to say 
they were receiving chemotherapy and/or total body irradiation prior to the infusion of stem 
cells. Nine surviving patients were interviewed approximately six months post transplant. The 
basis for choosing a six month interlude was that this was the time by which early major toxicity 
would have resolved and the patient would most likely have been discharged home. One patient 
was interviewed twice post transplant because for him the post transplant course had not run as 
smoothly as it had for other survivors of the transplant and it was felt that he may offer a 
different perspective. One other surviving patient was not interviewed post transplant because 
saturation had been reached (that is to say that all surviving patients were providing consistent 
responses and that no new insights were emerging.)
683
  No ‘promise’ had been made to patients 
that there would be a follow-up interview. My words to the patients at the end of the first 
interview was along the lines of “It may well be that I might be interested in interviewing you 
again in about six months time. Would it be alright with you if I contacted you then?” It was 
decided therefore that the decision not to interview Pt05F at the six months interval did not 
require notifying her of the decision; indeed a phone call to advise her that I would not be 
interviewing her a second time may have alarmed her. 
To summarise, 16 patients were interviewed prior to stem cell infusion, nine were interviewed 
post infusion, one patient was interviewed twice post infusion, making a total of 26 patient 
interviews. 
Cohort 2 comprised seven transplant physicians from different transplant units/hospitals in the 
Sydney area. Two additional transplant physicians, both working in a leading transplant hospital 
in London, UK, were also interviewed to include in the data any major variances in the 
perception of consent allowing for institutional and cultural differences between international 
colleagues working within similar common law and ethical principles but with different patient 
populations. Each transplant physician was interviewed once. Nine transplant physicians were 
interviewed in total. 
                                                 
683
 Morse, J. M. 1993. Drowning in Data. Qual Health Res, 3, 267 - 69. 
Page 191 of 429 
 
Cohort 3 included a variety of different members of the transplant team including nurses, social 
workers, psychologists, radiation oncologists, transplant co-ordinators, and patient 
representatives. There were nine individuals interviewed once; one individual was interviewed 
twice when it was recognised that clarification about certain matters was required, making 10 
interviews in total.   
Cohort 4 comprised a patient–nominated person who contributed in some way to the patient’s 
decision to undergo HSCT. There were 10 such individuals who were interviewed once. 
 
6.3 Recruitment of participants 
This research was approved by Human Research Ethics Committee of the Sydney West Area 
Health Service, and by University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee – Appendix 
2.  Information sheets and consent forms for all participants appear as Appendices, 3, 4, 5 and 6  
6.3.1 Patient participants 
Patients who had already consented to undergo HSCT were initially identified by a transplant 
haematologist as being well enough (both medically and psychologically) to be interviewed, and 
being able to speak English fluently.
684
 Patients were offered a choice about participation by a 
clinical trials co-ordinator who was not involved in this study. It was explicitly stated to patients 
that whatever their decision, it would not have any bearing on the care they received. Details of 
consenting patients were referred to me to arrange a time for interview.  
All interviews with patients were undertaken by me. The first interview was conducted at the 
patient’s hospital bedside as they underwent ‘conditioning’ prior to the stem cell infusion. 
                                                 
684The potential bias in limiting patient participants to only those who were considered both ‘well enough’, and 
fluent in English is recognised, however the decision was based on the following reasons; 
 given that the patients were undergoing a complex and risky medical treatment with an uncertain outcome, 
there was a high probability that the interviews would touch on distressing matters. I was concerned that 
raising these matters could potentially harm some particularly vulnerable patients. For that reason, the 
services of  a psychologist were engaged,  in case they were needed for either patients, their significant 
others, or for members of the transplant team,  but were not actually required 
 funds to engage interpreters for lengthy in-depth interviews were not available.  
 neither I nor my supervisors had experience or expertise doing in-depth interviews with the assistance of an 
interpreter (particularly with vulnerable patients facing the possibility of death).  
Despite my decision, I acknowledge that this issue (in particular, the exclusion of non-English speaking people from 
qualitative research in healthcare settings) raises important issues of equity in research.  
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Interviews were conducted in private, at a time when they had no visitors. The exception was 
with Pt01M who asked that his wife remain during the interview. 
When a second interview was possible, it was conducted approximately six months post 
transplant and at the patient’s convenience which usually coincided with when the patient was 
returning to the hospital for a scheduled out-patient follow-up. There was a window of a few 
hours between when the patients had blood drawn and scans taken, and when the result of the 
tests were available; this provided an ideal opportunity for the patients to meet with me. 
Interviews were conducted in a quiet, private room, within the hospital, and again with just the 
patient and me being present. Many patients claimed to be anxious about the upcoming 
consultation with a haematologist to discuss the results of their tests, and expressed relief that the 
interview provided a helpful distraction by providing some way to help pass the time.   
6.3.2 Physician participants 
Letters were sent to all transplant physicians in Sydney who undertook HSCT advising them of 
the study, and requesting their agreement to be interviewed. The letter was followed up by a 
phone call requesting a suitable time for interview. One transplant physician declined to be 
interviewed; all others agreed. I conducted all the interviews with the physicians. 
Interviews were conducted at the time and place convenient to the physician; mostly they took 
place in the physician’s office, otherwise they were conducted in a private room at the relevant 
hospital.  
All transplant physicians interviewed in the Sydney area were male. This was not a deliberate 
strategy; there were no female transplant physicians who undertook HSCT working in Sydney at 
the time of the study. 
Another two transplant physicians, both based in London, UK, one male and one female, were 
contacted by email ahead of time to request their participation in a face-to-face interview during 
my attendance at a conference on health law in London. They were interviewed for their insights 
into the consent process in a different cultural and clinical setting. Specifically, I was interested 
to hear if there were any obvious differences in the process of consent, including information 
disclosure by transplant physicians working under a different health system, yet a similar 
common law system as Australia. The male transplant physician was also able to provide 
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insights into complications associated when, due to cultural mores, patients choose not to 
contribute to the traditional doctor-patient decision-making dialogue.  
6.3.3 Relevant members of the transplant team 
Haematopoietic stem cell transplants involve multidisciplinary care provided by a team of 
relevant healthcare professionals (HCPS). In consultation with a transplant physician, key HCPS 
were identified and invited to participate in the study by being interviewed. This manner of direct 
recruitment was deemed appropriate given that names and position descriptions of HCPS are in 
the ‘public domain’. Approval for this method of recruitment was provided by Sydney West 
Area Health Service, Human Ethics Committee that has jurisdiction over the transplant unit 
where the HCPs worked.  
With one exception, all the HCPs were from the same hospital as the patients, and the majority 
of the transplant physicians. This provided consistency in institutional policies regarding 
processes and education. The exception was one HCP from a hospital which refers patients to the 
index hospital and it was thought that this HCP might have views on whether patients’ decision-
making was influenced by their need to be admitted to a distant hospital for an extended period 
of time for the transplantation itself and then attendance at the Out-Patient Clinic for much of 
their initial follow-up. 
Interviews were conducted in a quiet room in the hospital, in the person’s office, or in some 
cases, via telephone. 
6.3.4. Patient-nominated ‘significant other’ 
This cohort of informants comprised four healthcare professionals (other than transplant 
physicians), the son of one patient, and spouses of five individual patients. The reason for this 
admixture is described in the footnote.
685
 Three patients declined to nominate anyone. One 
person nominated by a patient subsequently declined to be interviewed.  
                                                 
685
  Following the initial suggestion to include this cohort, it was agreed that patients would be offered the option to 
nominate a person whom they believed was pivotal in their decision-making. With the patient’s authorisation, that 
person was interviewed about their perception of how the individual patient came to make the decision to consent to 
HSCT. The protocol was later further modified (with Ethics approval)  to ask the patients if they were interested in 
nominating a spouse or family member, as opposed to leaving the decision open for them to nominate anyone as the 
person who was pivotal in their decision to consent. This amendment was taken for the following reason; four 
patients had nominated individual HCPs as the person significant in their decision to consent. Three of those four 
had nominated non-transplant haematologists, and one nominated a social worker.  Whilst these interviews were 
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Interviews were conducted at a time and place convenient to the informant, including a quiet 
room at the hospital, at the person’s place of employment in one instance, and via telephone.  
 
6.4 Demographics of participants  
6.4.1 Patients 
All patients in this study were urban dwellers. It was decided not to report on the patients’ 
ethnicity in this thesis and selected other publications as that potentially identified some patients. 
The majority were Anglo Saxon, and others were from European (both Central and Eastern), 
Mediterranean, Celtic, and American (both North and South) backgrounds. No patient in the 
study was from an Indigenous group, or from Asia, or the Middle East. It is likely therefore, that 
all patients in the study understood, or at least had extensive experience of a “Western medicine” 
paradigm of individual decision-making and consent to medical treatment. 
686
 
The participant code indicates the chronological order in which the patients were interviewed 
and their gender (M/F).  
Sixteen patients were interviewed initially on admission for the HSCT; nine were interviewed 
again six months later; one patient was interviewed three times.
687
 Twenty-six patient interviews 
were conducted in total. 
                                                                                                                                                             
illuminating, it was agreed that it was not in keeping with the spirit of the original recommendation that was to 
access the perceptions and opinions of someone who would have intimate insight in to the patient’s decision-making 
process. The original question as to who was ‘pivotal in their decision-making’ did not capture this as well as had 
been hoped because the clinicians who had been nominated did not have a strong personal investment in the 
decision. From that point forward, patients were asked to limit their nominated person to someone within their 
intimate circle, to be known in the study as their ‘significant other’. 
686
 Humphery, K. 2000. Indigenous Health and "Western Research", VicHealth Koori Health Research & 
Community Development Unit, Centre for the Study of Health & Society, University of Melbourne.;  Rosenthal, J. 
P. 2006. Politics, culture, and governance in the development of prior informed consent in indigenous communities. 
Current Anthropology, 47, 119-142.; Manderson, L., Kelaher, M., Williams, G. & Shannon, C. 1998. The politics of 
community: negotiation and consultation in research on women's health. Human Organization, 57, 222-229.; 
Yousuf, R., Fauzi, A., How, S., Rasool, A. & Rehana, K. 2007. Awareness, knowledge and attitude towards 
informed consent among doctors in two different cultures in Asia: a cross-sectional comparative study in Malaysia 
and Kashmir, India. Singapore medical journal, 48, 559.; Hessini, L. 2007. Abortion and Islam: policies and 
practice in the Middle East and North Africa. Reproductive health matters, 15, 75-84. 
687
 As previously stated, this patient was interviewed twice post transplant because for him the post transplant course 
had not run as smoothly as it had for other survivors of the transplant and it was felt that he may offer a different 
perspective. 
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Participant code Pseudonym age in yrs times interviewed disease 
type of pre-
conditioning 
treatment 
stem cell 
source/donor 
outcome as at time 
of writing 
* timing of death post tx 
pt01 M Anthony 48yrs 1 ALL MA unrelated deceased <3 months 
pt02 M Campbell 35yrs 2 ALL MA related disease free 
 
pt03 M Edwards 49yrs 2 AML RIC related disease free 
 
pt04 M Grant 66yrs 2 CML RIC related disease free 
 
pt05 F Isabel 57yrs 1 CML RIC unrelated disease free 
 
pt06 M Karl 57yrs 1 MDS RIC unrelated deceased <3 months 
pt07 F Mia 55yrs 1 AML RIC unrelated deceased <3 months 
pt08 F Odette 36yrs 1 ALL double cord blood deceased <3 months 
pt09 M Quincy 54yrs 1 AML RIC related deceased >3months 
pt10 M Steve 54yrs 2 AML RIC unrelated deceased >3months 
pt11 M Uday 55yrs 3 MF RIC unrelated deceased >3months 
pt12 M William 54yrs 2 AML MA unrelated disease free 
 
pt13 F Yvette 59yrs 1 AML MA unrelated deceased <3 months 
pt14 M Alfred 42yrs 2 NHL RIC related disease free 
 
pt15 F Claire 55yrs 2 MF RIC unrelated deceased >3months 
pt16 F Elizabeth 56yrs 1 ALL RIC unrelated deceased <3 months 
key to diseases: :ALL = Acute Lymphoblastic Leukaemia; AML = Acute Myeloblastic Leukaemia 
 CML = Chronic Myeloid Leukaemia;  MDS = Myelodysplastic Syndromes 
 'MF' = Myelofibrosis;  NHL = Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma; 
key to type of treatment MA = Myeloablative  therapy; RIC = Reduced Intensity Chemotherapy 
* the significance of the timing of death is that if death occurs within 3 months of the transplantation itself, then 
death is said to be directly related to the transplant, according to both the European (EBMT) and International 
(CIBMRT) bodies overseeing bone marrow transplantation.  
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that it might have been illuminating to interview patients earlier than 
six months post transplant and to thus capture the thoughts of patients who were not going to 
survive about their decision to undergo HSCT, it was considered that these patients were too 
unwell and potentially vulnerable to participate in an interview. 
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6.4.2 Transplant Physicians 
Participant code Pseudonym age range hospital code 
TxDr 01 Dr Elliot 40-50 H1 
TxDr 02 Dr Devonish 50-60 H1 
TxDr 03 Dr Abbott 50-60 H1 
TxDr 04 Dr Clarke 40-50 H1 
TxDr 05 Dr Opie 50-60 H14 
TxDr 06 Dr Jensen 40-50 H4 
TxDr 07 Dr Keating 50-60 H2 
TxDr 08 Dr Gray 60-70 H6 
TxDr 09 Dr White 40-50 H6 
 
Seven of the transplant physicians were from four different transplant units across Sydney. Two 
transplant physicians practicing in London and having experience with patients from the Middle 
East were interviewed in the UK. 
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6.4.3 Significant others 
Participant code Pseudonym Age range Relationship to pt 
so01 F pt02 Dr Draper 40-50 referring doctor 
so02 F pt08 Patricia 30-40 social worker 
so03 M pt10 Dr Thomson 50-60 referring doctor 
so04 M pt11 Dr Vadam 40-50 referring doctor 
so05 M pt04 Harry 30-40 Son 
so06 F pt11 Frances 50-60 Wife 
so07 M pt12 Xavier 50-60 Partner 
so08 M pt15 Denis 50-60 Husband 
so09 F pt14 Beatrice 40-50 Wife 
so10 M pt05 John 50-60 Husband 
 
The participant code comprises the chronological order in which the patient-nominated 
‘significant other’ was interviewed, followed by the gender of the ‘significant other’ participant, 
and then the participant code of the relevant patient. 
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6.4.4 Relevant members of the transplant team 
Participant code Pseudonym Age range 
Hospital 
code 
 hp01 F Ada 50-60 H1 
 hp02 F Benedict 30-40 H1 
 hp03 M Aidan 50-60 H1 
 hp04 F Kathleen 50-60 H1 interviewed twice 
hp05 F Dalia 30-40 H1 
 hp06 M Bilal 40-50 H1 
 hp07 F Clara 40-50 H1 
 hp08 F Eva 30-40 H1 
 hp09 F Gwen 40-50 H9 
  
The participant code comprises the chronological order in which the healthcare professional was 
interviewed, followed by their gender. The specific role of each healthcare professional in the 
transplant team is not declared in this thesis to protect individuals’ identity. 
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 6.5 Data collection  
6.5.1 The interviews 
In depth interviews were conducted with members of the four cohorts described in the preceding 
pages, with the purpose of exploring issues around consent in detail. There were no pre-set 
questions,
 
rather, the interviews were conducted in such a way as to satisfy two pre-
determined
688
 criteria:  
1. to give the participants as much  freedom as possible to tell their story about their 
experience of consent to a high-risk medical procedure,  
2. to ensure that the talk of the participants covered specific predetermined concepts 
informed by my reading of the relevant literature on consent, particularly in the context of 
life-threatening illness. 
Thus, the interviews were designed to enable analysis of the specific elements of consent, 
namely, voluntariness, competence, information disclosure, and finally authorisation (the 
‘process’ of consent). In other words, to explore how specific informants described their 
perception of consent, together with its particularities, in a given situation. 
Interview ‘schedules’ to be used as guides to ensure coverage of each issue were prepared, and 
modified progressively as needed after reflecting on each interview, as is appropriate in 
qualitative research.  These appear as Appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
Patients and their nominated ‘significant other’ were invited to reflect and comment on the range 
of factors that may have influenced the patient’s decision to consent to the procedure.  
Physicians and other transplant team members were invited to speak about their perceptions of 
what might influence patients’ decisions to consent to HSCT. Transplant physicians and HCPs 
were not asked to comment on particular patients; rather they were directed to limit their ‘talk’ to 
their perceptions in general.   
Fifty-five interviews in total were performed. All patient interviews and all physician interviews 
were conducted face-to-face, and undertaken by me. Interviews with the other two cohorts, ([i] 
                                                 
688
  Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook, Thousand Oaks 
CA, SAGE Publications.; Pope, C. & Mays, N. 1995. Qualitative Research: Reaching the parts other methods cannot 
reach: an introduction to qualitative methods in health and health services research. BMJ, 311, 42-45. 
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relevant members of the transplant team, [ii] patient nominated significant others) were a mixture 
of face-to-face and telephone interviews, and were conducted either by myself or by a research 
assistant (MB).  The additional interview with one of the transplant team to clarify some issues 
was conducted face-to-face by a different research assistant (RF).  
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
6.5.2 Medical Records audit 
The medical record of each patient who had consented to participate in the study was audited by 
me prior to the first interview.
 689
 The purpose of this was to capture all the medical details of the 
patient, for example their specific disease, the source of donor cells they were scheduled to 
receive, and to provide an insight from the notes and correspondence of the transplant physician, 
as to the criteria used in deciding to recommend HSCT for each patient.  
 
6.6 Data analysis 
6.6.1 Data analysis strategy  
The analysis focused on fleshing out, to the greatest extent possible, the concept of consent.
690
 
My exploration included particular attention to the so-called elements of consent namely 
voluntariness, competence, and information disclosure; however it was open both to new insights 
about what the elements of consent might be, and to new insights about the accepted elements of 
consent.
691
 This was both bounded and constituted by a particular ‘situation’: HSCT, and the 
tertiary teaching hospitals in which it occurs.
692
  
Once the interviews were transcribed verbatim, the texts were uploaded into an electronic 
database, NVivo™ 693 version 7 then later, version 9. Each individual transcript was read and re-
                                                 
689
 The patients’ consent to participate in the study included being interviewed and for me to access their medical 
records. 
690
 Flick, U. 2008. Designing Qualitative Research, London, SAGE. p18 
691
 Kushner, S. 2000. Personalizing Evaluation London, SAGE  p104 
692
 Bogdan, R., and S. K. Biklen. 1982. Qualitative research for education: An introduction to theory and methods, 
Boston, Allyn & Bacon.p 156-62 
693
 QSR International  
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read to become engaged, as far as is possible, with the data.
694
 My questions in reading these 
transcripts included; how did patients come to make their decision to undergo HSCT?; what 
might have influenced their decision?; how much information do patients want to know?;  how 
much do they understand about the risks inherent in the procedure?; and how did transplant 
physicians talk about any role they might play in the patients’ decision–making? I was 
particularly interested in whether and how participants might have talked about the kinds of 
concepts that are usually thought to contribute to the notion of consent, and in particular to the 
legal and ethical elements of consent, how these concepts might subtly differ in the accounts of 
the different cohorts, whether there is something specific about the situation (HSCT) that might 
alter or affect these elements. Specifically, are the legal and ethical constructs of consent 
achievable in the setting of a high-risk medical intervention?  
After deep reading,
695
 of the transcripts, I engaged in detailed coding of the text. These codes 
labelled specific concepts
696
 or issues that arose. I coded by continually asking myself (in 
relation to each text)  
 what is happening here?  
 under what conditions does this happen? 
 to what standard elements of consent does this relate?  
 does this relate to something important other than the elements of consent?   
Jane Morse
697
 described this step of ‘reader generated questions before reading’, as a particularly 
informative tool in qualitative analysis of textual data.  
During the first few read-throughs, I was looking for issues - not only those issues related to the 
elements of consent, but others that may or may not be found to be important as the analysis 
progressed. The text surrounding each of these issues was marked, in the first instance for 
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 Kon, A. 2009a. The Role of Empirical Research in Bioethics. American Journal of Bioethics, 9, 59. 
695
 Wolf, M., Barzillai, M. & Dunne, J. 2009. The importance of deep reading. Challenging the Whole Child: 
Reflections on Best Practices in Learning, Teaching, and Leadership, 130. 
696
 Bohm, A. 2004. 5.13 TheoreticaI Coding: Text AnaIysis in Grounded Theory. A companion to qualitative 
research, 270. 
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 Morse, J. M. C. 1975. Effect of Reader-Generated Questions on Learning from Prose. 
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subsequent retrieval and to keep the issue in context.  This part of the analysis is described as 
being ‘inductive’ -  I was allowing the text to inform me about what was going on for the 
participants by allowing issues to emerge.
698, 699
 This is sometimes also known as ‘bottom-up’ 
analysis.  
The next set of read-throughs was ‘deductive’ or ‘top-down’ analysis in which I grouped the 
issues that had emerged into categories of a common meaning or intent under the identifiable 
particularities of consent.  
For example, in inductive/bottom up analysis, most participants talked about the necessity of 
patients having sufficient relevant information to make a reasoned decision about whether or not 
to consent to HSCT. Information was an issue raised spontaneously by participants in all groups. 
In inductive/bottom up analysis, I developed a cluster of codes that related to the gathering and 
use of information, including: assumed knowledge; sources of information; variability in patient 
needs; health literacy; various styles and formats of disclosing information; patients’ 
understanding. In deductive/top-down analysis, Information Disclosure was a key category, as 
this is a widely recognised element of consent. All of the codes about information were gathered 
into a group called ‘Information Disclosure’.  
The literature in legal, ethical and professional arenas all define information disclosure as an 
essential phase in the consent process. Limited guidance is given as to the specifics of what must 
be disclosed, other than to state that in Australia, laws governing consent to medical procedures 
place great emphasis on disclosure of information, both ‘in broad terms’ and in particular in the 
disclosure of ‘material risks’.700 Nevertheless, the law cannot be exact in stating what 
information needs to be disclosed because circumstances vary.
701
 Thus although the law guided 
me to be interested in information disclosure, it provides only a general, abstract understanding 
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 Gibson, W. J. & Brown, A. 2009. Working with Qualitative Data London. UK, Sage Publications.; Cresswell, J. 
2007 Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five traditions, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage 
Publications. 
699
 Pope, C., Ziebland, S. & Mays, N. 2000. Qualitative research in health care: Analysing qualitative data. bmj, 320, 
114-116. 
700
 1992g. Rogers v Whitaker (1992)  109 ALR 625 (HCA).at 490 
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 Skene, L. & Millwood, S. 1997. Informed consent to medical procedures: the current law in Australia. Doctor's 
knowledge of the law and their practices in informing patients. In: SHOTTON, L. (ed.) Health, Law and Ethics. 
Canberra: Social Science Press. 
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of consent. In contrast, the ‘inductive/bottom up codes’ provided a detailed understanding of 
consent in the concrete situation of HSCT. This included patients’ decision to waive their right to 
receive information, how transplant physicians manage to fulfil their obligation to inform, 
assessing patients understanding, timepoints when patients were more receptive to receiving 
information, how patients manage the information to arrive at a decision, the impact of how the 
information is framed, what role uncertainty, fear, hope and trust all play in the decision-making 
process, and the overriding imperative to live. 
Thus, although I was guided in a top down way to pay particular attention to the recognised 
standard elements of consent (information disclosure, voluntariness, and competence/capacity), 
the bottom up analysis allowed for the enrichment of my understanding of the importance of 
some lesser known aspects inherent in the consent process. These findings will be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
 
Synopsis 
The analysis of the qualitative data was structured in such a manner as to interrogate the standard 
elements of consent as they are articulated in law and ethics.  In this sense, the analysis was not 
driven by a single qualitative research theory as espoused by any particular author, but by a 
desire to explore an accepted conceptualisation of consent in practice. This manner of 
examination was valuable in that it did not prevent the elucidation of new insights, rather it 
allowed for them to emerge. Existing theory was drawn upon at every stage of the process from 
the selection of the methodology and the ensuing study design, with its means of generating 
meaningful data, and finally its analysis. As new ideas and concepts developed they were further 
explored in concert with existing literature from the law, bioethics and clinical practice. Hence, a 
developing understanding of consent to high-risk medical intervention was continually and 
iteratively being informed by existing scholarly work.  
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Part III: Results 
 
Chapter 7  -  Competence/capacity 
Chapter 8  - Voluntariness 
Chapter 9  -  Information disclosure 
Chapter 10 - Consent and the consent form  
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Introduction to Results Chapters 
 
The results of this study are presented in four chapters; the first three (chapters 7, 8, 9) describe 
data relevant to the acknowledged elements of consent (capacity/competence, voluntariness and 
information disclosure). The final chapter (chapter 10) is concerned with the empirical data 
relating to the concept of consent per se, and the consent form. 
In each chapter, excerpts from participants’ interviews are provided to illustrate the views or 
perceptions of the participants with regard to the elements of consent, the concept of consent, 
and the consent form. It should be noted that whilst I have provided an account of both the 
homogeneity and heterogeneity of views or perceptions, not all participants are accounted for as 
some individuals may not have explored those issues to any great extent in their narratives.  
Attempts have been made to de-identify individuals, as far as possible. Participants are identified 
by the cohort to which they belong, and a number. For example TxDr07 is a transplant physician, 
HCP03 is a healthcare professional member of the transplant team other than a transplant 
physician, Pt06 is a patient and SO10 is the ‘significant other’ of one of the patients. All 
transplant physicians interviewed except one were male; the majority of HCPs were female. 
Hence gender was not specified for either transplant physicians or other professional members of 
the transplant team (HCPs) in order to preserve their anonymity. Gender is however included for 
patients and significant others. Quotations from patients who were interviewed a second (or 
third) time are denoted by 02 (or 03) for example Pt09M02.  Occasionally my voice is included 
(CLS) to set the context for the following responses.   
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Chapter 7– Capacity/Competence 
Introduction 
The goal of achieving valid consent cannot be met without a competent patient, which is to say 
that the patient must have decision–making capacity, (or a competent substitute decision maker 
must be appointed, with either partial or full authority). Strictly speaking, a patient’s decision-
making capacity is assessed medically, whereas competence is a legal concept and can only be 
determined in court.
702
  Nevertheless, it is common to find the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘competence’ 
used interchangeably in both medical and legal usage. Capacity/competence is a functional 
concept; it refers to an individual’s ability to understand factual information,703 to use that 
information, and to communicate a decision to others.
704
   
In most general interactions, and according to law, adults are assumed to be competent unless 
there is reason to suspect otherwise.  This presumption is really only challenged and examined 
more closely in a clinical setting when a patient’s behaviour appears ‘irrational’. The sort of 
behaviour that might be considered to be ‘irrational’ includes refusing a recommended treatment, 
especially if in refusing that treatment the patient is putting his/her health in grave danger. 
Another indicator of diminished capacity would be when the patient deviates from a previously 
articulated value, or position of reasoning. However it is important to note that it is the person’s 
decision making ability that should be scrutinized, not the decision itself. 
In knowing that all the patients in this study had consented to undergo an extreme medical 
intervention (HSCT), I was interested to investigate whether there is anything in particular about 
patients undergoing a life threatening intervention that may compromise their capacity. 
Additionally I was interested in examining whether there was something about the assessment of 
capacity that was problematic for patients who consent to an extreme intervention. 
Patients in this study undoubtedly belonged to a vulnerable population. They had all been 
diagnosed with a life-threatening disease; they had been unwell for some time; they were likely 
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to be emotionally fraught given their diagnosis and prognosis (there were no viable treatment 
alternatives that offered the potential of cure), and they were frightened about their immediate 
and long term future. Furthermore, their decision to consent to undergo HSCT had impending 
grave consequences. An HSCT, whilst potentially offering these patients disease-free survival, 
also had the potential to cause their death in the near, and in the intermediate future. Hence, by 
consenting to undergo the planned HSCT, they understood that there was a possibility that they 
would not survive the intervention.  
Additional anxiety might have been experienced by the patients because, as transplantation is 
ideally undertaken at a time when the patient is in remission from their disease, at the time of the 
admission to hospital for HSCT the patients were generally feeling well but were aware that the 
preconditioning (innate component of the intervention) was about to make them very unwell. 
Being in remission and feeling relatively well, but deciding to undergo an intervention which one 
may not survive, but in the anticipation of a potentially longer life, is a dangerous and judicious 
decision to make.    
For all these reasons, it is therefore crucial that patients are competent to make the decision to 
proceed with HSCT. Importantly, surety of a patient’s capacity is a means of protecting not only 
a patient's right to decide, that is to say their autonomy, but is also a means of protecting those 
patients who might lack competency, from the potential harm of their decisions. An incorrect 
assessment may result in the denial of a person’s right to autonomous decision-making which 
translates to a breach of a fundamental human right. Accordingly, assessment of 
capacity/competence is an essential legal and ethical component of the process of consent. 
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7.1 Assessing a patient’s capacity/competence 
7.1.1 Responsibility for assessing a patient’s medical decision-making capacity 
It is whichever doctor has primary responsibility for the patient including being responsible for 
obtaining the patient’s consent, who has the legal responsibility for assessing the patient’s 
decision-making capacity.
705
 
706
In this study, that role would fall to the transplant physician.  
Transplant physicians in the study reported that their assessment of patients’ decision-making 
capacity was made initially by an informal, instinctive perception rather than application of any 
formal test.  
TxDr02:- How do I assess their competency? I mean, well I’m not a trained psychologist, I mean, 
I’ve learnt all this stuff on the job, I never received any formal training in it, it’s an acquired 
professional skill that I’ve taught myself essentially…  
 
TxDr04:- I suppose it’s just the feel you get when you talk to them about the transplant procedure 
 
TxDr06 :- I don’t formally send them to a psychiatrist to evaluate them, or anything  
 
TxDr08:- I think there you really do play it by ear. I don’t think I’ve got any - I personally have 
no rules of thumb 
 
Whilst it remains the transplant physicians who hold responsibility for assessing the patient’s 
capacity, it was nevertheless, often other members of the transplant team, particularly the nurses 
who spend more time interacting with the patients than the doctors, who at times developed a 
different interpretation of the patients’ capacity. Their perceptions of patients' capacity was 
generally based on their assumption that certain patients were incapable of comprehending the 
general nature and potential effects of the proposed intervention. 
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HCP07:- Generally doctors can do a fair psychological assessment, a quick psychological 
assessment but they often miss things and don’t value enough the psychological assessments. 
They wouldn’t transplant someone if physically they couldn’t do it and yet mentally sometimes 
people are just ‘not right’ and the doctors miss it.  They miss it and they’ve done that a few times, 
and people have been transplanted and psychologically they’ve been, hmm, they’ve not been 
well. They haven’t handled it well, the whole situation’s fallen apart, it’s been a horrible death; 
it’s been a horrible passage you know, it’s been awful  
 
Other members of the transplant team used ad hoc interactions with the patient to form opinions 
about the patients’ capacity 
HCP04:- I see it [the Patient/Family Education Day] as an information session for the patient, but 
I also see it as a means for us to assess whether the person is suitable and acceptable to be on our 
transplant programme   
 
HCP08:- I think that you assess [the patients] in your first few conversations ….you know some 
patients are very bright, [and] some patients aren’t very bright; … we’re all different and our 
whole society’s made up of different people and we get everything here, you know, from the geo-
physicist to the, well, anyone. 
 
HCP08:- Well I don’t think it’s something that you kind of analyse, I think you just do it 
intuitively– well I think nurses do it intuitively….I think the reason for that is that we’re with 
them 24 hours a day. We’re with them morning, evening, night; doctors are in there for ten 
minutes a day or they have an interview in their private consulting rooms or whatever. I truly 
wonder sometimes if they see enough of their patients to have a real understanding of what 
they’re like. 
 
7.1.2 The process of assessment of capacity 
Assessment is usually performed intuitively during the clinical interactions between doctor and 
patient. The criterion for assessing capacity is a relatively low-threshold test.
707
  Whilst there is 
no universally accepted set of standards for assessing capacity,
708
 the consensus requires that the 
patient has the ability to understand (in broad terms), and to retain that information to use as part 
of the decision-making process and to make free choices. Unless there are indications to the 
contrary, adults are presumed to have decision-making capacity. 
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TxDr08:- … most of the patients we deal with are compos mentis or appear to be... 
 
This lack of formal assessment therefore rested largely on the physicians' implicit abilities to 
judge patients' capacities.  
TxDr02:- I have no structured way in myself of assessing people’s competence other than my 
own, uh, I guess inherent sense of what people are like. 
 
On those occasions when a patient’s capacity required a deliberate assessment, transplant 
physicians indicated that they used no particular standard method of assessment. Spending time 
talking with a patient was perceived as being the most enlightening as to the cognitive ability of 
the patient. 
TxDr01:- Not in a formal way, I think, I mean you get a pretty good feeling for how well a 
patient, a person is able to function including if they hold a permanent job ... and also by just 
sitting down in front of the person for 30 or 60 minutes, I usually get a pretty good idea.  
 
Contrary to this customary informal, inconsistent method of assessment, some members of the 
transplant team thought that a more formal type of assessment of capacity was warranted.  
HCP02:- I would like them to see a psychological, I would – this is not just me personally, 
because we’ve talked about this with a lot of the RNs on the ward - to have some psychological 
assessment done…I’ve thought more of having it done for, uh yeah having it done to see if the 
patient actually, to see if their consent is really valid, I suppose, to put it bluntly. 
 
HCP04:-  I go to the transplant planning meetings obviously and I know how thoroughly, how the 
cases are discussed from the medical point of view, and what’s the right thing to do for a person 
with that condition. But whether or not it’s the right thing to do for that particular person with 
that particular condition, I don’t think we discuss enough. You know, what the feeling is of the 
person rather than of patient with the disease,  if you know what I mean…. you don’t really get to 
glean much about the patients personally really, because it’s more about what the disease is, and 
what treatment and what transplant is the right option  
 
Conversely, it was only those physicians in this study who talked about having concerns about 
any particular patient’s capacity who said that they considered a formal approach to assessing the 
patient was warranted. Otherwise, they described their subjective judgment as being appropriate. 
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TxDr06:- I don’t formally assess each person psychiatrically. The ones that you do have concerns 
about, I do get someone to see them formally, psychiatrically [to confirm they are mentally 
competent]… so I don’t know, and I suppose it’s just a matter of how the person comes across to 
you 
 
TxDr08:- I wouldn’t automatically think of going to a court for an adult [to have a surrogate 
decision-maker appointed if necessary] although technically if you think a person’s sufficiently, 
uh not in control of their, their decision making, you should probably take it to a court 
 
It should also be noted, that none of the informants talked about employing any of the available 
standard tests sometimes used in clinical practice, for example the Aid to Capacity Evaluation 
(ACE),
709 
or the Hopkins Competency Assessment Test (HCAT). The only suggestions were that 
an objective, independent person be engaged to conduct an assessment  
 
7.1.3 How might capacity/competence be assessed differently? 
When asked, if given the opportunity to change how patients’ capacity is assessed, HCPs 
recommended the inclusion of a formal, independent psychological assessment as part of the 
general work-up of every patient prior to transplantation. 
HCP03:-I first worked in transplant back in 1990 and all of our patients used to be seen by a 
psychologist as part of their workup.   I really think that that was a good system.   
 
HCP07:- Oh my gosh. What I would like more to see, is a psychologist being involved in the 
consent process … I would like to see a psychological evaluation done with a physical evaluation 
at the same time, and more discussion with the patient, the patient’s family, the psychologist, the 
social worker and the doctor making a decision about the suitability of transplant - that would be 
my ideal….  
 
The first thing one notices in these comments about the occasions when the need to formally 
assess a patient’s capacity arises, is that transplant physicians talk about potentially referring a 
patient to a psychiatrist, or to a court of law [given that incompetence denotes a legal status] to 
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determine capacity in those patients about whom they may be concerned, and one gleans from 
their talk that this is a rare occurrence. 
In contrast, HCPS discussed routine assessment of all patients by psychologists as being 
desirable.  It is unclear if the informants differentiated psychiatric evaluations from 
psychological evaluation in the same manner most others might, and that psychiatrists would be 
examining different parameters in assessing and treating a patient e.g. a psychiatrist is likely to 
assess a patient for a mental illness, whereas as a psychologist would be more likely to assess a 
person’s coping skills. Whilst the findings of these different evaluations may manifest in some 
shared functions in the patient for example impaired cognition, they may also express themselves 
quite differently, and indeed may not be a reflection of decision-making capacity.   
7.2. Factors that might impact on a patient’s capacity 
7.2.1 Concerns that illness impacts on capacity  
The most common reason patients lack capacity is due to cognitive impairment; it has long been 
recognized that illness can affect the cognitive ability of some people
 710
 through the effects of 
delirium, infections, pain, drugs, psychological factors, etc.  Sick people, although appearing to 
have normal mental capacity, may have difficulty thinking clearly when presented with complex 
clinical choices.
711
 Many of the participants in the study - patients, transplant physicians and 
other members of the transplant team, expressed similar concerns.   
Pt16F:- I was just so sick and I just blocked things out.  I just couldn’t, I couldn’t take it all in  
 
HCP07:- Uh I don’t think that sort of decision [consent to HSCT] should be made when someone 
is physically sick … although that occasionally has to happen….  
 
TxDr03:- You know, all you have to do is, you know, start renovating your house to realize that 
at some point you just can’t  –  you just, you know, you relinquish control to someone else 
because you just feel that you can’t it. So is that because of cognitive impairment?  I find that 
really hard to know…  That would require a very, you know, that would require psychometric 
testing of things to distinguish I think.  I’m not sure that I can tell. 
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TxDr03:- Clearly, there is a huge difference in cognitive abilities between people and there are 
people who ask me searching questions and others who don’t. My sense, my strong sense of it is, 
that it is more to do with complexity [of HSCT] than loss or lack of cognitive ability.  
 
Whether a  sick person might find it difficult to reason due to [temporary] loss of capacity or 
whether they experience a shift in their locus of control is not clear, but it does highlight the need 
to be attentive to how patients express their desire and level to be autonomous,  
TxDr03:- I think that’s very difficult and um, you know, it’s very hard, I think, for me to 
differentiate what’s loss of cognitive function with what’s abandonment of decision-
making in something so complex (as HSCT)… I see a lot of people who I think, if you 
were buying a used car, you’d know exactly what to ask, and you’d be asking a lot of 
questions and kicking a lot of tyres and going to a lot of trouble. But this is just so far out 
of the realm of experience and ability that you abandon hope – not abandon hope, you 
abandon involvement in it, because you feel you can’t.  And I think that’s what happens 
more than that people have lost capacity to do that.   
TxDr09:- I would say that, um I think the great majority of patients - they may not like 
having to make the decision, but they have the mental capacity to make the decision 
 
7.2.2 Chemotherapy-induced cognitive impairment - ‘chemo-brain’  
Although some controversy still exists, it is now recognized by most scholars that chemotherapy, 
and cranial radiotherapy may result in a spectrum of neurocognitive deficits that includes 
impaired learning, memory, attention, and speed of information processing.
712
 
713 714
 If these 
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strange, sometimes vague yet distressing mental changes are present, they may last for a short 
time, or may last for years. Findings of a recent study assessing neurocogntive functions in 
patients following HSCT demonstrated that although neurocognitive function generally 
improved from 1 to 5 years after HSCT, deficits remained for more than 40% of survivors.
715
 
All patients in this study had received chemotherapy prior to them consenting to HSCT, as well 
as it being part of their pre-conditioning regime. Some patients in this study additionally received 
total body irradiation which includes cranial radiotherapy.  
When asked about whether they recognized any change it their ability to remember things, or to 
plan, patients reported a variety of changes in their cognitive functioning. 
Pt07F :-Um I would say my memory is not as good. And that’s since the chemo, yeah.  ….Um, 
but, oh.  I’ve just got short memory loss. I can go from that to that, now and…[gesticulates that 
an idea has evaporated] 
 
Pt05F:- Yeah.  I think the family had said they’d noticed a little bit of vagueness in me.  
Forgetting things that, you know, – they’ve told me.  I don’t know about that, but anyway they 
reckon … 
 
When asked about whether they believed their ability to make decisions had altered, patients 
believed their decision–making was not impaired but their ability to plan for sequential events 
was not as effortless as they remember it being.  
Pt07F:- Um, not decisions, – but yes, planning, planning’s a problem 
 
And specifically in reference to planning 
Pt13F:- Um, yeah probably – it probably has.   
 
However, some opted to defer some activities to family or close members rather than be bothered 
with some roles 
Pt13F:-… but where there are bigger decisions, um like perhaps trading shares or um even 
signing or reading paperwork, um I just say “you can do it” and, you know, “you take it away” 
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but that’s a luxury I have [of having a partner].  If he was not here, and he didn’t have the choice 
or he didn’t have the intellect, I would have to do it – and I could, I’m capable of doing it.  It’s 
just so much easier to – 
 
Other patients reported no obvious changes to cognitive functioning at all 
Pt12M:- But I did pretty well with it. I didn’t seem to have any of those things happen. Um, yeah 
we could still plan and, I don’t think I was more forgetful than I normally am.  You know like, I 
don’t think anything altered in there, [pointing to head] you know, um. 
 
However, notably, those who were specially asked, were emphatic that they hadn’t experienced 
any reduced capacity to decide about undergoing the transplant  
Pt15F:- No! 
 
Pt13F:- But it certainly has had absolutely no impact on my decision to have a transplant 
 
Knowing that one has a life threatening disease, and the only available treatment is also 
potentially life threatening, is likely to have a negative psychological impact on most people. If 
patients’ cognition was affected, deciphering at what point it changed is difficult; was it at 
diagnosis, during first line therapy, following remission, as a result of chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy, etc? Whilst it is interesting to speculate, it is probably immaterial whether any 
possible cognitive decline in any of these patients was related to previous treatment, the concern 
in this study is whether they had sufficient cognitive ability for their consent to be valid.   
 
7.3. Is capacity task specific?  
Whilst it is generally agreed that capacity should not be considered to be a stable characteristic, 
and that it might change over time due to various circumstances, there is lack of agreement about 
whether capacity is task specific – whether a person can experience impaired capacity when it 
comes to deciding about certain matters, but still have the capacity to decide about other issues. 
For example, judicial decrees of a person’s competence may be global in nature, suggesting that 
impaired competence would be reflected in any decisions a person would attempt to make. 
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Medical assessments for capacity are more likely to focus on the ability of the person to make a 
reasoned decision about a particular task.
716
 
For those who believe capacity is task specific, capacity may vary depending on the subject of 
the decision, for example, the consequences of consenting to HSCT are different to those of 
refusing to undergo it even though both decisions may end in the patient’s death. Patients who 
refuse HSCT will die of their disease, but will be saved from the challenges of an extreme 
intervention. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, HSCT is an extensive and multifaceted process. 
It comprises many procedures, including but not limited to insertion of central line, pre-
conditioning with chemotherapy +/- total body irradiation, the requirement to continue taking 
medication long term. The patient will experience significant side effects, long periods of 
hospitalization, sometimes in isolation, intensive follow-up, and the ever present anxiety 
surrounding uncertainty about the near and distant future, etc. Provided that the patient is able to 
understand the information relevant to the decision, retain that information for as long as needed 
to use the information as part of the process of making the decision, and to communicate the 
decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means), then whilst the patient 
may lack capacity for some decisions, [s]he may well have capacity to decide to consent or 
refuse HSCT. Hence, capacity depends not only on the decision-maker, but also on the 
characteristics of the decision, including its complexity and the way in which it is presented.  
Some commentators
717
 have suggested that capacity should be on a ‘sliding scale’, which is to 
say that the stringency of an evaluation of a person’s capacity should be commensurate with the 
degree of seriousness of the decision. Others
718
 disagree with the ‘sliding scale’ model claiming 
that such a model conflates the competence of the patient with the ‘rationality’ of his/her 
decision.
719
 To wit, having a mental-illness like schizophrenia may not necessarily mean that a 
person is incompetent to make decisions, for example those which are related to the individual’s 
health.  Such issues are potentially divisive among members of the multidisciplinary team, 
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especially when compliance and management problems arise with patients having psychosocial 
issues, placing them at risk clinically. It may well be that issues related to ’patient management’ 
for example, and the patient’s ability to cope psychologically and specifically to remain 
compliant with the regime, overshadow concerns about capacity. Nevertheless, ‘patient 
management’ issues, whilst the effects may be far reaching, need to be balanced against 
beneficence.   
DrTx07:- … schizophrenics is one that we not uncommonly come across, someone who um, we 
are worried about being compliant, … and even there I’ve thought, well can we deny – because 
we do the transplant because we believe it’s life-saving, and there is a – the ethical dilemma for 
me is that well, do we deny them having a transplant, a life-saving procedure because … because 
we can’t cope with their mental illness. Because often what happens is, they [nurses] say “We 
can’t manage this person on the ward. We can’t cope with this one, they won’t - .”  I say “well 
that’s our problem, we’re not going to deny them because we can’t cope with their – or their 
illness – we have to treat the whole person so, um”, so I said “yeah, it’s clear, it’s an added risk, 
just like having diabetes or heart failure is an added risk.” 
 
Nor does having an addiction to psychotropic drugs necessarily preclude a person from having 
the capacity to make autonomous decisions about his/her healthcare. In spite of the potential 
added burden to the transplant team as a whole in managing the patient’s addiction, the patient’s 
best interest needs to be considered.
720
 As long as the person understands the information 
provided, appreciates the consequences of the choices [s]he makes, and can communicate that 
decision clearly, then [s]/he may be considered to be competent to make health related decisions.  
DrTx09:- …we end up being pretty confident that one of the reasons they’re depressed is that 
they understand exactly what’s going to happen to them. We’ve got um a guy at the moment on 
the ward … who’s a crack cocaine addict and that’s been very difficult to try and assess whether 
he is making his decision and giving consent under the influence…. but we would be very much 
be of the opinion that we cannot discriminate … if that’s the most appropriate treatment for their 
disease, we can’t discriminate against them on the basis of the fact that they might be a drug 
addict or they might be an alcoholic, um it might add complications to doing the transplant but as 
long they we feel that they understand what we’re trying to do, um very often you do involve a 
family member in making sure that they understood what we were trying to do, we would try and 
make the procedure work… but he disconnected his Hickman line from the chemo on Saturday, 
presumably because he’d been stuck on the chemotherapy for a couple of days and was coming 
off his addiction. He left the hospital, presumably acquired some cocaine and came back in this 
morning deeply apologetic wanting to start again … he has a horrible tumour... I might not 
approve of his drug habit, but I do think he needs proper treatment for his tumour …where if you 
are concerned about the ability to give consent you can bring, you can involve other people 
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[either to assess his capacity more formally, or to appoint a substitute decision-maker if he was 
found to be incompetent] 
 
According to case law, when the person can both understand and demonstrate capacity at the 
actual time the consent was given,
721
 for example, being in a “lucid interval” at the time when 
the relevant information and implications about the risks and benefits of undergoing HSCT had 
been fully explained,
722
  and understood,
723
 then capacity can be assumed. However, had either 
of these two patients discussed above, lacked insight into their predicament, if they had lacked 
awareness of their illness or the need for treatment, then this could have been a strong predictor 
of incapacity.
724
 However, it had been judged that each of the patients discussed above had 
capacity which was commensurate with the gravity of the decision
725
 to undergo HSCT.  
 
7.4. Components of capacity/competence 
The law concerning capacity/competence requires that the patient is capable of understanding 
and can appreciate the relevant information, in broad terms.
726
 Beyond that, there is little 
agreement about a definition of capacity/competence, other than it is the ability to perform a 
task.
727
  Given the lack of clarity over the definition, criteria for establishing competence 
therefore vary, but generally include having the ability to (i) understand relevant information (ii) 
appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences (iii) ability to manipulate  
information rationally (iv) communicate a choice.
728
 
729
 
730
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7.4.1 Understanding the relevant information 
The acquisition of information relevant to decision-making is the first important step. Patients in 
this study were provided with all the information they required, or additionally requested, to 
make a decision about undergoing transplantation. Information was provided both verbally, 
visually and in text.
731
 There were many opportunities provided to potential patients and their 
significant others to acquire additional relevant information necessary for them to consider and 
use in the decision whether to consent or refuse HSCT.  
HCP08:-... its quite intense – there’s a lot, a lot of education  
 
HCP08:- ... even though there’s pre-transplant education I don’t think anybody truly realises what 
they’re going through until they get here 
 
But simply acquiring the information does not necessarily mean that the patient has the capacity 
to understand that information. Here it is more about the cognitive capacity to understand rather 
than the patient needing to understand the intricacies of the intervention. 
Participants in general, recognized that an apparent lack of understanding may be related to 
language or literacy skills rather than cognitive ability per se in which case additional care is 
required to assure that the patient understands.  
HCP02:-… if you had a random group of people and you explained the same thing to them, 
they’re obviously going to be, there’s obviously going to be a lot of variation in what they take in.  
 
TxDr08:- …we wouldn’t try to raise the IQ we would have to use much simpler language.  
 
HCP07:- I can understand the consultants’ feelings, these people will die without it, but you 
know, there are worse things than dying from a disease, and going through a transplant badly can 
be one of them 
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7.4.2 Appreciating the nature of the decision and its consequences  
Capacity/competence involves an ability to understand not just the information acquired but also 
to evaluate the likely effects and ramifications of any decision. Accurate assessment of the 
patient’s capacity to consent is therefore most important for decisions regarding extreme medical 
treatments, such as HSCT, which has severe side effects or may even result in death. 
When asked about patients’ understanding of the potential medium and long term adverse 
effects, transplant physicians described difficulties in relaying the information to patients in a 
manner that was able to be evaluated by individual patients 
TxDr06:- I - I think that’s the hardest thing to convey because, not everyone gets it and it’s very 
hard for them to estimate the severity [chronic graft versus host disease].  It varies from very mild 
chronic changes like dry eyes, to sort of disabling limitation of movement or shortness of breath 
on minor exertion. I think that’s the most difficult thing, they really can cope with a secondary 
malignancy of such-n-such a per cent in 10 years time, but they find it hard to grasp the real risk 
of disability. And I think that’s the hardest thing to explain because it’s so variable and not 
everyone gets it and it’s hard to predict.  So I don’t think anyone can really fully appreciate that 
aspect 
 
HCP08 - but it’s amazing how many you know into that second or third week when they’re really 
not well will say “oh I didn’t realize it would be like this …..” when of course they have been 
told, they’ve just forgotten because at the time that’s not the information they process 
 
In an effort to improve patients’ insight of the nature of the decision and its potential 
consequences, opportunities are provided to most patients to meet with a patient who has 
undergone a transplant previously  
TxDr06:-…or you can simply show them patients that are crippled in bed type-thing, but no, I 
don’t know if that’s helpful. As I said, the most people who come to the information sessions, see 
patients [as a guest speaker usually] who have gone through it, sailed through it and they look like 
normal people, so that can be misleading too but er, yeah whether we should have an array of 
people from bed-bound to ambulatory is worth thinking about 
 
TxDr04:-…and even if they spoke to someone who’s gone through one, I think it’s still very hard 
for them to appreciate what’s involved and I suppose that’s the problem ... I think it’s a near 
impossible to fully appreciate beforehand what you may go through. 
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HCP05:- - I think too because I think a lot of the stuff even though it’s explained in plain English 
and everything –you can only understand in retrospect 
 
TxDr04:- And no, I’ve never gone through a transplant, and  so I can’t actually appreciate it 
either so, so for a person who’s never gone through one, and always been on the outside and to 
try to explain to someone who is potential transplant [candidate], I think there will be gaps in it  
 
7.4.3 Ability to manipulate information rationally 
Transplant physicians were asked how they gauge whether a patient has the capacity to makes 
sense of the information they have been provided with in order to make a decision.  
TxDr01:-... uh if I’m asked a lot of odd questions, or if I don’t get the reaction I’m waiting for 
when I say something, I need to, you know, ask the same question again slightly differently or to 
probe whether they really understand what I’ve said. 
 
TxDr04:- I suppose it’s just the feel you get when you talk to them about the transplant procedure 
even though they may give little cues that give you an idea that they understand where you’re 
coming from – but I don’t think they can ever er, really appreciate what they’re in for.  
 
TxDr04:- So it’s all very hard to, actually hard to [assess], if they’ve actually picked up the right 
signals regarding everything you say,  
 
Both transplant physicians and other members of the transplant team acknowledged that it is 
almost impossible for any person to truly comprehend or to anticipate what it is like to undergo 
an HSCT without having previously experienced it 
HCP04:- I think the this whole area of transplantation is just so complex that even all of us have 
difficulty understanding everything that’s going on,  so it would be so difficult for a patient who 
just hasn’t got a medical background or a certain even a level of education to understand  
everything that happens, or everything that could  possibly happen. Even if it could be fully 
explained in laymen’s terms, I think it would be difficult.   I don’t understand why certain 
infections reactivate and what they do to the person when they do.  But those things can be life 
threatening for patients and so for someone to consent and be fully informed about everything, I 
think, I think that would be impossible 
 
HCP06:- Yeah we ask them information. I mean, it’s kind of a, in some ways it’s a mechanical 
thing as well. We explain everything to them and then – but then I always ask them “do you 
really understand? any questions that you want to ask?”  They don’t ask that many questions, but 
when I ask them if they really understand, they seem to understand it very well.....  
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TxDr04:- Er, well there’s no, there’s no formal sort of a assessment of recall of any appointment 
or sessions and  I suppose that is a  gap in terms of assessing people as we really don’t know how 
much they take in 
 
Compounding the lack of previous experience, is that even in broad terms, being able to make a 
rational choice regarding the potential benefits and risks is difficult given the uncertainty 
surrounding the outcome of HSCT. 
HCP07:- So it’s quite difficult isn’t it, because I mean, one thing about BMT is that you really 
can’t predict what’s gunna happen. 
 
TxDr04:- and I think it’s a near impossible to fully appreciate beforehand what that you may go 
through 
 
7.4.3 Communicating a choice 
Patients in this study had no difficulty in communicating their choice to undergo HSCT namely 
because all were capable of speech, they were all fluent in English, and their choice to undergo 
HSCT was made clear by the ongoing participation in the discourse between themselves and the 
transplant team, and in their voluntary admission to hospital.
732
 This is discussed more fully in 
the results chapter dealing with consent. 
 
Synopsis 
Because valid consent is premised on the disclosure of appropriate information to a competent 
patient with decision–making capacity, assessment of the patient’s capacity is an essential 
component of the consent process; it has far-reaching legal and ethical implications. Despite 
much work in attempting to define capacity/competence the question of how the concept is 
adequately captured remains unsettled.
733
 
Results of this study identified that there was no standardised means of routinely assessing 
patients’ capacity. Transplant physicians used their inherent skills of perception and intuition to 
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initially access patients, and then referred any patient about whom they had concerns, to a 
psychiatrist for formal assessment. Other members of the transplant team described their 
dissatisfaction with the lack of a routine psychological assessment of all patients as part of the 
work-up process which precedes the consent process. Whether or not a psychological assessment 
would identify patients whose decision making capacity was impaired or merely those who 
might benefit from additional psychological support during the transplantation is not clear.  
There seemed little evidence, however, that patients should be routinely screened to determine 
their decision-making capacity, beyond that which is currently in practice, namely that the 
transplant physicians intuitively assess the capacity of each patient by means of their interaction 
during long consultation[s] with each patient. 
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Chapter 8 – Voluntariness  
Introduction 
In order for consent to be both legally and ethically valid, the patient’s decision needs to have 
been made voluntarily. Voluntariness, in the context of consent, is understood to entail the 
capacity to make the decision freely, to act in accordance with one’s authentic sense of what is in 
one’s best interests in light of the prevailing situation.734 735 For an action to be truly voluntary, 
according to Nelson et al
736
, it needs to be (a) intentional and (b) free from controlling 
influences. It can therefore be said to incorporate Kantian philosophical ideals of freedom, 
independence, and personhood.
737
 
 738
 Threats to any of these ideals may result in changes in the 
cognitive process of a susceptible person by which that person decides upon and commits to a 
particular course of action, that is to say that the potential of the threat causes the recipient of the 
threat to be vulnerable to change.
 
The process is thus relational – a person can only feel 
vulnerable if there has been a real or perceived threat.  
Illness, with its associated loss of control and autonomy,
739
 renders patients vulnerable to the 
influence of others.
740
 As a result of their vulnerability, patients may potentially be susceptible to 
being persuaded, manipulated, coerced to either undergo, or to refuse a proffered treatment, thus 
threatening the voluntariness of their decisions.
741
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Most often, the voluntariness of a patient’s decision is only called into question when a patient 
refuses a treatment. Case law is littered with examples of instances where the patient’s decision 
was found to have been unduly influenced by other people or other things.
742
 The important issue 
here, both from a philosophical and legal perspective, is not so much whether a person’s 
decision-making has been influenced, but whether it has been unduly influenced; unduly 
meaning inappropriately or in an unwarranted manner to the point where the decision does not 
represent the voluntary choice of the patient. Simply demonstrating influence is not sufficient to 
establish the inappropriateness of that influence.
743
 Influence can take a variety of forms 
depending on the degree of behaviour modification it elicits in the receptive person; it is only 
said to be ‘undue’ when it causes a person to act in a manner which is not by their own free will, 
or it is without adequate attention to the consequences.  Most cases that come before the court 
concern a person or patient who it is alleged has been unduly influenced to refuse the proffered 
medical intervention. In contrast, in this study, I question the patients’ voluntariness to consent to 
undergo a medical intervention, and remarkably, one that is potentially life-threatening.  
In what follows, I differentiate persuasion, manipulation, and coercion in terms of the 
(increasing) degree of influence. This is not to suggest, that there are distinct cut-offs between 
persuasion, manipulation, coercion, rather they are located on a continuum. In this regard it is 
also important to note that decisions by competent adults are rarely (if ever) made in an 
interpersonal vacuum. Significant others, including family, friends, lay carers and healthcare 
professionals, inevitably play a part in decision making, either directly or indirectly.  
 
8.1 Persuasion 
In the context of this study, I use the term persuasion to mean an action or process that causes 
someone or something to act, or believe something through the power of reasoning or argument. 
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The aim of persuasion can therefore be said to be to enlist the patient’s reasoning744 by providing 
him/her with relevant information.   
Healthcare professionals are in possession of relevant information through their years of training, 
experience and knowledge and it is their duty to advise the patient about his/her diagnosis, 
prognosis and treatment options. It is through the gaining of this information that the patient is 
then able to make reasoned decisions and to undertake an autonomous action [to consent or to 
refuse treatment]. According to Faden and Beauchamp,
745
 an action is autonomous if it is 
performed intentionally with understanding and without controlling influences. Therefore, by 
taking into account the information disclosed to him/her, the patient may be persuaded by the 
information but still makes an autonomous decision.  
It is the doctors’ responsibility to disclose all relevant information to the patients,  to give them 
fair warning about risks of both consenting and refusing proffered treatment options and to make 
appropriate recommendations. All transplant physicians in this study acknowledged this 
important role and identified it as part of their ‘standard’ information presentation. 
TxDr03:- So I always say to them, I’ve got to go through this bad stuff with you, but bear in mind 
that there is this chance that you’ll be cured, and so that’s why we’re having this discussion.  
 
But at the same time however, they recognised that it remains the patient’s decision to consent or 
refuse treatment. 
TxDr01:- I can’t, I can’t forcefully argue that “yes you’re going to have a transplant” 
 
TxDr06:- I really make them make the decision, I won’t make it for them… its not my judgment 
that is important in making the decision, it is theirs and so they have to make the decision 
 
Whilst transplant physicians generally based their recommendations on their best understanding 
of the medical facts, they nevertheless acknowledged that patients base their decisions about 
treatment upon other concerns, according to their own values and beliefs.  
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TxDr01:- Because they are making their decision, the patient is making the decision based on a 
lot of things that I’m probably not aware of – daughter’s marriage, will I live to see the summer, 
rather than will I live another three or ten years.  Because something important might be on their 
mind and because of that I don’t have a problem with what they’re choosing usually. 
 
TxDr03:- And so I just put it to them that the transplant offers good odds, and it’s great odds in 
comparison with not having a transplant.  And I point out to them that they have two choices, one 
is to have a transplant and one is not to have a transplant.  And it’s their decision, not something I 
say 
 
Some of the transplant physicians went further, making the separation between views, roles and 
‘evidence’ more distinct. Once they had satisfied themselves that the patient had all the relevant 
medical information required to make a reasoned decision, some transplant physicians preferred 
to distance themselves from the patients’ final decision  
TxDr06:- And I basically put it back to them that, you know, it’s not my life that, that’s 
undergoing the transplant, it’s not me that’s taking the risk ... I have presented the facts and my 
recommendation to go ahead given your disease and all that, ... but it’s still really his decision to 
make,  ...  
 
Their reason for wanting to distance themselves from the decision, as some transplant physicians 
rationalized, was to enable them to concentrate on ‘explaining’ the relevant information to the 
patient, rather than trying to achieve patient ‘understanding’746 of what is an extremely complex 
process, fraught with uncertainties.   
TxDr02:- Well yes, yes it is a reasonable question [“But what would you do, Doc?”] because in 
that situation I just say,  “I  have to remain detached from the process in order to talk to you about 
this, and in doing that I have to take an overview of what the situation is.  This is something that 
we have weighed the evidence for and against, and our standard recommendation is as follows.”  
And I would say “that’s what we recommend as being your best long term interest.” 
 
TxDr02:- But I think you have to reach some overall balance in getting, um, people’s agreement 
about uh treatment where they feel that it’s not all black. And that depends on um, you know, the 
dynamics of the interview and how people respond 
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TxDr03:- I think what I would do, maybe I’m fooling myself, I think what I would do and what I 
suggest to patients is often what is best for them but I guess we all think that. 
 
In contrast, other transplant physicians perceived their duty as including ‘actively persuading’ 
the patient to accept their recommendation  
TxDr03:- …as I said to you before, we tend to lead the patients.  I don’t believe that any of us, 
and I don’t think anyone would claim to either, say to the patient “here are your options what do 
you want to do?” That would be a totally unjustifiable, even cruel thing to do to someone I think.  
Because you can’t abandon someone – this sort of complexity is a forest, and to abandon 
someone to make a decision like that is just totally impossible.   
 
TxDr07:- You’re basically – it’s like a coach - yeah, jollying them along. You’re like their coach, 
so any coach will push their athlete beyond the limits that the athlete can do on their own. So 
perhaps that’s a role of the doctors and the nurses and the allied health staff  where we’ve got to 
be coaching and encouraging and pushing our patients to look after – to help themselves. 
 
In many ways this active engagement in decision-making around transplantation was consistent 
with the expectation by the patient that their transplant physician would make recommendations 
regarding treatment. It was also consistent with reports by transplant physicians that they are 
frequently asked by their patients to personalise their recommendation responding to “but what 
would you do if you were in my shoes, Doc?” 
TxDr07:-...often in the end patients will say “Well what do you recommend?” and if I think if 
that’s what they need, I say “well, if it was me or someone from my family - .”… I do offer 
opinion because when I say, I believe blah, it’s because that’s what the figures show gives you 
the best chance of a long term outcome. Some try to bring in the difference between quality of 
life versus longevity, some people are very keen and say “well what’s the quality of life like”? 
And um, I – you know explain that the quality of life can be impaired after a transplant and um, 
but in most people it generally gets better, but it can sometimes take several years to get better 
and has to be balanced against the risk of dying early from your disease. It’s a person’s own 
decision as to what the trade-off is in terms of longevity versus quality of life is.  
 
By being explicitly, or even implicitly open to persuasion, patients allowed themselves to be 
influenced in their decisions about transplantation. Such influences may, of course, be either real 
or perceived and appeared to originate from the values they attached to surrounding 
relationships, both intimate and social.   
CLS:-  So did anybody help you make the decision, to undergo the transplant?    
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Pt02M:- I tell you who did.  My work mates, my boss, they were very supportive. My in-laws, 
my mum of course. A lot of people did ... There are people, a lot of people who put their faith in 
you and you think to yourself “you just can’t be a coward and not do it”.  … And for me to pull 
out when everyone’s trying to help you out, it’s not the right thing to do. 
 
In this sense, the decisions that patient made were neither unilateral nor independent, but were 
‘relational.’ In other words, as Mackenzie has described, whilst the patient remained autonomous 
in that [s]he was self governing and had authority over his/her decisions, such decisions were 
made in relation to the historical, social, class, race and gender contexts in which the patient was 
situated.
747
  
Pt15F:- And even if I had doubts, I would have made the decision because of him [her husband], 
because he was so “this is what you have to do” 
 
CLS:-  I’m wondering if the decision is because you want to do it or because – partly because , 
as you said, your husband wants you to do it? 
Pt07F:- [long pause]  Partly for my husband. Not only for him. Um, for my husband and for my 
son. Um that’s who I’m doing it for. 
CLS:- What about for you? 
Pt07F:- [long pause] Um I’ve accepted that I could die. I’ve accepted that part.  I’m very calm 
about it.  But I don’t want to leave my husband or my son – I love both of them very much and 
um and their housekeeping skills are dreadful! [patient and interviewer both laughing]  
 
That such influences exist and were acknowledged by the patients in the study, is hardly 
surprising. We are relational beings - relationships and interactions are at the core of who we are 
as humans. To quote Nedelsky “We come into being in a social context that is literally 
constitutive of us.”748 Human interactions can therefore never be free of some degree of 
influence.
749
 Much of the time, influence to which we are all exposed is neither purposeful nor 
explicit, however, at other times actions or behaviours are explicitly intended to influence the 
person to whom they are directed.  It is not surprising therefore that patients spoke of the 
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persuasive influence they felt arising from their relationships with others surrounding their 
decision making.
750
 This need not be a source of moral concern depending on the particular 
circumstances. Unless a patient had felt that the decision to consent to HSCT was no longer 
his/her autonomous choice, then persuasion was simply a manifestation of their relationships
751
 
and choices were effectively negotiated within the contexts of important relationships. 
 
8.2 Manipulation   
Manipulation differs from persuasion, in that rather than enlisting the person’s reasoning (as is 
the case in persuasion), manipulation seeks to influence the person's decision through actually 
altering the available choices or the perception of those choices. Faden and Beauchamp
752
 
distinguish three forms of manipulation: manipulation of options, manipulation of information, 
and psychological manipulation. In each instance, manipulation is defined as the deliberate 
distortion, or omission of information in an attempt to induce the patient to accept a specific 
treatment.
753
 Equally, manipulation could involve attempting to induce a patient to choose one 
alternative over another, or indeed to refuse treatment altogether. Manipulation may take many 
forms and may be so subtle as to be undetectable to the observer. 
8.2.1 Manipulation of Options  
It is understandable that patients are only likely to consider those options that are proffered by 
their physician.  This leaves open the possibility that physicians may manipulate the choices that 
patients have by presenting patients with only limited options.  This commonly occurs when the 
physician has decided prior to meeting with the patient, that certain options are ‘not appropriate’ 
for this patient, for any number of reasons, and therefore it serves no useful purpose to bring that 
particular option to the attention of the patient.  Importantly, the decision that an option is, or is 
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not, appropriate may be based upon both medical and quasi-medical ideals, e.g. the clinical 
assessment, clinical guidelines, a priori decisions about the allocation of resources,  or according 
to preconceptions,  based on experience, 
TxDr03:-  So we suggest what we think is best, avoiding toxicity and ultimately choose 
treatments that have got, you know, the best numerical outcome if you like. But ultimately I try to 
avoid certain treatments because they’ll be harmful, toxic, and/or the outcome will be worse. 
 
or it could be based on intuition  
TxDr03:- ... often there are instances where I don’t think people should go through a certain type 
of conditioning because I don’t think they’ll tolerate it  
 
Whilst experience and intuition
754
  are recognised as playing important roles in determining 
which options physicians will offer the patient,
755
 uncertainty, particularly in HSCT can also 
significantly influence the transplant physician’s recommendation.756  
8.2.2 Manipulation of information 
All healthcare professionals are expected to communicate relevant information about a patient’s 
diagnosis, prognosis and treatment options , including information that is ‘material’ or most 
salient to that patient. The expectation in law, ethics and clinical practice is that the open and 
truthful disclosure of this information facilitates expression of the patient’s autonomy, allowing 
them to make reasoned decisions consistent with their own values, beliefs, health goals and other 
aspects of their lives, rather than passively agreeing to whatever the doctor believed was in the 
patient’s best interest. As a consequence, the content, scope and detail of this information and the 
way in which it is presented may influence the decisions the patient makes. Manipulation of 
information is often referred to as ‘framing’. Framing is a means of presenting information in 
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such a way as to subtly influence the decision made by the patient.
757
 In their beneficent intent 
towards their patient and in what they perceive as being in the patient’s best interests, some 
physicians may not even realise they are framing information, believing that they simply present 
information that the patient needs to know.
758
  
In contrast, other physicians may reflect on their communication style, and may try to minimise 
framing by using value neutral terms as far as possible. In attempting to avoid manipulating 
patient choice, some physicians described the risks and potential outcomes of HSCT using 
quantitative estimates rather than qualitative language, keeping the discussion value neutral. 
TxDr 06:-  ... most people understand percentages so I think I normally present it as a 
percentage, you know that there’s a 20 % chance that you will die from the procedure 
during the first three months, something like that, yes.  
 
Whilst this is an understandable response to concerns about the potential for communication 
style to determine the choices the patients make, it creates its own problems. The first is the 
emphasis on medical ‘facts’ is at the expense of psychosocial issues.759 The second issue is that 
presenting information in a value neutral style may leave the patient feeling lost or abandoned 
within a sea of statistics. Whilst this may be relatively unproblematic in other areas of medicine 
for example where the ‘stakes’ are not so high, in the setting of HSCT, where the stakes are high, 
the complexity, the ambiguity and unfamiliarity of HSCT may leave many patients feeling 
confused and unsure of their ability to assess the therapeutic options and to make the ‘correct’ 
decision independently. 
Pt07F:- Dr Newton said I had to have the transplant, it was my only option and um and I just 
accepted it. 
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Pt01M:- ..relying on the doctors to fix me up ‘cause I don’t know how to do it 
 
Other transplant physicians spoke not of avoiding the possibility of influencing the patients’ 
decision, but of explicitly presenting information in such a way that the patient would support the 
proffered treatment plan that the physician felt was in the patient’s best interest. In other words, 
for many of the physicians in this study, framing was a necessary and important part of their 
professional role. 
TxDr03:- And so I just put it to them that the transplant offers good odds, and it’s great odds in 
comparison with not having a transplant.  And I point out to them that they have two choices, one 
is to have a transplant and one is not to have a transplant. And it’s their decision, not something I 
say. And I point out to them that there’s hope with a transplant, there is not without a transplant in 
terms of survival.  So you know it’s probably not terribly reassuring but it’s a reality, and that 
there is a chance.   
 
However, framing of information is not simply a matter of content but also a matter of language 
and terminology. Certain words may be included or eliminated resulting in the identical 
information being presented to the patient but in a manner which they find less confronting.   
TxDr07:- The ultimate goal is, I think, to help that individual. Um, and it’s a situation where I 
would think that the end justifies the means, so the end is to be able to administer the best 
treatment, that I believe is the best treatment, based on the discussion and what the risk, the 
evidence shows. So if the way to deliver the best treatment to that person is um, is by using 
terminology or what they’re worried about is frightening the patient with that word, I would 
actually um, I’d probably be – participate in that, well you could say, it’s a deception. I would 
participate in a way that they want to do it, by using euphemisms. Now I had a guy a few years 
ago who, I think it was the right decision because he’s – he said to me “doctor don’t tell me if I 
got cancer, because if I got cancer, I want nothing more. Don’t want any treatment.” I knew he 
had a good prognosis, he would have done very well with treatment, but as soon as I said the 
word cancer he would roll up in a ball. He told me, he said “if I’ve got cancer, that’s it”, I said  
“you’ve got a thing called a lymphoma”. Yeah. So I think I’d have to make my own judgement 
whether I um, I er, would try and use euphemisms and say this was a lymphoma and um, and I’d 
use that word because I think in some ways by using that word ‘cancer’ you actually also 
misinform the patient because the patient has a wrong perception of what that means. So in a way 
by um, by using that word, by using some words, you think you’re informing the patient, but 
you’re actually misinforming because they don’t understand that word the way that we 
understand it.  So, I- I think the end is to treat the patient to the best of my ability, and I have to 
make a judgment that this is the best way to do it.  That way he would be able to comply and 
accept the treatment and believe that there is a possible good outcome.  
 
TxDr07:-...I would have to say “you need to understand, and she needs to understand the risks of 
this, um, that there is a chance you won’t survive”. I perhaps wouldn’t use the word ‘die’, but 
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would say “there’s a chance she won’t survive this”, to try to soften it a little bit so that they all 
understand it means the same thing but it perhaps doesn’t have the shock impact of using ‘death’ 
and ‘dying’ 
 
TxDr08:-I don’t mind evading the word leukaemia, but she has to know that she has a serious 
blood disease that could kill her and that transplant’s the right approach 
 
The way in which the information is framed, particularly information about risks has been shown 
to have significant effect on the decision that patients make about their healthcare.
760
 
761
  Whilst 
it is acknowledged that it is not possible to foretell or foresee the intention of another person, 
what can be said is that there was no evidence in the interviews of the transplant physicians in 
this study that suggested that there was ever any malevolent intent in the framing of information. 
Instead, appearances were that when framing was used it was done so either inadvertently, or 
intentionally in an attempt to enable patients to make reasoned decisions that employ their values 
as well as the medical facts.
762
  This is a likely response to the influence of the physicians’ 
adherence to professional virtues, and possibly to a lesser degree of a cultural acceptance of the 
‘silent world of doctor and patient’ where patients obey the physicians.763 
8.2.3 Psychological manipulation 
Psychological manipulation may, hypothetically, be used by anyone within the patient’s circle of 
influence as a means of persuading the patient to do something that is actually the choice of the 
person doing the manipulation, rather than the patient. Such decisions are, according to Faden 
and Beauchamp’s definition of a voluntary act764 not autonomous ones as they are made under 
controlling influences. 
Physiological manipulation by transplant physicians was not described by any of the patients or 
their significant others in this study. Consistent with this, transplant physicians spoke about how 
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important it was for the patients to be as comfortable as possible in the circumstances about their 
decision to undergo such a hazardous intervention as transplantation, making it unlikely that 
transplant physicians would have knowingly used any psychological manipulation to influence 
patients.  
TxDr02:-...and I might say at the end “you know, if things are under control [meaning disease in 
remission and donor cells sourced] we will do it, but you better have a think about, you know, 
whether you really want to go ahead with this or not. You know you might have a 50% chance of 
dying in the first 3 months, do you want to do that?” 
 
TxDr03:-...I haven’t told you this to make you depressed, I’ve told you this just to give you the 
facts and so that you know what the potential risks are... 
 
TxDr06:- ...you know, when you say that half the people are dead in the next year or so, then I 
think they can understand...I think most people can understand that.…  
 
TxDr06 ...they may not have formally, in terms of fully committed in their mind, that this is what 
they feel is the best process for them. But they understand logically, this is the best process but 
they themselves may not have fully committed; they may not feel hundred per cent comfortable 
 
But while transplant physicians did not appear to psychologically manipulate patients into 
agreeing to undergo allo-HCT, a number of the patients described the sense that their referring 
haematologist or their general practitioner was ‘forcing’ them to proceed with transplantation. 
Pt 11M:- ...my haematologist said “you have no other choice” 
 
Pt07F:- Dr Newton [GP] said I had to have the transplant, it was my only option and um and I 
just accepted it. 
 
Pt 01M:- It was a long weekend in October and we were going to go away. And she [referring 
haematologist] said “... you can’t go away because, if you die I’ll never forgive myself”  
 
Not altogether surprisingly, most talk about psychological manipulation was not related to 
interactions with healthcare professionals, but their interactions with members of their intimate 
circle.  
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Some family members were quite candid about the pressure they applied to the patient in order to 
persuade them to consent to transplantation.   
SO08M:-...it was a case of trying to persuade Claire ... so I guess I sort of leant on her and I said 
“look we’ve really no choice -  we’ve got to go through the bone marrow transplant as much as 
it’s scary and with about only 60% survival rate,...”  Yes on my part, I obviously influenced her 
in that direction and uh I guess my, my daughter was pro that as well.  
 
SO10M:- Isabel was a bit sceptical you know she wasn’t sure whether she wanted it or not and 
basically my attitude is ‘Well, you’re having it’....... well I told her, she knew my opinion right 
from the start and everything else “well you’re having it.”  She was a bit sceptical and she was 
well “you know it’s my final say” and I said yeah” I know it’s your final say” but to me it was 
just “well sorry darling, you’re having it” 
 
Pt05F:- And of course she [speaking about daughter] said “oh no mum, I want you to go down to 
Sydney, I want you to have it – you’re brave, you’ve got us all through this, and you’ve done this 
and you know”,  so  I suppose I’m doing it a bit for her as well.  
 
Pt07F:- At that stage I was 50/50 [undecided].  I didn’t want to, but my husband was saying 
“you’ve got to have it” 
 
And indeed some ‘significant others’ felt it was incumbent upon them to coerce their family 
member to undergo the transplant 
SO10M   I was just frightened you know, that she would deteriorate in front of my eyes...and that 
was that. And as much as it scared the hell out of me to have to nudge her into that [consenting to 
transplantation], she knew that was the way to go, but she needed somebody to give her a push 
 
The ‘psychological manipulation’ that patients described most often however, was not the 
explicit demands made upon them by members of their intimate circle, but obligations the 
patients themselves felt to their significant others – the perception that they felt they had to ‘do 
this’ for the sake of others. 
CLS:- Let’s just go back to something you said your husband said “you’ve just got to do this.” 
Did he put any pressure on you, do you think? 
Pt07F:-Um [long pause] no it’s not [long pause]  it’s not pressure, it’s when you love someone 
very much that you care about them and you can’t accept that they’re going to die and this is what 
it is.  And he cares very much for me. 
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Pt05F:- … I’m going to do it for myself, and I also want to do it for my husband because I really 
think that without me he’d be lost  
 
Pt15F:- Well I’d say initially that it’s not just for me, it’s for my family. 
 
Pt02M:-… like even my girlfriend, you know, she’s been through -  how do I put it? She’s been 
so good, the very first time I’ve been sick, and even when I was here, I said to myself, if I’m not 
going to do it for myself, I’ll do it for her, she deserves be better than that, you know what I 
mean?... you’ve got to have … you know, you’ve got to have a goal. That was my goal, I’ll do it 
for her, I’ll do it for my mum, you know? Yeah, and I can see … well the funny thing is if I do it 
for myself, then I get upset and sort of say oh stuff it, I won’t worry about it, I’m not going to 
continue the treatment, that’s when you give in, but when you …when she comes in, and she has 
the smile on her face, and I think well, there’s my reason there, yeah 
 
8.3 Coercion   
Coercion is stronger than either persuasion or manipulation in that it is said to involve “the use of 
explicit or implicit threats to ensure that a treatment is accepted.”765  For the most part, patients 
in this study did not describe situations where they felt coerced - either by members of their 
intimate circle or by the healthcare professionals charged with their care, although at times this 
did occur.  
Pt11M:-I didn’t really have a choice…..my haematologist said “you have no other choice” 
 
But many patients described a more subtle ‘internal’ form of coercion – a perception that their 
decision was ‘forced’ by the nature of their situation and of their disease and the (very real) 
possibility of impending death. For the choice to proceed with transplantation or to refuse it, 
where the choices would lead to ‘certain death’, or the possibility of life but with significant 
burdens, would seem both threatening and unavoidably coercive.
766
 As Arthur Caplan has 
argued,  whilst being faced with ‘certain death’ may not in itself be necessarily considered 
threatening, it is difficult to imagine that it would not impact on one’s ability to make a voluntary 
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choice “...since the very fact of imminent death limits the realities of choice to doing anything 
that a physician offers as holding any hope”.767   
Many of the patients in this study talked about there being ‘no choice’ other than to consent to 
undergo the procedure.  
Pt02M:- That’s it, I’ve got no choice.  
 
Pt09M:- And there wasn’t really any choices  
 
Pt13F:-it was a bit of a light at the end of a tunnel because this – with this aggressive form of 
cancer I’m not going to live more than six or eight weeks so, there was just too much to live for, 
I’m not finished living yet, so no, there really was never an option....I just don’t need to die yet. 
...I’m not ready. [said in a very determined voice] 
 
Pt03M :-I decided straight away – there was nothing to think about  
CLS :- what was running through your mind?  
Pt03M :- there was nothing to think about! 
 
But having ‘no choice’ as the patients described it is not the same thing as not being given a 
choice, a subtle but nevertheless crucial distinction. For there was, of course, always the choice 
to refuse transplantation, however by doing so they were, by default, choosing ‘certain death.’ 
Pt03M:- If you don’t accept it, what chance have you got? You know, it’s, it’s the only cure 
you’ve got, and the only chance you’ve got, so you really have to make the best of it 
 
Pt10M:- It was a case of, “ have the transplant or you probably won’t be here at Christmas time” 
 
It would appear then that rather than there being no alternative for them from which to choose, 
there was no acceptable alternative for them, from which to choose. When asked why they 
believed there was no acceptable option other than to undergo the transplant, patients provided 
very pragmatic responses.    
Pt09M:-So there was no in-betweens, it had to happen or I would die 
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Pt05F:- And he said “oh well there’s a different drug other than Glivec which could probably give 
you, who knows, a couple of more years, but no-one knows”   
 
Pt10M:- Living! I’ve got things to do and I’m only young; two young kids; gotta go back to 
work; too early to die 
 
Pt11M:- ... one outcome might be that you stay in remission for quite a considerable time or the 
other outcome is you might not 
 
But while this may be interpreted as the person’s disease coercing their decisions 768 in much the 
same ways as one’s socio-economic circumstances as being coercive may determine the 
healthcare decisions that people make, an alternative explanation is that the fundamental ‘force’ 
here is not so much a fear of leukaemia, or lymphoma, or myeloma, or death, but a strong 
imperative to live. This ‘interpretation’ was described by both patients and transplant physicians 
in this study. 
TxDr06:- Er, well I don’t know if it’s the disease [that is coercing them], but it’s basically their 
wish to live that’s doing that. You know if you… you know if you didn’t really care, then you 
might not even consider such a risky procedure but it’s basically they want to live, they’re either 
young, they’ve got a family to live for, they’ve got things they want to enjoy so they want to 
extend their longevity, so that’s making them, well I suppose that’s the aim of the transplant yeah, 
to so, you can have a more normal life, normal duration, normal lifestyle, normal time so it’s not 
the disease itself that’s coercing them it’s their wish to return to normal and be - live the normal 
lifespan that’s expected for their age. ...I think it’s that returning to a normal part of the curve 
where they’re going to live another ten years for their age or whatever for the age, that’s the 
driving force. 
 
Synopsis 
Patients generally acknowledge the limits of their own knowledge when it comes to complex 
medical decisions, and expect their healthcare professionals, and their doctor in particular, to 
provide them with the information that they need to make reasoned decisions about proposed 
treatment options. The requirement that decision should be made freely  and  voluntarily does 
not, of course mean that physicians should not offer recommendations or that they should not 
attempt to persuade the patient to accept their advice, providing that in doing so the physician is 
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still leaving the patient free to accept or reject the advice. The line between what is appropriate 
influence and what is coercive or undue (unwarranted, inappropriate) influence when considering 
voluntariness is a fine one. This is particularly the case in life threatening situations where the 
transplant physician is left with the difficult task of managing the competing issues. On one hand 
the physician must provide the patient with the information that he believes the patient would 
want to know, that is to say, the information that is material to the particular patient, and on the 
other hand, minimise the patient’s anxiety about potential adverse outcomes, and enable the 
patient so that [s]/he does not make poorly considered decisions.  
It is possible of course for a transplant physician to dissociate himself from the patient’s 
decision-making, unconditionally accepting the patient’s choice and supporting the patient’s 
autonomy (albeit a particular and narrow construal of autonomy). But this appears to be 
uncommon. 
More often, transplant physicians adopted the role of ‘coach’, nudging and prompting patients to 
[re-]consider the potential benefits versus the particular risks they face in undergoing HSCT.  In 
doing so, however, the physicians in this study adopted positions further along the continuum of 
influence, positions that could be seen as manipulative or coercive. In fact, physicians were 
occasionally explicitly coercive and created influence through the information they provided, and 
the way in which they provided this information. In contrast, patients’ significant others sought 
to directly control the decision made by the patients regarding treatment,  in large measure by 
reminding patients of the ‘obligations’ to those around them.  
Ultimately however, what featured most powerfully in the narratives of those undergoing HSCT 
and those caring for them were descriptions of the ways in which the patient’s illness both 
limited and determined their choices. The choices people made, in the end, were forced not so 
much by their networks of social obligations or by the information provided by the transplant 
physicians and other healthcare professionals, but by their desire to avoid ‘certain death’, and to 
continue to live.  
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Chapter 9 - Information disclosure 
Introduction 
Logically, people cannot consent to something which is being proposed without having some 
basic knowledge about what it is to which s/he is consenting. For a person’s consent to a medical 
procedure to be valid, the person needs to understand the basic nature of the treatment. 
Additionally, health professionals have a duty to provide information about the material risks of 
treatment, in both an objective sense (risks which are ordinarily told by professionals regarding 
the treatment) and in a subjective sense (risks which are material to the individual patient even 
though they may not be risks which the health professional would ordinarily advise patients 
about).
769
 There are two fundamental reasons why it is expected that the patients should be 
informed about any proposed intervention. The first is that this is a manifestation of respect for 
autonomy
770
 and the patient’s ‘right’ to make decision about his/her own body, future or life.771 
The second is that there is an assumption that information is useful, that is to say that the person 
will use that information to make a reasoned decision about whether or not to consent to what is 
being proposed.
772
 
773
 
According to legal and ethical doctrines, the responsibility for providing the pertinent 
information about any proposed procedure (and possible alternatives) to the potential patient falls 
to the treating doctor.
774
 This duty of doctors to disclose pertinent information to patients is 
further endorsed and promulgated as a professional standard by the Medical Board of Australian 
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(MBA) in its Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia.
775
 The purpose of the Code is stated as 
being that it  
"…sets out the principles that characterize good medical practice and makes explicit the 
standards of ethical and professional conduct expected of doctors by their professional 
peers and the community".
776
  
 
Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) also provided guidelines 
to all doctors in Australia in 1993 outlining the necessity to provide information about the 
potential risks, as well as the benefits of a proposed medical intervention, the type of information 
which should be given to patients and the manner in which information should be given.
777
 The 
stated aim of the NHMRC guidelines is to foster better communication between doctor and 
patient so that patients are able, with their doctor’s assistance, to make the best decisions about 
their medical care.
778
  
While that MBA Code of Conduct carries with it the possibility of legal sanction, professional 
guidelines such as those developed by the NHMRC, have little, if any legal force. 
In Australia the legal duty of the doctor to disclose pertinent (material) information to any 
potential patient was articulated in the landmark case of Rogers v Whitaker [at 490];
779
  
The law should recognize that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in 
the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. 
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In sum, it is clear therefore, that disclosure of material or pertinent information to the potential 
patient by the treating doctor is a requirement in law, ethics and professional practice. 
 
9.1 The importance of disclosure of information to patients  
Transplant physicians interviewed in this study all reported that they thought it was important to 
disclose information to patients. However, when asked why they believed it is important, their 
reasons ranged from concern for the patient (ethical), to more direct concern for themselves 
regarding the expectation they perceived they bore in performing a high-risk procedure 
(professional). None mentioned the legal requirement of disclosing information to patients as 
being their motivation. 
TxDr02:- I have to tell them what, at a minimum, what the risk of dying is from the treatment.  I 
usually say “I really, really need to talk to you about some, umm, uuh, potentially unpleasant 
things, is that okay?” 
CLS:- What if the patient says “I don’t want to hear” 
TxDr02:- I still have to talk to them 
CLS:-  Why do you have to talk to them? 
TxDr02:- Because you have to inform people what the worst case scenario is. You can’t - well, 
you know, my belief is that, you can’t ask someone to go through a hazardous procedure without 
telling them that it is hazardous - this is hazardous because you might die. So you’ve got to give 
them some comprehension that we’re not talking about a stroll in the park.  
 
TxDr02:- I don’t think you can put someone through a transplant without telling them at least, as 
a minimum, that there is a significant chance that things might go wrong. 
 
TxDr04:- I tell them what is going to happen, what complications they’re likely to face, and 
what their risk of dying is. So I’m pretty blunt because I reckon they have to know...and then I 
say “look, I know this sounds all grim, but once you understand that, then we go into it with 
confidence and optimism, but you have to know all that from the beginning.” 
 
TxDr03:- I think that there are some things they all need to know...it’s an unreasonable 
expectation of me to take into a transplant a patient who hasn’t been told as least some very basic 
information 
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When other members of the transplant team, spoke of the importance of providing the patient 
with relevant information, their rationale was to facilitate the patient’s ability to make an 
autonomous choice. 
HCP06M :- I think it is a very important thing that you need to be thorough with them 
particularly about the reason...I just don’t want them to accept the treatment as ‘this is what’s 
given’ ...so I try my best to explain to them the biology behind it, why we are having it,...It’s 
important for them to understand  
 
This willingness, nay insistence that the patients must be provided with information about the 
hazardous nature of HSCT may be viewed as demonstrating ‘respect for the patient’. 780 781 I use 
the term ‘respect’ here to mean in recognition of the patient as being an autonomous entity, an 
individual who has decision-making authority over him/herself. Nevertheless, as an autonomous 
entity, the patient is within his/her legal rights to decline to receive information, which is 
discordant with the physician’s legal and professional duty to disclose information to the patient.  
 
9.1.1 Information is disclosed in two phases 
According to the accounts of various participants in this study, information is provided to 
patients in two phases. I use the term phases, rather than stages which, to my mind, are discrete 
events, whereas phases vacillate; using my description, phases can and often do, overlap one 
another or even blur into one.  
9.1.1.1 The first phase of information disclosure 
In the first phase, the amount and type of information provided is generic in nature, that is to say 
that it covers the breadth and depth of information that a ‘reasonable patient’ in a similar set of 
circumstances might want to have disclosed to them. The sorts of information this might include 
would be a description in general terms about what the transplantation entails, and the risks, 
including common complications and side effects. This information is provided in the first 
instance by the transplant physician. 
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A transplant coordinator would consolidate this information as needed through face to face 
meetings with patients. Patients and significant others were additionally encouraged to maintain 
close telephone communication with the transplant co-ordinator to answer any questions they 
may have regarding generic information. The sort of information the transplant coordinator 
might provide included details concerning the search for a suitable donor, the scheduled timing 
of the transplant, logistical details including accessing assistance from the Leukaemia 
Foundation and details of support groups, financial assistance and post-transplant 
accommodation at the Foundation’s apartments near the hospital.  
It should be noted that the provision of such generic information is by no means perfunctory. 
Indeed, a great deal of reflection goes into the preparation and delivery of generic information to 
patients and their significant others in a variety of formats e.g.  in written format such as in 
brochures and “A Patients’ Guide” (a 127 page booklet prepared by the Bone Marrow Transplant 
Network and which deals with the basics of bone marrow transplant, preparing for the 
transplantation, advice about taking care of oneself prior to and during the transplant, a 
description of conditioning therapies and their side-effects, common complications, and 
recommendations about how best to deal with life after the transplantation).  
TxDr08:-...and he [hypothetical patient] would certainly be given comprehensive documentation  
 
TxDr02:- We also provide every patient and his family with a copy of the Information Book [“A 
Patients’ Guide”] which has all the gory detail in it, although it doesn’t have precise figures, but 
it does talk about risks of dying and stuff like that.  So it’s offered to everyone and we try to send 
a copy of that to everyone ... So I guess that’s one way of doing it. Now obviously giving 
someone a book doesn’t mean that they read it, or read the relevant parts, but it’s a way of 
providing that sort of information to people..... 
 
Patients generally found the book (“A Patients’ Guide”) useful especially regarding general 
information supplementary to that which was provided by other resources.  
Pt03M:- I did read the book – that was quite good 
 
Pt02M:- …they explain in very simple, very easy, and they give you symptoms, and they give 
you what we should do, what you should eat, what you shouldn’t eat, why you’ve got the 
symptoms, you know. So ,it was so easy to read that book...  
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Pt06M:-   yeah, well I got that book...there was a lot in there 
 
Some patients found the book provided greater detail and more information than they currently 
wanted  
Pt05F:-   yeah, I read all the information. [Then when asked - did you find it useful?] Some of it 
yes, but I’m afraid I might be a person that a little bit of information is enough for me. And I 
think you’ll find my family, especially my husband, is going to be exactly the same  
 
Pt10M:-   I was given a book about a bone marrow transplant and I read, I read probably half of 
that but it was good information but it was starting to depress me so I stopped reading it…but it 
did prepare you for, it did prepare you for what could happen or what was going to happen 
 
And some patients found the discussion and descriptions about the complications and potential 
side effects confronting 
Pt02M:-... it was so easy to read, that book, but very scary as well.  
 
Pt15F:-...I found the days that I was most upset would be a day that I had read something and 
thought “this could be me in a month or two.” And that was really hard – that was a day that, that 
would just kind of upset me, I would become fairly emotional for that day, yeah. 
 
Indeed, one patient found the descriptions of the complications and potential side effects so 
confronting that she preferred not to read anything about the procedure in either “A Patients’ 
Guide”, or even the less detailed brochures. 
Pt07F:-   they sent me the book and brochures, but I never touched them.  I couldn’t, I couldn’t 
bring myself to touch them… 
 
Members of the transplant team noted that it was sometimes the significant other/carer, rather 
than the patient who read the book. 
HCP04:-...I’m often told it’s the patient’s carer who will read it and not the patient  
themselves.....my impression is that the carers read it for their own information ...you know some 
people say  “oh no, my wife’s read everything but I haven’t read anything yet”  
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These varied responses to the attempts to deliver information to the patient, highlight a number 
of concerns, namely that  (1) the highly complex nature of the information about HSCT is not 
always understandable or ‘user-friendly’ to all patients using textual formats, (2) the mere 
provision of the information in textual style does not guarantee that the patient will read it (3) 
information should ideally be provided in a variety of formats to improve accessibility for 
patients and their significant others. 
For those reasons, in addition to it being provided in textual form information is also delivered 
verbally and visually at an Information Day to which all patients and their significant others are 
invited and almost all attend. The information provided is complementary to that found in “A 
Patients’ Guide” and brochures. Items such as the central venous catheter, and the nasogastric 
tube (a tube that is passed through the nose and down through the nasopharynx and oesophagus 
into the stomach to facilitate delivery of drugs and nutrition during episodes of mucositosis, and 
the thought of which causes significant anxiety in many patients) are passed amongst the 
audience to familiarize the patients with some of the paraphernalia associated with the 
transplantation procedure.  Patients and those significant others who accompanied them were 
given the opportunity to ask questions throughout the presentations, at the various 
breaks/recesses, and at the end of the day. 
The Information Day provides the opportunity for patients and their significant others to meet 
and talk with other relevant members of the transplant team whom they may not have met yet, 
e.g. a nutritionist, a dentist, an infectious disease expert, the clinical nurse consultant, social 
worker, psychologist, etc., as well as there being the opportunity to hear from a previous 
transplant patient about his/her experiences 
Pt10M:- At the beginning I didn’t want a lot of information because I didn’t really want to know. 
I got told a lot of information which sort of put me off doing it, of getting it done.  But towards 
the end of that seminar [the Information Day], that really helped me out, that really helped sort it 
out in my head.  That was just enough – that day, if it was any longer it would have been too 
much, if it was any shorter it would have been too little.  It was – just the whole day was just 
totally complete… I walked away from that full of confidence, yeah this is going to be easy   
 
Pt06M:-   [when asked about his preferred source of information] ..., ultimately from the 
Education [Information] Day - that was extremely good.  
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For some patients, the Information Day provided an opportunity for their significant others who 
may not have been in attendance at the consultation with the  transplant physician  to hear 
firsthand about the procedure the patient is about to undertake, the details involved in 
transplantation in general terms, and the immediate and long term risks involved.  
Pt06M:- Um because we [patient and his wife] knew everything that was coming and because 
we’d done a lot of reading and a lot of talking to people, when we came down to the information 
day or the education day, um they went through all that again. For me it was okay. Yes, now I 
understand that more than I did before, but for everyone else that was in the room with me, my 
family, their jaws hit the ground, because they didn’t really know what was coming.  You know, 
both my brothers were just – they were gob-smacked. When they came out and they said “I had 
no idea.”   
 
SO08M:- It was very informative. I mean it laid it out cold, like meat on a cold slab [hand 
slapping the desk]. There it is, this is what you’re gunna be going through. So it was cold 
comfort but, you know where you stood, and you know, at the forefront of the mind is the fact 
that you know you’ve got a, you’ve got about a 40 to 60% chance of survival, if you’re lucky - 
could be less, that’s the average. 
 
It is apparent then that patients’ capability to retrieve information, assess the value of the 
information in terms of its relevance to the individual’s set of circumstances, then to be able to 
analyse, understand and use that information, in others words, the person’s health literacy,  is 
variable.
782
 This variability may have cognitive and/or emotional underpinnings 
783
 which limit 
the patients’ ability to comprehend the information disclosed. To make allowances for these 
variations, and to facilitate the comprehension of the information disclosed to them, the 
information needs to be provided in a variety of formats.
784
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9.1.1.2 The second phase of information disclosure, the “material risks” 
During what I am referring to as the second phase of information disclosure, the transplant 
physician is responsible for providing information about “material risks”, that is to say, 
information about risks specific to the individual patient and that this particular patient would be 
likely to find pertinent to his/her decisions regarding whether or not to consent to undergo 
HSCT. 
785
 
TxDr06:-...then everything has to be modified to the individual and the families, 
 
TxDr07:-... they have to be more or less well educated in their particular disease. You have to 
educate them, yet again, about the disease itself and about the natural history of their disease...  I 
say to them,”...if things go wrong, you (may) die ...no matter what we do, despite the best 
antibiotics and the best care...” 
 
TxDr05:-... so I tend to be very blunt with the patients upfront and say, “Do you realise you 
might die within three months of having this procedure, and you will die earlier than you would 
(otherwise) have died?” 
 
HSCT is a complex procedure that requires the involvement and commitment not only of the 
transplant physicians and members of the specialist team, but also requires the cooperation and 
involvement of the patient. Disclosure of information explicitly targeted to individual patients 
serves several functions; it builds on the generic information and provides greater specificity and 
depth to the information. Having more specific information is assumed to permit the patient to 
make reasoned decisions in light of his/her personal values, and belief systems.
786
  From a more 
practical sense, it is also hoped that information about material risks will facilitate emotional and 
psychological preparation for the immediate future which is bound to involve turmoil, upheavals 
and disruption to the lives of all those intimately involved.
787
 For example, both patients and 
their significant others need to be able to commit to a lengthy stay in hospital for the patient, and 
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a very long period of ‘convalescence’, both of which can be emotionally and psychologically 
taxing for the patient as well as for his/her significant others.
788
 Being able to prepare oneself for 
the challenges of isolation, loss of independence, etc is likely to result in greater understanding 
which may also translate into greater compliance with the restrictions imposed on the patient. 
789,
 
790
 
TxDr03:- … first of all, the things in order are - his disease, so the type of disease, the status of 
the disease – so how advanced or early in the disease, so those are the principle areas. Then his 
age, his co-morbidities, physical co-morbidities. And then his attitude, his life attitude if I can 
put it like that, the way in which he will deal with the prospect of potential severe illness and 
potentially acute morbidity and mortality... those are the things I have to talk to him about.  
 
Being able to foretell what any particular patient might consider as being material to their 
decision-making is a difficult task for any doctor, but none so  much as for transplant physicians, 
who generally speaking have not had a long term doctor-patient relationship with the patient. 
791,
 
792
 Transplant physicians talked about the importance therefore of endeavouring to build a 
partnership with every patient and to gain their trust in order to elicit their preferences.
793
  
TxDr05:- But I still think it’s important that we see the patient on a number of occasions 
beforehand … because er, it’s, it’s getting to know the patient, getting to know the family, that 
gives you an idea of whether this is going to be an easy transplant in terms of patient and family 
compliance and ability of the patient and family to participate in it, or whether it’s going to be a 
complex one and you’ll have to liaise with all sorts of other people to help you.  Whether, you 
know, just where the patient’s going to stay,  you know… if they’ve got a family member close 
by they can stay with for three months or do we need to get the Leukaemia Foundation or the 
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hospital social worker to organise somewhere to stay and all those sorts of things.  So I think it’s 
worth it in that investment - worth it for that investment and also um, for the circumstance when 
everything goes really badly.  The last thing you need is a family member coming up and saying 
“Well you didn’t tell me he was going to die because of the transplant.”  And it’s much better 
they know that upfront and as many people as possible know that upfront.     
 
Transplant physicians acknowledged that as they lacked first degree experience, having never 
experienced undergoing HSCT themselves, that their complete understanding of what HSCT 
would be like was limited. Nevertheless, their considerable clinical experience together with 
their empathy helped them to identify with how the patient might be feeling.
794
 
TxDr06:-...but I don’t think they can ever, in an interview situation, really appreciate what 
they’re in for... I’ve never gone through a transplant, and so I can’t actually appreciate it either ... 
 
TxDr04:- I tell them what is going to happen, what complications they’re likely to face, and what 
their risk of dying is. So I’m pretty blunt because I reckon they have to know...and then I say 
“look, I know this sounds all grim, but once you understand that, then we go into it with 
confidence and optimism, but you have to know all that from the beginning”... 
 
TxDr01:- So I always say to them “I’ve gotta go through this bad stuff with you, but bear in 
mind that ... there is a chance that you’ll be cured, and so that’s why we are having this 
conversation. And I generally make some light-hearted and probably, you know, not very helpful 
comment like ”you know, if you had a 1 in 3 chance in the lottery, you’d be happy to go in it.” 
 
9.2 Patients’ varying needs for information 
It is widely assumed that patients want to have information regarding their health and well being 
disclosed to them, and that they use that information to make reasoned decisions about their 
healthcare choices.
795
 These assumptions are aligned with societal changes in how the doctor-
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patient relationship is viewed,
796
 and underpin many of the policies (legal, ethical and 
professional) that advocate that doctors must disclose information including material information 
to their patients. 
Nevertheless, consideration must be given to not overwhelming the patient with new 
information. It is thought that people have a limited capacity to process information
797
 so that 
when a patient is presented with a large amount of information, most of which is new 
information, (s)he will usually subconsciously scan the information,
798
 ‘hearing’ only those 
points of greatest interest to him/her,
799
 and not necessarily taking into account much of the other 
surrounding and supporting information.
800
  
Patients in my study demonstrated significant heterogeneity not only in their desire for the 
amount of information, but also in the timing of the disclosure of information to them. Some 
patients found the impact of their disease, both medically and psychologically, was so 
burdensome, that they claimed to be unable to ‘deal with’ information about HSCT .  
Pt16F:-  … but I was just so sick and I just blocked things out.  I just couldn’t, I couldn’t take it 
all in, they just sort of [provided the information] holus bolus and it was just too much, too much 
information on top of everything ... 
 
Pt07F:-:... they sent me brochures, but I never touched them.  I couldn’t, I couldn’t bring myself 
to touch them…  
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Others wanted only limited information disclosed to them, and then only as they needed it, which 
was primarily when they were experiencing a particular symptom or when they were to have a 
particular medical procedure. 
801
 
Pt03M:- I don’t need to know everything – I only need to know what I need to know  
CLS:- What sort of things did you need to know? 
Pt03M:- It’s not the fact of what, umm - the only things that I ever needed to know was if 
something - if I didn’t feel well, why didn’t I feel well? 
 
CLS:- I think I remember you saying something like, you knew as much as you needed to. Now 
that you’re at the other end, [patient was now 6 months post transplant] did you know as much as 
you needed to? 
Pt03M02:- Yeah, I did, I did, because if I needed to know something, I, I could ask.  
CLS:- Hm-mm, and did that happen? 
Pt03M02: Oh yeah, yeah. 
 
Pt04M:- I don’t need to know that. If you need to do it, just do it 
 
Pt07F:- I would rather come in and they say “this is what’s going to happen, maybe this day or 
in the next couple of days”, I don’t want to know in the long future. 
 
Pt09M:- I sort of went with what he told me. A few other questions I asked along the way that I 
didn’t quite understand but he sort of filled me in on what was needed to be known...I’m just 
letting it travel through and I’m learning bits and pieces as I travel through. Sometimes I 
understand, sometimes I don’t....  
 
Of those who expressed a desire for only limited or specific information to be disclosed to them, 
some indicated that they were interested not so much in the content of the medical decisions 
affecting their care or the recommendations, but in the reasons behind them.  
CLS:-... there are some people who don’t have the need for a lot of knowledge, and there are 
others who really desperately want to understand all the intricacies, and there are those people 
who sit somewhere in between – where would you say you sat?  
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Pt09M:- I’m probably the first one, but I, I like to know why, but that’s really enough.  I don’t 
need all the in’s and out’s and little bits and pieces – I just need to know the bulk reason and I’m 
happy to go with this 
 
Only a few patients in this study expressed a desire to be told ‘absolutely everything’  
Pt12M:- There’s nothing I don’t want to know,... it wouldn’t matter what the disease was. When 
this came along, I’m the person who’s right at that extreme of wanting to know absolutely 
everything 
 
or at least to have the transplant physician be honest and forthright in disclosing information  
CLS:- Did you talk about whether there were any risks? 
Pt03M:- Oh, Dr D  told me about the risks – he said it straight – I like that, I don’t want people 
not being straight with me 
CLS:- Do you remember what he said? 
Pt03M:- He said that there was a 30-40% chance 
CLS:- Chance of what? 
Pt03M:- That the treatment would be a success 
CLS:- And after that? 
Pt03M:- After that I would be the same as anyone else 
CLS:- What would happen if you didn’t have the transplant? 
Pt03M:- The leukaemia cells would take over 
CLS:- And? 
Pt03M:- And that would be the end. 
 
Whilst it is well established in law, ethics and in professional practice that patients have a right to 
be informed about all matters concerning their healthcare,
802
 the finding in my study that not all 
patients necessarily wanted to be provided with extensive amounts of information and that they 
varied enormously in their informational needs, is consistent with the more recent literature that 
has also described the heterogeneity regarding the amount, breadth and depth of information that 
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patients want and need.
803
 
804
 
805
There are many reasons why this may be so including the 
patients cultural and ethnic background, age, gender, level of education attained, socioeconomic 
status, severity of illness, degree of trust in the healthcare professionals charged with caring for 
their health, the variable level of desire and confidence to be involved in matters relating to their 
healthcare. It could also simply be that patients feel too burdened or overwhelmed by their 
disease.
806
 This considerable variability of informational needs of patients was acknowledged by 
both transplant physicians and the other members of the transplant team.  
TxDr03:-...there are clearly patients who don’t want to know, and there are probably patients 
who don’t want to know anything 
 
HCP08:-...some patients will say quite specifically “Don’t tell me about it  - I don’t wanna 
know, I just wanna get through each day and then get out of here” 
 
TxDr04:- Well, often the really young ones are a bit “don’t want to know about it”. Young males 
grunt, they don’t say much. And the slightly older ones in their 30s and 40s are much more 
attuned, aware. And you get those who are in their 50s or early 60s who may not be as aux fait – 
they might not have done their research on the Net for instance. So it just varies in that respect. I 
guess it’s linked to education level 
 
HCP08:- Occasionally, sometimes, some patients ask really good questions, like meaningful 
questions, as if they‘d done some preparation...but also some patients don’t ask any questions. 
You know some patients are very bright, and some patients aren’t very bright, you have to give 
the amount of information according to what you think their need is. 
 
HCP04:-What I think is that patients don’t want a lot of information, I mean what they want is to 
be cured ... occasionally patients have said “can’t you just put me to sleep and wake me when 
it’s all over”?. I mean, they want it [HSCT ] because they know they have to have it but whether 
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it’s too scary, or whether they’re just burdened down by their illness .....I mean ,  they’ve just 
had enough. 
 
TxDr06:- Some patients really don’t want to hear too much. ..., in fact, they tell you they don’t 
want [you] to go into the nitty-gritty of the whole process. [but] they want to know the basics, 
their risks and their chances of survival  
 
TxDr08:-...and then you get the guy who wants to know all about Philadelphia chromosome – he 
wants to know the molecular biology, to know every aspect of the conditioning regimes, he 
wants to know the time, the date, he wants to know all of it, then he wants discussion in some 
depth about 5 to 10 of the complications and he does ask for percentages – you might equivocate 
a bit where percentages are concerned, and that sort of interview can last easily a couple of 
hours, and may want to be repeated... ...but at the other end you literally do find people who say 
“Look, I have decided to have the transplant. Dr Jones, whom I trust says I ought to have a 
transplant – you’re in agreement, so let’s get on with it!” 
 
HCP04:- I think what I’ve learned is that you just can’t assume that people want to know. So I 
think over the years I’ve spent more time trying to find out from the patient what they want to 
know... 
 
The variability between what patients wanted to know can be particularly challenging for 
transplant physicians because they have to make some form of determination as to what might be 
considered to be material to an individual patient. When asked how they determined how much 
information any particular patient wanted or needed, rather than them making judgments on how 
they perceived the patient’s informational needs, or reverting to a standard guideline, most 
transplant physicians indicated that they specifically asked each patient about their informational 
preferences. 
CLS:- So how do you identify how much information [the hypothetical patient] Mr Smith 
wants? 
TxDr01:- I ask them usually 
 
TxDr04:- One of the great lines you can use is “are you the sort of person who wants to know a 
lot, or not much at all?” and that’s not a bad line to use. And sometimes you can get an idea from 
the questions they ask.   
 
Other members of the transplant team also used that technique of seeking individual patient’s 
preference for breadth and depth and timing of information 
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HCP04:-Well, I ask them about, you know, “are you the sort of person who likes to know 
everything or would you like to know it in instalments; and how much would you like to know at 
a time; do you want to know what it’s like day-to-day, or you know, what’s it like when you’re 
discharged, etcetera. Some people want to know everything, and some people just want to know 
a little bit at a time. 
 
HCP03:-… I might start off by asking them what the doctor has told them. And then I will ask 
them directly how much do they want to know, because I mean, number one, they need to know 
their diagnosis. Um now once they know their diagnosis how much then further they want to 
know is up to them. 
 
A number of transplant physicians indicated that once they had elucidated the patient’s 
informational preferences, they could then decide on how to proceed with regard to the 
disclosure of information about the upcoming transplant.  
CLS:- What if um Mr Smith says “don’t tell me any of the bad stuff, don’t want to hear that”? 
TxDr04:- Uh my reply to that is “I understand that, that it’s, you know, anxiety provoking but 
there are some things you need to know.  And it’s, my experience is that very few people won’t 
want to hear something.  I don’t think I’ve ever struck anybody who’s said “no, no don’t. Just 
stop, don’t tell me anything”.  
 
TxDr03:- I think that there are some things they all need to know [e.g. about the proximity of 
death] .  That’s a big assumption, I realise, because there are clearly patients who don’t want to 
know, and there are probably patients who don’t want to know anything, but I think it’s 
unreasonable, it’s an unreasonable expectation of me to take into a transplant a patient who 
hasn’t been told at least some very basic information.  I, um, so I tell them all what their chance 
of success is, I tell them all what the reasons for failure are, and I try to quantify the risks for 
each of those reasons.  And then after that, I judge how much detail to provide based on the 
questions they’re asking, um my assessment of their intelligence, their capacity to understand 
and the questions that are being asked by the relatives or accompanying people. 
 
TxDr03:- But you can’t explain everything to them. You simply, I believe, you simply cannot 
explain the different types of chemotherapy, radiation, reduced intensity, manipulations in the 
laboratory, post-transplant conditions – people are not in a position to understand that.  So my 
take on it is that you explain to people that it’s something so really serious, potentially, you 
know, causing acute mortality; various forms of morbidity which you can explain, duration and 
severity, the likely effect on their family and their relationships.  And but you don’t, you can’t go 
into everything. So yeah I think um it’s about degree of gloom if you like, degree of, you know, 
how you have to explain to them the nature.  So part of that is to say to people this is not like an 
ordinary medical procedure, you’re not going to come in sick and go out well. You’re going to 
come in well and go out sick, and you may well be sick for some time.  So, you know, it’s all – 
to me it’s all about painting a picture for them of what it’s likely to be like.  And how bad it 
might be without frightening them to the point where they’ll say “I don’t want to have anything 
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to do with this”.  And so I feel my duty is to convey to them the complexity and the potential 
complications, but not to spell out each one.  I told you already I spell out individual 
complications that are really common but yeah I don’t, I think you can’t convey every single 
thing. 
 
9.3 How information is disclosed  
There is a large literature aimed at helping patients understand healthcare information especially 
information pertaining to risks surrounding proposed intervention. 
807
 
9.3.1 Information is disclosed in various styles 
Opinions vary about whether lay people prefer having risks be explained in terms of percentages 
rather than in other descriptive styles (e.g. the majority, half, three quarters, most, a few, rarely, 
the average etc) 
808
. Similarly, there was no consensus amongst the transplant physicians in this 
study about how best to present risks to patients, and indeed most used a mix of measures to 
present risks, depending on what it was they were trying to illustrate. 
TxDr05:-...you can try to use either percentages or fractions, yeah, so often I use fractions... I 
like to use one third, one third, one third, or the 20/40/40 approach, not trying to get too 
numerically accurate, you know. I don’t like to talk about 37% or things like that because that 
detracts from the argument.  
 
TxDr06:- Normally most people understand percentages, so I think I normally present it in 
percentages, you know “there is a 20% chance that you will die from this procedures during the 
first 3 months, something like that, yes...Er I don’t know if they weigh up risk versus benefit but 
I suppose the figure to them is a very real figure, you know, when you say that half the people 
are dead in the next year or so 
 
Indeed the variability of how best to present information about risk to patients was echoed in the 
descriptions of transplant physicians when asked to talk about their preferred style.  
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TxDr08:- No I would certainly not put a percentage on it, [a particular symptom of HSCT ] but it 
would certainly be mentioned.  I would say, probably the majority of patients get some degree of 
graft versus host disease, and I would say “your chances are higher than average, or lower than 
average,” and I actually tell people that if things go well you have probably a normal life span, if 
things go badly you could be dead within six weeks of the transplant. I can’t, nobody can, argue 
with that. But I don’t know. I think predicting the future and putting it, if somebody asks me 
what is the chance that they’ll get severe untreatable graft versus host disease, I would give them 
a percentage. I’d say “because of your age, the type of donor, the state of your disease, your 
comorbidities, it’s probably about 90% or 15%,” and I’ll do my best to give them an accurate 
figure but, I don’t really know 
 
TxDr07:- Yeah, well the difficulty is because getting precise figures is hard, they’re based on 
clinical trials which may or may not fit that particular patient and then  you have conflicting 
trials, some which give positive results and some , so I have to at least explain to the patient, 
“these figures I’m giving you are my own impression of trying to synthesise the medical 
literature, the research , my own experience... in my experience, this is what I think is likely.” 
And I have to condense it to a pretty simple figure so that I would say “I think there is, let’s say, 
a 20% mortality of this procedure in you, in my own opinion, synthesising my experience and 
what I have read, ... and then I would say “well that means that ...if I had 10 of you, 2 out of the 
10 will die, but 8 out of the 10 will survive, but they will die from complications, infections, or 
GVHD, or [in] some people the leukaemia will come back and they would die of recurrence 
from the leukaemia. So, in this [situation], if we do nothing there’s a 20% chance your 
leukaemia will come back and you will die.  If we do the transplant, but unfortunately [there is a] 
20% chance you will die from the transplant, there is a 40% chance of it being unsuccessful 
whereas its only – you see, I’m getting confused myself now !! 
 
Patients vary in the amount, breadth and depth of information they want. The variance could be 
due to a number of things including their level of desire to be involved in matters relating to their 
healthcare, their trust in the healthcare professionals charged with caring for their health, or it 
could be that they are too burdened or overwhelmed by their disease. 
809
   
CLS:- how involved do you want to be in your treatment, in understanding what’s happening? 
Pt13F:-Well, I want to know what’s happening. I want to know what the possibilities are, what 
the possibilities are not, and what they are going to do to overcome those....because in the long 
run, it doesn’t really matter what drugs they’re using, they’re using them for the very best 
reasons, and umm, that’s fine. 
 
Pt01M:- ...relying on the doctors to fix me up, because I don’t know how to do it 
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9.3.2 Information is disclosed in various formats 
The importance of providing the information in a variety of formats, textual, visual, verbal, is 
well established.
 810, 811
 and was recognised by the members of the transplant team  
TxDr01:-    we’ve got pamphlets and brochures about transplant... But most of the time they are 
highly motivated, well-read, they’ve sought and found a lot of information on the internet, or 
books.  So they come with quite a lot of knowledge.  Um, like usually also a couple of 
misconceptions that we need to set those straight before we can begin, before we can discuss.   
 
TxDr07:-...there’s multiple sources, so that’s where our transplant co-ordinator is very important, 
probably more important in terms of the information than I am. So it’ll be lots of phone 
discussions with her 
 
Some patients relied totally on the information in its various forms (verbal, visual, written) 
provided to them primarily by the transplant physicians, and secondarily by other members of 
the transplant team;  
Pt06M:-: Oh from talking to doctors and nurses and we did a bit of work looking around. Um I 
guess most of it I got verbally from doctors 
 
Pt09M:- I just sort of went with what he’d told me and a few other questions I asked along the 
way when I didn’t quite understand but he sort of filled me in on what was needed to be 
known...I’m learning bits and pieces as I travel through ... from the nurses here and doctors and 
so forth. 
 
Pt13F:- Um probably from my haematologist in Hospital 13. yeah.  And reading a book that is 
published by the Bone Marrow Network [“A Patient’s Guide”] 
 
Other patients were more proactive in seeking out their own information, sometimes prompted 
by their transplant physician, other times by members of their family 
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Pt06M:- And he [transplant physician] said “here’s some pamphlets and here’s the web address 
on the computer” and he said “look it all up” and he said “come back in three or four weeks” and 
he said “you’ll have a hundred more questions to ask me. That’s fine, you just write them all 
down and come in and ask me”. …And he was right, I did, I went back in and in that period of 
time… there was no question of whether it was going to go ahead or it wasn’t going ahead, it 
was going ahead.  It was just about matter of what’s expected of me and what do I have to do?  
How do I do it; when do I do it; and trying to understand it all.   
 
Pt09M:- Well basically, Dr A gave it to me at the surgery when he diagnosed me. Um he give 
me a few pamphlets and told me to look it up on the internet which I did but it got too 
complicated on the internet and I didn’t follow it up much more.  
 
Pt13F:- I did, yeah I did a bit of that [searching on the internet.]  Um I’m always a little bit 
reluctant to believe too much of what I hear on the net – because it’s, um you know, I know it’s 
not always accurate. So I would Google stuff that maybe I knew was reliable and staff have 
given  me a few little things on bone marrow transplants – staff in Hospital 13 too if they found 
something interesting, so yeah that sort of thing. 
 
Some patients require a great deal of information, others are happy in the knowledge that the 
team managing their healthcare are skilled and to be trusted. 
HCP04:-What I think is that patients don’t want a lot of information, I mean, what they want is 
to be cured ... 
 
9.3.3 Sources of information 
The most frequent sources of information for patients in this study were healthcare professionals 
in general, including the referring haematologist, the transplant physicians, and members of the 
transplant team.   
Pt13F:-   probably from my haematologist in Hospital 13. Yeah 
 
But transplant physicians frequently found that this information was not entirely accurate, either 
in its content in relation to an individual patient, or in the way the patient had understood the 
information. 
TxDr01:-...um by just talking to him I can establish that yes, he’s well informed, or no, he 
doesn’t  have a clue, and if that is the case I will refer him back to his haematologist  
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TxDr04:-...so that the first problem is sometimes the information provided is inadequate, 
sometime even trivial. So I have to start again with the patient- in fact I always do anyway.  
 
TxDr07:-...to educate them, yet again, about the disease itself an about the natural history before 
even talking about the transplant 
 
[a] transplant physicians were the main source of information about options and outcomes of the 
HSCT prior to the patient agreeing to undergo HSCT  
Pt06M: I guess most of it I got verbally from the doctors 
 
Pt 09M:- I just sort of went with what he’d told me and a few other questions I asked along the 
way when I didn’t quite understand, but he sort of filled me in on what was needed to be 
known... 
 
TxDr07:-... the main source is myself, the transplant co-ordinator and then booklet that we give 
patients 
 
[b] in the lead–up to the patients admission to hospital for the HSCT the transplant coordinator at 
each hospital is the primary contact for both the patients and the significant others, or families. 
TxDr06:-...so really the transplant coordinator is the main educator – she the one that deals with 
the families, the primary contact the patient has if they’ve got any queries about the timing of the 
transplant and how the search [for a donor] is going    
 
[c] whilst nurses play a significant role in the provision of more generalised information about 
the day-to-day process as the patients experienced the phases of the HSCT 
Pt 09M:-....I’m learning bits and pieces as I travel through ... from the nurses here ... 
 
Patients were encouraged to do their own research as well. However, patients were advised that 
any items they found by doing their own research could be and probably should be discussed 
with the transplant physician for clarification and relevance to their particular condition 
TxDr04:- And then I’ll say, “look you’ve probably done a lot of this work on the Net, and you 
can do as much as you want, I don’t mind, but it will often confuse you – you’re better off 
writing your questions down and we’ll try to answer them” 
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Pt 09M:- Um he give me a few pamphlets and told me to look it up on the internet which I did 
but it got too complicated on the internet and I didn’t follow it up much more.  
 
Pt06M:- Oh, from books, the internet, from talking to doctors and nurses and we did a bit of 
work looking around. 
 
Even though transplant physicians frequently encouraged patients to do their own research, over-
reliance on the information found using these different sources could be problematic. This was 
for a range of reasons, but one of the main problems was that the information was not tailored to 
the individual patient. 
Pt05F:- I did actually read a few articles on Glivec in Reader’s Digest and stuff and um, and 
everyone told me I looked so well that I thought, oh well, maybe I’m just best to stick to the 
Glivec [and not undergo HSCT ] 
 
Pt06M:-… my wife and daughters were looking on it all the time [the internet] and they were 
saying “Look at that Dad, look, this person had this and dah dah dah.” Yeah, but you don’t know 
really what they had, you know, so I just sort of brushed it aside and said “no I’m not interested 
in that.  I’m interested in what I’ve got and what I think is going to happen to me.” 
 
Pt15F:-…that same week there was this media sort of hype about this breakthrough research …a 
very, very specific blood test that could potentially have an impact on my treatment,… Well 
Denis being the hubby he is and being, you know, hot off the wire, he emailed [transplant 
physician]… So, of course we’re now thinking, well if that’s actually happening and if that’s 
going to have some impact on potentially my care, and complications arising from graft versus 
host disease, well it would be really nice to be a part of that [research] and to actually feel that, 
you know, maybe there’s something more that can be done that will sort of effect my 
treatment.…. So that’s when Denis started looking at research and then he started asking both Dr 
J and Dr D what sort of mortality rate [there] was as far as transplants and all that kind of stuff, 
just to sort of see what was happening… 
 
Pt13F:- I did, yeah I did a bit of that. [searching on the internet]  Um I’m always a little bit 
reluctant to believe too much of what I hear on the net – because it’s, um you know, I know it’s 
not always accurate. So I would Google stuff that maybe I knew was reliable... 
 
As well as some of the patients being cautious about what they read on the internet, members of 
the transplant team found that it is not always the case that a patient armed with more 
information is better informed. 
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HCP03:- Oh the internet!  The internet can be one of the worst things when patients are ‘internet 
positive’ - that’s the terminology we use, yes.  If they’re internet positive that means they’ve 
trawled the net, they’ve looked at every bit of information; they’ve probably not understood half 
of it but, thought they have.  They’ll question everything, they’ll start quoting you this, this and 
this, I’ve read this, this and this on the net.  Um and some of it comes from very dubious 
resources or dubious sources when you look at it…  
 
9.4 Understanding  
A number of things can be concluded from these findings -  not everything can be explained to a 
patient -  patients often do not want to ‘know everything’ about their medical condition /therapy - 
patients and their transplant physician together should therefore determine the extent and depth 
of information, and how it is best disclosed. These findings are not novel; others have shown this 
in other settings.
812, 813, 814
 
But consent relies (at least in ethical or clinical terms) not simply upon the information being 
disclosed by a healthcare professional, but upon this information being understood, at least to 
some extent, by the patient. In contrast to the extensive literature on information disclosure, 
much less is known about the extent to which any or all information imparted during the clinical 
interaction is understood and the extent to which this influences, or should influence, decisions 
made by the patient.  
While ‘understanding’ occupies an uncertain status in relation to both the legal and moral 
construction of consent,
815
 when asked how they ascertained how much a patient understood 
about the implications of the decision they were about to make, transplant physicians mostly 
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acknowledged that no formal standard of assessing patients’ understanding was employed. This 
would appear to be a significant lacuna in the so-called “informed” consent paradigm. 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that some degree of understanding is assumed to be a feature of 
any choice or decision.
816
  
TxDr06:-:... you get a feel I think by, you know, the types of questions they’re asking and the 
feedback that you get when you’re talking about things, but no, I suppose, not without a formal 
assessment, you really don’t know 
 
TxDr07:- Yeah, [pause] we probably don’t do that very well actually. We make a lot of 
assumptions. Yeah - well when I do see them again, if I do see them a second time- well I would,  
if I had an initial discussion I would um, often even preface it saying “tell me what you 
understand about your disease?” and when they come back the second time I say “well tell me 
what you understand about the risk of the transplant and why we’re doing it.” So in some way 
you can usually get a good sense of whether they’ve understood anything. Some people really 
impress me about how much they’ve understood, and others have completely misunderstood it.  
So that’s one way.  
 
TxDr04:- So I ask them what would happen if they didn’t have a transplant? What might happen 
if they do have a transplant and what’s their understanding? Now, it varies enormously of 
course; I guess the three biggest variables would be, in terms of their understanding, would be 
their ethnic group, educational level and age.  I suppose they’re the big three. 
 
Part of the difficulty here is that while information disclosure is transparent, tractable and easily 
measureable, understanding is not. Likewise, while it may be possible to establish ‘standards’ of 
disclosure (although these may be open to contestation) it is difficult, if not impossible to 
describe an objective or ‘universalisable’ standard of understanding  necessary for determining 
whether consent is valid. 
TxDr03:- Occasionally one asks oneself if this person is really making an informed decision? I 
think the only way - the way I do it, I ask them whether they’ve understood what I’ve said. 
...And then at the end I’d say to them “so let me check something with you – you understand that 
you may die actually having this? This is pretty serious.”  So I go back and I go over those 
things. Now, have they understood what I have said? If they say “yes”- there are some big 
assumption that you to make here. But again without a formalised process (of assessing 
understanding) it’s very hard to do. At the end of the day I often feel that I am making a decision 
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for some people,, But in general I think I am making a good decision, and the decision I am 
making is based on their  desire to live. .. 
 
TxDr06:- Er, well there’s no, er, um there’s no er, there’s no formal sort of assessment. I 
suppose, that I suppose is a, ah, a gap in terms of assessing er, people as we really don’t know 
how much they take in. I suppose it’s just the feel you get then you talk to them about the 
transplant procedure, even though they may give you little clues that  they give you an idea that 
they understand where you’re coming from– but I don’t think they can ever really appreciate 
what they’re in for. I’ve never gone through a transplant so I can’t actually appreciate it either. 
So for a person who’s never gone through one, and always been on the outside and to try to 
explain to someone who is a potential transplant, I think there will be gaps in it. Even if they 
spoke to someone who’s gone though one, I think its still very hard of them to appreciate what’s 
involved, and I suppose that’s the problem in imparting information to someone...I think it is 
nearly impossible to fully appreciate beforehand what you may go through. 
 
9.4.1 Barriers to understanding   
The need to understand, and in turn to be understood is crucial in all aspects of healthcare,
817 818
 
but never more important as in high-risk medical procedures such as HSCT where there is a 
significant risk of early transplant-related mortality (up to 25% within 3 months) and where the 
vast majority of survivors will experience significant late-term complications.  
Given the extent to which information disclosure and subsequent understanding are based upon 
language, it is not surprising that transplant physicians spoke of the difficulties in 
communications about HSCT with patients  who were not fluent in English [in the hospital 
settings in which I interviewed transplant physicians and patients.] When language was an issue 
for adequate communication between healthcare professionals and patients, transplant physicians 
and other members of the transplant team reported the common practice in public hospitals of 
using authorised interpreters.  
Whilst not ideal, the use of interpreters is often the only way in which information can be 
transferred between the transplant physician and the patient.
819
 But the use of interpreters raises 
significant challenges relating to the loss of patient confidentiality, the potential for omission, 
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addition, condensation, substitution etc of material information 
820
 and ‘interpretations’ of what 
either party has said, or indeed means to convey.
821
 In reality, there is no way to be certain that 
the information has been faithfully portrayed in the intended style. Oftentimes equivalent words 
or phrases or even ideas may not exist in different languages.  Significantly, informative nuances 
can frequently be missed in the interpretations. 
822
 
TxDr04:- If she doesn’t speak any English then we get an interpreter. Now often they say 
“family member.”  [to which I say] “Oh no, no family members. No way, forget it. Formal 
interpreter or no-one.” And you’ve got to decide how much, what the complexity [is that] you 
want to convey and you try and do it as best you can. There’s no minimum standard requirement 
... but I’d go through those major things with them...the major complications and death – at least 
you’ve imparted that, and what happens when you come into hospital and the follow-up 
 
TxDr08:- I think we are obviously at a disadvantage like in terms of communication with people 
who don’t speak English...so we would have to use an interpreter and as soon as you have an 
interpreter you’re not quite sure what goes on 
 
But language isn’t the only variable. Cultural differences, in particular, are widely recognised as 
a cause of communication problems.
823
 Cultural differences become a significant challenge when 
cultural norms, such as those relating to gender, influence the process of consent. In the clinical 
setting this may be an issue where a male transplant physician and the female patient are unable 
to have a frank discussion because the cultural mores.  
TxDr08:- There must’ve been ten nicely dressed Galabeyah gentlemen, age ranging from twenty 
to sixty, and some of them were very well educated. I was questioned minutely by three or four of 
these men on all the aspects of the transplant; then they sent me out of the room as if it had been 
an interview. Then they called me back, and asked me another couple of questions and then the 
older man of the group said “…we will approve the transplant for Nabilah.”  She was never 
involved in it at all; she was told what she was going to do   
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TxDr07:- What would I do? I would probably try to understand the culture. I think you have to be 
on one hand sensitive to the way they do things, and it may be incomprehensive to us that they do 
things that way, but if that’s the way they do it, sometimes you have to give a bit of ground to 
respect their culture, if that’s the way it’s done. Then you have to at least go part of the way to 
doing it their way. But on the other hand um, most pure ethical stand is that she is my patient and 
I have ultimate responsibility for this one and therefore I have to somehow know that she has 
been given the right information and that she [as opposed to a family member] has made the 
decision.  
 
9.4.2 Adequacy of understanding 
At the beginning of each initial interview, patients were asked what they knew of their disease 
and the reason they were currently in hospital. All patients interviewed could name their disease, 
could talk about when they were diagnosed, what treatment they had experienced up to this 
point, and were able to relate that they were now in hospital in order to undergo HSCT Each 
patient was also able to recall specific information that they had been given about the risks of 
transplantation by their transplant physician. It appeared therefore, that each patient had at least a 
basic understanding of their situation. 
Pt01M:-:...I think I was 43% blasts. And the first lot of chemo didn’t do it, that was in October 
and they when said that now the decision’s yours, you’ve got a 30% chance of pulling through 
your next set of chemo and which means that I might not make it … So you take it- take it or 
leave it.  … now I’m going to try and pull through this one. 30%’s not much but its 1 in 3 isn’t 
it? I was thinking 30% of me but it’s not, it’s 30% of everybody. That’s one in three persons. 
 
Pt02M:-  [when asked what his diagnosis was] ALL. 
CLS:- ALL? And do you know what that is?  
Pt02M:- Acute Lymphoblastic Leukaemia.   
 
Pt06M:-...looking at my history, the um strength of the match that I’ve got, um a lot of the 
factors that were going, I was a good candidate for success, or reasonable success, um you know, 
better than 50% chance.  So you know, they’re good odds I think. 
CLS:-  Can I just ask you a little bit about that, 50% chance of what? 
Pt06M:- Not, – and this is the way I’ve understood it, – not cure.  To get through the treatment 
so I can get to a point where I can have a reasonable lifestyle. That’s my understanding of it. 
 
Pt09M:- Ooh not that I know a great deal about them. No it’s just the stem cells, the stem cells 
that feed my bone marrow, they will get changed. I get a – my brother’s a donor. Um we’ve 
already harvested him – we’ve got his cells on ice.  
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Pt09M:- Well the chemo’s – they’ve given me chemo each day. The chemo is to kill the stem 
cells in me that are still good. There are some good ones there but the majority are bad.  It’ll kill 
them. When we get them all killed we then put my brother’s stem cells in me. A part of them 
will go straight to work and do the job – a part of them won’t, they’ll put up a fight and I’ll put 
up a fight against them and that’s where a lot of the sickness and that will come in to being. Um 
we’ve got to conquer that – once we conquer that I believe the next six months are going to be 
sort of sick and not sick, and in and out of hospital, and so forth and so forth. And after that I’m 
hoping to be 100% back to normal. 
CLS:- So were you given percentages of success rates?  
Pt09M:- 75% success rate yeah.  Yeah, that was given  
CLS:- Okay. Good. And that’s success of what?  
Pt09M:- Of the whole thing being a success. 
 
When asked about their understanding of what was going to happen to them during the 
HSCTprocedure including the symptoms that they may experience, patients generally did not 
offer a comprehensive list of all the risks associated with HSCT . Even though they had been 
informed about the risks at several time points, by several people, (e.g. the transplant physician, 
the transplant coordinator) and in several formats (for example in presentations at the Education 
Day, in the book “A Patient Guide”, copies of which had been given to every patient, other 
publications, etc), patients often only named a limited number of specific risks or toxicities.     
CLS:-  What do you know about the side effect of the transplant? 
Pt03M:-  Your hair falls out, your nails don’t grow,  
 
Pt10M:-  I’ve been telling anyone that wants to listen, this is going to be the fastest recovery from 
a bone marrow transplant anyone’s ever seen. … I walked away from that [Education Day] full of 
confidence. Yeah, this is going to be easy  
 
CLS:- And what’s going to happen to you during those weeks [during which time he will be 
hospitalized] do you think? 
Pt10M:- Um I guess I’ll get – well because of the radiation therapy I’ve had, I’m expected to get 
a sore throat which means I’ve got to have a hose put up my nose and down the back of my throat 
so they can feed me through it and give me tablets and what-not. Um I’ve been led to believe I 
could get the fevers back, the high temperatures. Um 38, 41 degree temperatures that I’ve had 
before... but that may not happen either – I may just – I mean the sore throat they reckon is 
universal um that’s going to happen. Um but I might not get the temperatures, I don’t know. I’ve 
just got to sit here for three weeks and just make sure everything marries up, and then if 
everything’s fine in three weeks, well then I go home. If it’s not, if it’s not fine and if it’s going to 
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take longer well I’ve got to sit here until it’s fine, until it matches up, yeah.  That’s pretty much 
how I understand it. 
 
There are a number of possible explanations for such responses. The first, of course, is that the 
patients had a very limited understanding of the risks associated with the procedure; the second 
is that the risks that these people described were the ones that were ‘material’ to them and that 
other risks did not feature in their consciousness. It is also possible that the patients were 
adequately informed and understood the risks associated with HSCT but were unable to put these 
risks into words, or could most adequately talk about risks through the use of humour
824
 or other 
linguistic devises
825
 Perhaps they simply chose not to discuss the other more serious risks of 
HSCTas a way  of coping with the existential horror that accompany the possibility of one’s own 
demise.
826, 827
 Given these possibilities, where patients responded in ways that suggested either 
limited understanding or reluctance to discuss the serious or morbid risks of transplantation, they 
were not probed regarding their depth of understanding for fear of distressing them. 
 
9.4.3  Retrospective accounts of patients on their understanding of HSCT  
Those patients who survived at least six months following HSCT were interviewed a second 
time. At this interview they were asked about the level of understanding they had at the time 
leading up to the HSCT , and whether there had been any ‘surprises’ – any things that happened 
during the period of hospitalisation and immediately following discharge, that they weren’t 
prepared for, or didn’t know about until they occurred.  
Importantly, all of the patients interviewed reported that they were not surprised by any of the 
dreadful effects that they experienced – in each case noting that the effects had been previously 
discussed with them and so there was no sense of not being prepared or at least pre-warned when 
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they did occur. This suggests that the patients had all been adequately informed of the process 
and complications of HSCT.  
Pt03M02:- And nothing surprised me, because I knew, within the first three months, like having 
the leukaemia and having the chemo, that I’m always going to have - until I get through this, I’m 
always going to have some sort of side-effects, so nothing really surprised me. Um, but I mean 
um, no, nothing - there was nothing really surprised me at all. The first chemo, because you 
didn’t know what you was in for, is the worst one, ‘cause it’s, it’s a belter, it’s a ripper. Um, 
because I was prepared, I was ready for it, like I, I wanted it, like “Bring it on!” [both laughing] 
 
CLS:- So do you think you’d been prepared for the worst? 
Pt10M02:- Oh definitely, yeah. 
 
This does not necessarily mean however, that the patients had received all of this information 
prior to undergoing HSCT, or at the point when they had decided to go ahead. By the time of the 
second interview, all of the patients had experienced extended periods both as inpatients and 
outpatients and so would have been engaged in recurrent conversations about their care and 
progress. These discussions would have been had about their existing symptoms, about 
symptoms they could only anticipate, and about their progress and (likely) prognosis. These 
conversations took place both with transplant physicians and with many other members of the 
transplant team involved in their care but most notably with the nursing staff by virtue of the fact 
that they had far greater personal contact with patients particularly during their ‘inpatient 
admission.’   
Pt15F02:- Uh well I actually felt quite involved and I think that was to do with the staff because 
they were always explaining everything, and if there was something that wasn’t explained um 
then you know, I would ask and you know it would be explained to me.  So that certainly helped 
with any, if you like, any sort of worry you had about, you know, what they were giving you, 
what it was for and what were going to be the possible side effects.  I thought that everybody 
was, took great pains to make you aware of what was actually going to happen and how you 
might feel, you know what could be the sort of effects. So yeah I really felt that, you know, I 
didn’t have this huge unknown and, you know, all these questions, um you know, so I felt quite 
at ease about all that.   
 
For the most part, continuing disclosure of information about options and outcomes was mainly 
the domain of transplant physicians, whereas on-going disclosure of information about the 
process of HSCTand about symptoms was undertaken by of the nurses.  
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HCP03:- If they say “nothing” [patients say they don’t want information], or you either get “I 
don’t want to know anything, talk to my son, talk to my daughter, talk to my husband, talk to my 
wife, but I don’t want to know anything”.  Um and I always say “right, okay well that’s fine” but 
I will say to them “I’m going to ask you at certain points if you want to know further 
information, because you may change your mind and either you need to tell me that, or I need to 
just reiterate each time.” 
 
HCP03:-“Are you sure you don’t want to know yourself?” … I think that’s important [to ask the 
patient] because I think to start off with some people are a bit gob-smacked about what they’ve 
got and they need time. 
 
It is also possible that the patients were feeling a form of euphoria
828
 and/or were expressing a 
type of ‘halo-effect’, an affirmative cognitive bias created subconsciously by them based on the 
fact that so far they had survived.  
Pt03M02:- No regrets, no, no, I’ve been to hell and back three or four times now, so as long as I 
keep on coming back, I don’t care, [both laughing]  they can put me to hell, but as long as I keep 
on coming back, I don’t care, and that’s what I said, as I said, so I said “do whatever you want, 
do whatever needs to be done, just get me back  up to the ward”. 
Pt15F02:- Not so much now Camilla because probably because I haven’t actually, I haven’t 
experienced a lot of discomfort.  It’s almost, it is almost like it hasn’t happened to me, you know 
it’s like the whole process, because it’s sort of like, I was in hospital, out of hospital, it didn’t 
have a huge physical impact on me.   
 
It is important to note however that while most patients considered themselves to be sufficiently 
informed, in deference to their still highly vulnerable circumstances, patients were only cursorily 
interrogated during the interview process about whether their previously stated informational 
needs were satisfied and whether they understood the complexities of the interventions, and the 
ensuing complications and effects.
829
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9.4.4 Reflections on information disclosure 
As described earlier, a number of the patients and members of their family found some of the 
information provided to them prior to the patient undergoing the HSCT, disturbing and 
frightening, and their response was to try to discount the information.  
SO10M:-... they give us a lot of magazines and brochures and uh everything else, all the stuff, 
you know, what can go wrong, and this and that  and anything else. Well, I didn’t want to know 
any of that. I just wanted her well. But Isabel, [Pt05F] Isabel reads books and this and that and 
everything else, and you know, I think she just, personally, meself, I think she just fed herself 
with too much information. 
 
HCP04:-...we say “have you got any questions, would you like something else explained, do you 
understand?” Some people say “I just wanna get on with it. I don’t really want to know all about 
that.” 
 
For some people, too much information means that the information simply can’t be assimilated 
HCP04:- Uh, well, from my observations, for many patients its information overload in some 
ways. It’s a lot of information to take in, and often I would go back the next day, or a couple of 
days later and we’d have to go through it all again.  
 
HCP04:-...people have said, “No-one told me this would happen”, even though I know [that it has 
been explained to them],  
 
Only one patient talked negatively at his follow-up interview, about having been provided with 
too much information. For him, the detailed information was concerned with effects that he 
didn’t experience, and in retrospect he wondered about the validity of informing patients about 
frightening things that may not materialise.  
Pt02M02:- Yeah, actually there was [things he anticipated but didn’t experience], -when I read 
the book about transplant, they tell you that, - they explain the way they virtually, they virtually 
kill you before they bring you back to life. They give you radiotherapy, chemotherapy, - you feel 
like you’re dead. ... but I tell you what, 85% of the things in the book, I’ve never experienced, 
never, never, the only bad thing I had were ulcers, which is nothing, in comparison to what I 
could have had, so yeah. 
 
Others patients understood the necessity of warning patients about various symptoms regardless 
of whether those risks materialised.
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Pt14M02:- No, no way.  No, because I think you have to know because I’m not real um keen on 
the people that have it and then blame other people– because you didn’t tell me this. So you, 
because basically, they have to do it I understand that but I’d like them to do it anyway even if 
they didn’t have to. So I’m glad they told me all that.  
 
9.5 Decision-making  
The legal and ethical requirement of information disclosure to ensure valid consent is predicated 
on the assumption that once the ‘facts’ are disclosed to the patient, [s]he is then positively 
situated to be able to make an autonomous decision about whether or not to proceed with the 
proffered medical intervention. And this in turn, is predicated on the supposition that patients 
know what is in their best interest, and how to promote their long term goals based on their 
personal preferences. At first glance, this supposition is irrefutable — who else could better 
decipher and employ a patient’s preferences in a decision? However, this line of reasoning can 
also lead to a misleading conclusion, that patients always make choices that are in their best 
interest,
830
 or that promote their long term goals.
831
 
According to the literature, medical decision–making is a stepwise process. 832 Having been 
provided with the medical facts it is assumed that the patient will deliberate on the materiality of 
the information according to his/ her values and preferences, and then make a decision. Thus 
there is a difference between being involved in the decision–making process, that is to say the 
‘deliberation’, and ‘making the decision’833 which is the outcome of the decision–making 
process.  
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9.5.1 Deliberation 
Deliberation of information is thought to occur by one of two approaches; an analytical mode or 
an experiential mode.
834
 To employ an analytical mode is a conscious activity in which the 
patient reflects on and compares each attribute of the available choices. It involves reflection and 
is relatively slow when compared to the alternate mode of experiential deliberation. Experiential 
deliberation involves more autonomic reasoning, often employing ‘short-cuts’ known as 
heuristics which are often intuitive.  Experiential deliberation therefore occurs relatively quickly. 
One might think that for a decision of such great consequence as consenting to HSCT , that the 
patient and his/her significant other(s) might spend considerable conscious ‘work’ mulling over 
the potential risks and probabilities associated with a life threatening intervention. However, in 
this study, for the majority of participants, deliberation seemed to be only a brief moment in time 
based on their experiential, intuitive biases  
CLS:- How much time did you take to decide that you would go ahead with HSCT ? 
Pt03M: I decided straight away - there was nothing to think about 
 
Pt01M: It’s not a decision you make, you just do it. 
 
Notably, the analytic mode of deliberation was only obviously employed by one couple, Pt15F 
and SO08M for whom the period of deliberation was extensive with many attributes being 
deliberated including whether they believed that there was an acceptable alternative treatment for 
Pt15F.  
SO08M: [the haematologist had said] . “… you’ve got about five to ten years to live and the only 
way out would be a  transplant”  After looking it up on the web, looking at what the, you know, 
chances of survival are gunna be with a bone marrow transplant, it was like [makes a noise 
indicating despondency].  So we sort of pushed it under the carpet, the whole thing, and just said 
“right, let’s just see what drugs there are” and I just went on the website to find out more about 
it...  
 
Then once they decided that Pt15F clearly needed to undergo an HSCT , they analysed and 
deliberated on additional information such as which hospital was preferable given its location 
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and reported success rates, the apparent currency of knowledge of individual transplant 
physicians, etc. 
Pt15F: :-... I somehow felt that we had almost more information than he was giving us.  And um 
because Denis sort of, Denis likes to sort of probe and sort of ask questions, and I think some of 
the things you know Dr J would either maybe hadn’t heard of a particular kind of research or - 
you know and like I know doctors don’t have time to be on the, you know, the internet much, 
Denis has been on all these different webs and certainly with Dr N too, I don’t think he was 
familiar with some of these, you know, these websites that you know Denis had been on.  So we 
were getting tons of information, and in some ways we actually, you know, like I said, we felt 
that uh for example when… this sort of news item came through about Hospital 1 and about this 
particular blood test, neither Dr N or Dr J had actually, were aware of it at all.  Um and then, you 
know, just sort of talking to, you know, to sort of a couple of um, you know, friends, they were 
saying well, you know, they work all hours in their clinics, and I realise that you, know, they 
don’t have time to even read the daily paper necessarily.  So, you know, we were a little bit 
surprised but then, you know, with their workload, you know, … if they’re not involved in 
research they might not necessarily know about it.  Now going back to the initial consultation 
with Dr D, he seemed a bit more involved in um current research practices if you like, and um he 
actually gave us a copy of this German um research that they were basing protocol on here.  So 
he basically just gave us a copy and said “you might be interested in reading it.”  So that was 
actually quite um, you know, a bit of an eye opener for us because you know we felt that um, 
here was somebody that was a bit more involved in what was actually happening, uh, maybe had 
more or maybe was a bit more involved on the research side, so, you know, consequently easier 
for him to be aware of this information.  Um but um it was sort of interesting because I 
remember Denis actually asking Dr D again after he’d given us a lot of the initial information 
that, you know, we were already pretty much aware of,   
 
Before settling on which hospital Pt15F would undergo HSCT , the couple consulted 4 different 
transplant physicians and considered each hospital in Sydney which undertook bone marrow 
transplants and also considered going overseas for treatment. 
SO08M:-:...and I think we went to see, apart from our the doctor at Hospital 2, we went to see 
another specialist haematologist at Hospital 3 and finally we went to see X and then Hospital 2 
where we actually transferred to a bone marrow transplant specialist Dr J at Hospital 4. ... and 
while we were seeing him we went to see this other specialist who’s pretty good in Australia ... 
at Hospital 3, and the one from Hospital 3 was suggested by this [disease-specific] website, and 
then finally we had a fourth opinion and went to Hospital 1.... And so it was a case of - do we go 
for this or, and of course, looking at the statistics survival statistics - they were about 60% 
survival rate - that’s at Hospital 4....so it came down to either Hospital 4 or Hospital 1 .... As 
much as it’s scary and with about only 60% survival rate, I mean we looked at going to probably 
the best place in the world which is in Seattle - that’s the most famous place in the world, 
they’ve got a  hospital there... they do more[bone marrow transplants]  than anybody else in the 
world yeah 
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SO08M:-...Oh well through the web we got statistics of survival rates, you know in America for 
example, which was slightly better there, you know, than over here because you’ve got a bigger 
population. .... And the, the difference also I’ve found through all the research that I did, and just 
browsing through these websites, is that we tend to have a more scatter-gun approach as regards 
blood disorders, whereas in America they’ve actually got specialists looking up items like 
[specific disease]. They’ve got specialists on [specific disease] whereas over here they’ll be 
specialists that look at all the blood disorders so they’re like a jack of all trades 
 
SO08M:-.And uh and their survival rate was actually slightly better after seeing, doing some 
more research on Hospital 1 because they follow some German protocol. So that was basically it, 
in a nutshell 
 
The quotes from Pt15F and SO08M reflect only that particular dyad of patient and significant 
other in the study, but it could probably be assumed that in a larger cohort, others might behave 
similarly.  
Nevertheless, transplant physicians acknowledged that the vast majority of patients appeared not 
to analyse or to deliberate on the information they had been provided with, nor desired to be as 
intensely involved as Pt15F and SO08M in their deliberation. 
 
TxDr04:-  [when talking about most patients] I haven’t had that feeling that they want 
involvement in the decision–making 
 
TxDr02:- Yeah well, there are people who don’t want to be involved in the decision–making 
process at all 
 
When asked to comment on why they thought some patients did not want to deliberate on the 
information that had been so thoroughly disclosed to them and to match the information to their 
values and preferences, transplant physicians cited that complexity and uncertainty of HSCT 
may limit patients’ cognitive ability.  
TxDr03:-… it’s very hard I think, for me to differentiate what’s loss of cognitive function and 
what’s abandonment of decision–making in something so complex [as HSCT ]  
 
TxDr06:- Yes as I said, it’s hard to know if anyone can be fully committed to a procedure that 
they know they’ve got a chance of dying 
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TxDr02:- “…well you know, [said to the pt]  you have to participate to a certain extent in the 
decision–making  process, even if only in at the end of the day, after hearing what we’ve said 
and what we recommend, that you agree to going ahead with it, which to a certain extent implies 
that you [the patient] give consent to the treatment even though you may not fully understand it 
all or want really to think through all the fine detail of it.”  
 
So, in this study, it appeared that the majority of patients and their significant other(s) did not use 
the information disclosed to them in the manner in which it was intended by the transplant 
physicians, or which might be generally assumed, namely to be used to weigh up against their 
values and preferences in preparation for a decision to be made that was in with their best 
interest.    
9.5.2 Making the decision  
Humans make decisions about general matters that affect their lives almost constantly in their 
day-to-day life. Many of those decisions are concerning familiar matters, that is to say, things 
with which they have experience, or are familiar with, or at least, can imagine. In relation to 
health care, people consistently and unavoidably make decisions about a set of symptoms, its 
meaning or significance, and subsequently about whether treatment and/or testing is necessary. 
For example, you awake with a sore throat; is it because you used your voice yesterday more 
than usual or does it signify something more sinister; is it a simple upper respiratory infection 
that will resolve without further consideration or could it indicate an underlying disorder; should 
you continue your daily activities as usual, rest, or report the condition to a doctor; you are a 
‘front-line’ healthcare professional, so should you request a throat swab and blood tests to 
exclude the possible need to remain isolated from vulnerable patients?  
Occasionally, however, we may be called upon to make a decision about an unfamiliar set of 
medical circumstances – a situation about which one has no experience and that one may find 
unimaginable. This unfamiliarity, particularly when the consequences may literally be fatal, can 
be enormously disquieting.  As some of the patients contemplating undergoing HSCT noted.  
Pt08F:- I mean, my life just changed in that moment when she told me. I knew that she’d turned 
my life upside down.  And it wasn’t in my control any more.   
 
Pt04M:- “Well,” I thought “that’s the end of the world now” 
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The question concerning what role patients should assume in decision–making regarding their 
healthcare is deeply contested and ongoing.  It has become commonly accepted, under the 
auspices of ‘respect for autonomy’, that patients not only want to take an active role in making 
decisions about their healthcare, but indeed should be strongly encouraged and ‘empowered’ to 
do so.
835
   
Nonetheless, what it actually means for patients to take an ‘active role’ in decision–making, or 
even what an ‘autonomous decision’ looks like, is often unclear. This may be particularly true in 
high-risk, unfamiliar situations such as HSCT . 
 
Pt01M:- … in the beginning it was such a shock that um, you know, I mean the doctor said 
something like “if you don’t have that treatment you’ll only live a couple of weeks.” You sort of 
miss what they say next...and then we just made the decision straight away  
 
Pt05F:- … then I went to the psychologist and, I think she helped me turn around a little bit...and 
I just went in one day and I said to the psychologist lady, I said “no, I’m going ahead with this. 
I’ve made up my mind; I’m going to have it.  I know it’s not going to be easy, but I’m going to 
have it. It’s my chance, my second chance of life.”  And so I did. 
 
Patients acknowledged that the decision whether or not to undergo HSCT was like no other 
decision they had been called upon to make in their lives.  
Pt05F:- I’ve had a lot on my mind...it’s with trying to make this decision; it’s the biggest 
decision you have to make in your life.  
 
Transplant physicians noted that mostly patients did not want to take an active role in making the 
decision to undergo HSCT .   
Whilst it may initially appear to be a reasonable assumption that patients would want to take 
control of decisions regarding their healthcare especially considering the exceedingly high stakes 
involved in undergoing HSCT with its significant toxicity, risk of life threatening infections, 
change in body image and disruption to quality of life of the patient, etc, it is perhaps not 
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altogether surprising that patients in this study preferred to assume a more passive role in 
decision–making.  
TxDr03:- I think for a lot of patients it is that passive, er there’s an element of passivity... 
 
TxDr06:- Hm well I think that yeah, you do get people like that, yeah 
 
TxDr04:- Of course they have an opinion in it, but the decision ultimately they don’t want in 
their hands, I don’t think. They want the doctor to do it…I think they have a role to play, and 
you get their feedback, but you know, is it possible for them to[make the decision], do they want 
to? No.  No, I don’t get that sense. 
 
Moreover, transplant physicians did not find it surprising that patients were reticent about 
wanting to be actively involved in decision–making. 
TxDr04:- I know when I’ve been a patient myself, I don’t want to have to make the decision, I 
don’t want to have to organise things.  
 
TxDr04:-.Uh and sometimes they don’t make it at all, it’s [the decision to undergo HSCT ] made 
for them.  Maybe that’s what they think, that it’s out of their hands and maybe that’s the way 
they feel that they’re just being carried along And sometimes it is a process that’s out of 
everybody’s control. In a way it’s just a process it’s like, it’s like the law – you’re in a 
circumstance and it’s got a life of its own and it’s a bit like that, it has a  life of its own. And you 
just – everyone get carried along. And sometimes I’ve had that feeling that you, you almost can’t 
put a brake on it, it’s really hard to put a brake on it, you know it’s just got a, it’s got a 
momentum.   
 
Patients generally talked about not wanting to be involved in making the decision to undergo 
HSCT  
In recent years, empirical studies have documented that some patients choose to defer medical 
decisions to others, including their lay carers, family members, or members of their health team, 
to make decision on their behalf.
836, 837
  This ‘right’ to authorize someone else to make those 
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medical decisions has also been the subject of legal deliberation.
838
  Some have suggested
839, 840
 
that the reasons patients may relinquish decision–making responsibility may include their 
(subconscious) desire to shift the burden of responsibility for the outcome away from 
themselves.
841
  
CLS:-: ...do you want to be part of the decision–making process? Do you want Professor D to 
say to you “Okay, these are some of the options we have to think about, now what do you 
think?” Do you want to be part of the decision–making process? 
Pt07F: No, because I trust Dr D and whatever decision he makes.   
 
Pt01M: [in response to question about whether he wanted be actively involved in decision–
making]  I’m a truck driver, not a doctor!  
 
Delegating the decision–making to the transplant physician might also be a means of freeing the 
patient of the burden associated with making decisions - thus freeing them up to focus on other 
matters relating to the illness trajectory, should they wish to do so, or need to do so. 
 
Pt03M02:-:....as I keep on saying to them, “whatever you have to do, do it!” 
 
Pt04M:- “...if you need to do it, just do it” 
 
Pt10M02:-... I think, I think mostly, most of the right decisions were made and by whoever had 
to make them, and I just went along for the ride, yeah. 
 
Pt08F:- I like to keep things in order, [I like to] control what I do and then [following her 
diagnosis], I can’t do anything now.  I have a young daughter to take care of and it’s so 
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annoying, you know and thinking “oh I’m going to die, who’s going to look after her” – all these 
things that come to your head.  
 
Western society generally grants patients latitude or leeway when they are ill; that is to say, 
freedom to adopt the so-called ‘sick-role’ in which they are frequently excused from undertaking 
various activities that they would otherwise normally assume when they are well. 
842
 Contrary to 
this assumption that patients are thus free of their normal responsibilities, many patients in this 
study found that it was not possible to put life ‘on hold’ whilst they focused on their current 
medical situation – for them, life did not stop, nor could it be put on hold. Life’s challenges 
simply carried on regardless of the patient’s medical predicament, and often were exacerbated by 
their illness.  
One patient spoke of his anguish over the wayward life and drug addiction of one of his children, 
his frustration in not knowing how to help and/or improve the situation, the concern and stress 
this caused him, and how that impacted on his ability to focus on decisions about his own life 
plans. Others talked about their continued need to deal with ‘life matters’ some unrelated to their 
disease, and others directly caused by it. 
 
Pt11M:- When I first came in [to hospital to undergo HSCT], I didn’t know how we were going 
to pay for the house.  My son at that stage was going to a private school – didn’t know how we 
were going to pay for that.  I wasn’t sure how much sick leave I had.  I didn’t know whether my 
job would still be there, um and just lying in bed, I felt pretty, um, [patient becomes distressed - 
long pause] Yeah, well it was very difficult. 
 
Pt10M:- I’ve had to move out of me house [the owner sold it] and I sort of moved in with me 
partner… but at the moment I’ve got all my stuff in me cars, and I’ve got them in storage at 
various people’s places and whatnot and so I’ll just see how things go in six months time and I’ll 
organise meself something...  But at the moment, at the moment I can’t worry about things like 
that, I’ve got more important things I’ve got to worry about. 
 
Pt06M:- My wife [as a result of his illness] got a carer’s pension – carer allowance which pays 
for petrol.  And we were trying to get a PBS card and um we’ve gone through countless 
paperwork and documentation just to get them to believe that I’ve got this disease.  And the 
doctors would be filling out booklets of reports, sending them away and each time we sent them 
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away they’d write back and say “oh we need to have this one done now and we need to have that 
one” and we’re trying to get all this done in this last six weeks.  Um and to two Superannuation 
Boards, they’re both New South Wales Government Super because it’s just, I had one lot and 
one amount and one account and some more in another account, they live in the same building in 
Wollongong.  There’s a glass petition between the two offices and you know it’s so frustrating 
that one can’t go over and say ”look, this is the same person, let’s work together on this and 
we’ll knock it over.”  No – they will not have a bar of it.  You must sign separate documents for 
each claim.  So we did that.  And then Centrelink wanted the exact same, and so did [the 
insurance company].  So in the end I had four organizations who all were wanting the same 
information but on their own piece of paper, and they’re still not finalised.... I wanted all that, all 
that stuff finished before [he was admitted to hospital for HSCT ] but no chance.  Still haven’t 
heard from Centrelink about a PBS card – I’ve spent what, $300 on antibiotics in that four week 
period where I could have had them for $20 if I’d had the PBS card 
 
Alternatively, some patients may feel that they simply are incapable of making a rational 
assessment of their situation, both because they have no prior experience of it and because they 
lack the objectivity, knowledge or technical skills necessary to make a considered judgment 
about the ‘right’ course of action.843 On the other hand, many patients acknowledged that the 
transplant physicians have the necessary ‘special knowledge’, that they  “…are members of a 
profession and as such profess to know better than others the nature of certain matters, and to 
know better than their clients what ails them…”844 In addition, transplant physicians have been 
inculcated to make decisions about a person’s medical care; and this is substantiated by their 
many years of education, and training to develop skills and specialist knowledge.
 845
 
 
TxDr03:- They will often say to me “it’s all too complicated for me you know Doc, but tell me, 
what would you do?”… So I often say, I often say to them “I’d be nervous, but this is what I’d 
end up doing.” 
 
TxDr07:-...often in the end patients will say “Well, what do you recommend?” and I, I  think if 
that’s what they need, then I say “well, if it was me or someone from my family...”  ...It’s a 
person’s own decision as to what the trade-off is in terms of longevity versus quality of life 
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This perspective assumes that the transplant physicians have the same desired goal as the patient, 
namely the patient’s disease free survival. Although this is probably a reasonable assumption, it 
is likely that the physician and the patient make their decision in very different ways and on the 
basis of a different weighing of facts and values.
846
  
TxDr08:-My job is to make a recommendation even in difficult circumstances. “What would you 
do, doc, if it was your daughter?”  “Actually Mrs Jones, that’s not a legitimate question, because 
if it was my daughter, I’d be absolutely befuddled and muddled about my own emotional 
attachment to my daughter and I’d muddle it. It’s your daughter, and my recommendation is that 
she does have a transplant even though I recognise it could go wrong.” 
 
TxDr08:-….. back to the idea that the doctor has to be trained to be relatively honest. Not unduly 
interested by money or power or kudos. He has to think -  “if this was a family member of mine, 
would I be happy with the advice that I’m giving this person?”   
CLS:- Um hmm, so are you making decisions in the patient’s best interest as the physician, or are 
you trying to put yourself into the patient’s mind set? 
TxDr08:-No I’m trying to make the decision, well, a mixture of both.  I’m trying to, to make a 
decision according to reputable best clinical practice, but as adapted to this patient. I would listen 
to the patient as much as I possibly can. A doctor must give recommendations and then adapt to 
what the patient wants…I’ve got to tell them what I think is best clinical practice and then I’ve 
gotta do what they want. 
 
Some patients saw that there was no real decision to be made - that there was no acceptable 
choice for them other than to undergo HSCT . 
Patients reported that it had been put to them that without HSCT they would die as a result of 
their disease. However, even though significant effort had been made to ensure that patients 
understood the risks associated with undergoing HSCT , that there were no guarantees of success 
(being survival) given the uncertainties surrounding HSCT , and that they may still die, and 
sooner than if they didn’t undergo HSCT , they did not perceive any realistic alternative.847 For 
the patients and their significant others in this study, many talked about making the decision 
whether to proceed to HSCT in terms of a situation in which they perceived that for them, there 
was no choice. In other words, they perceived that the relative importance of any possibility of 
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disease-free survival outweighed the relative importance of any possibility of dying as a direct 
result of undergoing HSCT .  
Pt03M02:-:...what choice have you got? You know it’s, it’s the only cure you’ve got, and the 
only chance you’ve got, so you really have to make the best of it, um to the best of your 
capability...   
 
Pt15F:-:… they basically said ‘you really don’t want to go down that track’.  So already I had 
that sort of in the back of my mind that, well if that’s the case and they were saying that the 
transplant is your best option, then I basically felt I had no choice 
 
Wife of Pt01M:- When he was first diagnosed the doctor said without treatment he’ll only live 2 
or 3 weeks, so that’s not an option… [Wife of Pt01M was never interviewed separately, as a 
‘significant other’. She was present and participated in the interview with the patient – often the 
two of them spoke at the same time] 
 
Pt09M02:- And I said [to the transplant physician] “well okay well what are the alternatives” – 
and he said “there’s none”.  “Well, what if I don’t have it done”?  He said “well you’ll die” – 
“how long”, “I can’t tell you, but you will die and it won’t be that long”.  So with that in the 
back of your mind, there is no choices. Um yeah, okay you don’t have it, so you wait for six 
months and you’re dead so you know it’s, there is no, there’s no choice really. So uh I’m not 
sure that that answers your question or not but it, that’s it, it’s black and white as far as I’m 
concerned.  
 
Perceiving that they had ‘no option’ was also seen by members of the transplant team as being 
the most common rationale given by patients for their consent to HSCT 
HCP04:- Why they’ve decided to have one? The normal thing, the normal quote is “I don’t have 
a choice”  even though in theory they do have a choice.  They feel they don’t have a choice and I 
think obviously what they’re saying is “if I want to live then I have to do this” 
 
HCP04:- [responding to whether the option to undergo HSCT is framed in a way such that it is a 
choice about living] I suppose it is, because we do say “your best option for cure is to have a 
transplant” and if you were talking about one of the aggressive leukaemias perhaps what will be 
said is “ you know without it, [HSCT ]  the disease is  going to come back, and then we may not 
have this option” 
 
The perceived lack of acceptable choice was frequently characterized by patients as being in a 
predicament which they could not ignore but over which they had no control, and therefore any 
decision to be made was ‘out of their hands’ -  ‘beyond their control’. 
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CLS:-...did you actively make the decision to have the transplant do you think, or was it just 
going to happen? 
Pt07F:- It was just going to happen...Dr N was first and he said “you either have the transplant or 
you’ll have 3 months to live”, um so I decided well, that’s my only option …  
 
Pt15F:- Once that was explained to me, [the statistically chances of curing her disease]  it just 
felt like no option, and there was no point in waiting … 
 
Pt01M:-…but there wasn’t really time, you know ... The doctor rang up said “you’ve got 
leukaemia you need to go straight to hospital” and within two hours we were in there and we sort 
of went along with what the doctors said. We was in, too much in shock to argue whether it 
would be the right thing to do  
 
9.5.3 The imperative to live  
It was clear from the talk of all the patients and their significant others that the overriding 
motivation for patients to agree to undergo such a high-risk procedure was their consuming 
yearning to live. In support of this, it is noteworthy that many patients reported having decided 
that they would proceed to transplantation (if it were offered to them) even before they had been 
provided with all the relevant information. Indeed, even after they were provided with details of 
their specific risk profile, and of the inherent uncertainties of HSCT, all of the patients perceived 
that there was only one acceptable choice for them and that was to undergo HSCT. 
In each case, the patients focused on their long term goal - survival, paying little or no attention 
to the potential short term effects of HSCT. For these patients the imperative to live took 
precedence over any concerns about the impact HSCT would have on their lives should they 
survive.  
CLS:-: Was there ever a time you thought “no I don’t want it”? 
Pt01M:- Oh no, not really.  
Pt04M:- No, I never thought that.  For whatever reason, you’ve just got to do it, you’ve got to do 
it, you know. 
Pt06M:- No – there was no second thought. No second thought whatsoever. I had to do it... … 
there was no question of whether it was going to go ahead or it wasn’t going ahead, it was going 
ahead.  It was just about matter of what’s expected of me and what do I have to do?  How do I do 
it, when do I do it,   
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CLS:-: How do you come to make that choice – what goes through your mind? 
Pt01M:- Living! I’ve got thing to do and I’m only young – two young kids. Got to go back to 
work– too early to die  
Pt09M02:- Um yeah, okay if you don’t have it, so you wait for six months and you’re dead, so 
you know it’s, there is no, there’s no choice really …that’s it, it’s black and white as far as I’m 
concerned.  
 
CLS:-:…when the bone marrow transplant was offered to you, can you remind me what your 
decisions were  - what did you weigh up 
Pt03M:- Life! 
Pt05F:- I felt well, it’s someone telling me it’s my chance. My second chance; not first chance, 
second chance. Well my first chance is my first life and I feel that, you know, this has given me 
a second chance of life - is that how I would explain it?  I’d say so yeah 
Pt01M:- They just said more or less you know, you’ve got two weeks to live. If you don’t have 
treatment, you’re not going to have an option …Too young to die! 
Pt05F:- And as I said, I’m too bloody young. I’m 57. I’ve lead a healthy, good life 
Pt07F:- So um yeah, no um, I don’t want to leave them [husband and son], so that’s been the 
reason I have to go on. 
 
Transplant physicians also recognized the seductive character of the overriding imperative to live 
TxDr06:-  ...if you [they] didn’t really care, then you [they] might not even consider such a risky 
procedure. But it’s basically they want to live; they’re either young, they’ve got a family to live 
for, they’ve got things they want to enjoy, so they want to extend their longevity. So that’s was 
making them [decide]...so they can have a more normal life, life duration, normal lifestyle, 
normal time   
 
TxDr05:- Er, well it’s basically their wish to live  
 
Patients who were interviewed a second time, were asked whether there was a ‘tipping point’ 
that marked the position where they felt that they ‘had to’ consent to HSCT. In other words, a 
point at which the inherent risks of undergoing HSCT relative to its anticipated benefits were 
sufficiently acceptable that they believed that they should proceed to transplant. What became 
clear however, from the responses of those patients in this study who discussed this, was that it 
was not the risks associated with undergoing HSCTthat was the major driver of their decision–
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making, but the risk of not proceeding to transplant which many perceived, rightly or wrongly, as 
certain death.  
CLS:- what if he had given you very different odds, let’s say he said you’ve got, you’ve got a 
40% chance of coming through this? 
Pt11M02:- well I think we asked the question was what happens if we don’t do anything? And his 
answer was “you know you can [decide not to have the HSCT ] … but there’ll come a time when 
you have an infection or something that can’t be treated and that’ll be the end.” 
 
CLS:- OK, so the numbers really didn’t really make much impression on you?  
Pt11M02:- No. 
 
Pt12M02:- Oh I think he was very straight forward, just saying “this is the case that, you know, 
you either have a bone marrow transplant, um which should have a successful outcome and we 
get rid of the leukaemia.  Or if you decide not to do that, that’s fine, but you know you’ve 
probably only got a 10% chance of being around in the next two years.” 
 
CLS:- Do you think if he had given you [a different risk profile], would it have made any 
difference [to your decision]? 
Pt12M02:- No. No.   
 
CLS:- So do you think the statistics make any difference to patient’s decision-making? 
Pt12M02:- we needed to have the transplant um and that needed to be done.  And the other 
alternative wasn’t very good 
 
CLS:- So, if they’d said “you’ve got a 50% chance of it coming back”, would that have made 
any difference?  And just so you know, I’m just plucking numbers out of the air, I don’t know. 
Pt10M02:- Not really. It all gets down to survival, yeah. 
 
It would seem therefore, that for those patients in this study, there was no hypothetical threshold 
above which the risk of dying as a direct consequence of HSCT would have meant that they 
would not have consented to HSCT.  
This suggests that once the opportunity to undergo HSCT had been offered to a patient, their 
choice was influenced in two ways. The first was that the patient felt compelled to make 
decisions that promoted the possibility of their own survival – irrespective of the risks of that 
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course of action. The second was that the patient had to accept that in their situation their agency 
was limited and they had little option but to trust those who had the skills, expertise and 
knowledge, as well as access to the technology and infrastructure, to enable their survival.
 848
 
 
9.5.4 The significance of trust  
Many of the participants in this study spoke openly about the trust and faith they had in the 
transplant team. Much of this was focused on the transplant physician for a number of reasons; it 
was he who had assessed the patient for suitability of HSCT, who had provided the 
individualised risk profile, who had offered the HSCT as being in the patient’s best interest, and 
because he was seen as being the person responsible for the transplant team.    
Pt03M:-. Relying on the doctors to fix me up because I don’t know how to do it 
 
*Wife of Pt01: He’s, he had a lot of faith in the doctors so whatever the- 
Pt01M:- Whatever the doctor says, I do... 
*Wife of Pt01:- they’re there to cure you - we just sort of went and put our faith in the doctors 
and just went along with what they said.  
*Wife of Pt01M was present and participated in the interview with the patient – often the two of 
them spoke at the same time. The opportunity to interview the wife separately, as a ‘significant 
other’ did not arise as sadly the patient died very soon after the interview.   
 
Pt07F:- Dr D eased a lot of that [severe anxiety] for me. He’s marvellous.   I think he’s 
wonderful. He has, he puts, um, faith in you. I love him. As a doctor he’s, I have faith in him. … 
that’s how I feel with Dr D, I feel ‘safe’.   
 
CLS:- Hm-mm. I’m sensing that there’s an element of trust there, is that right? 
Pt09M:- Ah, there is, yeah. Of course there is. Well I wouldn’t be here if there wasn’t. Um you 
put your life in their hands basically and they know more about it than what you do.  
 
Pt03M02:- You’ve got ask yourself - what’s on the other side of the coin?  You don’t have any 
choices.  You’ve got to sort of put your life in their hands and go for it and hope for the best. Um 
and I believe that’s what you really have to do.  
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Interestingly, transplant physicians were somewhat more reserved, more circumspect in their talk 
about how they understood the degree to which patients trusted both them, and the procedure 
itself.  
TxDr06:- Er, well I don’t know if they trust you; you’re the one that’s offering them a chance of 
normality. I suppose they trust you as much as they trust any other medical profession, but 
maybe if no-one else offers them that chance, and if you’re the only person that’s offering a fifty 
per cent chance of cure, then even if they, you know, don’t trust you, no-one else is offering 
them that.  
 
TxDr02:-...so I guess that involves some degree in the end of trust in the people that are 
providing the healthcare and consenting to go along on that basis 
 
TxDr07:-... but you know a patient who’s got cancer, they just come in looking for help and for 
someone to look after them.  Their main responsibility I think is to be willing to accept - you 
[they] need to make a decision that this doctor or nurse or whoever, is the person that can treat 
them. 
 
Synopsis 
The rationale, both in ethics and in law that underpins the obligation to disclose information to 
people considering undergoing HSCT(or any medical intervention) is so that the potential 
patient, armed with the disclosed information and the understanding that it supposedly brings, 
can make decisions about his/her healthcare in a way that is meaningful to him/her. 
Philosophically, the argument is that an ‘informed patient’ has a greater sense of control over 
his/her health care, a greater sense of agency, and a greater sense that their autonomy has been 
respected. 
849
 
 850
 However this viewpoint makes a number of assumptions about healthcare 
context. First, that there are genuine therapeutic alternatives from which the patient can choose. 
Second, that the risks and benefits of each of these alternatives are clear, measurable, and 
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commensurable. And third, that the patient is in circumstances where meaningful choice is 
possible. Yet none of these assumptions appear to hold true with regard to HSCT. Indeed, 
interviews with participants in this study indicated that explicit information about the procedure 
and the individual’s specific risk profile may have a limited influence on the decisions that 
patients make. This does not mean, of course, that information disclosure serves no purpose in 
high-risk settings. Rather, that information disclosure may serve other purposes, for example, 
fostering trust by the patients, and providing hope in the face of the overwhelming uncertainties 
of HSCT. 
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Chapter 10 - Consent and the consent form  
Introduction 
The notion of consent is based on philosophical assumptions regarding human dignity, liberty, 
and respect for both an individual’s autonomy and agency.851 In practical, legal and ethical terms 
these assumptions underpin the necessary elements of consent – capacity/competence, 
voluntariness and information disclosure.   
The three preceding chapters described how participants in this study made meaning of these 
aspects of consent in the context of their own practice and experience. But consent involves more 
than satisfying these elements; it also involves authorisation whereby a person authorises (or 
agrees to) a particular course of action. In this study, that implies that the patient agrees to 
undergo HSCT, a complex procedure which comprises many individual interventions which are 
all necessary intrinsic steps in the comprehensive treatment known collectively as HSCT. 
Thus, any discussion about consent requires therefore, not only the examination of its elements, 
but also consideration of its ‘function’ in the clinical context. In this chapter I will examine the 
role that consent may play in the clinical context, its institutional place, and the meaning of 
consent as spoken about by participants in this study.    
 
10.1 - Consent and decision-making  
It is well-established that decision-making is a complex and varied phenomenon influenced by 
the context of the decision, and by the participants’ experience, values, preferences, social 
relationships, and by the factual particularities of the decision.
852
 The exact place that consent 
occupies in relation to decision-making is a matter of dispute with some commentators
853
  
                                                 
851
 McLean, S. A. 2010. Autonomy, Consent and The Law, Routledge. 
852
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853
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alleging that consent is synonymous with decision–making and others854 disagreeing with that 
premise.   
Transplant physicians in the study also expressed divergent views about the relationship between 
consent and decision–making. Some believed that they were much the same process;  
TxDR03:- I think they’re the same. Yes, I think they are the same – I think the decision-making 
is the same because you consider your options when you’ve heard the risks and rewards.   And in 
that decision-making you come to a process of, you know, agreement or refusal 
 
while others viewed the decision–making process as quite separate from the patient providing 
consenting to undergo HSCT; 
TxDr0:- Yes I do. I think the decision to have, or not to have a transplant is one thing, and then 
once you’ve decided, then I need to point out [various things] so that there can’t be any 
discussion [at a later date] about me not having mentioned this, or this, or that… to give the 
patient an opportunity to form a well-based decision 
 
Importantly, irrespective of whether consent is synonymous with decision–making, the question 
remains as to whether consent should be regarded primarily as a discrete event (the moment of 
authorising a particular treatment), or as a process,
855
 in much the same way as decision–making 
is a process of gathering information, deliberating over the information, discerning what 
information that is relevant to oneself, then making a decision about how to proceed.
 
 
 
10.2 Consent as a discrete event, or as a process 
When considering distinctions between the two concepts of consent,  the ‘discrete event model’ 
implies that the patient waits until sufficient information has been accumulated and then 
disclosed by the physician before a definitive decision about consent or refusal can be made. In 
contrast, proponents of the ‘consent is a process’ model,856  in discarding the discrete event 
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model
857
 claim that there is never a circumstance in which consent occurs in isolation and does 
not involve some process of deliberation, even if in some circumstances it occurs very rapidly, 
for example in an acute medical setting.  
The notion that there may be a single moment, isolated from the complex particularities of the 
patient’s situation where they make a reasoned decision based ‘only’ upon the factual 
information they have been given, a ‘Eureka moment’, may therefore be a misconception of what 
happens. This is particularly so in HSCT , where unlike some other situations, the patient has 
been unwell for some time, has likely received ‘first-line’ treatment, and where a decision to 
proceed to HSCT  has been based upon consideration of the patient’s disease characteristics, 
particular circumstances and responses to treatment. As a result, the patient will have had an 
ongoing relationship with a variety of healthcare professionals including various members of the 
transplant team during which time decisions will have been made at many different time points 
and in relation to many different interventions. Therefore information would have been provided 
over a sustained period of time, providing the patient with plenty of opportunity for reflection 
and integration of this information into his/her set of affairs.  
TxDr03:- I don’t think there’s a ‘Eureka moment.’ I think what often happens is that the concept 
of transplant is introduced by their clinician, by their haematologist or physician as being the best 
way to go. And then they come and they talk it over with me and then we discuss it, and they 
then, they don’t like what I tell them but they’ve been told by their original physician and they get 
told substantially the same thing with greater detail by me.  The essence of what they’re told is 
that their chance is better with a transplant than without a transplant, and I think they go home 
and toss and turn and lie awake at three in the morning and turn it over, you know, in their mind 
thousands of times, and ultimately come to a decision to do it, because their physicians have 
recommended it and they have faith …that’s what happens.  I don’t think anybody, you know, 
stands up one day and says “look, I’ve discovered something new, I’m going to have a transplant” 
 
TxDr04:- The consent process starts when they turn up at your room for the first consultation, 
because they’ve [already] embarked down that road, so you’re half way, half way – you’re part of 
the way through the consent [process].   
 
If it is true that consent occurs not as a discrete event but as a process of continuous discourse 
(information disclosure by the physician and agreement by patient) – then this creates 
uncertainty regarding the point at which a decision is made to proceed with HSCT.  
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TxDr03:- I suspect that some of them just go with the flow.   
 
TxDr02:- I suspect it’s a passage but I haven’t experienced it, ...I just don’t know.  
 
TxDr04:- Sometimes it’s just a ‘no-brainer’ and ... and sometimes they don’t make it at all, it’s 
made for them. Maybe that’s what they think, that it’s out of their hands and maybe that’s the 
way they feel, that they’re just being carried along.  And sometimes it is a process that’s out of 
everybody’s control in a way.  It’s just a process - it’s like, it’s like the law – you’re in a 
circumstance and it’s got a life of its own, and it’s a bit like that. It has a life of its own, and you 
just – everyone get carried along.     
 
Pt10M:-… I didn’t say no to a doctor or anything. I never said yes, and I never said no. I just 
come along for the ride… Nobody asked me did I want to do it - no-one.  Ah, it was suggested 
that I should do it.  It was um – the way things were unfolding here, everything was falling into 
place for me to go and do it, that’s why I went and done it.… I just did not want to be here, but 
now I’m here and it’s done, I’m quite happy.   
 
10.3 Consent: Implied or explicit? 
Unlike many other medical interventions, HSCT involves numerous interactions with a broad 
variety of healthcare professionals including generalist haematologists, transplant physicians, 
transplant coordinators, nurses, radiation oncologists, social workers and psychologists. The fact 
that the patient attends these appointments and interactions, undergoes pre-transplant 
assessments (blood tests, scans, physiological assessment and so forth), in all probability attends 
the education sessions (mostly with family members), undergoes testing for a suitable donor 
including inviting close family members to be tested for compatibility as a stem cell donor, 
submits to administration of high-dose chemotherapy), and finally their arrival at the transplant 
unit with arrangements in place that they will be admitted to hospital for approximately three to 
four weeks, may be taken as evidence that they are consenting to undergo HSCT.   
TxDr02:- And I think everyone assumes at that point, that because they’ve come in to hospital for 
a transplant, that that’s what they’ve agreed to do. 
 
TxDr03:- I think it’s largely implicit. So that having come to see me often, you know, generally it 
will be a minimum of twice and sometimes, you know, three or four times.  And having been 
informed, the act of returning and participating is a type of consent.  Now, you know, that can be 
formalised, of course, into specific written consent, but their involvement is consent once they’ve 
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been informed, because you have to be involved, you have to come to the hospital, you have to 
have pre-transplant tests.  And all those are implicit consents to proceeding.   
 
Indeed, for many of the healthcare professionals in this study, the enmeshment of the patient in 
all facets of the transplant process make obtaining a formal, explicit consent to HSCT both 
unnecessary and redundant. 
TxDr07:- [when asked whether having the patient attend all their consultations, and then  turn up 
to hospital with bags packed for a month’s stay, is implied consent] Yes, true.   
 
TxDr03:- So I take their attendance as an indication of their desire to participate and to live, and I 
check some basic things with them and if they’re not voicing, you know, real concerns, then I, 
yeah, I proceed 
 
10.4 The differing constructions of consent 
It was apparent from the participants in this study that consent could be constructed in a number 
of different ways – none of which were mutually exclusive. Thus, consent could be spoken of as 
a conversation or an authorisation, as an action or process, as a relationship or as a process of 
deliberation or reasoning  
 
10.4.1 Consent as communication  
In general terms, transplant physicians in this study, found it difficult to clearly enunciate what 
the process of consent entailed. To some, it was about them and their role in informing the 
patient, to others it was about the patient and how much information s/he understood, and for 
others, the consent process was characterised by its content – it’s focus on the risks inherent in 
the medical procedure.  
TxDr02:- So I suppose the process of getting consent is really one that I’d term um getting 
agreement from the patient that that is what is going to happen, and that they agree to do that.  ...  
an assessment of what they know, a discussion of what the alternative treatment is if there is any 
alternative treatment... Um and then talking about the process of doing the transplant, what is 
actually physically involved and then what the complications are and the risks, broadly speaking, 
are.   
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TxDr04:-... the issue is the patient – well, the issue is the patient understanding as much as he 
wants to understand - his understanding.  The issue, I guess is for the patient, the family, us, the 
issue’s for everyone, it’s for all of us I suppose. 
 
TxDr07:-... the consent process is to understand their disease, understand the patient, their um, 
not just the medical but the psychosocial aspects, try and educate them about the disease, without 
the transplant, then what would happen with the transplant, and um, I think would go into the 
details of the transplant about the risks of the transplant. 
 
10.4.2 Consent as an ‘informed’ choice 
Whilst consent undoubtedly has a discursive basis, it is always associated with a choice – the 
patient’s choice of whether to consent or not, to agree to or refuse to undergo HSCT, in the 
current study. This notion that consent is primarily about a choice, an authorisation that enables 
an action, is consistent with the legal doctrine of consent and is sympathetic with much of the 
philosophical literature on consent. Onora O’Neill,858 in describing what she calls ‘the ritual of 
consent’, expresses the view that consent is nothing more than the patient choosing from 
amongst a small menu – “often a menu of only one item from which to choose – that others have 
composed and described in simplified terms”. Likewise Caplan notes that “competent patients 
must be given the opportunity to control the provision of medical care even if death or disability 
may result”859 
TxDr02:- In fact, there is always an alternative and sometimes the alternative is the one that I 
mentioned earlier, which is accepting death without any further treatment, which I often raise as 
being an alternative.  
 
TxDr03:- I try in every consultation, you know, I try with every patient to reinforce with them 
that it is a decision, because I think, for a lot of patients, it is that passive, there’s an element of 
passivity about it.  And I always say “this is not compulsory, this is something you have to think 
about, this is a choice – you can choose not to have a transplant.” 
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10.4.3 Consent as a relationship based on trust  
In recent years, alternative views regarding the meaning, social significance, and processes of 
consent have emerged. Many of these reject the notion that consent is purely a reflection of 
autonomy and applied reason, and argue instead that it is primarily a means by which a crucial 
therapeutic relationship is established, promoted and sustained. Several of these perspectives are 
based on the belief that this relationship has its roots, not in autonomy, but in care, vulnerability 
and particularly trust.  
Trust has been depicted as dealing with “the inherent unknowableness of the future”.860 In this 
sense, anytime a person consents to undergo a medical procedure s/he is placing his/her trust, to 
a greater or lesser extent, in the healthcare professionals (HCP) about to undertake the procedure, 
to place the patient's interests above all else.
861
 Given the risks and complexities of all-HPT and 
the high degree of uncertainty of outcome, trust in the expertise of the HCPs and in the transplant 
team, would seem an important foundation for consent to HSCT.  
TxDr02:- I guess that involves some degree in the end, of trust in the people that are providing 
the healthcare and, um, you know, consenting to go along on that basis 
 
TxDr03:- I think ... they turn it over, you know in their minds thousands of times, and ultimately 
come to a decision to do it, because their physicians have recommended it and they have faith … 
I think it’s something that they’ve been told about that they – and it’s just no more complex than 
[them] saying “this is the best chance I’ve got. The doctors who know, or should know, tell me 
that this is the best chance I’ve got of being cured.  I really hate some of the things I’ve been told, 
but this is what the people I have to trust, have told me gives me the best chance, so I’ve got to do 
it.” 
 
TxDr03:- And it’s a faith issue to trust the doctor, to trust the system... 
 
Indeed, the characteristics of HSCT, together with the medical circumstances that necessitate 
patients considering undergoing transplantation, suggest that choice may be an illusion, a 
‘convenient fiction’, and that the consent process may really be about the importance of trust 
during a time of great vulnerability, rather than about choice.   
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TxDr06:- Er, well I don’t know if they trust you, you’re the one that’s offering them er, a chance 
of normality, and I suppose they trust you as much as they trust any other medical profession  
 
TxDr03:-... the doctor and the system are saying to them “this is the best chance,” and they just 
run with that without making too, you know, they don’t want to make enquiries of their own, or 
they’re not capable or it’s too confusing or to confronting, or they’re too stressed, or they’re too 
unhappy. I think... those are all issues 
 
HCP04:-...I suppose in some ways maybe they’ve not so much consenting as, as putting their 
trust in a procedure and a team to be cured.  
 
Trust is, of course, the foundation of any relationship,
862
 but may be particularly salient in 
relationships characterised by vulnerability or by imbalance in power or capacity,
863
 such as is 
the case between the patient and the transplant physician, where the patient is quite literally 
dependant on the transplant physician for his/her life. In the context of serious illness such as 
haematological malignancies, it is therefore, not surprising that patients in this study frequently 
described how they relied upon their transplant physician to help them navigate their way 
through difficult decisions.
864
   
Pt07F:- ...that’s how I feel with Dr Devonish – I feel safe...I trust Dr Devonish, and so I’ll go 
ahead with it.  
 
Pt08F:-... so at least I’ve got the possibility to get help and to get better, so it must be, it’s up to 
them now... 
 
But whilst trust featured prominently in the narratives of both patients and those caring for them, 
both groups also noted the degree to which this trust was unstable or fragile. This innate 
instability and fragility of trust was both a consequence of the fact that patients felt that they had 
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little option other than to trust the transplant team, (by virtue of their disease, and their desire to 
live) and also as a consequence of the significant uncertainties inherent in HSCT.    
HCP07:- So it’s quite difficult isn’t it, because I mean, one thing about BMT is that you really 
can’t predict what’s gunna happen. 
 
HCP03:- Um I don’t – no, actually I find it difficult because in some respects you can say - you 
can give them the worst case scenario, but you can say “but I can’t say if it’s going to happen to 
you, but you need to know about it.” 
 
HCP09:- ...they think, “well, oh, you know, the survival options are showing me that I’ve got 
better survival if I go through this transplant,” and they don’t tend to think too much about the 
other risks that are with the transplant, like the graft versus host disease, or you know, the 
potential risks for mortality during the process or whatever, you know. They just look at the 
longer term um survival aspect of it, and they feel like they really, you know, that they’ve got no 
choice. They’re kind of in a, between a rock and hard place a little bit, you know. “Do I take the 
risk of, um, not having a transplant because I’m scared of these other options and maybe, you 
know, oh jeez I’ve got a um, you know certain, you know, something like a 70% chance of 
relapsing, you know. Do I hang, do I live with that hanging over my head, or do I kind of try and 
take my um, take a risk and go with the bone marrow transplant and get um, a substantially 
greater chance of uh, you know, long-term survival you know, by having the transplant” - do you 
know what I mean? 
 
HCP08:- … I suppose the most important thing that they have to understand is that this may be 
the only way we can save their life, that if they don’t …. Statistically we might be able to say or 
the doctor might be able to say to them “if we don’t go ahead with the bone marrow or stem cell 
transplant, you statistically, you will relapse within the first five years, or the first two years, or 
whatever, and we may not be able to get you back into remission, and you may die from this 
disease”  
 
10.5 How might the process of consent be different  
All of the healthcare professionals who participated in this study noted difficulties surrounding 
consent to HSCT  although they framed these difficulties in different terms. Some talked about 
the problems of defining consent, whilst others saw consent as a conceptual problem, and others, 
a practical problem. Nevertheless, when asked how the process of obtaining consent could be 
changed, or improved, many of the participants struggled to articulate what a different version of 
consent might look like. 
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In general terms, those who could imagine how the consent process could be modified, tended to 
argue either for change to the way that information was disclosed, or the way that consent was 
sanctioned or authorised. 
TxDr04:- In an ideal world, uh I’d have the patient see two doctors, two specialists. 
CLS:- Mmm, two at the same centre? 
TxDr04:- Yeah.  Two at the same centre, yeah, just so they get two different spiels because I 
think we all have our different ways of doing it, and a couple of us think similarly and along 
similar lines– one of my colleagues and I think quite similarly and I think a couple of the others 
think slightly differently, and so it might be good for them to hear it from someone else. I think 
that could be helpful.   
  
TxDr03:- I’d probably put in something relating to the things I’ve already communicated to you. 
I’d probably, you know, say, put in specific statements – “I have been told that...”And then I 
might have a series of dot points saying something like “I am aware that, or Dr X has explained to 
me that 1) a transplant can cause death within thirty days, or 2) a transplant can be associated 
with complications that are felt months or years after the procedure, etc.” Now, do you 
have to spell things out? Probably. I think you probably do. So again it comes down to 
the questions what do you have to give for consent? To me you have to give consent – 
what makes you give consent? What would I give consent to? I’d want to know the worst 
that could happen, I’d want to know what the good things might be.   
 
For others however, the complexities surrounding consent were so great, or so intrinsic, and thus 
irreducible, that either nothing could be done, or was needed to be done, to reform existing 
approaches to consent to HSCT. 
TxDr02:- I personally, I can’t imagine how you could change it. [laughs – then long pause]  I, – 
you know, in a way it’s an unstructured and informal process that’s dynamic and it has to take 
into account all the variables of human behaviour and the differences between people, um and I 
don’t see a way that you could honestly really change that process – given the complexity of the 
[bone marrow transplantation] process. 
 
TxDr03:- I’m comfortable – it depends what the document is for. If it’s legal protection that you 
want, then obviously it has to be written and signed. If you want to say something, if you want to 
be sure that the patient’s actually given consent, I’m comfortable the way it is. Because I feel 
totally happy that my patients have consented. 
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10.6 The consent form 
There is no legal requirement in Australia for consent to be in writing.
865
 From a legal 
standpoint, a patient’s implied or explicit, verbal or non-verbal consent is adequate to protect the 
healthcare professional against a claim in trespass. Indeed, having signed a consent form does 
not necessarily preclude that patient from later claiming that s/he was not adequately informed 
for consent to be valid.
866
  That is to say that those institutions, (including hospitals) that require 
patients to sign a consent form prior to any medical intervention, are following internal clinical 
governance or professional guidelines rather than common law requirements.
867
 In this regard, it 
is noteworthy that at the hospital from where all the patients in this study were recruited, and at 
all the Australian transplant centres involved in the study, there was no specific consent form for 
HSCT.   
In support of this, all the Australian transplant physicians participating in the study made it clear 
that they believed it was not necessary for patients to sign a consent form for HSCT .  
TxDr04:- No, no - what would that mean? [to sign a consent form] that “I’ve read what, a 200 
page book, fifty websites, my doctor has told me I have x-risks of the fifteen top complications, 
VOD, haemorrhagic cystitis, infertility, you want to list them all?” No! Transplant is a myriad of 
things – it’s not one defined thing. So signing a form for consent for a transplant to me is a little 
bit, it’s a little bit tokenistic. 
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TxDr02:- Um, no there’s not a formal consent in the sense of, as you go out the door you sign this 
piece of paper - because we don’t have one.  
 
Indeed, for the transplant physicians in this study consent was much more than the signing of a 
form. For them, a patient’s authorisation to proceed with HSCT was evidenced not by the signing 
of a form, but by their choices, actions and behaviour. 
TxDr02:- I think everyone assumes at that point, that because they’ve come in to hospital for a 
transplant, then that’s what they’ve agreed to do 
 
TxDr03:- So I take their attendance as an indication of their desire to participate, and to live. I 
check some basic things with them and if they’re not voicing, you know, real concerns, then I, 
yeah, I proceed… Now, you know, that can be formalised of course into specific written consent, 
but their involvement is consent once they’ve been informed, because you have to be involved, 
you have to come to the hospital, you have to have pre-transplant tests.  And all those are implicit 
consents to proceeding.   
 
TxDr04:-…. you’re in the bed, you’ve turned up – there’s consent right there.   
 
When asked whether they believed there would be any value or advantage in having a consent 
form specifically for HSCT, the Australian transplant physicians interviewed in this study were 
very clear that this would be both unnecessary and excessively bureaucratic.  
TxDr04:- I don’t think there’s much [benefit] because what’s going to be in that? What are you 
going to say, what is acceptable to omit?  What, you know, what is required and what is 
sufficient?  I don’t know.  I just think it’s huge, it’s too big, it could be too big.   
 
TxDr01:- Look, patients are usually not bothered with consent forms, I’d have to say.  …the 
consent form’s legal legs are a bit shaky, I would have to say, because you can always contest 
what’s in a consent form 
 
In this regard, it is important to note how the two transplant physicians interviewed who 
conducted HSCT in major transplant centres in London, described their experience of the explicit 
consent forms that patients are required to sign prior to undergoing HSCT in the UK.
 868 869
.. In 
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their hospitals, it is the task of the transplant registrar to go through the consent form (which runs 
to many pages) with each patient prior to their commencing conditioning therapy.  
TxDr09:-...we explain to them that this is a very um complex procedure which does have a 
number of complications and … we want to talk through everything... we are comfortable that we 
have discussed pretty much every eventuality that could ever happen to the patient. Plus the fact 
that you never know something might happen that we haven’t been able to predict. I think it’s 
really tough for the patients. 
CLS:- Um hmm, so other than that, you think it might be a little bit tedious? 
TxDr09:- I think it’s scary. 
CLS:- Um hmm, is that, is that a bad thing? 
TxDr09:- Yes!  
CLS:- What effect does that have on the patients? 
TxDr09:- Well they go away very shaken …Because the thing is, they go through this “there’s no 
hope in it”, I mean it’s [the consent form describes] just one complication after the other, and you 
think “oh god, what if - maybe I won’t get graft versus host disease”,  then somebody hits you 
with veno-occlusive disease and you think, “well, you know, what are the odds of I’m gonna get 
out of the hospital without one of these awful things happening?” Yes, not much, I’d say. 
 
TxDr08:- Yes, we’ve made too much of the consent form and not enough of the information 
[understanding the information disclosed] 
 
TxDr09:- From the medical point of view, I would almost say it’s over the top. 
 
Given the potential difficulties associated with the type of explicit consent requirements 
described by the transplant physicians practicing in U.K. (above), it is notable that the patients in 
this study, like their Australian physicians, did not attach great importance to whether or not 
there was a consent form, and indicated little interest in whether they had even been asked to 
sign one.  
Pt06M:- Uh, I probably have [signed a consent form].  Did I [asking himself] sign it on the 
Education Day? Did I sign any the day I came in here [admitted to the ward]? I can’t remember.  
 
Pt08F:- yes, I did, before my last visit, my last visit here. 
                                                                                                                                                             
869
. “Although completion of a consent form is in most cases not a legal requirement (exceptions include certain 
requirements of the Mental Health Act 1983 and of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as amended 
by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) the use of such forms is good practice where an intervention 
such as surgery is to be undertaken.” Reference guide to consent for examination or treatment, second edition 2009 
Department of Health, UK 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/138296/dh_103653__1_.pdf accessed 
17/04/2013  
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Pt09M:- Well, I can’t recall. I honestly can’t, I don’t know  
 
Pt04M:-… if they give it to me, I just sign and that’s it. I said “as long as it don’t cost me 
money!” [both laughing] But I know you do have to sign, you can’t not sign   
 
Further, when asked about what purpose a consent form for HSCT might serve had one existed, 
most patients commented, not on its moral significance (as a means of declaring their autonomy 
or agency) but on its potential use by the hospital and/or its agents as protection against claims 
that could be brought by patients or their families for any adverse events resulting from HSCT  
Pt03M:- ... so that if anything goes wrong, and the patient says he/she didn’t know what was 
happening and wants to sue the hospital, then the hospital can prove that the patients knew what 
procedures were going to happen – it’s for legal reasons. 
 
Pt05F:- Oh, to cover themselves I suppose. 
CLS:- In case of what? 
Pt05F:- That you’re a case – you know, that you’re not the wrong person, I suppose. Something 
like that. 
CLS:- Oh okay.  So it’s mainly to say, “yes, I am X”, is that it? 
Pt05F:- Yes, that I am X, yeah, yeah. …At least, I think so 
 
Pt04M:- In case anything goes wrong. 
CLS:- Mmm, and then what? 
Pt04M:- And you can’t sue anybody! 
CLS:- Oh! Is that what it’s for?   
Pt04M:- That’s what I think anyhow 
CLS:- So it is all about money. 
Pt04M:- That’s right, it is all about money, yeah. [both laughing] 
 
Pt09M:- I suppose down the track, if something did go wrong, my family might turn around and 
say “well, maybe you didn’t, prove that you did  [consent to HSCT]”…I’m sure it would be 
legally binding that I have to give permission to do it. And if I don’t make it, [die as a result of 
the stem cell transplant] well, the family could come back and say “well, you know, he didn’t 
consent to that,”… 
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Synopsis  
Patients and physicians in this study describe HSCT as a complex, sustained and dynamic 
phenomenon, with an often unpredictable course and consequences. HSCT necessitated a long-
term relationship between the HSCT recipient and their care-provider[s]. In this regard, the 
relationship was centred not so much around a single decision about whether or not to proceed to 
HSCT , but around the provision of care. And this care involved many interactions and many 
decisions. Consent therefore, was not a discrete event, but a fragmentary, continuous and 
iterative process - not something that could be ‘captured’ by a signature on a consent form. In 
this regard, it was noteworthy that at no point did patients in this study sign a consent form for 
HSCT  and that both patients and transplant physicians perceived written consent as being 
superfluous and serving no particular useful purpose (as far as achieving consent’s core aim to 
protect patient autonomy). 
This suggests that ‘consent’ may actually serve two quite separate and distinct purposes. The 
first is that consent (whether documented or not) may fulfil institutional requirements for 
evidence of authorisation, and satisfy perceptions that health practitioners in particular, may have 
about their legal obligations. But as the results of this study make clear, consent may also play a 
quite different role in the clinical setting – being less about a single authorisation and more about 
iterative communication and the establishment and maintenance of trust.  
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Part IV: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Chapter 11 – Discussion of results 
Chapter 12 – Conclusion, limitations of study, implications 
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Chapter 11 Discussion of Results  
In Western liberal democracies, such as Australia, the requirement for a patient’s autonomous 
consent prior to medical treatment is indisputable, and is enshrined in ethics, law and clinical 
practice. The rationale for this reflects a cultural privileging of autonomy, liberty, and the right to 
self determination and, in turn, the importance we attach to the right we assign people to make 
choices which are based on their own values and preferences.  
In medical contexts, consent has been conceptualised as either ‘the coming together of minds’ 
whereby each party reaches a mutual conclusion (so called explicit shared –decision making), or 
more narrowly, as the voluntary agreement or acquisition of what the other party proposes. 
Consent may also be both a waiver of one’s rights not to have anyone interfere with one’s bodily 
integrity, or a process whereby a patient authorises the undertaking of the proffered treatment. 
Regardless of which view of consent applies, a person’s consent to a proposed intervention 
requires a deliberate act – there has to be intention. But this is not the end of the story – for a 
patient‘s consent to be legally and ethically valid, a number of criteria or standard elements need 
to have been met, namely that the patient has the capacity to consent, that the patient has made 
the decision voluntarily, and that the patient has been provided with adequate information about 
the facts and risks associated with the treatment.  These criteria demand an action from both 
parties involved [i] the patient must authorise the proposed intervention [ii] the attending 
healthcare professional must meet considerable responsibilities. 
This model of consent is understood broadly in terms of various regulations – it is supported by 
codes and theories of ethics, is enshrined in health law, and is the core of much of health policy 
and clinical governance.  
Nevertheless, it is unclear how well this model of consent is reflective of, and integrated into 
clinical practice, and in, particular how accurately it captures or describes decision–making in 
situations where patients are critically ill, and where high-risk medical interventions are 
recommended. 
The aim of this study therefore, was to examine the legal and ethical limits of the accepted model 
of consent in a population of critically ill patients undergoing a high-risk medical intervention. 
This was explored qualitatively, with data derived from interviews conducted with patients 
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undergoing allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HCST), their self-nominated 
‘significant other’, transplant physicians, and other relevant members of the transplant team were 
interviewed about decision-making in the context of HSCT.  The interviews were in-depth and 
semi-structured to ensure that all participants were provided with opportunities to discuss matters 
that they thought were important to the patient’s consent to undergo HCST. Analysis focused on 
[i] how and when the so-called standard elements of consent were described by the participants 
[ii] whether the legal and ethical constructs of consent were achievable in high-risk settings such 
as HSCT [iii] what the participants felt was important to their decision-making, and [iv] how 
consent to HSCT and other high-risk interventions should be understood. Particular attention 
was also paid to new insights concerning the construct of consent that may have arisen from the 
discussion of the various participants.   
Contextualising the elements of consent in the experience of high –risk medical 
intervention  
While the participants in this study were asked to speak principally about their experience of 
decision-making in the context of HSCT, inevitably, many of those interviewed, both healthcare 
professionals and patients, and their significant others spoke about the accepted elements of valid 
consent, namely capacity/competence, voluntariness, and information disclosure, and about how 
each of these elements was challenged in the situation where decisions had to be made about 
undergoing HSCT. 
 11.1 Capacity/Competency 
The current construction of consent requires that the patient must have capacity, that is to say, 
they must have the cognitive ability necessary to receive information, retain that information 
long enough to be able to incorporate it into their decision making, and then to be able to 
communicate that decision. All adults are deemed to have capacity unless proven to the contrary.  
Whilst there are some settings in which capacity is formally assessed, in most clinical situations, 
capacity is assessed subconsciously (predominantly) by the attending doctor according to how 
the patient responds to the information disclosed, the sorts of questions s/he asks, and comments 
s/he makes, and his/her apparent understanding of the information provided. Thus, in the 
majority of situations in adult healthcare, the assessment of capacity is a normative judgement.  
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This, by implication, requires that there is open and frank communication between the patient 
and the healthcare professionals caring for them. 
It was clear from the interviews conducted in this study that there was a strong relationship 
between patients and those caring for them. All patients had numerous consultations with the 
transplant physician and the transplant co-ordinator[s] prior to consenting to HSCT. These 
interactions helped to foster trust, enabled information disclosure, and allowed for the informal 
assessment of the patient’s capacity to consent to the risks associated with HSCT. 
Although the law talks about capacity as being biphasic, that is to say, that a person either has 
capacity or lacks it, in the clinical setting capacity may fluctuate. While none of the patients in 
this study lacked capacity to consent to undergo HSCT, it is undeniable that in some situations 
the effects of serious illness and therapy may have partially and temporarily undermined the 
decision-making capacity of a limited number of the patients.  
11.2 Voluntariness 
The term ‘voluntariness’ is ill-defined but is often referred to as an action that is free of coercion 
and undue influence. Numerous attempts have been made to clarify precisely what ‘free of 
coercion’ and ‘undue influences’ mean. Faden and Beauchamp870 take the meaning of 
voluntariness to include that decisions/actions must be under one’s own control and they must 
also be intentional. They proposed that because of the many confusing associations surrounding 
the term ‘voluntariness’, it should be replaced by the term ‘non-control’. Despite this, a 2012 
literature review found confusion persists, and that there remains no generally accepted or well-
developed model of voluntariness.
871
  
Notwithstanding the lack of an adequate definition, the notion that a person’s consent to a 
medical intervention must be given voluntarily, seems a commonsense objective, and is in 
accordance with our current cultural standards, as well as our ethical and legal regulations. 
However, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis, questions arise about how one can be assured that 
                                                 
870
 Faden, R. & Beauchamp, T. 1986a. A History and Theory of Informed Consent, New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
871
 Nelson, R. & Merz, J. 2002a. Voluntariness of consent for research: an empirical and conceptual review. Med 
Care, 40, V69-80. 
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a person is making a voluntary decision, especially when one accepts that all decisions we make 
are subject to both internal and external influences and constraints.  
In response, some have suggested
872
 
 
that
 
when attempting to determine voluntariness, it is more 
useful to take into account the degree of control that an individual has over his or her behaviour 
within the parameters of the circumstances in which s/he finds him/herself. This definition seems 
particularly apposite in relation to high-risk interventions like HSCT because it acknowledges 
the many ways in which a patients’ choices may be constrained, but also recognizes that 
although individuals cannot always control the circumstances that shape their actions, they can 
attempt to control their behaviour within the parameters of those circumstances. 
Although any direct measurement and clear understanding of voluntariness remains elusive, what 
must surely be of prime importance is a person’s perception of whether his or her action is 
voluntary. And in this regard, it was noteworthy that every patient in this study expressed the 
view that their decision to undergo HSCT was made freely and without any sense that they had 
been coerced by anybody or, anything, other than their desire to live. To this extent, therefore, 
although their choices were shaped and constrained by the circumstances created by their illness, 
their decisions were voluntary at each point along the HSCT trajectory. 
 
11.3 Information disclosure 
Whilst the notion of valid consent relies on the satisfaction of all the elements of consent, in 
bioethics, in clinical practice and in the law, there is frequently most emphasis on disclosure of 
information. The practical reason behind this stance is that it is assumed that people making 
decisions need information, want information, and will use information in coming to a reasoned 
decision.
873
 It is further assumed that it is only when they are informed that the patient can make 
choices that are in his/her best interests,
874
 because as Schneider states so forcefully, information 
“…liberates people from the servitude to others that ignorance creates.”875 Doctors therefore, are 
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873
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obliged both legally and morally, to tell patients the truth about their illness, their prognosis, 
about the proffered treatment, about its alternatives if any, and likely adverse effects that may 
follow treatment.
876
 
This preoccupation with information disclosure has led some to argue that bioethics does not 
concentrate on what patients really want to know but on what, it is assumed, they should know.
877
 
This criticism of the privileging of information is given force by the fact that, contrary to the 
prevailing Anglo-American bioethical assumptions, many patients do not want to make their 
own medical decisions. This may be because decision–making surrounding one’s own healthcare 
can be difficult, especially when procedures are complex and outcomes are uncertain, as is the 
case in this study. But it might also be because the philosophical ideas that underpin consent, 
namely, individualism, rights and personal autonomy,
878
 do not describe the way most patients 
think and feel in situations where they are ill and need medical care. It is also possible that 
patients may also worry that regardless of how much information is disclosed to them, they will 
still be limited in their ability to make medical decisions wisely, especially in contrast to the 
medical professionals who have years of experience and knowledge.
879
 In this regard, it was 
noteworthy that patients in this study were more interested in understanding why a particular 
recommendation was being made by the transplant physician, than the specific details of the 
protocol. Once they understood why the recommendation was being made, and were satisfied 
that this decision had been made after careful, and expert deliberation, they usually felt less need 
to be informed about the details of the protocol; there was no longer any need for them to attempt 
to understand or retain the information, or indeed to attempt to contribute to the decision-making.  
For the most part, patients were generally happy to leave medical decisions up to the experts in 
whom they trusted to have their interests at heart and who had the necessary expertise to 
optimise their safety and survival.  These patients were sick, they were scared, and they 
recognised that their health, indeed their continued existence, was largely beyond their control. 
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877
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What they needed, more than anything, was care; what they needed to know was more about the 
personal, familial, social and practical implications of HSCT,
880
 including how they, and their 
significant others might cope, -  how was his family going to access his superannuation if he 
died,  who was going to relieve her of her parental responsibilities so that she could remain an in-
patient as required for the duration of HSCT, who would assume the role of carer for her 
mentally ill husband,  how would he cope without the comfort of his loved ones, and so forth?  
Providing patients with extensive information about the complex medical details of HSCT 
simply did not address these concerns, and for some, may have even risked compromising their 
autonomy and agency.
881
 
Importantly, the patients in this study all claimed they had sufficient information in order to 
make the decisions regarding HSCT. They also claimed that they had sufficient information in 
order to trust their lives to the transplant team, and to delegate decision-making authority to 
others or keep it, should they chose to do so, and for many, this was what these things that were 
most important.
882
  
The results of this study therefore suggest that each of the accepted elements of consent are far 
more complex, both in their construction and in their actualisation, than is often assumed to be 
the case. While this does not diminish the importance of consent, or the need to deeply engage 
with patients about their care, it does suggest that we should look more critically at the way we 
understand autonomy (given that this is the fundamental ethical principle upon which consent is 
based) and the relationship that autonomy has to decision–making in high-risk medical contexts.  
11.4 Autonomy 
Almost every discussion about consent begins with a statement about the importance of 
autonomy or about the need for respect for autonomy. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that, as 
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yet, there remains no universally accepted interpretation of what autonomy actually means. In 
very general terms, autonomy is assumed to mean having the freedom to choose, particularly to 
choose one’s own moral position,883 or more fundamentally to have the capacity for intentional, 
reasoned action.
884
  
Philosophically, there are two prominent but distinct understandings of autonomy – Kantian885 
and Millian.
886
 Kant’s version connects autonomy with universal principles by appealing to the 
idea that we ought not base our actions on principles that others cannot share. It is concerned 
with the manner of choosing.  In contrast, Mill’s concept of autonomy is allied to his conception 
of freedom – that one ought to be free to develop one’s own individuality, free to follow one’s 
own desires and impulses. In this Millian tradition an actor is autonomous if the action arises out 
of the agent’s own authentic desires and reasons – the important aspects being that it is the 
agent’s choice, the agent’s desires, and the agent’s reasoning. In this sense it can be said that Mill 
offers a political view of the boundaries of decision–making.  In contrast, Kant describes 
autonomy as a function of reason rather than that of desire; it is about the moral value of 
autonomy. Put simply, according to Kant an act is autonomous if it is rational, and is within the 
rule of law, rather than an arbitrary rule of anyone’s interests, that is to say a function of reason 
rather than desire, whereas for Mill autonomy is more concerned with the sovereignty of the self 
and  the maximisation of desires.  The degree to which Kant’s writings provide a moral 
justification for autonomy as self-sufficiency and independence is the subject of intense debate
887
 
particularly in relation to medical interventions where for the most part, Millian ideas about 
autonomy are dominant in Western liberal societies; the test for whether a patient has 
autonomously elected to follow a particular course of action is typically judged in terms of 
whether or not it was his/her choice. How that choice was made does not matter, as long as it was 
adequately informed - whether that choice was the ‘best’ choice is of little or no consequence. 
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What is striking about the accounts of decision–making around HSCT provided by the 
participants in this study is the degree to which they differ from these theoretical accounts of 
autonomy, both of which, at least in relation to the decision–making experiences of the 
participants, over–emphasise the atomistic, independent and ‘rational’ nature of decision–making  
in ways that simply do not reflect how decisions occur when one’s mortality is at stake.  
It has previously been noted that patients threatened by serious illness do not make decisions in 
isolation, or to the exclusion of others, or do so independently of their social context.
888
 
Consequently, it was unsurprising that the narratives in this study, and particularly those of the 
patients, were characterised by interdependence. Patients frequently talked of how their decision 
would impact the lives of their intimate circle of people, noting that it was not necessarily the 
patient who had the most to lose – a small child may lose her mother, young children may grow 
up without their father, a spouse may have to continue life without his soul-mate, and so on.  
This concern for the impact that our decisions have upon others and this recognition that their 
interests may factor in our decisions can be understood both socially - as we are social beings - 
and philosophically - in that it suggests that autonomy is located socially and not simply within 
the breast of an individual.  Feminist philosophers acknowledge this alternative concept of 
autonomy, and refer to it as relational autonomy.
889
 According to Mackenzie and Stoljar
890
 
The term ‘relational autonomy’...does not refer to a single unified conception of autonomy but is 
rather an umbrella term, designating a range of related perspectives. ...premised on a shared 
conviction...that people are socially embedded and those agents’ identity are formed within the 
context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants  
 
The importance of this ‘relational’ view of autonomy is that it shifts the centre of attention away 
from the focus of sovereignty and rationality of choice, to social and political determinants of 
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autonomy and agency.
891
 The narratives of both the patients and their ‘significant others’ in this 
study bear this out, expanding the notion that ‘no wo/man is an island’892 and that decision-
making is complex and comprised of considerations that are not only particularized or private, 
but also socially and structurally constructed.  
This suggests, firstly, that complete freedom from ‘interference’ in medical decision-making is 
both unrealistic and undesirable as it ignores and diminishes the importance of social 
relationships in enabling and framing a patient’s autonomy. The results of this study also 
suggests that more attention should be directed to agency rather than autonomy – that is to say, to 
what attributes the patients need to enable them to make meaningful choices about their 
healthcare. 
11.5 Agency 
Some have argued that agency works through actions taken to preserve things of value,
893
 or 
through interventions in which patients take an active role, and thus attempt to regain their self-
reliance.
894
 Others have conflated agency with autonomy, control or resistance
895
 and caricatured 
it in terms of the traditional image of a passive patient and the paternalistic doctor.
896
  Both of 
these formulations are unhelpful and misleading. Other theorists provide clearer more 
substantiated accounts of what agency means, for example Giddens
897
 offers a straightforward 
definition of agency as the ‘capacity to make a difference’, whilst Bandura898 proposes that ‘to be 
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an agent is to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life circumstances’. Bourdieu’s899 
work takes the notion of agency further still, describing a recursive relationship between agency 
and social structure in his theory of ‘habitus’. 
Recent theoretical work on agency has focused on how it plays out in practice.  Bandura
900
 for 
example, elaborates four ‘core properties’ that compose the nature of agency: intentionality, 
forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness. He further identifies self-efficacy as the 
key mechanism of agency.  While these properties resonate with the findings of this research, 
Emirbayer and Mische’s901 phenomenological account of agency in terms of three “overlapping 
ways of ordering time” (past, present and future oriented agency) is most useful in making sense 
of the way that the participants in this study talked about their decision–making around HSCT.  
Patients in this study had all previously consented to, and experienced, earlier attempts at 
arresting their disease with rounds of high-dose chemotherapy, and so they all had past-oriented 
agency that could guide and support their preparation (psychological and emotional) for what 
they were about to undergo with HSCT.  Importantly they also had future-orientated agency in 
that they could imagine a future, a future in which they featured. But, to reach that perceived or 
imagined future, which was only possible with HSCT - they needed to actualise present-oriented 
agency. In other words they needed to constantly “self-organize and self-regulate”. They were 
“not simply on-lookers of their own behaviour”902 but agents engaged in every facet of HSCT 
and HSCT decision–making.  
Patients therefore, were focused on the future, and on what they could do to benefit from the 
transplant to secure their future. The most obvious way that they could do was, of course, to 
accept the recommendations and the expert care provided by their transplant physician/team. To 
do this, they needed to understand that HSCT was the ‘right’ course of action – and this required 
that they were provided with the relevant information. But more importantly, it demanded that 
they trust the transplant physician charged with their care.  
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11.6 Trust 
Trust is a defining element in any interpersonal relationship,
903
 and has long been recognized as a 
key feature in the doctor-patient relationship.
904
 In this context, trust is not simply a 
unidirectional affectation or professional virtue but is a complicated, multidimensional construct 
- shaped by "the expectations of the public that those who serve them will perform their 
responsibilities in a technically proficient way” 905 and that “...they will make their patients' 
welfare their highest priority.” 906 Doctors, therefore, are expected to be technically competent, 
virtuous, committed to their patents’ welfare and to honour a fiduciary duty to their patients. 
One of the reasons why trust is so important within the doctor-patient dyad, is that it provides for 
the formation of a deeply-personal and effective relationship in which each participant can have 
an open and frank disclosure about the outcome that the patient is hoping for, the outcomes that 
are possible, and the things that are likely to impact on the patient, both directly and on his/her 
aspirations. Viewed in this way, trust is a ‘forward focussing’ concept,907 which is vital when an 
individual is trying to decide between one course of action and another, and particularly where a 
bad outcome would make the individual regret his/her choice of action.
908
  Basically, it 
presupposes that the patient is optimistic about the future.  
Empirical studies suggest that trust may lead to increased patient satisfaction with their 
healthcare management, improved adherence with treatment,
909
 and even improved health 
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outcomes.
910
  Despite this, there is relatively little empirical research on the degree and 
importance of trust in the doctor-patient relationship, and even less so regarding the impact and 
significance of trust in the setting of high-risk medical interventions.   
11.6.1 The role of trust in situations of high-risk 
While many assume that trust is fixed, or independent of context, the reality is that it is highly 
contingent. This is particularly so when something important is at stake, and where outcomes are 
uncertain. (Indeed, it may be argued that in the medical context, if there is no risk associated with 
an action, there is little need for trust between the actors). Furthermore, the more risky a 
situation, the more uncertain the outcomes, the more compelled a person is to rely on another 
person, and to trust that person will help them.
911
 In this regard it is noteworthy that HSCT is 
amongst the highest risk procedures in accepted clinical practice.  
Furthermore, for patients considering undergoing HSCT, the risks are enormous regardless of 
their final decision to either consent or decline treatment. As one patient noted during the course 
of this study, HSCT can be likened to a game show where contestants are asked to choose 
between two doors which represent their future. Patients who select Door 1 - those who decline 
HSCT and chose to ‘take their chances’ with the natural course of their disease, will most likely 
succumb to their disease. Door 2 - the other option, represents the decision to undergo HSCT. 
However lying in wait behind Door 2 are 2 shutes, and the patient falls involuntarily into one or 
the other.  One shute leads to increased survival, the other leads to early death. And this is where 
the predicament lies - no-one is able to predict which shute s/he will fall into, and there are real 
possibilities that choosing to embark on a course of action hoping to prolong ones’ life may 
actually the result in early death,  or a life characterised by distress and disability. Such 
situations, of course, may cause immeasurable anxiety and distress and necessitate those whose 
life is at stake to seek out support, advice and care from someone whose judgement they trust - 
hopefully someone who has previous experience of other people attempting to make the same 
choice. And this is precisely what patients considering undergoing HSCT do. In the context of 
HSCT, where there is enormous uncertainty surrounding immediate and longer term outcomes, 
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the relevance of trust cannot be overstated. It is in the patients’ interest to invest trust in their 
doctor and members of the transplant team. As one patient stated;  
I do really feel I’m in the best hands I could be, as far as what’s actually going to happen to me 
(
Pt15F)  
 
In consenting to the procedure, patients consistently exhibited trust in the skills of the transplant 
physician[s] and members of the transplant team (technical competencies), as well as the 
appropriateness of HSCT for them (phonetic competencies).  
It was notable, however, that patients in this study rarely used the word trust in their narratives. 
This may be because trust is both ubiquitous, and assumed. As one patient said when specifically 
asked to comment on whether he felt trust in his relationship with the transplant physician;   
… yeah, of course there is. Well, I wouldn’t be here if there wasn’t.  (Pt09M) 
 
Thus, while not specifically mentioning trust when discussing their relationship[s] with the 
transplant physicians, patients clearly described aspects of trust. Patients talked about “having 
confidence in” the transplant physician, about having “faith in him”,912 and about the fact that 
they ‘‘believed” that their best interests were paramount in the motives of those responsible for 
the care they were receiving. The extent and depth of this trust coloured every aspect of HSCT, 
particularly the decision–making surrounding HSCT, where it was both an implicit and explicit 
feature of interactions between the patient and the doctor. 
As noted in other studies,
913
 and in this thesis, HSCT recipients receive relevant information 
about their disease and about HSCT, in a variety of formats, and at various stages of HSCT. 
While in many cases, this information is provided by the transplant physician the patient also has 
regular communication with the transplant co-coordinator and with other medical and nursing 
staff. Although it may be assumed that these efforts were principally aimed at maximising the 
patient’s agency and autonomy, it was noteworthy that  transplant physicians frequently reported 
that in their conversations with patients preceding their decision to undergo HSCT, patients 
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would commonly ask “...yeah, but what would you do Doc?”   or “...what would you do if you 
were in my shoes?”  
It is possible of course, that patients deferred to their transplant physician to make decisions on 
their behalf because the medical information was so complex, or because they felt that were 
either unable to make reasonable sense of it,
914
 or because they were so ill that they preferred to 
leave decision-making to the doctor.
915
  An alternative reading is that the numerous consultations 
and information sessions were as much about opportunities for the doctor-patient relationship to 
develop, and for trust to flourish through familiarity, as about ‘information disclosure’. This is 
important because while the information given pre-HSCT had significant impact on how patients 
viewed their disease, this quickly became subsumed during the process of undergoing HSCT, 
leaving trust as the dominant feature and basis of care. 
In spite of everything, the trust that patients had in their transplant physician provided them with 
a degree of optimism – a sense that despite the risks, HSCT was their best option, and that their 
best interests were foremost in the minds of all those caring for them. Indeed, such was their trust 
that some patients spoke in almost-reverential terms of their transplant physician. For example: 
“... he’s marvellous” “I think he’s wonderful” and “... whatever decision he makes will be a good 
decision”. 
Although this degree of deference, and to a lesser extent, this emphasis on trust, is at odds with 
contemporary ideas about what it is to be a rational patient with agency - to be completely 
autonomous - it is, in many ways, not totally unexpected as it reflects the vulnerability-trust 
nexus as described by the influential work of Katz
916
 and earlier by Parsons.
917
  Both Katz and 
Parsons define a vulnerable person as one who has a decreased capacity to protect him/herself 
from harm. However, vulnerability is not limited to a person’s concern about physical harm, it 
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extends to encompass autonomy, including whether they have reduced agency and/or power.
918
  
Patients, therefore, are made vulnerable by their illness, by the intensity and risks of the therapy 
they need, and because they are unable or under-resourced to manage their own immediate 
healthcare – they are reliant on healthcare professionals whom they must trust to act in their best 
interests. It’s not surprising then that the more ‘unable’ the patient feels, the more crucial it is for 
the patient to feel that s/he can trust another person.  
The doctor-patient relationship is, of course, unavoidably characterised by an imbalance in both 
knowledge and power, and it is this imbalance which gives rise to patient vulnerability.  In this 
study, patients accepted that they were not able to manage their illness – they recognised they 
were in a situation in which they lacked both the power and knowledge
919
  necessary to control 
their lives. They were totally dependent on the transplant physicians to provide the means for 
their continued survival.
920
   Patients therefore felt that they had no option other than to trust the 
people, the ‘system’, and the treatment itself.921 922  Furthermore, what became clear from the 
narratives of the patients in the study was that the importance of the consent process and in other 
formal and informal communicative interactions,  lay less in the information conveyed than the 
role it played in creating, maintaining and justifying trust. And the consent process not only 
established and maintained trust – it also established, maintained and built upon something less 
tangible, and arguable more profound – hope. 
11.7 Hope  
So whilst it appears that the close attention paid to the disclosure of information undoubtedly 
plays an important role in creating and sustaining trust, especially for patients considering high-
risk interventions like HSCT, the accounts of the patients in this study revealed that it 
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accomplished much more than this. The information provided and the language and imagery 
used, revealed outcomes of shared interest, described the goals of care, and clarified the inherent 
uncertainties of HSCT. It also left patients with a clear sense that their survival was a very 
realistic probability. Their narratives spoke of a foreseeable future, albeit it one that was 
characterised by uncertainty.
923
 
924
 In other words, they had hope.  
Hope was portrayed in the patients’ narratives as a positive phenomenon that provided a 
framework for coping
925
 - not only with the foreboding interminable uncertainties surrounding 
HSCT but with the physical and psychological rigours of the procedure. Hope provided a 
scaffolding for their day-to-day living and for their thinking, both of which became vitally 
important because they could not draw on past experiences to prepare themselves as one might 
otherwise do when facing other major events in life. It was hope which sustained the momentum 
necessary for them to progress through HSCT.
926
  In this regard, the descriptions of hope, 
provided by the patients and ‘significant others’, and acknowledged by many of the transplant 
team, were consistent with Fromm’s927 notion that:  
To hope means to be ready at every moment for that which is not yet born and yet not become 
desperate. 
 
Importantly, whilst all participants recognized the positive contribution that hope could make in 
the context of HSCT, many also recognised the fragility of hope, especially when people are 
facing threatening situations in which they are likely to be feeling defenceless and vulnerable. In 
this regard, it was noteworthy that some patients spoke of having come across ‘grim-reaper’ style 
doctors who spoke with such candour and bluntness about the harmful effects of HSCT that it 
destroyed any hope they had of surviving. These patients described how, in response, they had 
distanced themselves from those doctors, believing that to survive HSCT they needed to feel 
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secure in the knowledge that they were surrounded by and in the care of, healthcare professionals 
who shared a belief that a positive outcome for the patient was achievable.
928
 In other words, 
they needed to feel that their transplant team both respected their need to have hope, and shared, 
at least to some extent, the idea that this hope was credible and not unrealistic.  
Transplant physicians in the study also acknowledged how clinicians could diminish or destroy a 
patient’s hope and that they had seen how that form of communication had left patients feeling 
unsupported – bereft of hope. At the same time, however, they spoke of the fine line they trod 
between ensuring that the patient and their family were fully aware of the morbidity and risk of 
mortality that they were about to face, while also assisting them to remain positive and optimistic 
about the chances of remission or survival.
929
 A number of transplant physicians described how 
they negotiated this difficult path by following ‘bad news’ with attempts at ‘salvage’, that is to 
say, by using statements intended to reduce the impact of the bad. For example, one described 
the type of ‘talk’ he would use as follows; 
TxDr 07 “…this is a negative picture that I have painted,  but let’s be positive – we need to go 
forward with a positive approach, because in my experience people with a positive approach do 
better” 
 
While there is limited, if any, evidence that a positive approach, or hope, can influence biological 
processes in any way,
930
  it is broadly accepted both within and outside medical communities, 
that retaining hope and maintaining positive attitude may assist people to cope with their illness 
and with disturbances relating to treatment. Most transplant physicians in this study expressed 
the idea that a patient who has hope, and maintains a positive attitude,
931
 is likely to do much 
better than the one who does not feel positive about a future - who does not embrace the emotion 
of hope. So, whilst debates persist about the efficacy and meaning of hope in clinical practice, 
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what is more readily accepted is that when a patient feels only despair and has no hope for the 
future, this may compromise care and treatment adherence, and their envisaged outcome may 
become reality.
932
 
What was abundantly clear from the interviews was that the transplant physicians were aware of 
the benefit of instilling and maintaining hope in their patients. They did this by using a number 
of different techniques;  by acknowledging that the patients will be/are experiencing a 
frightening time in their lives,  by assuming the role of  ‘a coach’, by being frank in their 
discussions with both the patients and their significant others, by providing them with a sense of 
‘continued care’ by reassuring them that they will maintain presence or contact with them 
throughout the ordeal, and by providing reassurance to the patient that they had extensive 
experience dealing with the many uncertainties and risks associated with HSCT.  
At the same time, however, the transplant physicians were also concerned with offering 
measured hope, that is to say, not wanting to create unrealistic hope. This is important because 
for the patients (and for those around them), the mere fact that HSCT had been offered to them 
was reasonably interpreted by patients as an indication that they had grounds to be hopeful for a 
favourable outcome. Thus while patients were unclear as to what their future may hold, what was 
most relevant to them was that they could reasonably imagine a future at all, a future in which 
they existed. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that none of the patients in this study talked about thinking very 
much about a near-future by which I mean that period during which they would experience the 
greatest toxicity and risks of HSCT. Their vision of the future explicitly ignored this critical 
period. It was as though they purposefully projected their thoughts up and over the gruelling 
near-future, and focused only on the desired longer term future. In many ways, this makes sense 
because it provides a way to cope with the early rigours of HSCT and is a way to manage the 
uncertainty associated with the early post-transplant period. As one transplant physician 
explained - it helped patients to have them focus on ‘the finish line’. In this context, the hope that 
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patients had in a future that they imagined was for a life reminiscent of one they understood, but 
without the spectre of illness. What characterized their hope and dreams was being ‘back to 
normal’ - meaning exactly as they were before undergoing HSCT, rather than some form of ‘new 
normal’. This settled, comforting and comfortable, familiar sense of a future made sense to the 
patients in this study. It was tangible, and particularly in the time leading up to HSCT, it offered 
a degree of assurance, a reality that was easily understood. Seen this way, it is both easy to 
understand why patients wished for the ‘safety’ of normality, and why the transplant physicians, 
and other members of the transplant team would consistently, but gently, emphasise to the 
patients  that their lives may be very different post – HSCT.   
The future, the possibility that HSCT offered a future, permeated the talk of both patients and 
transplant physicians. This was most evident when participants spoke about the things that 
weighed on their mind when they were thinking about HSCT and that factored into their decision 
to pursue it.   
11.8 Anticipatory decisional regret 
According to the principles of decision theory,
933
 when humans make decisions about which 
particular option to choose, it is with the intention of maximising utility. This is particularly so 
when risk is a significant factor.
934
 This notion of utility-maximising decision-making is best 
understood in the context of financial decisions, the field in which much of this early research 
was undertaken, and in which the utility sought is some form of financial gain. When the 
decision is a medical one however, while the intention is still about maximising utility, in this 
instance utility is primarily about achieving the best possible health outcome. Regardless of the 
context, such decisions require a specific action, or a specific inaction. In the context of this 
study, the principal ‘action’ was the patient’s decision to consent to HSCT.  
The problem with all decisions that are based upon maximising utilities in clinical practice is 
twofold. First, they are based on probabilities, upon the risks of an anticipated or unanticipated 
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outcome. Second, the consequences of these decision and the things at stake are of great 
significance, they matter. This means that sometimes the decision the person makes can result in 
unwanted and unintended consequences. And this can be a profound source of regret. The 
quandary, of course, is that this realisation is only learned in retrospect – by which time the 
opportunity to make different decision in the hope of achieving a different outcome is lost.  
Various types of regret can be distinguished by their ‘target’, 935 which, in regards to HSCT, 
might include;  
1. Outcome regret - in which the target is the outcome of a decision. In other words, the 
patient finds the outcome of HSCT unsatisfactory for whatever reason  – perhaps because 
s/he experiences intolerable disabilities, significantly decreased quality of life, or  
imminent death  
2. Option regret - in which the target of regret is the decision chosen – this might include 
either the decision to consent to HSCT or the loss of chance to consent to HSCT given its 
time-sensitive nature, possibly due to the course of the disease, development of 
comorbidity, or the ability to source an appropriate donor in time,  
3. Process regret - in which the target of regret is the decision-making process preceding 
the choice. This could include a patient’s concern that they did not understand  what 
HSCT entailed, or that they were not given sufficient information about HSCT, or felt 
coerced (either implicitly or explicitly) into proceeding with HSCT.  
Importantly, regret may be felt both in retrospect – looking back on one’s decisions in light of 
the consequences realised as a result of that decision, and prospectively. This form of regret, 
often described as anticipatory decisional regret, is a negative emotion a person may feel in the 
knowledge that they must make a choice, and that there exists the probability of a poor outcome, 
as a consequence of this choice  In other words, anticipatory decisional regret describes how 
someone not only feels now, but also expects to feel at some time in the future, about the 
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decision that they are currently making.
936
 Stated differently, it is a ‘looking forward, looking 
backward’ occurrence.937   
For all of the patients in this study, making the decision about whether to consent to HSCT was 
unlike any other medical decision-making situation they had confronted. The outcomes were 
uncertain, the risks great, and the thing at stake – their life - of incalculable importance. And so 
for many patients, the decision was not only about which option would provide the greatest 
utility, but also which option would lead to the least regret. For patients considering HSCT, they 
had to consider what would be worse? 
to consent to HSCT in the hope that s/he might survive with tolerable side effects BUT only 
to experience severe/dreadful side effects AND possibly die as a direct result of HSCT 
 
OR 
to decline HSCT, in the improbable event that the disease remain in long-term remission OR 
in the hope that the disease will progress sufficiently slowly so that in the time remaining 
(before dying of the disease), s/he can spend time with family and friends, or doing 
whatever is meaningful to them, without having her/his quality of life severely impacted by 
burdensome treatment BUT in the knowledge that they have lost the opportunity of potential 
survival. 
All participants in this study – patients, transplant physicians, transplant team members, 
significant others – spoke of the efforts made to ensure that patients were aware of the utilities 
‘at stake’ in decisions about HSCT. Transplant physicians, in particular, described how they 
worked to ensure that patients were in no doubt as to the risks and potential outcomes of either 
proceeding with HSCT, or forgoing it. TxDr05 was typical of the transplant physicians 
interviewed,  
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...so I try to keep initial interviews really simple,  by saying, “Do you realise there’s a 30% 
chance you’ll die because of this treatment? Do you realise you might be incapacitated and have 
terrible illness for some time and then the disease will come back?”   
 
Importantly, however, in each of these discussions, the patient was left in no doubt that HSTC 
was being offered to them because it was medically indicated, and that it provide them with a 
chance of long-term survival  
TxDr03 …I point out to them that there’s hope with a transplant, there’s not without a transplant 
in terms of survival 
 
HCP08F…I say to them, your doctor would not offer that to you unless that was your best chance 
of a permanent remission 
 
Of course, anticipatory decisional regret as a consequence is not unique to HSCT. For example, 
researchers
938
 studying decisions made by parents regarding vaccination of their children have 
noted that parents anticipate regret when they imagine an adverse effect (including death) 
occurring following vaccination of their child, even though they support vaccination in principle, 
and even when they are aware that adverse events are rare. Furthermore, parents may perceive 
that death from the vaccine is more ‘regrettable’ than death from the disease because it resulted 
from an action rather than an inaction. While the impact of agency on anticipated decisional 
regret has been a matter of considerable controversy,
939
 it was also clearly evident in the 
narratives of many of the patients in this study.  
Pt05F – I’ve spoken to a few people that have had it [HSCT], and I’ve spoken to a people that 
haven’t had it, and they kind of had wished they had had it...gives them that little bit more 
chance. I’m going ahead with this – I’ve made my mind up, I’m going to have it. I know it’s not 
going to be easy, but I’m going to have it, it’s my chance, my second chance of life. 
 
                                                 
938
 Lagoea, C. & Farrarb, K. M. 2015. Are you willing to risk it? The relationship between risk, regret, and 
vaccination intent. Psychology, Health & Medicine, 20, 18-24, Connolly, T. & Reb, J. 2005. Regret in cancer-related 
decisions. Health Psychology, 24, S29.; Ritov I, Baron J. Reluctance to vaccinate: omission bias and ambiguity. J 
Behav Decis Making. 1990;3:263–77 
939
 Connolly, T. & Reb, J. 2005. Regret in cancer-related decisions. Health Psychology, 24, S29, Gilovich, T. & 
Medvec, V. H. 1995b. The experience of regret: What, when, and why. Psychological review, 102, 379-395.; 
N’gbala, A., & Branscombe, N. R. (1997). When does action elicit more regret than inaction and is the 
counterfactual mutation the mediator of this effect? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 324–343. 
Page 330 of 429 
 
While uncertainty, unpredictability, morbidity and mortality, and anticipatory decisional regret 
may of course, characterise all medical interventions, these are likely to be significantly more 
salient in HSCT than in any other circumstances. There are a number of reasons why this is so. 
First, patients enter HSCT at a time when they are feeling relatively well, perhaps better than 
they have previously.
940
  They therefore commence HSCT knowing that as a result of their 
decision they will, at least in the short term, experience considerable assaults on their physical, 
psychological and social functioning, and possibly death.  Further, what they do not know at that 
time, and what the healthcare professionals caring for them can only estimate, is how intense 
their symptoms will be, and whether or not they will survive. Second, unlike many other 
healthcare decisions, the consequences of HSCT are not only more acute and more severe, but 
more binary. Either they will live or die – go into remission or not. Transplant physicians 
generally spoke explicitly of this with patients;  
TxDr03 …I point out to them that there’s hope with a transplant, there’s not without a transplant 
in terms of survival 
 
This then is the reality HSCT patients face. They agree to HSCT whilst relatively well, hoping 
that the transplant will extend their life but knowing that they will inevitably experience 
considerable toxicity, and that somewhere between 1 in 12, and 1 in 4 patients will die in the first 
3 months following HSCT.  
 
11.9 Decision making in the face of death 
It might be a commonsense conclusion to assume that  it was fear of death that compelled 
patients in this study to consent to undergo HSCT, after all, it is universally accepted that many, 
if not all of us, fear death.
 941 
 But what is it about death that we fear, and is it rational to fear 
something that is inevitable, unavoidable, and comes to us all?
942
  These questions, not 
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surprisingly, are a matter of intense debate as they touch on profound reflection about the 
meaning of life (existence, identity, death), and mortality. 
Across time and straddling cultures there has been much made of the anxiety that people feel 
about death, dying, and ‘what lies beyond’. As early as the Roman times, the philosopher 
Lucretius
943
 talked of the fear of death being an ‘abject terror’, an imagination of the horrors that 
could befall us - those things that only the intact human can feel. The English philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes,
 944
 likewise claimed
945
 that merely having the capacity to be aware of one’s 
own mortality, puts man in a state of constant anxiety, thinking of his inevitable future death. 
Freud,
946
 in contrast, dismissed these claims, believing that humans could not really fear death 
both because it was something they had never experienced, and therefore they could not fear it - 
and because finality and death are not able to be resolved by the unconscious. Any fear professed 
to be about death and dying, he claimed, was therefore more likely related to the fear of 
abandonment,
947
 than of death itself. But regardless of precisely what it is that one fears, and 
whether the fear of one’s own mortality is a pathological or normal human emotion,948 fear 
persists.  
Indeed, this notion that death ought to be feared, persists today in the broader community where 
it is sometimes said that the mere thought of death generates anxiety.
949
 Ernest Becker
950
 
951
 for 
example, writing of his own fear of death claimed that;  
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The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else... 
This fear has, for centuries, led societies, professions and individuals to regard the death as 
something that must be defeated and/or that must be avoided at all costs rather, than it being a 
natural and inevitable part of life.
952
 Consequently, in many settings the mention of death is often 
‘taboo’, and people habitually refrain from speaking of death.953  
The patients in this study however, were very open to discussing their own death. In part, this 
may have been because the likelihood of death had been on their minds for some time, both as a 
consequence of the illness that had brought them to HSCT, and as a possible complication of 
HSCT.  The transplant physicians interviewed in the study also talked about how essential they 
believed it was for individual patients to be quite clear about the risks of HSCT, and an 
enormous amount of time was invested in ‘educating’ the patient.  So it was not surprising that 
each patient was able to discuss in a quite rational and ‘matter-of-fact’ way, the prospect of them 
dying with and without HSCT. Indeed, most could quote the percentages they had been given of 
death, as well as the likely timeframe of their death if they elected not to undergo HSCT. But 
even though they could rationally discuss their potential death, it was still clear from their stories 
that the idea of death, of ‘non-existence’, was intolerable to them.  
The reasons why death was so intolerable to the patients in this study appear to relate to concerns 
about their own life, or about the impact their death would have on those who depended on them. 
This is consistent with the writings of Victor Florian on the fear of death.
954
 Florian described the 
subjective construction of one’s own mortality and the meanings people attach to death as an 
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inherent part of the meanings they attach to their own life.
955
 Specifically, he saw people who put 
strong emphasis on the pursuit of intrapersonal goals related to achievement, power, personal 
success, as being particularly afraid of death due to its consequences to self-realization and the 
accomplishment of one’s projects. In contrast, he believed that people who put strong emphasis 
on the pursuit of interpersonal goals throughout life would be particularly afraid of death due to 
its disruption to their social identity and the welfare of family and friends.  
The intrapersonal goals identified in patients’ narratives focused primarily on the timing of their 
death - to die now was seen by them to be premature.
956
 More specifically, they saw themselves 
as being simply too young to die. Some cited a sense of loss of future, identifying significant 
events that they had planned or envisaged that they would not be able to participate in, or attend; 
I’m too young...  
I’m not ready...  
I still have too much living to do...  
I want to see my children marry and to see my grandchildren born... 
To these patients, death meant not simply the end of life, but the end of a future. 
Interpersonal goals were expressed more often in terms of concerns regarding the impact their 
death would have on others. Indeed a number of patients went so far as to say that their 
motivation for undergoing HSCT was for their family and friends whom they believed needed 
them [the patient] to survive because they were central to the lives and happiness; 
My family needs me... 
My children need a mother... 
They couldn’t cope without me...  
All the groundwork that everyone has done for me... 
                                                 
955
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These protestations are heart breaking and speak to the core paradox of death and dying – that 
death is both relational and singular. Everything these patients valued was threatened - every 
aspect of their life and every possible future was rendered vulnerable.  
Much of the talk about death by participants in this study is consistent with the view of the 
German continental philosopher Gadamer
957
 who likened life to a conversation with others – a 
conversation composed of questions and answers. Death, according to Gadamer was a severing 
of those conversations, leaving questions hanging, unsatisfactorily unanswered.
958
 But for many 
people, death is stronger than a mere disruption to life’s conversation. Indeed, Gadamer’s 
description, whilst apt, fails to capture the scope of anxiety expressed by participants and the 
way that this informed so much of their decision-making. This may be, in part, because it is 
simply either impossible to fully comprehend or describe the nature of the existential suffering 
that a dying person endures,
959
 or because it was not death, but dying, that the patients feared, as 
is the case with other seriously ill people.
960
 With this in mind I had expected that some patients 
in the study may have expressed concern specifically about the dying process and the suffering 
that may be associated with complications of HSCT, rather than about death per se.
961
  This 
anticipation was based on an appreciation of the literature surrounding HSCT, and of my own 
observation that transplant-related death may be a very harrowing experience both for the 
patient, and those around them. In addition, many of the patients in this study had come to know 
other transplant patients who had not survived, and had some insights into the circumstances of 
their deaths, and the impact it had on their families. To my surprise, however, this issue was not 
raised by the patients. Their talk more often centred on the timing of their death. For them to die 
now, for them to have their futures obliterated, was simply inconceivable, a tragedy. But in 
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contrast to the notion advanced by some commentators, including Schneiderman
962
 and 
Nussbaum
963
 that to identify death as a tragedy represents a failure to recognize one’s mortal 
limits, these patients were neither naive to the idea of death, nor hubristic, as Schneiderman 
suggests.
964
 It was ‘simply’ that death was neither the ‘best’ option for them, nor in the best 
interest of others who depended upon them.  And thus to die, to lose everything that had 
meaning, particularly when the possibility to live was being held out as a choice, would be a 
tragedy.   
The idea that one’s death is a tragedy is perhaps not so ego-centric as it first appears when one 
considers this proposition in the light of the work by the German philosopher, Martin 
Heidegger
965
 who maintained that because the loss created by death is not experienced by the 
person who is dead, but rather by those who remain, our own death should not concern us.
966
 
According to Heidegger, everything about us ceases to be - everything about us that is, except 
the memory of us held by others.
 
It is therefore those left behind who carry the burden of grief,
967
 
and it is because of them that death may reasonably be considered a tragedy. 
For patients in this study, therefore, it was not so much the fear of death that was most influential 
factor in their decision to consent to HSCT, but a desperate desire to remain in their social world.  
It was their sense of the imperative to live that caused them to choose HSCT.  
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This imperative to live, and to avoid death are clearly interdependent and for many patients in the 
study, reflected the social and relational obligations of reciprocity, as well as their emotional and 
psychological needs.
968
  For these patients, life was unfinished, and the prospect of death was 
intolerable. HSCT provided at least the possibility for them to continue their lives and to 
maintain their relationships with others. They perceived therefore, that there was no option but to 
consent to HSCT. 
  
                                                 
968
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Chapter 12, Conclusion  
The aim of this research was to provide, through an analysis of empirical data obtained through 
interviews with those actors most intimately involved in the process of consent, a richer 
understanding of consent to a high risk medical intervention. 
This study has provided an examination of consent beyond the courts, and beyond the policies 
and guidelines promulgated by hospitals, health departments and professional bodies. Through 
prolonged qualitative study of the experiences of patients undergoing HSCT and of those who 
care for them, this study has provided insights into the role that the law plays in day to day 
decision-making in high-risk medical settings. What this study reveals is that the law does not 
figure foremost in the minds of patients or in the minds of the health professionals who care for 
them. Rather it works in the background, providing an unconscious architecture for the 
therapeutic relationship. It does not drive practice or decision-making which, quite rightly, is 
concerned more with care and the achievement of remission and long-term survival. In this sense 
the concepts of consent and the duties to provide information that are generated by the common 
law are negatively focused, in the sense that they say more about what not to do, or what is 
minimally required, rather than how to maximize the best outcomes in the treatment relationship.  
 What this study demonstrated is the importance of relationships.  For many seriously ill patients 
who have limited treatment options, the materiality of risks takes second place to the overriding 
imperative to live. Patients in this study were willing, indeed intent, on taking whatever risks 
were inherent in the proffered treatment, for the chance of a future. That is not to say that the 
information about risks was not material to them – it was simply not the overriding motivator for 
them to consent. The many occasions when information was disclosed to them, afforded 
opportunities to develop their relationship with the transplant physician[s] and the other members 
of the transplant team so that they could gain confidence in their knowledge, experience and 
ability, and specifically to be able to trust in those in whom they were surrendering their future.  
 The thesis also illuminates the importance of the relationship between law and ethics. While 
cursory review of the data from this study might suggest that consent is simply not achievable in 
high-risk medical settings where the choice is between death or a proposed intervention that is, 
itself, life-threatening, this would misconstrue the way that law works and the limits to what it 
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can, and should, do. The law provides a framework within which people can behave -  it is the 
role of ethics to navigate a path towards best practice. The law builds a minimal structure out of 
the legal requirements for consent and creates space for ethics to talk about the best ways to 
approach consent. And ethics, unlike law, can speak about other values which appear to be 
equally important in the relationship between patients and healthcare professionals in high-risk 
medical treatments. These values - of trust, of respect for autonomy, agency and the social 
embeddedness of people’s lives, and of bounded hope, inscribe the decision-making that occurs 
in the context of high-risk medical settings and may ultimately be as important as the legal 
requirements of consent in determining a consent process that maximizes the experience of 
patients. 
 
Limitations of the study 
While the results of this research are compelling, there are, of course, some limitations that 
caution against attempting to generalise the results to all medical interventions, or to all clinical 
contexts. 
One obvious theoretical limitation of this study is the absence of a control or comparison group. 
But whilst it would have been valuable to have been able to capture the role of consent in 
patients electing not to proceed with treatment,
969
  from a practical perspective this would have 
been particularly difficult because, as noted in the Methods chapter, it is extremely rare that a 
patient refuses HSCT once it is proffered.
970
 Furthermore, patients who are potential candidates 
for HSCT but who do not proceed to HSCT will usually have made that decision earlier in their 
disease trajectory, and do not reach the stage of consulting a transplant physician (because they 
are not referred by their private doctor or generalist haematologist).  
A further limitation of the study is the exclusion of patients who had limited command of the 
English language. This exclusion was also acknowledged in the Methods chapter and explained 
by the lack of funding to employ interpreters, and/or translators. Although interpreters would 
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have been available, it is possible that this would have introduced additional challenges during 
the analysis of the data. Nevertheless, this remains an important limitation as inclusion of 
patients who were not fluent in English may have highlighted subsequent difficulties these 
patients might experience, especially related to weighing up of information, and decision-
making.  
The most significant limitation however, is the inclusion of only patients undergoing HSCT, and 
those caring for them. For, while the insights gained from this study may well apply to many 
other high-risk medical interventions, without the inclusion of patients undergoing other high-
risk medical interventions, the findings of this study should only inform our understanding of 
decision-making around HSCT.  
Even though this study does have some limitations, it should be noted that it was much more 
rigorous than many other similar studies in that it included not only a large number of patients 
undergoing HSCT, but also individual patient’s nominated ‘significant other’, as well as 
members of the medical and nursing staff, and other healthcare professionals who were involved 
in the patients’ education, consent, and care. This picture of decision–making surrounding HSCT 
is, therefore, much more likely to capture what occurs in practice and how it is experienced than 
if the account of only one of these groups of informants had been studied. Importantly, the 
numbers in each cohort were sufficient to achieve thematic saturation of the data, and allowed 
for the triangulation of analysis, lending credibility and validity to the results.  
Another major strength of the study is that it was prospective and longitudinal which meant that 
it could not only capture the change in experience and perceptions over time but that it could 
capture reflections on past experiences and past decisions – a process that inevitably occurs in 
life but is rarely captured in research that provides a single snapshot of a lived experience.  
 
Implications and Future Research 
The results of this study reveal that transplant physicians were motivated more by their moral 
and professional obligations to their patients than by any explicit desire to satisfy the so-called 
legal elements of consent – although, not surprisingly, in so doing, their actions were legally as 
well as morally sound, which, arguably, is as it should be. In particular, transplant physicians 
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paid close attention to ensuring that patients knew the risks that lay ahead and understood that 
there was a chance that they could die from the treatment being proposed. A great deal of effort 
was applied to ‘educating’ both the patient and his/her significant other, providing them with 
written materials, inviting them to a ‘meet and greet’ type education day/seminar, enabling 
virtually unencumbered access to the transplant co-ordinators and to other members of the 
transplant team so that patients and their loved ones could discuss any concerns that had about 
the transplant. When asked why they went to such lengths to inform patients and their significant 
others, both the transplant physicians and the other members of the transplant team explained 
their actions in terms of their personal and professional duty to ensure that the patient understood 
the risks. None of them mentioned their legal duties as being a factor.  
This does not suggest, however, that healthcare professionals should not take account of the law 
as it applies to medical practice. Indeed, in order to effectively discharge their duties, all 
healthcare professionals need to be knowledgeable about the relevant law. In this regard it was 
noteworthy that while transplant physicians and other members of the transplant team felt strong 
moral obligations to provide optimal care, many lacked a clear understanding of the legal 
requirements of consent – particularly in relation to information disclosure. This suggests the 
need, not for profound transformation of practice – for legal breached of consent are rare and the 
standard of  medical care is generally very high – but for strategies to encourage further 
reflection on, and re-evaluation of the processes surrounding consent.   
One of the best ways in which the consent process could be enhanced would be to increase 
healthcare professionals’ awareness of both the law and ethics. This could be achieved by 
attending more to these issues at all stages of training
971
 - during undergraduate education, 
during professional training accreditation, and as part of ongoing continuing professional 
development (CPD). This could also be achieved by making discussion about consent part of the 
‘clinical conversation’ in hospitals, for example during clinical meetings and Grand Rounds. 
Over time, this might effect a change in the culture that better recognizes the complexity and the 
importance of the consent process - particularly in high-risk situations. What seems less relevant, 
at least according to my findings, is to rely on institutional policy or Patients’ Charters, as these 
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seem both to misunderstand the complex inter-relational nature of consent, overstate its legal 
nature, abstract it from reality, and miss the point that consent is about respect, trust, creating a 
therapeutic relationship and protecting the patient from undesired outcomes.  
Importantly, while the results of this study revealed substantial confusion (amongst all categories 
of the transplant team, as well as patients) regarding the role, and the legal status of consent 
forms in HSCT, it is not immediately apparent that decision–making around HSCT would be 
improved by the introduction of a formal HSCT Consent Form, as occurs in some other 
countries.
972
 
This then, suggests the need for further research, firstly to better understand how the insights 
from this study apply to other high-risk settings and secondly, to determine what strategies 
would most effectively enhance the process of consent to HSCT. 
While this research has revealed that consent to HSCT is a function of the threat of life-
threatening illness, the promise and perils of complex medical care, the relationships and social 
obligations that inscribe peoples’ lives; and the trust that patients (must) place in their healthcare 
team, it is unclear how much these same influences apply to other high-risk settings. Further 
research, therefore, should examine the experience of consent in other settings, including high-
risk elective surgery, solid organ transplantation, and other high-risk medical interventions. 
While this research could most easily be done with competent adults, it would also be important 
to conduct research in settings where surrogates (parents and guardians) are empowered to make 
decision for others about high-risk medical interventions.  
A second area of future research could focus on what could be done to optimise the processes 
and policies surrounding consent to HSCT. Such research could, for example, specifically 
examine the impact that different approaches to consent and different types of consent forms and 
patient information materials have on the perceived validity of consent, on satisfaction with care, 
and on therapeutic relationships. This research could be particularly valuable as it may provide 
insights that could translate not only to HSCT but to many other high-risk medical contexts.   
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Appendix 1 
History of bone marrow transplantation  
The history of modern bone marrow transplantation has its beginnings around the time of World 
War II, and was founded in concerns about the biological consequences of atomic warfare.
973
 As 
a result, much of the early research into the effects of exposure to ionising radiation was 
conducted under the auspices of various Departments of Defence and was not published until 
many years later.
974
   
Leon Jacobson,
975
 in his extensive studies on the effects of ionizing radiation, had previously 
found that the blood-forming system (haematopoietic system) was amongst the most sensitive 
biological systems to radiation. He demonstrated that mice exposed to radiation in doses 
sufficient to destroy the haematopoietic cells in the bone marrow, did not kill those mice in 
which the spleen (the organ of haematopoiesis in the mouse) was shielded from the direct effects 
of radiation, suggesting that death following exposure to radiation was due, at least in part, to 
failure of the haematopoietic system. Jacobson and colleagues exposed another cohort of mice to 
total body irradiation, but followed this by an intraperitoneal injection of cells derived from the 
spleen, and these mice also survived.  It was reasoned, therefore, that the mice had essentially 
been ‘rescued from death’ (a term that continues to be used in the 21st century when describing 
HSCT) by the re-establishment of haematopoiesis.  
In the meantime, Lorenz et al
976
 had shown that guinea pigs exposed to lethal doses of 
radiotherapy could be kept alive if they were injected/infused with haematopoietic cells taken 
from the bone marrow of a genetically identical littermate. 
                                                 
973
 Teal, G. E., Fabrizio, R. A., Barnes, S. M. & Moeller, W. A. 1965. Training  Requirements For Postattack 
Adaptive Behaviour. Final Report. Other Information: Orig. Receipt Date: 31-DEC-66. 
974
 Gilman, A. G. 1946. Therapeutic applications of chemical warfare agents. Fed Proc, 5, 285-92. 
975
 Jacobson, L. O. 1952. Evidence for a humoral factor (or factors) concerned in recovery from radiation injury: A 
review. Cancer Res 12. 
976
 Lorenz, E., Uphoff, D., Reid, T. & Shelton, E. 1951. Modification of acute irradiation injury in mice and guinea 
pigs by bone marrow injection. Radiology, 58, 863-77. 
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It had been known since the work of Nobel Laureate Alexis Carrel in the early 1900s that cells or 
organs transplanted from one individual (donor) to another (recipient), would be recognised by 
the recipient as being foreign if the pair were not genetically identical, and an attack against the 
foreign matter would be mounted by the recipient’s immune system, essentially rejecting the 
‘graft’, whereas syngeneic transplants i.e. between monozygous twins were not rejected.977 978   
As the immune system became better understood, so too was the requirement for compatibility 
between antigens of the donor and the recipient (histocompatability). Efforts were subsequently 
made to immunologically match donors to recipients who were not genetically identical 
(allogeneic) with significant success. However as Balner, de Vries, and van Bekkum noted,
 979
  
whilst many irradiated-then-infused allogeneic recipients remained free of malignancy, they 
developed severe diarrhoea, weight loss, and skin lesions – a constellation of signs and 
symptoms that they termed ‘secondary disease’, but which is now know as graft-versus-host 
disease. 
This early research had therefore shown that haematopoietic tissue destroyed by irradiation, 
could be replaced and repopulated by infusing a suspension of haematopoietic cells derived from 
a healthy donor. The survival and proliferation of such grafts occurred, not as a consequence of a 
humoral response, as had been postulated by Jacobson,
980
 but as Ford et al identified
981
 because 
[a] the infused cell suspension colonised the vacant spaces in the bone marrow of the recipient, 
taking over the role of producing blood cells  and [b] the body, as a result of the irradiation, 
failed to recognise the infused cells as foreign, and destroy them by the elaboration of antibodies 
produced against them i.e. by an immunogenic response.  
This new knowledge not only had implications for the military, (Ford was funded by the British 
Atomic Energy Research Establishment, and Jacobson by the USA’s Atomic Energy 
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978
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979
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981
 Ford, C., Hamerton, J., Barnes, D. & Loutit, J. 1956. Cytological identification of radiation-chimaeras. . Nature, 
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Commission) but it paved the way for consideration of whether it might be possible to apply the 
knowledge and techniques in a clinical setting, to cure radiosensitive malignant disease in 
humans, including haematological malignancies, by the purposeful destruction of the malignant 
cells of the patient, followed by the infusion of healthy marrow cells.   
However, it was in response to an accident in a nuclear reactor that the efficacy of the newly 
described bone marrow transplantation would first be tested. On October 15 1958, six persons 
were exposed to high doses of neutrons and gamma radiation during an accident at a research 
reactor at Vinca in former Yugoslavia (now known as Serbia and Montenegro). All six 
individuals were flown to the Hôpital Curie in Paris under the care of oncologist Georges Mathé. 
Initially they were treated for severe radiation sickness with transfusions of whole blood, packed 
red blood cells, concentrated platelets, γ-globulin, and antibiotics, but they did not show any 
signs of clinical improvement. On the 27
th
 day after the accident, a suspension of human adult 
bone marrow cells was infused intravenously to five of the six patients (the man not transplanted 
having received a sub-lethal dose of radiation). Each transplanted patient’s condition improved, 
however one of the men died shortly thereafter as a result of radiation damage to the viscera. 
Four of the five transplanted victims survived. 
At a similar time, in the USA, E Donnall Thomas, who, in his research on dogs, had recognised 
the importance of having donor and recipient genetically matched for survival of the recipient, 
began applying his knowledge to human patients. Until now, all attempts to graft bone marrow 
between a healthy human donor and recipient had failed other than between genetically identical 
pairs, that is to say, between monozygous twins.
982
 It was not until 1969, after years of work on 
developing an understanding of, and the means of detecting the effects of immunological 
differences between donor and recipient (histocompatibility) by assays (tissue typing) and 
development of antibiotics that inhibit transplant infections, that Thomas performed the first 
successful allogeneic bone marrow transplant in humans i.e. where donor and recipient were not 
genetically identical.
983
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983
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It should be noted that there were a number of significant differences between the transplants 
performed by Mathé and those by Thomas, including the correlation to [i] the dose of radiation 
and [ii] the matching of donor to recipient, and of course [iii] the intention of treatment. The 
transplants undertaken by Mathé were performed under emergency conditions; exposure to 
radiation had been accidental, the doses of radiation were described as being supra-lethal, lethal 
and sub-lethal, and the donor and recipients had been matched on sex and major blood groups 
only.
984
 In contrast, in Thomas’ patients the doses of radiation they received were controlled, 
based on body mass as elucidated in previous experiments using dogs, and donors had been 
matched to recipients using tissue typing to the level of complexity as was known at the time. 
Additionally, the intention was to cure the underlying haematological malignancy rather than to 
treat the effects of accidental radiation exposure.   
The subsequent development of bone marrow transplantation as a clinical therapy owes much to 
the development of chemotherapy. In the early 1900s, German chemist Paul Ehrlich was 
experimenting using chemicals to treat infectious disease
985
 (it was he who coined the term 
‘chemotherapy’). Prior to Ehrlich’s work, cancer had been treated exclusively with surgery and 
radiotherapy, with low cure rates due, in most part, to the hitherto unknown presence of micro-
metastases.  
The interest in chemotherapy to potentially treat cancer had come about from knowledge gleaned 
from the use of chemical warfare and specifically the use of mustard gas in World War I. The 
initial studies done in 1943 but not published until much later,
986
 revealed that soldiers who had 
come into contact with mustard gas had shown signs of injury to their haematopoietic system – 
they bled both internally and externally and were highly susceptible to infections. It was later 
observed that men who were exposed to mustard gas during World War II had significant 
depletion of bone marrow; the resultant low platelet numbers were responsible for the bleeding 
noted in the WWI victims, and the reduced number of circulating white blood cells and hence 
immuno-suppression was rendering them susceptible to infections and other diseases. It was 
reasoned that if chemicals could affect rapidly growing blood cells like white cells, then they 
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might also affect rapidly growing malignant cells.
987
 Consequently, nitrogen mustard was used to 
treat patients with lymphoma, often with some initial success although remissions turned out to 
be brief and incomplete, leading many researchers to believe that cancer was not curable by 
drugs.   
Progress in understanding the roles of both radiotherapy and chemotherapy in treating tumours 
advanced significantly during the following decades. Research in the 1960s
988
 showed that the 
ability of these agents to kill tumour cells was directly related to the doses given to the patient - 
the higher the dose, the better the ‘kill rate’ – leading to emphasis on intensifying doses of 
radiation and/or chemotherapy in the hope of reducing relapses. However, higher doses resulted 
in greater toxicity to normal tissue, in particular the gastrointestinal tract, the renal, hepatic, 
pulmonary, liver and cardiac systems, causing much of the mortality and morbidity associated 
with HSCT.
 989
 
Since the 1990s, emphasis has shifted again – this time to strategies for reducing the toxic effects 
of radiation and/or chemotherapy (known as ‘reduced intensity conditioning’, or RIC), to 
improving supportive care for HSCT recipients and to maintaining and extending the benefit that 
HSCT provides to persons with life-threatening disease.  
Now in the 21
st
 century HSCT has become a standard treatment for a wide variety of indications 
including both haematological and some non-haematological disorders, although it remains a 
high risk medical intervention in which its potential to increase a patient’s disease free survival 
needs to be counterbalanced with its potential to cause mortality and significant morbidity.  
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Appendix 2  
Ethics Clearance from  
1. University of Sydney 
2. Sydney West Area Health Service 
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Appendix 3  
Information Sheets and Consent Forms for  
1. Patient/participants pp 2-9 
2. Significant others pp 10-18 
3. Relevant health care professionals/ members of the transplant team pp 19-25 
4. Transplant physicians pp 26-32 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
Chief Investigator:     
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital  
Co-Researcher(s)  
Associate Professor Cameron Stewart – Division of Law, Macquarie University 
Associate Professor Anthony Dodds - Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, St Vincent’s Hospital 
Dr Christopher Jordens – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Dr Stacy Carter – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Ms Camilla Scanlan – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
You are invited to take part in a research study into the experience of people undergoing bone 
marrow transplant (BMT). The study seeks to identify what factors are important to people in 
deciding to go ahead with a bone marrow transplant.  
The aim of this study is to identify ways of helping future patients who are considering 
undergoing BMT. 
The study is being undertaken by Camilla Scanlan, as part of a Doctor of Philosophy in 
Medicine project, through the University of Sydney, under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Ian Kerridge. 
 
Who will be invited to enter the study? 
People who have consented to undergo a bone marrow transplant will be invited to enter the 
study.  
 
You will have the opportunity to nominate one person who you consider is close to you, for 
example your spouse or partner or carer. If you agree, we would like to interview that person to 
ask what they thought was important to you in your decision to have the BMT..  
 
Members of the transplant team, including the transplant specialists, BMT nursing staff and 
other relevant allied healthcare professionals will also be invited to participate in the study to talk 
about their experiences with bone marrow transplantation. (At no stage will they be discussing 
any particular patient(s) by name or any other means of identification.) 
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What will happen on the study? 
Should you agree to contribute in this study, you will be asked to participate in 2 
interviews/discussions with one of our researchers. The first interview/discussion would be 
shortly after you are admitted to the ward, but before your transplant. The second 
interview/discussion would be at 3-6 months after your transplant when you return to Westmead 
Hospital for follow-up. In both these interviews/discussions, which will be held in a private room 
at Westmead Hospital and will probably take around an hour, you will be invited to discuss what 
factors were important to you in your decision to undergo the transplant. With your permission, 
these interviews/discussions will be recorded and later written down to be analysed. 
 
In addition, with your permission, the researcher will check your medical file to compare the 
forms you have signed with the procedures you have undergone. 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood all 6 pages of this Participant Information Sheet & Consent 
Form. 
 
Patient Name: ___________________  Patient Signature :___________________   
Date Signed :__________ 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
If you agree that we may interview your spouse, partner, or carer, we will provide you with a 
Research Package to give to that person. Only if that person returns a signed Consent Form to 
the researcher, will the interview take place. We will refer to that person as a ‘significant other’. 
 
Are there any risks? 
We do not think there are any risks associated with the study. However, it is possible that you 
may find that some aspects of the conversation might cause you some distress. If this is the 
case we will put you in contact with a trained counsellor at the hospital and you will be able to 
speak to him or her at no cost to you.  
 
Are there any benefits? 
There will be no direct benefits to you as a result of taking part in the study.  
 
Confidentiality 
All aspects of this study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers 
and the hospital ethics committee will have access to your personal information. You will be 
issued with a pseudonym – a false or “pen name”  – so that your real identity remains 
confidential. Should you nominate a ‘significant other’  who subsequently consents to be 
interviewed, that person will also be issued with a  pseudonym.  Any publication of the results 
from this study will only use information that does not identify you, for example by the use of the 
pseudonym(s).  
 
The digitally recorded interview/discussion that we conduct with you and the written copy of the 
interview/discussion, will be identified only by the pseudonym. A master list linking the 
pseudonyms to named participants will be stored separately from the data for the duration of the 
project. After the project is completed and written up for publication, the master list will be 
destroyed.  
 
Digitally recorded interviews will be downloaded on computers and stored in password-
protected computer files, and transcripts of interviews will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in 
the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine at the University of Sydney. Only 
members of the research team working on the project will have access to the computer files and 
the filing cabinet. The computer files will be kept for 12 months for analysis, then the data will be 
transferred to DVD at which time the computer files will be destroyed by erasure from computer 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
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hard disks. DVDs will be stored in a locked cabinet for a period of seven years in case of any 
challenge to the study findings. After this time, DVDs will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen at the conclusion of the study? 
At the conclusion of the study the results will be written up in a thesis and a series of papers will 
be submitted to academic journals.  The findings of the project will be translated into a series of 
outcomes tailored to specific groups, including: 
 a series of professionally-designed information sheets addressing consent issues in 
transplantation 
 educational materials for health professionals. 
 
Do you have a choice? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. There is no pressure on you to take part if 
you do not want to do so.  If you choose not to join the study, or if you wish to withdraw from it at 
any time, your medical care will not be affected. 
 
Complaints 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of the study, or your rights as a study participant, 
you may contact 
Westmead Hospital Patient Representative, Ms Jillian Gwynne Lewis,  
Telephone No 9845 7014 or email  jillian_lewis@wsahs.nsw.gov.au 
 
Contact details 
If you would like to take part in the study, or have any questions, please contact  
 Ms Camilla Scanlan   (research scholar and interviewer) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3416 
Telephone after hours 0413 963 738 
 Email: camilla@med.usyd.edu.au 
or 
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge  (Chief Investigator) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3405 
Telephone after hours – 9845 9165 
Email: kerridge@med.usyd.edu.au 
 This information sheet is for you to keep.  
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PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT FORM – page 1 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
Chief Investigator:     
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital  
 
1. I understand that the researcher will conduct this study in a manner conforming with ethical 
and scientific principles set out by the National Health and Medical Research Council of 
Australia and the Good Clinical Research Practice Guidelines of the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration. 
 
2. I acknowledge that I have read, or have had read to me the Participant Information Sheet 
relating to this study.   I acknowledge that I understand the Participant Information Sheet.  I 
acknowledge that the general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and 
inconveniences which may occur to me during the study have been explained to me by 
…………………………………………….. (“the researcher”) and I acknowledge that I 
understand the general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and 
inconveniences which may occur during the study. 
 
3. I acknowledge that I have been given time to consider the information and to seek other 
advice. 
 
4. I acknowledge that refusal to take part in this study will not affect the usual treatment of my 
condition. 
 
5. I acknowledge that I am volunteering to take part in this study and I may withdraw at any 
time. 
 
6. I acknowledge that this research has been approved by the Sydney West Area Health 
Service Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
7. I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this form and the Participant Information 
Sheet, which I have signed. 
 
8. I acknowledge that regulatory authorities may have access to my medical records to monitor 
the research in which I am agreeing to participate.  However, I understand my identity will 
not be disclosed to anyone else or in publications or presentations. 
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PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT FORM page 2 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
Chief Investigator:    
 Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital 
 
Name of participant       Date of Birth  
 
Address of participant   
 
Signature of participant                     Date:  
 
Signature of researcher ______________________________________   Date: ____________________ 
 
Signature of witness ________________________________________ Date:_____ __ 
 
WITNESS: 
I, ____________________________________________________     (name of witness)  
 
of _______________________________________________________   hereby certify as follows: 
 
I was present when _________________________________________ (“the participant”) appeared 
to read or had read to him / her a document entitled Participant Information Sheet;  
or  
I was told by _______________________________ (“the participant”) that he/she had read a 
document entitled Participant Information Sheet  (*Delete as applicable) 
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I was present when _________________________ (“the researcher”) explained the general 
purposes, methods, demands and the possible risks and inconveniences of participating in the 
study to the participant.  I asked the participant whether he/she had understood the Participant 
Information Sheet and understood what he/she had been told and he/she told me that he/she did 
understand. 
 
I observed the participant sign the consent to participate in research and he/she appeared to me 
to be signing the document freely and without duress. 
 
The participant showed me a form of identification which satisfied me as to his/her identity. 
 
I am not involved in any way as a researcher in this project. 
 
 
Name of witness    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Address    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of  witness    ___________________________________     Date:  
_________________________ 
 
Relationship to participant    
______________________________________________________________ 
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“SIGNIFICANT OTHER” RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
Chief Investigator:     
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital  
Co-Researcher(s)  
Associate Professor Cameron Stewart – Division of Law, Macquarie University 
Associate Professor Anthony Dodds - Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, St Vincent’s Hospital 
Dr Christopher Jordens – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Dr Stacy Carter – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Ms Camilla Scanlan – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
What is the purpose of the study? 
You are invited to take part in a research study into the experience of people undergoing bone 
marrow transplant (BMT). The study seeks to identify what factors are important to people in 
deciding to go ahead with a bone marrow transplant.  
The aim of this study is to identify ways of helping future patients who are considering 
undergoing allo-BMT. 
The study is being undertaken by Camilla Scanlan, as part of a Doctor of Philosophy in 
Medicine project, through the University of Sydney, under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Ian Kerridge. 
Who will be invited to enter the study? 
People who have consented to undergo a bone marrow transplant will be invited to enter the 
study.  
You are being invited to participate because you have been nominated by your 
spouse/partner/family member/friend because they feel that you are close to them and may 
have some thoughts about the decision to undergo the BMT. The patient, your 
spouse/partner/family member/friend has specifically given approval for us to discuss with you  
his/her illness and issues surrounding his/her decision to undergo the BMT. If you agree, we 
would like to interview you to ask your opinion of what issues were important to the patient in 
his/her decision-making. 
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Members of the transplant team, including the transplant specialists, BMT nursing staff and 
other relevant allied healthcare professionals will also be invited to participate in the study to talk 
about their experiences with bone marrow transplantation. (At no stage will they be discussing 
any particular patient(s) by name or any other means of identification.) 
 
.What will happen on the study? 
Should you agree to contribute in this study, you will be asked to participate in one 
interview/discussion with one of our researchers. The interview/discussion will be held at a 
location agreed upon by yourself and the researcher, and will probably take around an hour.  
You will be invited to discuss what factors you thought were important to the patient in his/her 
decision to undergo the transplant. With your permission, these interviews/discussions will be 
recorded and later written down to be analysed. 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood all 5 pages of this Participant Information Sheet & Consent 
Form. 
 
Significant Other’s Name: ___________________ Significant Other’s Signature 
 
 Date Signed :__________ 
Are there any risks? 
We do not think there are any risks associated with the study. However, it is possible that you 
may find that some aspects of the conversation might cause you some distress. If this is the 
case we will put you in contact with a trained counsellor at Westmead Hospital and you will be 
able to speak to him or her at no cost to you.  
 
Are there any benefits? 
There will be no direct benefits to you as a result of taking part in the study.  
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Confidentiality 
All aspects of this study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers 
and the hospital ethics committee will have access to your personal details. You will be issued 
with a pseudonym – a false or “pen name”  – so that your real identity remains confidential.   
Any publication of the results from this study will only use information that does not identify 
you, for example by the use of the pseudonym.  
 
The digitally recorded interview/discussion that we conduct with you and the written copy of the 
interview/discussion, will be identified only by the pseudonym. A master list linking the 
pseudonyms to named participants will be stored separately from the data for the duration of the 
project. After the project is completed and written up for publication, the master list will be 
destroyed.  
 
Digitally recorded interviews will be downloaded on computers and stored in password-
protected computer files, and transcripts of interviews will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in 
the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine at the University of Sydney. Only 
members of the research team working on the project will have access to the computer files and 
the filing cabinet. The computer files will be kept for 12 months for analysis, then the data will be 
transferred to DVD at which time the computer files will be destroyed by erasure from computer 
hard disks. DVDs will be stored in a locked cabinet for a period of seven years in case of any 
challenge to the study findings. After this time, DVDs will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen at the conclusion of the study? 
At the conclusion of the study the results will be written up in a thesis and a series of papers will 
be submitted to academic journals.  The findings of the project will be translated into a series of 
outcomes tailored to specific groups, including: 
 a series of professionally-designed information sheets addressing consent issues in 
transplantation 
 educational materials for health professionals. 
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“SIGNIFICANT OTHER” RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
 
 
Do you have a choice? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. There is no pressure on you to take part if 
you do not want to do so.  If you choose not to join the study, or if you wish to withdraw from it at 
any time,  the patient’s  medical care will not be affected. 
 
Complaints 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of the study, or your rights as a study participant, 
you may contact 
Westmead Hospital Patient Representative, Ms Jillian Gwynne Lewis,  
Telephone No 9845 7014 or email  jillian_lewis@wsahs.nsw.gov.au 
 
 
What you need to do if you would like to take part in the study. 
There are a number of ways in which you can indicate your agreement to participate in the study; 
1. you may telephone Ms Camilla Scanlan (contact details below) 
2. you may contact Professor Kerridge on the ward at Westmead Hospital 
3. you may complete and sign the attached Consent Form. Have someone witness your signature 
(anyone who knows you will do) and sign as the witness, then mail the completed Consent Form 
to Ms Camilla Scanlan using the attached stamped, addressed envelope. 
Thank you. 
 
 
Contact details 
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If you would like to take part in the study, or have any questions, please contact  
 
 Ms Camilla Scanlan   (research scholar) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3416 
Telephone after hours 0413 963 738 
 Email: camilla@med.usyd.edu.au 
 
or 
 
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge  (Chief Investigator) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3405 
Telephone after hours – 9845 9165 
Email: kerridge@med.usyd.edu.au 
  
 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep.  
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“SIGNIFICANT OTHER”  CONSENT FORM – page 1 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
 
Chief Investigator:     
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital  
 
 
I understand that the researcher will conduct this study in a manner conforming with ethical and scientific 
principles set out by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia and the Good Clinical 
Research Practice Guidelines of the Therapeutic Goods Administration. 
 
I acknowledge that I have read, or have had read to me the Significant Other Research Information Sheet 
relating to this study.   I acknowledge that I understand the Significant Other Research Information Sheet.  
I acknowledge that the general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and inconveniences 
which may occur to me during the study have been explained to me by  …………….……….   (“the 
researcher”) and I acknowledge that I understand the general purposes, methods, demands and possible 
risks and inconveniences which may occur during the study. 
 
I acknowledge that I have been given time to consider the information and to seek other advice. 
 
I acknowledge that refusal to take part in this study will not affect the usual treatment of the patient. 
 
I acknowledge that I am volunteering to take part in this study and I may withdraw at any time. 
 
I acknowledge that this research has been approved by the Sydney West Area Health Service Human 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this form and the Significant Other Research Information 
Sheet, which I have signed. 
 
I understand my identity will not be disclosed to anyone else or in publications or presentations.   
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“SIGNIFICANT OTHER”   CONSENT FORM page 2 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
 
Chief Investigator:    
 Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital 
 
 
Name of Significant Other ______________________________________   Date of Birth  
Address of Significant Other  
_______________________________________________________________ 
Signature of Significant Other ______________________________________  
 Date: ___________________   
 
 
Signature of researcher ______________________________________ 
   Date: ____________________ 
Signature of witness ________________________________________  
Date:________________________ 
 
WITNESS: 
I, ____________________________________________________     (name of witness)  
 
of _______________________________________________________   hereby certify as follows: 
 
1. I was present when _________________________________________ (“the significant other”) 
appeared  to read or had read to him / her a document entitled Significant Other Research 
Information Sheet; or  
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I was told by _______________________________ (“the significant other”) that he/she had read a 
document entitled Significant Other Research Information Sheet (*Delete as applicable) 
 
2. I was present when  …………………………  (“the researcher”) explained the general purposes, 
methods, demands and the possible risks and inconveniences of participating in the study to the 
participant.  I asked the participant whether he/she had understood the Significant Other Research 
Information Sheet and understood what he/she had been told and he/she told me that he/she did 
understand. 
 
3. I observed the participant sign the consent to participate in research and he/she appeared to me to 
be signing the document freely and without duress. 
 
4. The participant showed me a form of identification which satisfied me as to his/her identity. 
 
5. I am not involved in any way as a researcher in this project. 
 
 
Name of witness    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Address    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of  witness    ___________________________________     
 Date:  _________________________ 
 
Relationship to patient    ____________________________________________________________ 
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ALLIED HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS AS PARTICIPANTS  
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
Chief Investigator:     
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital  
Co-Researcher(s)  
Associate Professor Cameron Stewart – Division of Law, Macquarie University 
Associate Professor Anthony Dodds - Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, St Vincent’s Hospital 
Dr Christopher Jordens – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Dr Stacy Carter – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Ms Camilla Scanlan – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This project is a 3-year study of consent to high-risk medical procedures. It will re-examine 
consent to high-risk medical procedures through a critical appraisal of its principles and 
practices. 
Even though the concept of consent is widely accepted, the concept is neither clear nor distinct; 
understanding of it’s practical application in clinical practice (particularly in the context of serious 
illness) is imperfect, and there are many and conflicting views of its nature and its procedures.  
In recent years concerns have been raised about how attainable each element of consent (viz 
capacity, voluntariness, specificity, disclosure) is in the context of serious illness and therefore 
how “realistic” the requirement of consent is in practice. A review of the literature suggests that 
there are a number of potential problems with the concept and practical application of consent in 
the medical setting. 
Research Questions include 
1. How do patients and relevant healthcare professionals describe the consent process in 
relation to bone marrow transplantation? 
2. Do the commonly described elements of consent (i.e. capacity, voluntariness, specificity 
and disclosure) feature in these descriptions? 
3. Are there aspects of these descriptions that are not covered by the commonly described 
elements of consent, e.g. regret, vulnerability, trust, responsibility, or other aspects of the 
patients’ circumstances or relationships with healthcare professionals and others? 
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4. What are the implications of this research for legal doctrine, ethical principles and 
institutional processes relating to consent for bone marrow transplant and other high-risk 
medical procedures? 
The study is being undertaken by Camilla Scanlan as part of a Doctor of Philosophy in Medicine 
project, through the University of Sydney, under the supervision of A/Professor Ian Kerridge. 
 
Who will be invited to enter the study? 
You have been invited to enter this study because you are an allied healthcare professional 
caring for patients who have consented to undergo an allo-BMT. 
 
What will happen on the study? 
If you agree to take part in the study, the researcher will arrange a time and place that suits you 
for an interview, which will take about an hour. With your approval, the interview will be 
recorded, transcribed, and analysed. The interview will be conducted by Camilla Scanlan, the 
PhD scholar, or by Margaret Boulos, Research Assistant involved in the study.  
 
 Without identifying individual patients, you will be asked to:  
1. describe a “typical”, unproblematic transplant case  
2. describe a transplant case that raised concerns for you about consent  
3. describe contrasting cases that illustrate the extremes of the elements of consent (e.g. 
cases involving the most and the least vulnerable patients, those who needed more or 
less information to make a decision etc.) 
4. critically reflect on the consent process, and whether there are important issues not 
reflected in established elements of consent.  
Are there any risks? 
We do not think there are any risks associated with the study to you.   
 
Are there any benefits? 
There will be no direct benefits to you as a result of taking part in the study. 
 
Confidentiality 
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All aspects of this study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers 
and the hospital ethics committee will have access to your personal information.  
The digitally recorded interview and transcript of the interview that we conduct with you will be 
identified only by a number. A master list linking numbered texts to named informants will be 
stored separately from the data for the duration of the project. After the project is completed and 
written up for publication, the master list will be destroyed.  
Digitally recorded interviews will be downloaded on computers and stored in password-
protected computer files, and transcripts of interviews will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in 
the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine at the University of Sydney. Only 
members of the research team working on the project will have access to the computer files and 
the filing cabinet. The computer files will be kept for 12 months for analysis, then the data will be 
transferred to DVD at which time the computer files will be destroyed by erasure from computer 
hard disks. DVDs will be stored in a locked cabinet for a period of seven years in case of any 
challenge to the study findings. After this time, DVDs will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen at the conclusion of the study? 
At the conclusion of the study the results will be written up in a thesis and a series of papers will 
be submitted to academic journals.  The findings of the project will be translated into a series of 
outcomes tailored to specific groups, including: 
 a series of professionally-designed information sheets addressing consent issues in 
transplantation 
 educational materials for health professionals. 
 
 
Do you have a choice? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  You may choose not to join the study, or 
you may wish to withdraw from it at any time. 
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Complaints 
 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of the study, or your rights as a study participant, 
you may contact 
The Secretary, SWAHS Human Research Ethics Committee 
Telephone 9845 8183, Fax 9845 8352 or  
Email researchoffice@westgate.wh.usyd.edu.au 
 
 
Contact details 
 
If you would like to take part in the study, or have any questions, please contact  
 
 Ms Camilla Scanlan   (Interviewer and research scholar) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3416 
Telephone after hours 0413 963 738 
 Email: camilla@med.usyd.edu.au 
 
or 
 
 Associate Professor Ian Kerridge  (Chief Investigator) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3405 
Telephone after hours – 9845 9165 
Email: kerridge@med.usyd.edu.au 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep.  
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ALLIED HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS AS PARTICIPANTS 
Consent Form – page 1 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
 
 
I understand that the researcher will conduct this study in a manner conforming with ethical and 
scientific principles set out by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia 
and the Good Clinical Research Practice Guidelines of the Therapeutic Goods Administration. 
 
I acknowledge that I have read, or have had read to me the Allied Healthcare Professionals as 
Participants’ Information Sheet relating to this study.   I acknowledge that I understand the Allied 
Healthcare Professionals as Participants Information Sheet.  I acknowledge that the general 
purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and inconveniences which may occur to me 
during the study have been explained to me by ……………………. (“the researcher”) 
and I, acknowledge that I understand the general purposes, methods, demands and possible 
risks and inconveniences which may occur during the study. 
 
I acknowledge that I have been given time to consider the information and to seek other advice. 
 
I acknowledge that refusal to take part in this study will not affect my employment. 
 
I acknowledge that I am volunteering to take part in this study and I may withdraw at any time. 
 
I acknowledge that this research has been approved by the Sydney West Area Health Service Human 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this form and the Allied Healthcare Professionals as 
Participants’ Information Sheet, which I have signed. 
 
I understand that my identity will not be disclosed to anyone else or in publications or presentations.   
 
Before signing, please read ‘IMPORTANT NOTE’ following. 
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Name of participant ____________________________________________________________  
 
Hospital of participant 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of participant _____________________________Date:  
 
Signature of researcher ____________________________ Date:  
 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE 
This consent should only be signed by the participant personally 
 
 
. 
WITNESS: 
 
I, ____________________________________________________     (name of  witness)  
 
of _______________________________________________________   hereby certify as 
follows: 
 
6. I was present when _________________________________________ (“the participant”) 
appeared to read or had read to him / her a document entitled Allied Healthcare 
Professionals as Participants’ Information Sheet; or  I was told by 
_______________________________ (“the participant”) that he/she had read a  document 
entitled Allied Healthcare Professionals as Participant Information Sheet  (*Delete as 
applicable) 
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7. I observed the participant sign the consent to participate in research and he/she appeared to 
me to be signing the document freely and without duress. 
 
8. The participant showed me a form of identification which satisfied me as to his/her identity. 
 
9. I am not involved in any way as a researcher in this project.  
 
 
 
Name of witness    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Address    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature of  witness    ___________________________________     Date:  
_________________________ 
 
 
Relationship to participant    
______________________________________________________________ 
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PHYSICIANS AS PARTICIPANTS – INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
Chief Investigator:     
Associate Professor Ian Kerridge, Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, Westmead 
Hospital  
Co-Researcher(s)  
Associate Professor Cameron Stewart – Law School, University of Sydney 
Associate Professor Anthony Dodds - Haematology/Bone Marrow Transplant Unit, St Vincent’s Hospital 
Dr Christopher Jordens – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Dr Stacy Carter – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
Ms Camilla Scanlan – Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This project is a 3-year study of consent to high-risk medical procedures. It will re-examine 
consent to high-risk medical procedures through a critical appraisal of its principles and 
practices. 
Even though the concept of consent is widely accepted, the concept is neither clear nor distinct; 
understanding of it’s practical application in clinical practice (particularly in the context of serious 
illness) is imperfect, and there are many and conflicting views of its nature and its procedures.  
In recent years concerns have been raised about how attainable each element of consent (viz 
capacity, voluntariness, specificity, disclosure) is in the context of serious illness and therefore 
how “realistic” the requirement of consent is in practice. A review of the literature suggests that 
there are a number of potential problems with the concept and practical application of consent in 
the medical setting. 
Research Questions include 
 How do patients and relevant healthcare professionals describe the consent process in 
relation to bone marrow transplantation? 
 Do the commonly described elements of consent (i.e. capacity, voluntariness, specificity 
and disclosure) feature in these descriptions? 
 Are there aspects of these descriptions that are not covered by the commonly described 
elements of consent, e.g. regret, vulnerability, trust, responsibility, or other aspects of 
the patients’ circumstances or relationships with healthcare professionals and others? 
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 What are the implications of this research for legal doctrine, ethical principles and 
institutional processes relating to consent for bone marrow transplantation and other 
high-risk medical procedures? 
The study is being undertaken by Camilla Scanlan as part of a Doctor of Philosophy in 
Medicine project, through the University of Sydney, under the supervision of A/Professor Ian 
Kerridge. 
 
Who will be invited to enter the study? 
You have been invited to enter this study because you are a transplant physician treating 
patients who have consented to undergo allo-BMT. 
 
What will happen on the study? 
If you agree to take part in the study, the researcher will arrange a time and place that suits you 
for an interview, which will take about an hour. With your approval, the interview will be 
recorded, transcribed, and analysed. The interview will be held conducted by Camilla Scanlan, 
the PhD scholar involved in the study.  
 
Without identifying individual patients, you will be asked to:  
1. describe a “typical”, unproblematic transplant case  
2. describe a transplant case that raised concerns for you about consent  
3. describe contrasting cases that illustrate the extremes of the elements of consent (e.g. 
cases involving the most and the least vulnerable patients, those who needed more or 
less information to make a decision etc.) 
4. critically reflect on the consent process, and whether there are important issues not 
reflected in established elements of consent.  
Are there any risks? 
We do not think there are any risks associated with the study to you.   
 
Are there any benefits? 
There will be no direct benefits to you as a result of taking part in the study. 
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Confidentiality 
All aspects of this study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers 
and the hospital ethics committee will have access to your personal information.  
The digitally recorded interview and transcript of the interview that we conduct with you will be 
identified only by a number. A master list linking numbered texts to named informants will be 
stored separately from the data for the duration of the project. After the project is completed and 
written up for publication, the master list will be destroyed.  
Digitally recorded interviews will be downloaded on computers and stored in password-
protected computer files, and transcripts of interviews will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in 
the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine at the University of Sydney. Only 
members of the research team working on the project will have access to the computer files and 
the filing cabinet. The computer files will be kept for 12 months for analysis, then the data will be 
transferred to DVD at which time the computer files will be destroyed by erasure from computer 
hard disks. DVDs will be stored in a locked cabinet for a period of seven years in case of any 
challenge to the study findings. After this time, DVDs will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen at the conclusion of the study? 
At the conclusion of the study the results will be written up in a thesis and a series of papers will 
be submitted to academic journals.  The findings of the project will be translated into a series of 
outcomes tailored to specific groups, including: 
 a series of professionally-designed information sheets addressing consent issues in 
transplantation 
 educational materials for health professionals. 
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Do you have a choice? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  You may choose not to join the study, or 
you may wish to withdraw from it at any time. 
 
Complaints 
 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of the study, or your rights as a study participant, 
you may contact 
The Secretary, SWAHS Human Research Ethics Committee 
Telephone 9845 8183, Fax 9845 8325 or  
Email researchoffice@westgate.wh.usyd.edu.au 
 
Contact details 
If you would like to take part in the study, or have any questions, please contact  
 
 Ms Camilla Scanlan   (Interviewer and research scholar) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3416 
Telephone after hours 0413 963 738 
 Email: camilla@med.usyd.edu.au 
or 
 Associate Professor Ian Kerridge  (Chief Investigator) 
Telephone during business hours – 9036 3405 
Telephone after hours – 9845 9165 
Email: kerridge@med.usyd.edu.au 
 
 This information sheet is for you to keep.  
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PHYSICIANS AS PARTICIPANTS - – Consent Form  - page 1 
 
Short Title: A critical analysis of consent in bone marrow transplantation  
  
 
I understand that the researcher will conduct this study in a manner conforming with ethical and 
scientific principles set out by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia 
and the Good Clinical Research Practice Guidelines of the Therapeutic Goods Administration. 
 
I acknowledge that I have read, or have had read to me the Physicians as Participants 
Information Sheet relating to this study. I acknowledge that I understand the Physicians as 
Participants Information Sheet.  I acknowledge that the general purposes, methods, demands 
and possible risks and inconveniences which may occur to me during the study have been 
explained to me by Camilla Scanlan  (“the researcher”) and I, acknowledge that I understand the 
general purposes, methods, demands and possible risks and inconveniences which may occur 
during the study. 
 
I acknowledge that I have been given time to consider the information and to seek other advice. 
 
I acknowledge that refusal to take part in this study will not affect my employment. 
 
I acknowledge that I am volunteering to take part in this study and I may withdraw at any time. 
 
I acknowledge that this research has been approved by the Sydney West Area Health Service Human 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this form and the Physicians as Participants Information 
Sheet. 
 
I understand that my identity will not be disclosed to anyone else or in publications or presentations.   
 
Before signing, please read ‘IMPORTANT NOTE’ following. 
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Name of participant ___________________________________________________  
 
Hospital of participant  _________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of participant _____________________________Date: _______________ 
 
Signature of researcher ____________________________ Date: _____________ 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE 
This consent should only be signed by the participant personally. 
 
WITNESS: 
 
I, ____________________________________________________     (name of  witness)  
 
of _______________________________________________________   hereby certify as 
follows: 
 
I was present when _________________________________________ (“the participant”) 
appeared to read or had read to him/her a document entitled the Physicians as Participants’ 
Information Sheet;  
or 
or I was told by _______________________________ (“the participant”) that he/she 
had read a  document entitled Participant Information Sheet  (*Delete as applicable) 
or 
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I was present when   Camilla Scanlan   (“the researcher”) explained the general purposes, 
methods, demands and the possible risks and inconveniences of participating in the 
study to the participant.  I asked the participant whether he/she had understood the 
Physicians as Participants’ Information Sheet and understood what he/she had been 
told and he/she told me that he/she did understand. 
 
I observed the participant sign the consent to participate in research and he/she 
appeared to me to be signing the document freely and without duress. 
 
The participant showed me a form of identification which satisfied me as to his/her 
identity. 
 
I am not involved in any way as a researcher in this project. 
 
 
 
Name of witness    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Address    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature of  witness    ___________________________________     Date:  
_________________________ 
 
Relationship to participant    
______________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 4  
Interview schedule for  
1. Patient/participants 
2. Relevant health care professionals/ members of the transplant team including 
transplant physicians 
3. Significant others 
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